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
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
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
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NUMBER I.

ART. I.—A DESIGNATION OF THE FIGURES OF ISAIAH,
CHAPTER II.

BY THE EDITOR.

THIS prophecy relates, it is expressly announced in the introduction, to Judah and Jerusalem. "The word"—or vision—"which Isaiah saw concerning Judah and Jerusalem," v. 1. Some commentators, however, as Le Clerc, and Professor Alexander, regard the Christian church as the subject of the prediction in the second verse, "and it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it." "This," Le Clerc says, "is not to be understood literally of the mount of the temple, but of the Christian church, which, as we know, has drawn to itself from the era of Constantine to the present time, so large a share of the cultivated nations, that it has greatly surpassed all other religious societies." And Professor Alexander: "In this verse the prophet sees the church permanently placed in a conspicuous position, so as to be a source of attraction to surrounding nations." This construction proceeds on the

assumption that the passage is symbolical, and that the mount of the Lord's house is used as the representative of the Christian church; as there is no figure by which it can acquire that meaning. It is not, however, symbolical. First. It has none of the marks that distinguish symbols from the other media of prediction. The agents were not seen exerting the actions ascribed to them, nor did that which is affirmed of the mount of the Lord's house, literally take place in the presence of the prophet. The events are not represented as having occurred under his observation, but are exhibited as future; and their period is defined as "in the last days." But, in symbolical prophecies, the representative agents, objects, and events, are always described in the past or present tense, and as having been beheld by the prophet. Next. That construction is inconsistent with the subject of the vision as announced in the title. It concerns "Judah and Jerusalem," not, in contradistinction from them, the Christian church. Thirdly. It is inconsistent with the other parts of the vision. If the mount of the Lord's house denotes the Christian church, then the Zion and Jerusalem of the third verse, and of chap. iii. 1, 8, 16, 17, iv. 3-5, and Micah iii. 10-12, iv. 2, also, and all the objects named in connexion with them, must, for the same reason, be taken as symbols of the church, which is impossible. What can the bravery of tinkling ornaments, and cauls, and round tires like the moon, and bracelets, and mufflers, and crisping pins, and other articles worn by the daughters of Zion, symbolize? What condition of the church can be denoted by Zion's being ploughed as a field, and Jerusalem's becoming heaps? And, finally, that assumption is confuted by the meaning which it ascribes to the passage. If the mount of the Lord's house is a symbol of the Christian church, then the other mountains on the heights of which it is to be established, and the hills above which it is to be exalted, must also be symbols of churches; and the prediction is that the Lord's church is to be established on the great churches, and exalted above the small ones, and all nations are to flow unto it; which is absurd and impossible. The mount of the Lord's house, therefore, is the subject of the prediction; and Jerusalem,

the scene in which the events foreshown in it, are to take place.

Other commentators, as Calvin, Cocceius, Vitranga, and Hengstenberg, who regard the mount of the Lord's house as the subject of the prophecy, and Jerusalem, as the scene in which it is to be verified, assume that the prediction itself is metaphorical, and denotes a clearer and more conspicuous manifestation there of God's presence and glory. But that is equally mistaken. Had the prediction been metaphorical, the things affirmed of the mount would have been such as could not literally come to pass: as when Christ employs a metaphor in foretelling the reward that shall be bestowed on him that overcomes,—“he shall be a pillar in the temple of God;”—that which is promised, cannot be literally accomplished, inasmuch as it is impossible to be at once a glorified saint, and a brazen or marble pillar. But there is nothing of that incompatibility between the subject and predicate of this prediction. It is perfectly consistent with the nature of Mount Zion, that it should be restored from its ruinous state, and made the fixed site of the Lord's house, that it should be higher than the neighboring hills, and that the nations should flow unto it.

1. The first figure of the chapter is a metaphor, in the word flow: “And all nations shall flow unto it.” Nations cannot flow in the same manner as a river runs. The expression is used to denote that as a river glides in a perpetual current to the point where it enters the sea; so the nations are to go in a continuous line, as it were, or in great numbers, habitually, to the mount of the Lord's house.

2. 3. The next are hypocatastases, in the expressions, He will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths. “And many people shall go and say: come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths,” v. 3. They are not literal highways which God is to teach those who go there; nor material paths in which they are to walk. But ways and paths which are to the body, what laws are to the mind, are employed on account of that resemblance, to denote the revelations and commands which he is there to communicate for their guidance. That, accord-

ingly, which the people propose to do, is not to walk in a literal path from one place to another, but instead, to pursue the course of conduct which God enjoins on them.

4. The next is a metaphor in the word go. "For out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem," v. 3. The law and word of the Lord did not literally go from Jerusalem, as persons travel from one place to another. The meaning is, that it is from that place where they are to be made known, that the knowledge of them is to be conveyed to those who dwell in other scenes.

5. A synecdoche. "And he shall judge—or arbitrate—between the nations, and convict—or rebuke,—many peoples, and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more," v. 4. Here, the species is put by synecdoche for the genus—swords and spears, the principal warlike instruments of Isaiah's age, for such instruments generally as shall be in use at the period when the prediction is to be fulfilled; and ploughshares and pruning hooks for the implements generally of husbandry.

This prophecy thus foreshows that Mount Zion is, in the last days, to be cleared of its ruins, and made the fixed site of a temple for God's worship; that all nations are to go thither for instruction respecting his will; that he is there to communicate to them revelations and commands; that he is to judge between them and convince or rebuke many of them in respect to their errors; and that they are under his reign to cease from their contests, discontinue the cultivation of warlike arts, and convert their weapons into implements of husbandry. The prediction is, therefore, yet to be fulfilled. The past history of the Israelites and Gentiles presents no correspondence whatever to it.

6. A metonymy, in the use of house, in place of the family residing in it. "O house of Jacob," v. 5.

7. A hypocatastasis. "O house of Jacob, come ye, and let us walk in the light of the Lord," v. 5. This is not a metaphor; as walking in a light, and in a light flashed from the divine presence, as from the pillar of fire which illuminated the camp of the Israelites in the desert, is suitable to man's nature, not incompatible with it. But as walking is to the

body, what the exercise of its faculties is to the soul ; and as light is to the eye, what knowledge is to the mind ; walking in a light emanating from Jehovah is put in the place of acting conformably to the teachings which he is to communicate for their guidance.

But why, if such are God's gracious purposes towards the Israelites, did he inflict on them the terrible punishments with which, as described in the preceding vision, they were overwhelmed ? The prophet now proceeds to state the reason, and forewarns them that he was thereafter to chasten them in a still more dreadful manner. It was because of their apostasy from him. It was for the purpose of confuting the false views and expectations on which they were proceeding. It was in order to his own vindication, and the manifestation of his rights and perfections, in such a manner as to impress mankind with the awe, submission, trust, and love, which his attributes and ways should inspire.

8. A metaphor in the word forsaken. "Therefore thou hast forsaken thy people," v. 6. God could not literally forsake his people and withdraw from their presence, as a human being forsakes a fellow creature and removes into another scene ; inasmuch as he is everywhere present, and must of necessity make them objects of attention, and uphold them while they continue in existence. The word which literally denotes the desertion or abandonment of one bodied being by another, is employed by analogy to signify the resembling act of God, in withdrawing *his favor and care* from the apostate Israelites.

9. A metonymy in the use of house for the family residing in it. "Thou hast forsaken thy people, the house of Jacob," v. 6.

10. A metaphor in the use of replenished. "Thou hast forsaken thy people the house of Jacob, because they are replenished from the east," v. 6. They could not be literally filled with magicians, magical arts, or other evil principles or practices, as the space of a vessel is occupied by a solid or fluid that is put into it. The term is used to denote that they had received among them such a crowd of those deceivers, or adopted their arts on such a scale as fully to satisfy their desire of them.

11. A similitude. "They are replenished from the east, and are soothsayers *like* the Philistines; and they abound with the children of strangers," v. 6.

12, 13, 14. Three metaphors in the use of the word filled. "And his land is filled with silver and gold; and there is no end to his treasures. And his land is filled with horses; and there is no end to his chariots. And his land is filled with idols. To the work of their hands they bow down; to that which their fingers have made," v. 7, 8.

The verb filled is used on the same principle as replenished in the preceding verse, to denote that they had been supplied from the east probably, with as much gold and silver, and as many horses, chariots, and idols, as they thought necessary for their protection and prosperity; as a vessel is filled by an element that occupies all its space.

15, 16. Two hyperboles, in the use of the word end. "There is no end to his treasures; there is no end to his chariots, v. 7." The figure is taken from a line that is extended interminably, and thence cannot be traversed. It is equivalent, therefore, to an elliptical comparison, and its meaning is, that their chariots were so numerous, and their treasure so profuse, that an individual, who should undertake to survey and enumerate them with exactness, would find the task like an attempt to reach the termination of a line that has no end.

17, 18. Metaphors in the words, bowed down, and brought low. "Therefore shall the mean man be bowed down, and the mighty man shall be brought low; for thou shalt not, or canst not forgive them," v. 9. The first literally denotes an incurvation of the body, as when under an insupportable weight, and is employed to signify an analogous humiliation of the mind, by the confutation of its errors, the defeat of its pride, the exposure of its sins, and the annihilation of its hopes. The other naturally denotes a depression from a superior and eligible place, to one that is lower and disadvantageous, as from a throne to a footstool, or an erect to a prostrate position; and is used to denote a resembling descent from an official or influential station, to a condition without authority or respect.

The prophet had, in the 6th verse, stated the provocation

for which God had already forsaken the house of Jacob. He here announces that there is to be a full confutation of their false views, and humiliation of their pride, and that the reason of it is, that he cannot forgive them. Their impeachment of him is such, that his righteousness requires that he should vindicate himself, by showing that it is he that has dominion over them, not their false gods; that it is he that bestows their gifts, not their idols to which they ascribe them; that he has the rights which he enforces in his government, and will inflict on the impenitent the evils which he threatens. These great truths, which flame like a lightning shaft on the forehead of this prediction of his avenging judgments, unfold the aims and grounds of his providence towards that people, and must be seen and realized, in order to a just understanding of his government. He will work out, by his dispensations towards them, a public and perfect confutation of all their false and injurious pretensions, and abasement of their pride; and because it is incompatible with his truth and rectitude to forgive them. It would be to sanction their apostasy, and undeify himself. It would be to allow to their idols the prerogatives which they assign to them. He next indicates the manner in which it is to be consummated. God is at length to reveal himself to them visibly in such terrible majesty, as to annihilate their unbelief, cause them to throw away their idols in disgust, and fly in consternation to the dens of the mountains, and caverns of the earth, to escape his dazzling presence. All the objects of their pride, also, are to be swept with the besom of ruin, and shown to be unworthy of the estimation in which they held them.

19. An apostrophe. "Go into the rock, and hide thee in the dust, from before the terror of Jehovah, and from the glory of his majesty," v. 10. The prophet thus turns from the form of prediction, and directly addresses the house of Jacob, as though the great moment of God's advent had actually arrived, and he already beheld the distant lightnings of his descending chariot. It is, perhaps, the boldest and loftiest figure of the prophecy. What a vivid stroke! How appropriate to the place in the prediction! How suited to touch the heart with a sense of the overwhelming impression which the presence of God will make on his enemies! And

what a grandeur it flashes over the announcements that follow! Who can doubt that the pride both of the Israelite and the Gentile will be effectually humbled at that interposition of the Almighty, and a resistless conviction take possession of every spectator that he is Jehovah, has the rights which he asserts, and is entitled to the homage which he claims!

Theodoret supposed that this prediction had its fulfilment in the Roman war under Titus; Jerome referred it to the calamities inflicted on the Jews either by the Babylonians or Romans. But there was no such visible manifestation then of the Almighty; nor did the inhabitants of Jerusalem, or Judea, flee to dens and caverns to hide themselves from the terrors of his presence. Those writers interpret the passage as though they thought it symbolical, and regard Jehovah revealed in dazzling majesty, as the representative of the Babylonians, or Romans, which is in the utmost degree mistaken. It is inconsistent with his deity that he should serve as the symbol of creatures. It is incompatible with his holiness that he should represent fallen creatures, offering worship to false gods, and wreaking their evil passions on their fellow-men. Besides, if God were the representative of the Romans, the laws of symbolization would require that the house of Jacob should also be employed as a representative, and a representative of some other people, or order of agents, and their construction of the prophecy would thence be confuted, as it would make it respect a different people from the Jews, whom the Babylonians and Romans conquered. But it is not a symbolical prediction. It is to be verified by a literal advent of the Most High in the terrors of his majesty, and is therefore yet future.

20, 21. Hypocatastases. "The lofty eyes of men shall be humbled; the height of mortals shall bow down," v. 11, according to Lowth's version; Professor Alexander renders it, in the present, "The eyes of the loftiness of man are cast down, and the height of men is brought low;" as though those effects were the consequences of his visible advent. To cast down the eyes, is to direct them downwards to the ground, in shame or fear, instead of upwards, in self-complacency and haughtiness; and that attitude is employed to represent a corresponding depression of the mind whose pride

they were accustomed to express. The height of men is their elevated station ; and the dejection of that height or seat to the ground, is used to denote the overthrow of the power which they derive from it or exert in it, and deprivation of their greatness.

22. A metaphor. " And Jehovah alone is exalted in that day," v. 11. To be exalted, literally, is to be lifted upward from the ground, or elevated to a higher station in space. It is employed here to denote an analogous elevation in the thoughts and estimation of men. As there is at that epoch to be a perfect confutation of Jews and Gentiles who apostatize, and ascribe the rights and honors of God to creatures, so there is to be a perfect vindication of him. It will be seen and felt by all that he is what he proclaims himself to be, and his righteousness, wisdom, and goodness in all his ways will be recognised and acknowledged. That is the end for which he exercises his present administration, and it will be fully accomplished.

The first part of the passage which follows, which we quote as rendered by Professor Alexander, has been treated by some commentators as metaphorical, and by others as representative : " For there is a day to Jehovah of Hosts, upon or against everything that is high and lofty, and upon everything exalted, and it comes down ; and on all the cedars of Lebanon, and on all the oaks of Basan ; and upon all the high mountains, and upon all the elevated hills, and upon every high tower, and upon every fenced wall ; and upon all ships of Tarshish, and upon all images of desire ; and " thus " shall the loftiness of man be cast down, and the pride of men be brought low, and Jehovah alone be exalted in that day. And the idols, the whole shall pass away. And they shall enter into the caves of the rocks, and into the holes of the earth, from before the terror of Jehovah, and the glory of his majesty in his arising to terrify the earth. In that day shall a man cast his idols of silver and his idols of gold which they have made for him to worship, to the moles and to the bats, to go into the clefts of the rocks and into the fissures of the cliffs, from before the terror of Jehovah, and from the glory of his majesty, in his arising to terrify the earth. Cease ye from man whose

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breath is in his nostrils ; for wherein is he to be accounted of ?" v. 12-22.

Jerome and Maurer exhibit the cedars, oaks, mountains, and hills, as used metaphorically for princes and others in exalted stations. That, however, is mistaken. In a metaphorical prediction, the subject of the affirmation is always the subject also of that which is foreshown, the figure lying wholly in the predicate. It would be in the verb therefore here, if the passage were metaphorical, not in the nouns ; as it is of the cedars, oaks, mountains, hills, fortresses, and ships, that the events foreshown are predicted. In a metaphor, also, that which is affirmed is never literally true of the subject of the figure ; but here the event predicted of the trees and mountains is perfectly suited to their nature.

Calvin, Cocceius, Vitrina, Le Clerc, Lowth, and others, interpret the cedars, oaks, mountains, and hills, as representatives of men of analogous characters and conditions, as princes, rulers, governments, the vain and proud. That, however, is an equal error. That they are not used as symbols, is seen, first, from the consideration that they were neither exhibited to the prophet in vision, nor subjected in his presence to the inflictions that are foreshown of them, one or the other of which is an invariable condition of symbolization. He did not see the day of Jehovah on the cedars of Lebanon, the oaks of Basan, and upon all the high mountains, and upon all the elevated hills. It was future, and is represented as such, not as present. Next, from the consideration that if the cedars and oaks, all the mountains and hills, the ships, and the images of desire, are used as symbols, then the idols also of gold and silver, the moles and bats, the dens and caverns, the loftiness and pride of men, and the men themselves who cast away their idols and retreat to the caverns and recesses of the rocks, must be used as representatives ; which is impossible, as there are no corresponding agents and objects which they can symbolize. What analogous qualities can pride and loftiness represent ? What are the resembling places which the dens and caves denote ? Of whom are the moles and bats the symbols ? Who are meant by the idols, and what corresponding act is signified by their being cast to the moles and to the bats ?

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But though they are not employed as symbols, may they not, it will perhaps be asked, be used by a hypocatastasis, as substitutes for men, and the event foretold of them, be used to *illustrate* the catastrophe that is to befall those in whose place they stand? That is inconsistent also in an equal degree with the passage. The announcement, "there is a day to Jehovah of hosts upon or against everything high and lofty, and upon everything exalted, and it comes down; and on all the cedars of Lebanon, and on all the oaks of Basan; and upon all the high mountains, and upon all the elevated hills; and upon every high tower, and upon every fenced wall; and upon all ships of Tarshish, and upon all images of desire;" is employed to *prove* that "the eyes of the loftiness of man are to be cast down, and the height of men brought low, and Jehovah alone exalted in that day;"—not to *illustrate by a resemblance*, the manner in which man is to be humbled. The destruction of those objects of delight, of pride, and of reliance for safety, is to be one of the *means* by which their haughtiness is actually to be brought down,—not a mere *similitude* to that humiliation. The prediction is accordingly continued, "*And,*" thus or by this means, "*shall the loftiness of man be cast down, and the pride of men be brought low, and Jehovah alone be exalted in that day.*" This is seen, also, from the consideration that the acts which men are then exhibited as exerting, are represented as occasioned by the same manifestation of Jehovah, by which every lofty and exalted thing, every cedar and oak, every mountain and hill is to be brought down. It is by his avenging presence that they are to be struck with terror, and prompted to cast away their idols and flee to the dens and caverns; as it is by his presence and avenging agency that the trees and mountains, fortresses and ships are to be overthrown. Had the catastrophe of these natural objects been employed merely to illustrate the humiliation of men by a similitude, it would have been exhibited as produced by a different manifestation or agency, not by the same. If those effects which are produced by that agency are illustrative, then the humiliation of men also which is wrought by it, must be regarded as of the same nature, and nothing whatever is left to be the subject of exemplification. And finally, this is expressly in-

icated in the representation that God is, at the time when the idolaters are to flee to the rocks and caverns to shield themselves from the splendors of his presence, to strike the *earth* also with terror, which is a metaphor, and denotes that it is to be shaken in a manner analogous to that in which a human being trembles, when agitated with terror; and that is by an earthquake. "And they shall enter into the caves of the rocks, and into the holes of the earth, from before the terror of Jehovah, and the glory of his majesty on his arising to terrify the earth."

The things that are high and lofty, then, the trees and mountains, the fortresses and ships, and their subversion, are not used in illustration of the humiliation of men, nor as symbols of them, and their overthrow; but those objects are themselves to be the subjects of the avenging agency of the Almighty, when he comes in visible glory to confound his enemies and vindicate himself.

23, 24, 25. Metaphors in the words, cast down or bowed down, brought low, and exalted, v. 17. Loftiness cannot be literally cast down, or bowed as a material body is dejected from an elevation to the earth, or an erect body, like a person or tree, is made to stoop. The expression is used to denote an analogous change of the mind from pride to humiliation, from self-confidence to despair. Being brought low, in like manner, properly signifies the depression of a person or material object from an elevated position; and is employed to denote a resembling change of the mind from haughtiness, to a sense of its subordination to God, and its helplessness and guilt. To exalt, in its proper use, denotes the movement of a person or material body in the opposite direction from a lower to a higher position; and is here employed to signify the elevation of God in the thoughts of men, to the regard which belongs to him as Jehovah, the creator and ruler of all.

26, 27. Metaphors in the verb terrify, v. 19-21: The earth cannot be literally stricken with terror at the presence of God. The expression is employed to denote a species of agitation, of which it is susceptible, that bears an analogy to the tremor of human beings who are smitten with excessive fear. It is an earthquake, therefore, with which it is then to

be shaken, and by that doubtless, that the high and lofty things, the cedars and oaks, the mountains and hills, the fortresses and fenced walls, the ships and images of desire, whatever they may be, are to be thrown down, and overwhelmed. That it is the earth that is to be the subject of the tremefaction is certain from the nature of the metaphor; as it is the law of that figure that the agent or object to which it is applied is the subject of the act or event which it denotes; as when it is said a ship shall be made to walk the water, it is the ship that is to be the subject of the motion which is signified by that expression; and when it is predicted that the Gentiles shall flow to the mountain of Jehovah's house, it is the Gentiles that are to go there in great numbers and in a continuous line, not some other order of agents.

What a vast and wonderful revelation of God's purposes, and the principles on which he founds them, this prophecy thus is, when interpreted by its proper laws? First. That in the last days Mount Zion is to be cleared of its ruins, and a new temple for Jehovah's worship erected on it, that is never to be overthrown. Next. That all nations are to go thither to worship, and receive from him commands and revelations. Thirdly. That he is to exercise judicial authority over them, and cause them to convert their weapons into implements of husbandry, and dismiss for ever the arts of war. Fourthly. A statement of the reason that though such are his gracious purposes towards the Israelites, he yet had, at the time of the vision, forsaken them. It was because they had apostatized to idolatry, become soothsayers, adopted the manners of the pagan nations around them, devoted themselves to the accumulation of wealth, and put their trust in horses and chariots; which was a rejection of him, an impeachment of his government, a denial of the truth of his promises and threatenings, and a virtual declaration that their idols were alone worthy of homage as gods. Fifthly. The announcement that all classes of them were at length to be fully humbled by the confutation of their false views, and overthrow of their guilty schemes; and because his perfections forbid that he should forgive them. Sixthly. A revelation that he is to accomplish it by a visible advent in the terrors of his avenging justice, that shall strike all his enemies with a

resistless conviction of his being, his deity, and his rights over them ; and cause them to cast away their idols, and fly to dens and caverns to hide themselves from the splendors of his presence ; and that he is to complete the prostration of their pride and annihilation of their guilty hopes, by overturning by an earthquake the great objects of their delight and reliance ; the beautiful trees with which their vales and mountains are adorned ; their mountains and hills themselves on which they offer their idolatrous worship ; their fortresses and walls on which they rely for defence against their enemies ; and their ships, and every other object of worldly trust and desire. That these are the predictions of the vision in contradistinction from the symbolical constructions that have been assigned to it, is as certain from the laws of figures and symbols, as the solutions of geometrical problems are from the principles by which they are determined. The prophecy renders it clear, therefore, First, that one great object for which God pursues his present administration towards the Israelites is, to vindicate himself, confute them, and overturn their pride. Next, That his advent is to precede the conversion of the nations, and the commencement of Christ's millennial reign ; inasmuch as many are to continue till his coming to be idolaters, and are then to renounce their false gods ; as they are to continue till that period to be characterized by pride, haughtiness, and a reliance on fortresses and fenced walls ; and as it is not till after his arrival and the commencement of his reign, that they are to convert their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. And, Thirdly, That the Israelites are at that epoch to be restored to their ancient land, and sustain a peculiar relation to God ; inasmuch as the prophecy concerns Judah and Jerusalem ; the house which is then to be erected on Mount Zion, is to be the house of the God of Jacob ; and the Gentiles who go thither to worship, are to go from a distance. It shows, therefore, that they are proceeding on mistaken views of God's designs, who assume that the world is to be converted through the proclamation of the gospel by men ; that it is to be accomplished anterior to the millennium ; and that the second coming of Christ is not to take place till that period has passed.

ART. II.—THE RESTORATION OF THE ISRAELITES.

BY THE EDITOR.

THOUGH the question, whether the Israelites are to be recalled from their dispersion, re-established in their ancient land, and sustain a peculiar relation to God, has been largely discussed by writers of different denominations, and with learning and ability, no such view of it has hitherto been presented, as to free it from difficulty, and command the undoubting assent of the church generally, or any considerable body of those whose judgment respecting it is held to be of authority. It is still an open inquiry. A large proportion, we believe, of those in the sacred office, seriously doubt their restoration, and yet doubt it on grounds, that in their own judgment, instead of absolutely disproving it, only render it improbable. In like manner, many at least of those who look for their return, have perhaps a strong persuasion of it, merely, rather than a conviction of its absolute certainty. They believe it, because they see what appear to them plain predictions of it in the Scriptures, while they feel that they still need a higher demonstration that that is their true meaning, in order to free it from uncertainty and make doubt impossible.

Where now lies the reason that, though it has thus engaged the attention of a long succession of great and good men, and been subjected to as keen a disquisition as almost any other, it still remains undetermined? Not because there are not ample materials for a judgment respecting it in the Scriptures. No theme is more frequent with the ancient prophets, presented in a greater variety of aspects, or treated with greater amplitude. Not because it is not of high importance. It is, undoubtedly, one of the greatest of the questions in debate in the church. There is no other, perhaps, that involves the meaning of so large a part of the Sacred Volume. The conclusions that are formed in reference to it must affect very intimately the views that are entertained of the purposes of God respecting the world. If he is to re-establish that people in Palestine, in a peculiar relation to himself, appoint rites of worship that are now unknown to the church, and reveal

himself to them by visible signs, as he did in ancient times, it is unquestionably one of the most wonderful of his designs, and must be in order to ends that are in as high a degree extraordinary and momentous. Such a measure would undoubtedly work a greater revolution in the church, and a thousand times greater in the world, than took place at the abrogation of their worship and their dispersion among the nations. It would involve the institution of a new dispensation. As, therefore, if it is to take place, it is to precede the millennium, the decision that it is foreshown is equivalent to a decision, that God is at that epoch to introduce a new dispensation; and that the views, therefore, on which the Protestant church is now proceeding, are in a large degree erroneous. No topic in the whole circle of theological inquiry has higher claims, then, to consideration, is adapted in a larger measure to awaken curiosity, or is fraught with a more important practical influence on the views, the faith, and the labors of God's people.

That the subject remains involved in so much uncertainty is not owing then, we apprehend, to any intrinsic difficulty, nor to a want of curiosity respecting it, but instead, to erroneous or defective views of the nature and laws of the language in which the prophecies respecting it are expressed. The question, whether the Scriptures teach that the Israelites are to be recalled to Palestine, and re-organized as God's chosen people, is a question of interpretation, and mainly of language, in distinction from symbols. What then is the nature of that language? On what principle is it employed? What are the laws by which its meaning is to be ascertained? These questions have been treated at length by a great number of writers: one class holding that the language of the predictions is to be interpreted by the ordinary laws of philology in accordance with its nature;—that which is literal, as literal; and that which is tropical, as tropical: and the other who regard it as altogether figurative, or spiritual, assuming that the rules of ordinary speech are wholly inapplicable to it, and that its meaning can only be evolved by laws that are peculiar to itself. Unhappily, however, neither party have paused to inquire, what the peculiarity of figurative language is, how it may be discriminated from that which is

literal, or what the rules are by which the several figures are to be interpreted. It seems never to have occurred to them, that a passage, in order to be figurative, must have a figure in it. They have accordingly disputed the question with just as much keenness, and with as uncertain results, whether language that involves no figure, is figurative or not, as whether that is which is truly tropical. We might quote many pages of argument from the advocates of the literal sense, in which they have failed to demonstrate the truth, simply by their not knowing how to distinguish literal from figurative expressions, and determine by that means whether a passage is tropical or not. Instead of looking to the language itself to determine whether it is figurative, they have often founded their conclusions on grounds that lie wholly out of it, and are no criteria of its nature. Thus Mr. M'Neile :—

“ *The progress of events, by giving fulfilment to many of the predictions of the prophets, has borne testimony, in a way that cannot be resisted, to the true meaning of the figurative language of prophecy.* History is but another name for the providence of God; and so far as it can be shown to have been the subject of prophecy, its faithful record should be distinctly and carefully compared with the terms of the prediction. Because the best possible method of soberly anticipating events from the language of those prophecies which are still *unfulfilled*, is to observe the connexion between the language and the event in those which have already found their *fulfilment*. *It is thus that in the school of experience, we shall make the nearest possible approaches to a right distinction between what is actually literal, and what is merely figurative, and what is specifically symbolical in the inspired language; which distinction is acknowledged by all who have attended to the subject, to be the grand desideratum of prophetic interpretation.*”—Lectures on the Prospect of the Jews.—Lecture i. p. 30.

He thus proceeds on the impression that there is not anything in figurative language that distinguishes it from that which is literal, in such a manner that they can be easily discriminated; but that they are in fact essentially the same, and that whether therefore a prophecy is literal or figurative, can only be known with certainty, by a comparison of its terms with those of other predictions that have already

received their fulfilment. No mistake, however, could be greater. The meaning of a prophecy must be *understood*, before it can be known that it has *received* its fulfilment. On what ground can it be assumed that certain events are the accomplishment of a prediction, except that they are such as that prediction foreshows? But their correspondence to one another cannot be ascertained, until the prophecy has been interpreted, and the nature of the events learned, which it predicts. The ground of its explication must, therefore, lie within itself; not in the events in which it has its accomplishment. Besides if there were no such radical difference between literal and tropical language, that they could be easily and infallibly distinguished from each other, then the fulfilment of a prediction would not yield us any aid in discriminating them. How could it be seen that certain events correspond with a prediction taken as figurative, but disagree with it interpreted literally, if there were no such dissimilarity between tropical and literal expressions, that they could be discriminated from each other? But the real or imagined accomplishment of a prophecy can never be necessary as a ground for the conclusion that the language in which it is expressed is figurative, any more than the demonstration of a problem in geometry can be necessary as a ground for the conclusion that the diagram by which it is to be wrought out, is a circle in place of a parallelogram. As circles and parallelograms are forms that essentially differ from each other, and their nature must be known before problems founded on them can be demonstrated; so literal and figurative forms of expression differ essentially from each other, and their peculiarities and the principles on which they are employed, must be understood, in order to the discovery of their meaning, and a perception of their correspondence with the events in which they have their fulfilment. Figurative language, in all its forms, has a nature of its own, that distinguishes it from that which is literal, as truly as circles have a nature that distinguishes them from squares, parallelograms, and triangles; and the properties and laws of the one are as incommunicable to the others, as those of circles are to other geometrical figures. To assume accordingly that there are no criteria in the language itself

of figurative predictions by which it can be discriminated from that which is literal, and its import determined with the utmost exactness; is in interpretation as great and fatal a mistake, as it were in geometry, to assume that there are no criteria in the forms of triangles, circles, and squares, by which they can be distinguished, independently of demonstrations that are founded on them.

Another error, equally great, and perhaps still more mischievous into which they have fallen, is the supposition that if a prediction be figurative, the agent or subject of the event foreshown, is not that of which the prediction actually treats, but of a different species, and that its meaning, therefore, is necessarily involved in obscurity. Thus Mr. Gipps says :

“Millenarian writers interpret Isaiah xi. 6–8, in reference to the state of things during the Millennium, and conceive that it is to be understood as applying to real lions, bears, &c. In Isaiah xxxv. 9, it is said, *No lion shall be there, nor any ravenous beast shall go up thereon, it shall not be found there.* This is evidently connected with the coming of Christ foretold in verse 4, in the same way as Isaiah xi. 6–8 was connected with his coming as foretold in v. 1 of that chapter. According to their own rule that a literal interpretation is to be given where it is possible, they are bound to give a literal interpretation of v. 9, and to understand *the lion and ravenous beast* of real animals. They discard, however, their own rule in this case; and take these expressions, not in a literal, but *figurative sense.*”—*On the First Resurrection*, p. 73.

He thus represents, and his statement might be confirmed by a multitude of quotations, that when that class of expositors interpret a passage as *figurative*, they assume that the agents and events to which it relates, are of a different species from those of which it expressly treats. It is not peculiar, however, to them, but frequent with expositors of all classes, ancient, as well as modern, and disbelievers, as well as believers, that Christ's advent is to precede the millennium. We might quote the comments of a great number on the passage to which he refers, Isaiah xi. 6–8, in proof of it. We give a single example from Mr. Irving.

“The only possible diversity of opinion which can arise between men

of good sound sense, in considering this passage, is, whether it be intended for a *figurative* or a *literal description* of the world, after the Assyrian's yoke is broken, and Messiah's reign begun. . . . I have no objection to its being understood and interpreted as figurative language, *containing under it the delineation of the perfect harmony of human society*, the innocence of strength, the harmlessness of subtlety, the bountifulness of power, and the subserviency of all to the child of reason. . . .

"There is a beautiful confirmation of this method of interpretation in the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth chapters of this prophet, where a certain portion of the earth, called Idumea, being visited for its persecution of Zion, is reduced to a most barren, noxious, and abominable condition; and into it as a vile harbor, are driven all the filthy and foul beasts of the earth out of all countries;—'Babylon, the den of every unclean beast, and cage of every foul bird;' whereupon all other places of the earth, which heretofore these wicked beasts had tenanted, are called upon to rejoice because of the riddance which they had received, and blossom as the rose. By which *highly figurative language the thing meant is*, that in the day when God rises to right oppressed Zion, he will beat off from her desolated land all spoilers,—'the satyr, the screech owl, the great owl, the vulture,' that is, *the wicked potentates of darkness, the strong and valiant enemies of Christ*, and gather them all into a land of burning pitch and brimstone. . . . This glorious prophecy, which presents us Rome and her vassal kingdoms in worse than Sodom's desolation, Zion and the earth under her in Carmel's beauty, and Lebanon's glory, *giveth much countenance to the interpretation which makes these wild beasts in our text to be figures of the powerful wickednesses which are upon the earth*, preventing its peace and blessedness: these being put down with the Assyrian, the wicked one, the kingdoms which they wielded for mutual destruction shall all be guided and directed into the ways of righteousness, zealous to aggrandize the meek and the poor in spirit, who in that day shall inherit the earth."—*Interpretations of O. T. Prophecies*, pp. 136–138.

He thus assumes that if these passages are *figurative*, the agents whose actions they foreshow, are not those that are designated in the predictions themselves, but instead of tame and ferocious animals, are men, and on the ground, it would seem, that that is the law of figurative language. It is surprising that interpreters should have formed so false a notion, and gone on age after age in the repetition of it, not only

without pausing to inquire into its accuracy, but without happening to discern its inconsistency with the laws of figures. There is no axiom in mathematics of more absolute certainty and self-evidence than the law of figures, that the agent or object to which the figure is applied, is the agent or object whose acts or conditions it is employed to illustrate; and that in figurative prophecies, therefore, the agent or object designated in the prediction, and the subject of the figure, is the agent or subject also of the act or event which the prophecy foreshows. This is the law of every species of figure, and of every individual of each species, and is as inseparable and essential an element of their nature as the specific forms of mathematical figures are of theirs.

Thus in the comparison, "The path of the just is as the shining light that shineth more and more unto the perfect day," "the path of the just" is the subject of the affirmation, and that, and that alone, which the similitude is employed to illustrate. To substitute another in its place, and treat that as the thing that is compared with the shining light, is as gross a violation of the figure, and perversion of the writer's meaning, as it were to substitute a noun of a different signification in the place of light, and wholly destroy the comparison, or form one between totally different objects. And such is the law of all similes. Let any one refer to his consciousness, and he will see that when he forms a comparison, that which he names as the subject of the comparison is always that which he truly means, and which he employs the figure to illustrate. The supposition that anything else is meant, is solecistical and preposterous. Not one person in a million could form a simile on the opposite principle, without unusual study and contrivance, and it would then be felt to be wholly unintelligible to the hearer and reader, and absurd.

Such is the law also of the apostrophe, as in Isaiah x., "Lift up thy voice, O daughter of Gallim; cause it to be heard unto Laish, O poor Anathoth;" it is the people of Gallim and Anathoth whom those terms denote, who are meant by the prophet, not the population of other towns. To suppose that they relate to any other people, is not only without authority, but is to make the prediction wholly unintelligible.

It is equally true of the *prosopopœia*. In the expression,

"O earth, earth, earth ! hear the word of the Lord," Jeremiah xxii. 29, it is the earth that is addressed and summoned to hear, not some other orb, some other object, or some other species of existence. To assume that the word earth means something else than our globe, is not only groundless, but is equivalent to the assumption that we have no means of knowing what it is that it denotes.

In metonymy, also, when the name of a town or city is used as the denominative of its inhabitants, as in the apostrophe quoted from Isaiah, it is those inhabitants whom it is employed to designate, not some other population, or some other species of agents.

This is invariably the law also of the metaphor, in respect to which the error we are confuting is most frequently made. Thus in the proverb, "The rich man's wealth is his strong city," it is his *wealth* that is meant, not his learning, his courage, his influence, or any other quality or possession ; and *the rich man's* wealth, not the wealth of any other order of persons. The figure lies in the predicate, not in the subject to which it is applied. It consists in denominating his wealth *a strong city*, which it is not literally, but only by its resemblance, as a means of protection. To suppose that the figure lies in that of which the affirmation is made, is in effect to assume that the proposition is in interpretation to be reversed, by converting the predicate into the subject, and the subject into the predicate, and making it, "a strong city is the rich man's wealth," which not only is not the meaning of the proverb, but is not true. It does not follow from the fact that a city is strong, that it belongs to one rich man, or a few of that class. There is no strong city, probably, that in fact belongs wholly to one individual or a small number of individuals. So also in the following passage, "My son, hear the instruction of thy father, and forsake not the law of thy mother ; for they shall be an ornament of grace unto thy head, and chains about thy neck ;" it is the parental instruction and law, which it is promised shall be an ornament and a chain, not anything else. To assign to them any other meaning, is not to perform the part of an interpreter, but wantonly to deny their true signification, and ascribe to them an office which they are not

employed to fill. This is not merely the law of the metaphor, but a law of the utmost significance. There is no other that transcends it in importance. There is scarce an essential doctrine, or fact, presented in the sacred volume, the truth and certainty of which are not intimately concerned in its observance. Thus in the numerous passages in which Christ is said to have redeemed us, given himself a ransom for us, and saved us by the washing of regeneration,—as the words redeemed, ransom, and washing, are used metaphorically, the whole certainty that Christ is the agent, who is declared to have accomplished what they express for us, depends on the certainty, that the agent to whom the figure is applied, is the agent who has actually exerted the acts, and filled the office which the figurative predicate declares him to have exerted and filled. To assume that his name is not used to denote him, but some other being, is not only to violate the law of the figure in the most wanton manner, and contradict the principles on which all are conscious that they are accustomed to use it, but is to perpetrate the most stupendous crime against him ; to deny him his office and work as Redeemer, and substitute some other being in his place. In like manner, as in all the passages in the Old Testament in which Jehovah is said to have redeemed the Israelites out of Egypt, out of the house of bondage, and out of the hand of the enemy, the verb redeemed is used metaphorically ; the certainty that Jehovah is the being, who is represented as having accomplished that redemption for them, depends on the certainty that in a metaphor the agent who is in fact represented as exerting the act which is expressed by the trope, is the agent who is actually meant to be represented as exerting it. There is no law of language, then, of higher moment than this. The great facts and doctrines of revelation ; a vast proportion of the events of uninspired history, may with truth be said to stand or fall with it. There is no law of greater certainty. Not a solitary instance can be found in the whole domain of metaphorical language, of a deviation from it. Nor is there any law, whose truth is more obvious. It is exemplified in each one's habits of thought and speech. It is the law and the only law, by which every human being employs and interprets metaphorical language, and no one can, without an unnatural effort,

imagine a metaphor to be used on any other principle. No solecism can offer a grosser contradiction to our consciousness, than the supposition that in that figure the subject to which the trope is applied, is not the subject of that which it is employed to express.

It is the law likewise of the synecdoche ; as when it is said, "Thy men shall fall by the sword, and thy *strength* in war ;" strength is put for the strong, and it is they whose fall the prediction foreshows.

It is equally true also that the agents and objects in respect to which the allegory and hypocatastasis are employed, are the real agents or objects which it is their office to exemplify and illustrate. Thus the declaration, Isaiah v. 1-7, in respect to the allegory of the vineyard, that "the vineyard of the Lord of hosts is the house of Israel, and the men of Judah his pleasant plant," is a declaration that they are the people whose conduct is represented by that allegory. It can no more be assumed that any other people are denoted by it, than it can that the name Jehovah of hosts denotes another deity, not the God of Israel. The agent, object, or act, which the hypocatastasis is employed to illustrate, also, is always that, and that only, to which it is formally applied : as when it is predicted of Christ, "a bruised reed he will not break, and a dim wick he will not quench," it is the acts of Christ, though of a different species, which these are employed to represent, not the acts of a different person.

The knowledge of this great law is of the utmost importance to the just exposition of the prophecies respecting the Israelites. It sets aside a vast mass of false constructions, and with the other laws that are peculiar to the several figures, evolves the true meaning of all tropical expressions, with the greatest ease and certainty. Under its guidance, the use of figures in prediction, instead of involving the purposes of God in obscurity, as is usually thought, is found to contribute to their clearness, demonstrableness, and force. Their express office is, to illustrate, not to darken ; and they fill that office in the prophecies with a beauty and perfection proportional to the frequency with which they are employed, and the propriety and dignity with which they are there distinguished beyond those of any other class of writings.

Another error into which those who have treated of these predictions have fallen, is the assumption that besides the natural meaning with which they are fraught, as interpreted by the proper laws of the language in which they are expressed, they have also another and higher signification, which is denominated their spiritual import. This view is held, indeed, by the Christian world generally, and has been for a series of ages. It was the theory of Origen, Theodoret, Jerome, and other early writers, and of Cocceius and Vitringa, especially, among the moderns, and is the basis of a large share of the current interpretations of the ancient prophets. Thus Dr. Davison says :

“Scripture prophecy is so framed in some of its predictions, *as to bear a sense directed to two objects* ; of which structure the predictions concerning the kingdom of David furnish a conspicuous example ; and, I should say, an unquestionable one, if the whole principle of that kind of interpretation had not been by some disputed and denied. But the principle has met with this ill acceptance, for no better reason, it should seem, than because *it has been injudiciously applied in cases where it has no proper place* ; or has been suspected if not mistaken, in its constituent character, as to what it really is.”—P. 210.

Mr. Bickersteth regards this as a very general characteristic of the prophecies.

“Where the obvious, grammatical, and literal meaning is capable of a plain and literal fulfilment, in times past or in times to come, and does not contradict other Scriptures, and there is no manifest figure in the words, we must at any rate hold that obvious meaning, if we would not reduce all Scripture to an uncertainty, and have no sure standing for all our confidence in God’s word. Let us ever then take this general principle, as of first importance in our interpretation, and believe accordingly.

“But with this first principle of interpretation firmly held, *we may also seek to obtain from the Scriptures, where the words allow it, a yet fuller meaning*, or all that further light which God in his wisdom and love may have designed to give us by them. We need not on account of the literal meaning, therefore, always *reject that spiritual application of the prophecies to the Church of Christ, which has been so largely held by all Christians from the early ages*. While we justly expect a *literal*

fulfilment of plain prophecies, let us not forget there is also a *depth and fulness of Scripture beyond our first thoughts*.

"As a general rule it must also be admitted, that it is not right to interpret part of the same prophecy exclusively literally, and another part exclusively figuratively. *Throughout there may be both a literal and a figurative interpretation*, but a prophecy cannot be thus partially divided, and exclusively interpreted on different principles."—*Restoration of the Jews*, pp. xviii–xxiii.

This theory was entertained also by Mr. Irving, though wholly irreconcilable with the views generally which he maintained respecting the proper principles of interpretation. Thus he says in reference to Isaiah xi. 6–8 :

"I see, besides the figurative, which doubtless is present, a *literal sense* to be also present; and can, even were there no other passage than this one, believe that it contains the promise of a deliverance to the lower creation also."—*Interp. O. T. Prop.*, p. 143.

And he regarded such a double sense as common to the whole of the Old Testament that relates to the Israelites and their enemies.

"For as everything of covenant and mercy spoken to the Jewish people, hath its ultimate reality in the church; so may we say that everything spoken against the oppressors of Israel, hath its ultimate reality in the apostasy, or anti-church of Rome."—P. 181.

These writers thus, though they express themselves somewhat differently, assign to *the language* of the ancient prophecies, both that which is literal and that which is figurative, a double meaning; one that is evolved by the laws of philology, and is the natural sense of the terms; another that has its ground, not absolutely in the terms themselves, but rather, it seems to be supposed, in an analogy that subsists between the objects of which they treat and another class of objects, and is called their *spiritual sense*. No theory, however, could be more groundless, or lead to a worse perversion of the prophecies. Language neither has, nor can have any meaning except that which is either literal or figurative. The power

or use of certain words, literally to express certain thoughts, is not inherent in them, or founded on their nature, but is the result of arbitrary convention. It is because men, for reasons of convenience, have chosen to appropriate them to their several offices, and use them as they do, that they are indebted for their import; not to any intrinsic adaptation more than any other accents of the voice, to represent such meanings. No word, therefore, can possibly have a literal signification, except as it acquires it by convention and usage. But besides their literal meanings, words have no import except that which is figurative, nor is there any principle except that on which they are figuratively used by which they can attain another meaning. If a word is employed without a figure to denote two things that differ from one another, then it has two literal meanings. If it has two meanings, only one of which is literal, or is employed to signify two things, only one of which it denotes literally, then by the definition it is appropriated to a use that differs from its literal signification; and that is the precise peculiarity of the use of a word by a figure. It is accordingly by a metaphor that all the terms employed in the Scriptures that have obtained what may be called a spiritual meaning in addition to their literal import, have acquired their new signification. Thus, the words *redeem*, *ransom*, *regenerate*, *create*, *renew*, and other kindred terms that are employed to denote the work of Christ, the agency of the Spirit, and the effects of his influences, have obtained their spiritual meaning by a metaphorical use. Not an instance can be found in the Old or New Testament of the use of a word in both a literal and spiritual sense, in which the spiritual does not lie in the mere metaphorical use of the literal. It may, indeed, be said with truth, not only that it is not possible, but that it is not conceivable, that a signification should be given to a word that is not either literal or figurative. If it is not figurative, then its meaning must be assigned to it arbitrarily, not because of any relation which that which it denotes sustains to something else. If it is not used arbitrarily, but because of some relation which that which it is employed to signify sustains to something else, as, for example, that which it literally denotes, then it is used figuratively, as that is the precise peculiarity of the tropical use of a word.

The theory of a spiritual sense of *words*, therefore, in contradistinction from both a literal and a figurative sense, is demonstrably false.

This consideration proves the utter impossibility, also, that, in any instance, *all the terms* of a prophecy should have even a figurative sense; inasmuch as we have already shown, it is an invariable and necessary law of figures, that *the names of the subjects* to which they are applied, should be used literally. The figure lies wholly in that which is affirmed, or declared, not in that of which the affirmation is made. On the supposition, therefore, that all the prophecies of the Old Testament, respecting the Israelites, have a spiritual meaning, *the Israelites themselves*, and not any other people, *must still be the subjects* of that which the spiritual meaning denotes, as certainly and absolutely as though the prediction was literal. There is no possible or conceivable process by which *the names, Israel, House of Jacob, Judah, or Jews*, when they are the subject of the affirmation, can mean anything else than what they literally denote,—the descendants of Jacob, the Jewish people. These writers are accordingly wholly mistaken in the supposition, that the spiritual meaning, which they ascribe to the ancient prophecies, is a meaning *of their words*; or is indicated by their language, in distinction from the agents, objects, acts, and events, of which that language treats. Their theory really implies, that those agents, objects, and acts, are representative of other agents, objects, and events, of an analogous species; and that they fill the office, therefore, of prophetic symbols, and are to be interpreted on the same principles.

The hypothesis, accordingly, on which the whole of their erroneous speculations in fact proceeds in respect to the difficulty of discriminating literal from tropical predictions is, that the whole of the ancient prophecies, which are conveyed through language merely, are nevertheless representative, as really as the visions of Ezekiel, Daniel, Zechariah, and John; and the agents, objects, and acts of which they treat, fraught with a signification as diverse from that of the language by which they are designated, as the import of the agents and acts of the symbolical prophecies is from that of the terms by which they are denoted. This is indeed singular, as many

of them professedly disapprove, and zealously denounce the treatment of the predictions and narratives of the Old Testament, as allegories, or symbolic representations, as a wanton and unpardonable perversion of them. Thus Mr. Irving, Mr. M'Neile, and Mr. Bickersteth protest against it with great earnestness; and Mr. Irving and Mr. M'Neile confute it by strong arguments; yet they in fact found on it the whole of their constructions, in which they either ascribe to predictions a double, or spiritual sense; or exhibit passages as tropical that are wholly free from figure. Mr. Irving, for example, in his interpretation of Isaiah xi. 6-8, and xxxiv. 11-15, assumes that the lion, the bear, the panther, the wolf, the cow and ox, the wild beasts of the desert, and the wild beasts of the islands, the satyrs, and the owl, are representatives of men of resembling characteristics. "I have no objection," he says of the first, "to its being understood and interpreted as figurative language, containing under it the delineation of the perfect harmony of *human society*;" and of the other, "this glorious prophecy, which presents us Rome and her vassal kingdoms,—Zion and the earth under her,—giveth much countenance to the interpretation which makes these wild beasts to be figures of *the powerful wickednesses* which are upon earth."—Pp. 137, 138.

Mr. Gipps regarded them as symbols of Gentiles and Jews. He says:

"In Isaiah xi, I cannot but conceive that verses 6-8 are to be understood in a figurative sense, and that they foretell the calling in at the first coming of Christ of the Gentiles, described under the figure of the *wolf, leopard, &c.*, and their union with the elect remnant of the Jews, described as the *lamb, kid, &c.*, in one church, after the ceremonial law, which was *the enmity and middle wall of partition* between Jew and Gentile, was *abolished*, and *peace* was thus *made* between them."—*Treatise on the First Resurrection*, p. 124, note.

But they cannot possibly denote those or other men, unless they are symbols of them; first, because animals, in distinction from their names, never denote persons, except when they are used as symbols of them. How can a lion, a bear, a satyr, an owl, denote men unless they are used as their

representatives? To suppose that they mean them by virtue of their nature, independently of their representative office, is equivalent to a supposition that they are in fact men and not such mere animals; next, because, if these passages *were* figurative, those animals would still be the subjects of that which the prediction foreshows; inasmuch as in metaphorical propositions, the agents and objects to which the figure is applied, are the agents or subjects of that which the figure is employed to assert, or declare. As those animals are the subjects of the predictions, and the figure, if they involve one, lies in the predicates, their names cannot denote antichristian men, Gentiles, or Jews, any more than they would if they were not figurative.

We might quote volumes of passages, in which writers thus treat the histories and literal and figurative predictions of the Old Testament, as though they were symbolic, under the false idea, first, that language may be figurative without having a figure in it; and next, that if a prediction be figurative, then the agent or object of which the affirmation is made, is not to be the subject of that which the prediction foreshows, but an agent or object of a different class, which it represents.

But this theory that the agents and objects of literal and figurative passages are symbolic, is wholly without authority, and a more gigantic error, and fraught with a more disastrous influence, than any other false principle that has ever been made a basis of interpretation. It cannot be assumed in regard to the passages to which it is usually applied, except on grounds that render it equally proper to ascribe a symbolic office to the agents and objects of all other parts of the sacred volume. What reason can be given for treating the lion, the leopard, the bear, the cow, the ox, the lamb, the calf, the asp, the basilisk, the cormorant, the satyr, and the owl, of Isaiah xi. and xxxiv., as representatives of human beings, that will not equally justify and require that the living creature after his kind, cattle and creeping thing, and beast of the earth, the fish of the sea, and the fowl of the air, Genesis ii. 24-26, the herds and flocks of Abraham, Lot, and Job, of Laban and Jacob, of the Israelites in Egypt and the wilderness, of the Amalekites and of Nineveh, the flocks of Kedar, the cattle

upon a thousand hills, all the fowls of the mountains, and all others that are mentioned in the Scriptures, should also be treated as symbols? There is no medium between rejecting it altogether, or receiving it as a universal law of historical and prophetic agents and objects. Any consideration that shows it to be unauthorized in respect to any one of which the Scriptures, or other historical or didactic writings treat, will equally show it to be gratuitous and unjustifiable in respect to all the others.

No sober person, however, will attempt to maintain such an assumption. It were in effect to adopt Swedenborg's system of interpretation, and plunge into the shadowy realms of his imaginary and absurd correspondences. There is not in the whole series of the artificial and preposterous senses which he ascribes to the historical and prophetic agents and objects of the Scriptures, a more unjustifiable, gross, or mischievous violation of the sacred word, than is involved in the assumption that passages like those we have quoted,—whose only meaning is expressed in their words—are symbolical.

The false and portentous meanings which this theory, if adopted, renders it necessary to deduce from many passages, is a proof also of its erroneousness. If the animals of Isaiah chap. xi., are symbols, why are not the rod and stem of Jesse also, his branch and roots, the rod of his mouth, the breath of his lips, the poor and the meek, the earth, and the acts and conditions that are affirmed of him and them? Why is not the personage also, chap. liii., who has no form nor comeliness; who is despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief; who was wounded for our iniquities; who made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death; and all the acts, sufferings, and conditions, that are ascribed to him? And why are not his birth, office, ministry, miracles, trial, crucifixion, burial, resurrection, and ascension, likewise, that are recorded in the New Testament? They can no more be exempted from the application of this theory than any others, if it can be shown that the agents and objects of the passages to which it is usually applied, have a symbolic office. But this would make Christ, in his human nature at least, and in all his acts and sufferings, the representative of another mediator, exercising an analogous office,

and suffering in an analogous manner, for a similar object, and with a similar result, to another order of fallen beings: which is false and impossible in the utmost degree. Is it just to sanction a theory that necessarily leads to such monstrous results? Is there anything in the most audacious assumptions of the modern Neologists that violates the Scriptures on a more stupendous scale, and makes them the vehicle of more false and portentous teachings?

It is shown to be wholly mistaken, also, by the impossibility of finding, in respect to many predictions, any such agents, objects, and events, as are required, if they are interpreted by the laws of symbolization. Thus if the animals of Isaiah xi. are to be taken as symbols, so also must the straw which the lion eats, the hole of the asp, and the basilisk's den, the holy mountain, the earth, Assyria, Egypt, Pathros, Cush, Elam, Shinar, Hamath, Edom, Moab, and the islands of the sea, the Egyptian sea, the wind, the river, the seven streams, the highway, the Gentiles, Israel, Judah, Ephraim, the Philistines, and the children of Ammon. But what analogous places, objects, and persons, are there that these can represent? If Israel, Judah, and Ephraim, are supposed to denote Gentile Christians, who do the Gentiles themselves, and the two Gentile nations, the Philistines and the children of Ammon, symbolize? Are there any nations in the world that are neither Israelites nor Gentiles, but as different from Gentiles, as Christian Gentiles are from Jews? What can the return of the Israelites from the countries of their dispersion, and re-establishment in Palestine, denote? Are the Christian Gentile nations to migrate in a resembling manner to some remote land, which their ancestors formerly occupied? What can surpass the extravagance and falsehood of the meanings which their theory thus ascribes to these prophecies!

And finally, it is shown to be wholly gratuitous and false, by the consideration, that the prophecies to which it is applied, have none of the marks that distinguish those which are made through symbols, from those of which the language in which they are expressed, is the medium. There is as clear and wide a difference between the media of symbolic and verbal prophecies, as there is between things and words; between agents and the names by which they are designated.

To confound them is as consummate and absurd an error as it were in a merchant to mistake the arithmetical figures that are used in the record of his transactions, for the property itself, whose value they are employed to express ; as it were in a painter to confound the title of the picture he has drawn, with the forms that constitute it ; as it were in an individual to ascribe to his name the qualities and functions that belong to his person. In a verbal prophecy, the words are the names of the agents, objects, acts, events, and conditions, of which the prediction treats ; and declare directly, who the subjects of the prophecy are, and what the actions are which they are to exert, or the events that are to befall them. That which they signify, according to the usage of language, is that which they foreshow. In a written symbolic prophecy, the words are not the media, in any degree, of the prediction. Their sole office is to describe the symbols, their acts and operations, and the effects to which they are subjected. The symbols themselves, and the processes through which they pass, are the sole media of prediction. The prophet, accordingly, who was called to describe the instruments of such a prophecy in language, was put in possession of them by an exhibition of the symbols to his senses ; sometimes in a natural way ; in most instances, miraculously in a vision. That method was as proper and necessary to such a species of revelation, as the utterance in the hearing of the prophet of the words of a prediction, was, of revelations that were made through the media of language. It is a peculiarity, therefore, of symbolical prophecies that distinguishes them from those which are verbal, that their symbols were exhibited, either naturally, or in vision, to the prophets who described them, and acted out their several parts, and passed through their representative processes, in their presence and under their observation. The prophets always represent themselves, accordingly, as having seen them, and always describe them, their agency, and the events of which they were the subjects, in the past or historical tense ; never in the predictive or future. But the agents and objects described in the predictions that represent the restoration of the Israelites were not exhibited to the prophets naturally or in vision. Isaiah did not, when he wrote the prediction, Chap.

xi. 10-16, see Assyria and Egypt, Pathros and Cush, Elam and Shinar, Hamath and the islands of the sea, Edom and Moab. He did not see a root of Jesse standing for an ensign of the people, and the Gentiles seeking to it. He did not see him setting up an ensign to the nations, assembling the outcasts of Israel, and gathering the dispersed of Judah from the four corners of the earth; nor Ephraim and Judah flying upon the shoulders of the Philistines towards the west, spoiling them of the east, and receiving obedience from the children of Ammon. There is not the slightest hint in the prophecy that they were present to him naturally, or exhibited to him in vision. Instead, all the actions and events which it foreshows, are represented as *future*. To assume, therefore, that those acts had actually been exhibited, and those events taken place under his notice, as they must if they were symbolic, and interpret them as symbols, is not only unauthorized, but a gross violation of the prophecy. As well may it be assumed with the modern neologists, that it has no predictive character whatever, but is a mere record of the past.

Symbolic prophecies are distinguished from such as are metaphorical, also, by the appropriateness to their nature, of the acts and events that are ascribed to the symbols. All the actions which they are represented as exerting, and all the modifications to which they are subjected, are such as are natural to them. Men act and are acted on as human beings, animals as animals, and winds, storms, volcanoes, and waters, according to their several natures. In metaphorical predictions, on the other hand, the natures, acts, and effects ascribed to agents, are such as are not suitable to them, but only resemble those which are natural to them. Jacob is made a corn-drag, a threshing-wain, and threshes the mountains, and beats the hills into chaff. Joseph is a bough—a bough by a well, that runs over the wall. The wind eats up the pastors. The earth is struck with terror. Pride is cast down. Gates lament and mourn. There is thus the most ample means of discriminating the verbal prophecies from those which are symbolic.

The reason, then, it is apparent from this analysis of the principles on which these and other writers have proceeded,

that the question respecting the restoration of the Israelites has not been satisfactorily determined, lies not in any obscurity or doubtfulness of the prophecies themselves, but in the defective and false views that are entertained of the media through which they are conveyed. The theories on which the writers on both sides have founded their interpretations and arguments, have necessarily led them astray. They have confounded literal language with figurative, and figurative with literal; and thereby darkened that which is clear, and made that doubtful which is certain. They have totally mistaken the laws of figurative language, and assigned it an office that transcends its powers, and subjected it to constructions that violate its nature; and finally, to complete the climax of error, they have treated the agents, objects, and acts, of verbal predictions, as though they were symbols, and thereby converted them into a complication of inconsistencies and absurdities, which generate uncertainty and doubt, just in proportion as they are understood. If these mistaken theories are rejected, and the prophecies interpreted by their proper laws, the question whether they teach that the Israelites are to be restored, cannot remain in doubt. There is no point in the whole compass of revelation capable of a more clear and unanswerable demonstration.

What then are the axioms on which the investigation of it should be conducted? What are the laws, by which the predictions that treat of it, are to be interpreted?

I. IT IS TO BE REGARDED AS AN INDISPUTABLE AXIOM, THAT NO PASSAGE IS FIGURATIVE, UNLESS IT HAS A FIGURE IN IT. To assent to this proposition, self-evident as it is, will, to thousands of writers, be a gigantic stride in the art of interpretation.

II. LANGUAGE NEITHER EVER HAS, NOR CAN HAVE, ANY OTHER MEANING THAN THAT WHICH IS EITHER LITERAL OR FIGURATIVE. The secondary import which terms acquire by being used in respect to religious subjects, and which is sometimes called a spiritual sense, is nothing else than a figurative meaning. Let those who doubt it, designate if they can a term having a signification that does not belong to one or the other of those classes; or if not successful in the endeavor, let

them, if they find their faculties adequate to it, invent for a term a third species of signification.

III. THE WORDS OF A PASSAGE NEVER HAVE, IN ANY ONE OF THE SEVERAL PLACES IN WHICH THEY ARE USED IN IT, MORE THAN ONE MEANING. If that meaning is literal, they have in that instance no other literal and no figurative signification. If it is figurative, they have in that place no other figurative and no literal meaning. They may be used in the same prediction in different senses, but never in the same place fill two dissimilar offices, or bear a double sense.

IV. As passages that are figurative, are such by having figures in them, and as every figure has a nature of its own, belongs to some class, and is to be interpreted by its own law, ALL FIGURATIVE PASSAGES ARE TO BE INTERPRETED BY THE LAWS OF THEIR SEVERAL FIGURES.

V. IN METAPHORICAL PASSAGES, THE AGENT OR OBJECT TO WHICH THE FIGURE IS APPLIED, IS THE AGENT OR SUBJECT OF THAT WHICH THE PREDICTION, EXPRESSED BY THE METAPHOR, FORESHOWS. When it is foretold that Jacob or Israel shall be made a threshing wain, and thresh the mountains, it is that people that is to be and to do that, whatever it is, which the metaphor is employed to express. When God promised to Jeremiah, "I will make thee unto this people a fenced brazen wall; and they shall fight against thee, but they shall not prevail against thee," it was he, not any other person, who was to be and to suffer that which the metaphor is used to signify. To assent to this proposition also, which is as certain and demonstrable as any truth in mathematics, will be to a great crowd of interpreters and critics an immense advance in their art.

VI. As in figurative predictions, the subject of that which is foreshown is that which is expressly named, and to which the figure is applied; and as the office of figures is always that of illustration, THE USE OF TROPICAL LANGUAGE IN PREDICTION, INSTEAD OF RENDERING THE PROPHECY OBSCURE, AND AMBIGUOUS, AS IS USUALLY THOUGHT, CONTRIBUTES TO ITS CLEARNESS AND

CERTAINTY, JUST IN PROPORTION TO THE NUMBER, STRENGTH, AND SPLENDOR OF THE FIGURES. What literal language could have conveyed to Jeremiah such an impressive and sublime assurance that he should be defended from the rage of the people whom his predictions were to offend, as God's promise that he would make him a fenced brazen wall to them, which they would strive in vain, with their mightiest weapons, to break through or overturn?

VII. VERBAL PROPHECIES HAVE NO MEANING EXCEPT THAT OF WHICH THEIR TERMS ARE THE MEDIA. THE AGENTS, OBJECTS, AND ACTS OF WHICH THOSE TERMS ARE THE NAMES, ARE NEVER IN THE SAME INSTANCE USED AS SYMBOLS, AND MADE THE MEDIA OF THE SAME OR ANOTHER PREDICTION.

VIII. SYMBOLICAL PROPHECIES HAVE NO MEANING BUT THAT OF WHICH THEIR SYMBOLS ARE THE MEDIA. THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH THEY ARE DESCRIBED, IS NEVER IN THE SAME INSTANCE THE MEDIA OF THE SAME, OR ANOTHER REVELATION.

Under the guidance of these axioms and laws, we shall find no difficulty in determining whether the prophecies foreshow that the Israelites are to be restored to their land, re-organized as a nation, assume their ancient relation as God's chosen people, and subsist there as such for ever. We have only to find a prophecy that has not yet been fulfilled, of which they are indisputably the subjects, and that declares that they shall be restored, and re-established in that relation to God; and that there are many predictions of that nature, is universally acknowledged. That the prophecies on which we shall found our arguments specifically announce and foretell a return of captives and exiles from other countries to Palestine, and establishment there in a peculiar relation to God, like that of the ancient Israelites, and that the Israelites are the persons who are literally named in them, as the subjects of that restoration, is not disputed even by those who deny that they are prophecies of their restoration. Instead, in their constructions of them, they proceed on that as an admitted and indisputable fact, as openly and absolutely as ourselves. The only questions in debate are, How, being such as they

are, are they to be interpreted? Where is it that their meaning lies? In their language, or in the agents and objects of which they treat? Are they verbal, or are they symbolic? And when these questions are settled, as we have resolved them, the controversy is ended. Those who reject the theories on which writers have heretofore proceeded, and assent to the true laws of language and symbols, will no more deny or doubt that the prophecies teach that the Israelites are to be restored, than those who assent to the definitions and axioms of geometry, will deny the demonstrations that are founded on them. There is not a proposition in the whole circle of human knowledge of more perfect certainty than that God has revealed the purpose of regathering that scattered nation, establishing them again as his chosen people, and reappointing a temple worship at Jerusalem, that is to embrace some of their ancient rites. It is not merely certain, but is taught with a frequency, an emphasis, and an amplitude, and invested with a dignity and grandeur, that are proportionable to the vastness and wonderfulness of the measure in the great scheme of his administration over the world.

Let us now try the question by an analysis of the predictions. We first allege a figurative passage from Jeremiah, in which the law of the metaphor is exemplified, and then literal predictions with which it is associated. In order to the explanation of the first, we transcribe a prediction, by which it is preceded, of the overthrow of the Jewish monarchy.

“Thus saith the Lord : Go down to the house of the king of Judah, and speak there this word, and say, Hear the word of the Lord, O king of Judah, that sittest upon the throne of David, thou, and thy servants, and thy people that enter in by these gates : Thus saith the Lord : Execute ye judgment and righteousness, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor : and do no wrong, do no violence to the stranger, the fatherless, nor the widow, neither shed innocent blood in this place. For if ye do this thing indeed, then shall there enter in by the gates of this house kings sitting upon the throne of David, riding in chariots and on horses, he, and his servants, and his people. But if ye will not hear the words, I swear by myself, saith the Lord, that this house shall become a desolation.”—Jeremiah, chap. xxii. 1-5.

Here is a literal and specific announcement by Jehovah to

the king of Judah and his servants, that unless they ceased from their cruel and bloody tyranny over the people, and executed judgment and righteousness, the monarch's palace should become a desolation. There is no room for question that Jehovah is the speaker, that the king, his servants, and people, are the persons addressed, nor that the event foretold is the desolation of his palace. It is admitted by writers of all classes. This announcement is followed by a metaphorical prediction of the slaughter of the king's family, and an indirect literal prophecy that Jerusalem should be destroyed because of the idolatry of its inhabitants.

"For thus saith the Lord unto the king's house of Judah : Thou art Gilead unto me, and the head of Lebanon ; yet surely I will make thee a wilderness, and cities which are not inhabited. And I will prepare destroyers against thee, every one with his weapons ; and they shall cut down thy choice cedars, and cast them into the fire. And many nations shall pass by this city, and they shall say every man to his neighbor, Wherefore hath the Lord done thus unto this great city ? Then they shall answer, Because they have forsaken the covenant of the Lord their God, and worshipped other gods, and served them."—V. 5-9.

Here the family of the king of Judah is the subject indisputably of the prediction, although they are metaphorized by being denominated Gilead, and the head of Lebanon ; and the destruction that is foretold of them is suited not to their nature, but to that of a cultivated country like Gilead, and a forested mountain like the head of Lebanon—the conversion of one into a wilderness, and uninhabited cities, and the cutting down of the choice cedars of the other, and casting them into the fire ; and instead of weakening the prediction, or rendering it ambiguous, how greatly is its clearness and vividness augmented by the metaphor ! What literal language could have conveyed to the monarch and his family such an impressive conception of the ruin that awaited them, as the image which is employed to illustrate it—the conversion of one of the most fruitful and beautiful portions of Palestine into a desert ; the depopulation of its cities ; and the hewing down and burning of the forests of Lebanon ? Into what vastness is the destruction expanded ! The extinction of millions is employed to exemplify that of a few individuals ; the waste

and desolation of a vast country, to illustrate the annihilation of a single house! Can any misrepresentation, now, of the prediction, be more gross, or indicate a profounder inacquaintance with the laws of language, than a construction which converts the king's family into a mere symbol of some other class of persons, and Jerusalem into a representative of some analogous place in the Gentile world, and thereby empties the prophecy of all its reference to the Jewish monarch and people. Is there a single prediction in the ancient prophets that can be shown to have relation to that people, if this does not? Is there a prophecy in the Old Testament respecting the person or work of Christ, that, if interpreted by such a rule, can retain any reference to him? Is there one that treats of the Gentiles, that will not by that process be divested of its relation to them, and transferred to some other class of agents? Not one. And this question respecting the principle on which such predictions are to be construed, is the precise question, let the reader observe, which we are to try; and it involves the meaning of every history, law, doctrine, promise, and threatening of the Scriptures, as intimately as of these predictions. The whole sense of the revelation God has made to us may justly be said to turn on the decision that is made respecting it. Those, therefore, who are not prepared to usurp such an authority over this class of passages, which predict the overthrow of the Jewish monarchy, and the captivity of that people, and carry their theory through the whole of the sacred volume, must beware how they venture on such a liberty in the interpretation of the opposite class of predictions, which foreshow that the Jews are to be restored from their dispersion, and the monarchy of the house of David re-established over them in their ancient land.

The prophet next proceeds to indicate that the means by which that prediction of the overthrow and destruction of the king's family was to be fulfilled, were slaughter, captivity, and disinherittance.

"Weep ye not for the dead, neither bemoan him: weep sore for him that goeth away; for he shall return no more, nor see his native country. For thus saith the Lord touching Shallum the son of Josiah king of Judah, who reigned instead of Josiah his father, who went forth

out of this place; he shall not return thither any more; but he shall die in the place whither they have led him captive, and shall see this land no more."—V. 10–12.

He was carried to Egypt by Pharaoh Necho, and died there; and that monarch substituted Jehoiakim, another son of Josiah, in his place, whose fate the prophet next foretells.

"Shalt thou reign because thou closest thyself in cedar? Did not thy father eat and drink, and do judgment and justice, and it was well with him? But thine eyes and thine heart, are not but for thy covetousness, and for to shed innocent blood; and for oppression, and for violence, to do it. Therefore thus saith the Lord concerning Jehoiakim the son of Josiah king of Judah, they shall not lament for him, Ah my brother! Ah sister! They shall not lament for him, Ah lord! or Ah his glory! He shall be buried with the burial of an ass, drawn and cast forth beyond the gates of Jerusalem."—V. 15–18.

He was taken captive by Nebuchadnezzar, and bound in fetters to be carried to Babylon. His son Jehoiachim, called Coniah, succeeded him, and was also in the following year carried captive to that city.

"As I live, saith the Lord, though Coniah, the son of Jehoiakim king of Judah, were the signet upon my right hand, yet would I pluck thee thence; and I will give thee into the hand of them that seek thy life, and into the hand of them whose face thou fearest, even into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon, and into the hands of the Chaldeans. And I will cast thee out, and thy mother that bare thee, into another country, where ye were not born; and there shall ye die. But to the land whereunto they desire to return, thither shall they not return."—V. 24–27.

We have thus in these passages both a literal and a figurative prediction of the overthrow of the Jewish monarchy on account of the unjust and tyrannous government which its princes exercised over the people; and impliedly a literal prophecy of the devastation of Jerusalem because of the idolatry of its inhabitants. We now quote the prophecy in the next chapter, of the restoration of the whole nation, Israelites as well as Jews, from exile, in which the prophet assumes

their dispersion because of the crimes of the rulers, as an event that had already taken place. The prediction is first made, like the prophecy of the overthrow of the monarch's family, by a metaphor.

"Woe be unto the pastors that destroy and scatter the sheep of my pasture! saith the Lord. Therefore thus saith the Lord God of Israel against the pastors that feed my people. Ye have scattered my flock, and have driven them away; and have not visited them. Behold I will visit upon you the evil of your doings, saith the Lord. And I will gather the remnant of my flock out of all countries whither I have driven them; and will bring them again into their folds; and they shall be fruitful and increase. And I will set up shepherds over them, which shall feed them; and they shall fear no more, nor be dismayed, neither shall they be lacking, saith the Lord."—Chap. xxiii. 1-4.

Here Jehovah the God of Israel—not merely of Judah—speaks, and that people is denominated by a metaphor, the sheep of his pasture and his flock. This is seen from the express designation of those whom the pastors feed, as his "people." Their rulers are by the same figure, though without an express affirmation, denominated the pastors who "destroy and scatter the sheep of his pasture." That the monarchs and princes are the persons denoted by the pastors, is seen from the consideration that they are the only persons who ruled the Israelites, which is the agency towards a nation, that corresponds to that of a shepherd towards a flock; and from the fact that in the prediction before quoted, their injustice and tyranny are represented as one of the reasons of the judgments which the crimes of the pastors are here said to have occasioned, by which the monarchy was overthrown and the nation driven into exile. And this image was so familiar to the Hebrews, and well understood, as to render it unnecessary to give the metaphor its usual form, by an express affirmation that Jehovah's people, the Israelites, are a flock that feed in his pastures, and the monarchs and rulers their pastors who feed them. Thus the work to which David was called as the monarch of Israel, is expressly represented as that of their shepherd. "The Lord said to thee: *Thou shalt feed my people Israel*; and thou shalt be a *captain* over Israel, 2 Samuel v. 2. This use of the word

feed, appears to have been founded on his work as a shepherd, while he had charge of his father's flock. "He chose David his servant, and took him from the sheepfolds, from following the ewes great with young; he brought him to feed Jacob his people, and Israel his inheritance. So he fed them according to the integrity of his heart, and guided them by the skilfulness of his hands," Ps. lxxviii. 70-2. Cyrus is expressly denominated God's shepherd, in the relation as their monarch, in which he was to restore the Jews from their captivity at Babylon. "He is my shepherd, and shall perform all my pleasure," Isaiah xlv. 28. In like manner the people of Israel were frequently by a similar metaphor denominated a flock. "If they will not hear, my soul shall weep in secret places for your pride; and mine eye shall weep sore, and run down with tears, because *the Lord's flock is carried captive*. Say unto the king and the queen, Humble yourselves; sit down: for your principalities shall come down,—the crown of your glory. The cities of the south shall be shut up, and none shall open: *Judah shall be carried away captive, all of it: it shall be wholly carried away captive*. Lift up your eyes and behold them that come from the north. *Where is the flock* that was given them, the beautiful flock," Jeremiah xiii. 17-20. The flock of the monarch is thus the population of Judea; and the terms are used in this manner in many other passages. God is denominated the Shepherd of Israel, Ps. lxxxi. Christ is represented as acting the part of a shepherd towards his people as a flock, Isaiah xi. 9-11. And the kings of Israel are often denominated pastors, and represented as exercising their office over the people as sheep, Ezekiel xxxiv. And he also who is to reign over them after their restoration is called their Shepherd, Ezekiel xxxvii. 24-25. The pastors, then, are the monarchs and princes, and the Lord's flock the people of Israel. Were it even doubted that the pastors are the rulers, and assumed with LeClerc, against the clear usage of the prophets, and the judgment of almost the whole body of interpreters, that they are false prophets; it is still as indisputable that *the flock which is the subject of the prediction*, is the Israelitish people; as they are expressly called Jehovah's people, whom the pastors fed. It is they therefore who are declared to have been scattered

and driven away, and their descendants, or "remnant," whom God announces that he will gather out of all countries whither he has driven them, and bring them again to their folds. It is not a restoration from Babylon only, but a restoration that is never to be followed by a dispersion; as is seen from the assurance,—*"and they shall be fruitful and increase, and I will set up shepherds over them who shall feed them; and they shall fear no more, nor be 'dismayed, neither shall they be lacking,—or any of them lost, saith the Lord."*

And the figure, like that of the preceding chapter, in place of obscuring, renders the prediction clearer and more impressive than it would have been had it been expressed in literal language. The Hebrews, many of whom were shepherds and herdsmen, and were led by the necessity of rearing sheep, goats, and cattle, for sacrifices, to pay the most minute attention to them, understood well what it was to scatter and drive away a flock from their pasture; what it was to gather them from thickets and mountains to which they had been driven, and restore them to their folds; and what it was to dismiss unfaithful shepherds, and put others in their place, under whom their flocks should multiply in safety, and none of them be lost. And the image undoubtedly gave them a far more vivid conception of their restoration and reorganization under a monarchy, which it is employed to represent, than would have been presented by any literal terms.

And this is the true, the natural, and the only meaning of the passage. It is not symbolical. A flock was not seen by the prophet restored from dispersion to their folds. Had he beheld such a spectacle, either naturally, or in vision, *he* would have been the narrator in the passage, and would have represented it as having been seen by him. He is not the speaker, however, but Jehovah, and he merely records what Jehovah uttered. Moreover, if it were symbolical, then, as the sheep themselves were the representatives, not the Israelites, whom the passage itself shows they are employed to signify, it would still be the Israelitish people whom the sheep symbolize; and thence the prediction would remain as absolutely as before, a prediction of their restoration to their own land, and re-establishment under a monarchy.

The supposition that there is a double representation in the

passage, first, by the sheep of the Israelites, and then by the Israelites of the Christian church, is not only wholly gratuitous and inconsistent with the laws of symbolization, but is shown to be false by the consideration, that the Christian church has not been carried from its native seat into captivity in all other countries, nor been the subject of any analogous calamity. And finally, it cannot be assumed that it is symbolic, except on grounds that would equally justify and require a similar assumption, not only in regard to the prediction of the overthrow of the monarchy in the preceding chapter and others that treat of the Israelites, but in respect to every other metaphorical prediction and narrative in the Scriptures; which would overturn a large share of the most indubitable and important historical statements and prophecies that relate to Christ's birth, ministry, and death, the conversion of the Gentiles, the resurrection of the dead, and all the great themes of revelation respecting the past and future.

This, then, is demonstrably the meaning of the prophecy. There is no conceivable process by which it can be evaded. It cannot be denied that the Israelites are the subject of the prediction, as that would be to contradict the explanation which God himself gives of his flock, as standing for his people. It cannot be denied, that that which God reveals in respect to them is, that he is to gather them from all the countries into which he has driven them, as that would be either to deny again that they are the subjects of the prophecy, or else that the restoration of the flock to their folds, can mean the restoration of the Israelites to their land; and that were to contradict the analogy on which the figure proceeds, and the express prediction in a subsequent verse, that they are again to "dwell in their own land." What change in the condition of the Israelites is it, which the regathering of the scattered flock to their folds can denote, if it is not the restoration of the Israelites to their own land? Can any one doubt that such a return from their dispersion, and re-establishment under a monarch of their own, will be to them what a regathering to their own folds is to a flock of sheep, that has been driven away from its pasture into deserts or mountains, where it is exposed without protection, to the elements and wild beasts?

Can any one deny that the promise that God will set up shepherds over them that shall feed them, is a promise that they are to have princes or rulers of their own placed over them, and are therefore to have a national organization? That would be to deny that those who are to be placed over them, are to sustain a relation towards them, like that of shepherds to their flocks, which would be to contradict the analogy on which the figure is employed. What relation can those who are denominated shepherds, have to the Israelites considered as a flock, if it is not in accordance with the established usage of the Hebrews, that of princes who are to rule them? What a zeal to get rid of the great purpose which God thus reveals, must animate those who, in defiance of all these considerations, deny that this is a prophecy of the restoration of that people!

Here then is a prediction, that, on the one hand, admits of no other construction; and on the other, is raised to the utmost precision and clearness of meaning, by the figure that is employed to illustrate it, that God is to gather the Israelites from all the countries in which they are scattered, at the time of its accomplishment, and re-establish them under a monarchy in their own land. When then is that restoration to take place? The period is designated in the prophecy that immediately follows.

“Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise unto David a righteous Branch; and a king shall reign and prosper, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth. In his days Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely; and this is his name whereby he shall be called, JEHOVAH OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS. Therefore behold the days come, saith the Lord, that they shall no more say, The Lord liveth which brought up the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt; but the Lord liveth which brought up, and which led the seed of the house of Israel out of the north country, and from all countries whither I had driven them: and they shall dwell in their own land.”—V. 5-8.

1. The Israelites are indisputably the subjects of this prophecy, as they are expressly designated as the seed that is to be led out of the north country, and from all countries whither they have been driven, and dwell in their own land. 2. It is

a prophecy of their restoration, then, and organization as a nation under a monarchy ; as they are not only to be led back as they were brought up out of Egypt, and dwell in their own land, but a king is to reign over them, and they are to be saved and dwell safely under his administration. 3. That monarch is Christ, as is seen from the title by which he is to be distinguished—JEHOVAH OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS. It is shown also by his denominative as a righteous Branch unto David, as that term is employed to designate him as the Messiah, not only by this prophet, but by Isaiah and Zechariah. In this construction, the whole series of interpreters, both Jewish and Christian, with scarce an exception, concur. 4. It is a restoration and organization, therefore, that is still future. It was to take place after the Messiah was raised up as a Branch unto David, and therefore after his birth. But no such restoration has been accomplished since Christ's first advent. So far from it, the final dispersion of the Jews did not take place till after his ascension, and they and the other tribes still continue exiles from their ancient land. 5. It is not only future, but it is not to take place till after Christ's second advent, as his reign, under which it is to be accomplished, is to be on the earth. It is on the earth "that he is to reign and prosper, and execute judgment and justice, as the Branch unto David ;" for it is on the throne of David that he is to exercise his administration over Israel, as is seen from the parallel passage, chap. xxxiii. 15–17. "In those days, and at that time, will I cause the Branch of righteousness to grow up unto David, and he shall execute judgment and righteousness *in the land*. *In those days* shall Judah be saved, and Jerusalem shall dwell safely ; and this is the name wherewith he shall be called, The Lord our Righteousness. For thus, saith the Lord, David shall never want a man to sit upon the throne of the house of Israel." It is in the days of his reign on the throne of David, therefore, in Judea, that this prophecy is to receive its accomplishment, and thence, after his second coming. It cannot be said that Christ now sits on the throne of David. Instead, he sits with the Father on his throne. David's throne was the throne of the Israelitish nation in Palestine, not the throne of the universe. To ascribe to him that throne, were to deify him, by ascribing to him the pre-

rogatives and government of the Almighty, and exhibiting him as the object of homage and obedience, not only to man, but to all orders of intelligences.

This is clearly, then, a prophecy of the return and reorganization of the Israelites as a nation, at a period subsequent to Christ's second advent and commencement of his millennial reign on the earth. There is no expedient by which any other meaning can be assigned to it. There is no ground for the pretence that the terms in which the prediction in respect to the Israelites is expressed are figurative. The verbs reign, prosper, execute, saved, dwell, and brought up, are used in their literal sense, and the meaning of the latter is exemplified as such by its use in describing the migration, under the divine guidance, of the children of Israel, from Egypt to Canaan. There is no ground on which they can be held to be tropical, except the false and preposterous assumption that language may be figurative that has no figure in it. There is no room for the pretence that the prediction is symbolical. The agents and actions were not seen by the prophet, either naturally or in vision. They were not naturally, for they are represented as future, not as past. They were not miraculously, as that is equally inconsistent with the prediction of them as future. The prophet is not the narrator of the prophecy, but its mere scribe. His record is a record of what he heard from Jehovah, not a description of a spectacle which he had seen. This characteristic of the prediction can no more be set aside by the interpreter, than the whole substance of the language itself. It were to assume that the facts on which it proceeds, and the media through which it was made, were wholly different from those which its form, and the language in which it is expressed, indicate; and that it is therefore a consummate misrepresentation, in place of a true prophecy. Can a more open and lawless violation of the word of God be conceived? There is no corresponding event which their return to their own land can symbolize. If the apostate and captive Israelites are symbols, they must represent persons of an analogous character and condition; and apostates, therefore, of some other order, and in some other species of captivity or dispersion. But if they are symbols of a different class of apostates, then their symbolic

return cannot, as some have assumed, denote their own conversion ; if it symbolizes a conversion at all, it must be a conversion of Gentiles. Their return, however, to their own land, is not adapted to symbolize a conversion. There is no analogy between a migration from one country to another, and a new creation in Christ. The one is a change of geographical position, which has no necessary or established connexion with a change of the heart ; the other is a change of the heart, which has no natural or established connexion with a geographical position. It cannot denote the conversion of Gentiles, therefore ; nor can it denote an analogous return of apostate Gentiles from a resembling dispersion and captivity in foreign lands, inasmuch as the Gentile apostates are not in such a state of dispersion and vassalage. The supposition is inconsistent in every relation with the condition of the idolatrous Gentile churches, and the representations of the Scriptures respecting the restoration of the Israelites. It is from the dominion of apostate Christian Gentiles in a large degree, that they represent that the Israelites are to be delivered, not those apostate Gentiles from the dominion of some other species of men, that have no existence in the world. There is no pretence, then, on which it can be treated either as figurative or symbolical, unless it be on the assumption that neither figurative nor symbolic prophecies have any distinguishing characteristics, or peculiar laws ; that the interpreter is at liberty to presume that the media through which the predictions are made are wholly different from those which they themselves represent ; and that he may therefore expound them on any hypothesis he pleases, and assign to them any form and any meaning that ignorance, prejudice, or fancy, may suggest. This is the position which they will find themselves obliged ultimately to assume, who undertake to treat the prophecy either as metaphorical or symbolic. Let them survey the bottomless abyss into which they must precipitate themselves, before they make the irreversible plunge.

There are many other passages, that are neither figurative nor symbolic, that foreshow a restoration of that people that is yet future. Thus, in Jeremiah, chap. xxx. 1-10, a return is

predicted that is never to be followed by a vassalage to strangers :

“ Thus speaketh the Lord God of Israel, saying, Write thou all the words that I have spoken unto thee in a book. For lo, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel and Judah, saith the Lord. And I will cause them to return to the land that I gave to their fathers, and they shall possess it. For it shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord of hosts, I will break his yoke from off thy neck, and will burst thy bonds, and strangers shall no more serve themselves of him. But they shall serve the Lord their God, and David their king, whom I will raise up unto them. Therefore fear thou not, O my servant Jacob, saith the Lord, neither be dismayed, O Israel, for lo, I will save thee from afar, and thy seed from the land of thy captivity ; and Jacob shall return, and shall be in rest and be quiet, and none shall make him afraid. For I am with thee, saith the Lord, to save thee : Though I make a full end of all nations whither I have scattered thee, yet will I not make a full end of thee ; but I will correct thee in measure, and will not leave thee altogether unpunished.”

This prophecy has much the same characteristics as the former, and is a clear revelation and promise of a restoration of the Israelites to their own land, and re-organization as a nation under a prince of the house of David, that is never to be followed by a vassalage to enemies, or a dispersion. 1. The Israelites are the subject of the prediction. This is shown by the relation in which it is spoken by Jehovah. His uttering it as the God of Israel, indicates that it is as the God of that people, that he is to verify it ; and that it relates, therefore, to them. They are expressly designated as its subjects. It is his “ people Israel and Judah.” It is his servant Jacob, and Israel, whom he is to cause to return to the land which he gave to their fathers. And the whole of the people are its subjects. It is that nation absolutely, Israel and Judah, Jacob and his seed, that are to be saved from the land of their captivity ; not a part of them only. The restoration of a part only would not be a full accomplishment of the promise : for while a portion of them remained in exile from their national country, it would still be as true that his people, Israel and Judah, had not returned to the land which he gave their

fathers, as it would that they had ; as true that they did not possess it, as it would that they did ; and as true that their yoke and bonds were not broken, as it would be that they were. It cannot be absolutely fulfilled, until it is verified in respect to every individual of that people. Its terms are not partial, but comprehensive of the whole, and absolute. There is no method by which this feature of the prediction can be erased, and another nation or class made its subjects, except by violating the clearest and most essential laws of language, and usurping the right of arbitrarily determining what the theme is of which it treats. 2. Its fulfilment, therefore, is yet future. First, because no such universal restoration has taken place since the prophecy was uttered. The return from Babylon was not a return of the whole nation who had been carried into captivity by the Assyrians and Babylonians. It was a return of Jews, chiefly, not of the ten tribes ; and did not embrace all of those even who had been carried or driven into exile by the Chaldeans, Ezra ii. 1 ; vii. 6-13 ; viii. 1-15. Next, because, if they had all been restored at that period, it would not have constituted a fulfilment of this prophecy, inasmuch as that restoration was followed by another dispersion and captivity. But after the release from bondage and return, here predicted, strangers are never again to serve themselves of them. The promise is as applicable to the descendants of the ten tribes, whose ancestors never returned to Palestine, and the descendants of the Jews who were sold into slavery, and driven into exile by the Romans, as it was at its utterance to the captives in Babylonia, Assyria, and Egypt ; and it cannot be fully verified till they universally enjoy a restoration that is never to be succeeded by a vassalage to Gentiles. Thirdly, because it is a return to a national organization under the monarchy of David their King, whom interpreters, both Jewish and Christian with scarce an exception, regard as the Messiah. It is future, therefore, as the Israelites have neither been restored from their dispersion since Christ's first advent, nor served him as their king ; but instead, have as a nation rejected, and still reject him. If the king whom they are to serve be supposed to be some other descendant of David, still his reign must be future, inasmuch as no king of his line has reigned

over them since their return from Babylon. They continued in subordination to the Persians till that people were conquered by the Greeks, and remained subject to the Greeks till they fell under the dominion of the Romans, by whom, in attempting to extricate themselves from their power, they were driven into the exile in which they continue to the present time. Fourthly, because it is a restoration that is to be accompanied and followed by their reformation and consecration to God. They are then to "serve the Lord their God." That has never been their characteristic since their return from Babylonia, nor had it been for a period, would it have been the fulfilment of the prediction, inasmuch as they have again revolted, and are still in apostasy. But after the return here foreshown, they are never to give occasion, by another rebellion, to be driven again into exile. Jacob is never afterwards to have cause to fear, nor Israel to be dismayed; but he shall return and shall be in rest, and be quiet, and none shall make him afraid. It is, therefore, still future.

We add another prediction of their restoration, in which figures are employed, to illustrate the perpetuity of David's reign over them, and the multitude of his descendants:

"I will cause the captivity of Judah, and the captivity of Israel to return, and will build them as at first, and I will cleanse them from all their iniquity, whereby they have sinned against me, and will pardon all their iniquities whereby they sinned, and whereby they have transgressed against me. And it shall be to me a name of joy, a praise and an honor before all the nations of the earth, which shall hear all the good that I do unto them; and they shall fear and tremble for all the goodness and for all the prosperity that I procure unto it. . . . For I will cause to return the captivity of the land as at the first, saith the Lord. Thus saith the Lord of hosts, Again in this place, which is desolate without men and without beast, and in all the cities thereof, shall be as a habitation of shepherds causing flocks to lie down. In the cities of the mountains and in the cities of the vale, and in the cities of the south, and in the land of Benjamin, and in the places about Jerusalem, and in the cities of Judah, shall the flocks pass again under the hands of him that telleth them, saith the Lord. Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will perform that good thing which I have promised unto the house of Israel and to the house of Judah. In those days, and at that time, will I cause the Branch of righteousness to grow

up unto David, and he shall execute judgment and righteousness in the land. In those days shall Judah be saved, and Jerusalem shall dwell safely, and this is the name wherewith he shall be called, Jehovah our righteousness. For thus saith the Lord, David shall never want a man to sit upon the throne of the house of Israel. Neither shall the priests the Levites want a man before me to offer burnt-offerings, and to kindle meat-offerings, and to do sacrifice continually. And the word of the Lord came unto Jeremiah saying, Thus saith the Lord, If ye can break my covenant of the day and my covenant of the night; and that there should not be day and night in their season; Then may also my covenant be broken with David my servant, that he should not have a son to reign upon his throne, and with the Levites the priests, my ministers. As the host of heaven cannot be numbered, neither the sand of the sea measured, so will I multiply the seed of David my servant, and the Levites that minister unto me."—Jeremiah xxxiii. 14–22.

Here the house of Judah and the house of Israel are the subjects of the promise. The restoration predicted is to be a restoration from the land of their captivity to Palestine; its mountains and vales, the cities of the south, the cities of Benjamin, the cities of Judah, and the whole land that had become desolate. It is to be attended by their universal sanctification and universal forgiveness. They are to be cleansed from all their iniquity whereby they have sinned, and pardoned all their offences whereby they have transgressed. Its period is the reign of the Messiah on the earth, "In those days *and at that time*, the Branch of righteousness is to grow up unto David, and execute judgment and righteousness in the earth." After it takes place, there is never to be a period when there shall not be a descendant of David to sit on the throne of the house of Israel, nor when there shall not be Levites to offer meat-offerings, and present sacrifices continually. Instead, their numbers are to equal the host of heaven and the sand of the sea. The ground of the certainty that a king of that line, and priests of that family, shall never be wanting, is God's covenant with David and with the Levites; and that covenant is as inviolable by him as the decree by which the succession of day and night takes place is by the Israelites. Thus saith the Lord, If ye can break my covenant of the day, and my covenant of the night, and cause that there should not be day and night in their season, then may

also my covenant be broken with David my servant, that he should not have a son to reign on his throne, and with the Levites, the priests, my ministers. It is as impossible, then, to God to violate his covenant with David, that he should never, after this restoration, be without a son to reign on the throne of Israel, and with the Levites, that they shall never be without descendants to offer sacrifices, as it is to the Israelites to prevent the succession of day and night. To what a grandeur of assurance is the promise raised by this indirect comparison! There is not in the whole circle of language another simile of such vastness and strength. The impossibility to God of breaking his covenant is like the impossibility to men of acts to which omnipotence alone is equal! And from this great truth results another, let the reader observe, equally certain, and as awful as this is sublime. They who maintain that it is God's purpose to violate this promise, by leaving the Israelites in their dispersion, without a national throne and monarch of the line of David, impute to him, what is as contradictory to his moral perfections, as it were inconsistent with man's physical nature to ascribe to him the power of arresting the earth in its revolution and putting an end to the succession of night and day! Let them pause, and weigh its dreadful import, before they venture to assume such an attitude towards the Holy One of Israel. But if their offence is thus great, the principles by which they are led to it must be proportionably false and lawless. And what grosser violence can be offered to language than to attempt to expunge from this passage the whole import of which its terms are the vehicle, and make the agents, objects, and events of which they are the names the media of its meaning? Have they any higher right to treat the house of Israel and the house of Judah as mere symbols of Gentiles, than the ancient Docetæ had to erase Jesus from the history of the crucifixion, and put a spectre in his stead?—than those neologists have for their construction of that narrative, who strike out the words, "he gave up the ghost," and substitute "swooned" in their place? or those who, in order to adjust the story of his transfiguration to their philosophy, change the statement, "the fashion of his countenance was altered and his raiment made white," into the mere affirma-

tion respecting the *apostles*, "*they dreamed*" that he was transfigured before them, and his raiment became shining, by which *they* are made the subjects of the event instead of him?

But the theory that this prophecy is symbolical, is as impracticable as it is groundless. No such agents, objects, and events can be found as those of the passage can, conformably to the laws of symbolization, represent. If, as is assumed by those who attempt to give them a representative meaning, the house of Israel and the house of Judah denote Gentiles, what two classes of Gentiles are they, of whom they are the representatives? The ten tribes and the Jews were at the period of the prediction apostates, and their descendants have been through a long tract of ages. What two bodies of Gentile apostates are there that answer to them? Of what is the return of the Israelites and Jews from captivity the symbol? Are two bodies of Gentile apostates to migrate in a resembling manner from a state of exile and dispersion to a land that was in a former age occupied by their ancestors? Is there any country in Christendom that has been given to a Gentile nation now apostate and in exile, by a covenant with their ancestors, in a manner analogous to that by which Canaan was given to Abraham's posterity? If it is not a migration, what is the resembling act which the return denotes? What is it of which the conversion and forgiveness of the Israelites are symbols? What are the changes of apostate Gentiles, that so resemble the renovation and pardon of Jews, that the latter can serve as their appropriate representative? As, by the laws of symbolization, places always denote places, what are the places which the territories of Judah and Benjamin, the mountains and vales, Jerusalem and the inferior cities, and the whole land that was laid waste, denote? Are there any dilapidated cities and desolate territories that sustain the same relation to apostate Gentiles that are in dispersion and exile, that the territories and cities of Palestine sustain to the Israelites? If the whole of the Israelites and Jews denote the whole of the Gentiles, what do the flocks that belong to the Israelites and Jews represent? Not Gentiles, surely. Is there any class of nations that sustain the same relation to the whole Gentile world, which the flocks owned by the Jews and Israelites sustain to them? Of what is the throne of the

house of Israel the representative? Who is denoted by the son of David, who is to sit on it? Who are represented by the Levites; and of what are their sacrifices the symbols? What are the periods that correspond to day and night? And what are the objects for which the host of heaven and the sand of the sea stand? Above all, of what is the impossibility to God of breaking his covenant the representative; and the impossibility to man of intercepting the revolution of the earth, numbering the stars, measuring the sand of the sea, and counting the descendants of David and the Levites? Those who attempt to treat the prophecy as symbolical, are bound to find agents, objects, events, and periods, that correspond according to the laws of analogy to all these as representatives. If they cannot carry their theory through, and show at least the possibility of its being verified, it is an unanswerable proof that it is false. But there are no such classes of Gentiles as the supposed symbols require; no such migrations; no such conversion and pardon; no such countries, mountains, and cities; nothing that answers to the flocks, the throne, the monarch, the priests and sacrifices, day and night, the host of heaven, the sand of the sea, or those impossibilities to God and man. The scheme is not only wholly gratuitous, and without a solitary consideration to recommend it, but is embarrassed at every point by difficulties, and confuted by contradictions, which no ingenuity can overcome. None that are not totally ignorant of the laws of symbolic representation, would ever attempt to subject the passage to such an absurd and monstrous violation. What a phrensy of infatuation must have seized those who, in despite of these appalling obstacles, can persist in an attempt to expunge from it all reference to the children of Israel, and force on it a meaning that at once contradicts the laws both of language and of symbols, and impeaches the veracity of the Almighty!

We have seen how the comparison of the impossibilities of God's violating this covenant, with man's inability to arrest the earth's revolution on its axis, illustrates and aggrandizes the certainty that David is never, after this restoration of Israel, to want a son to sit on his throne, and demonstrates with a corresponding strength, that their restoration is still future. Another similar proof is presented in the comparison

of the impossibility of numbering the descendants of David and the Levites with the impossibility of counting the hosts of heaven and measuring the sand of the sea. "As the hosts of heaven cannot be numbered, neither the sand of the sea measured; so will I multiply the seed of David my servant, and the Levites that minister unto me." What a vast conception! Their multitude is to be such, that to count them will as far transcend the powers of man, as to enumerate the stars of heaven, or measure the sands of the shore! The fulfilment of this promise, then, is not only future, but its verification must extend through an immeasurable round of ages! Their multiplication, like the throne of their monarch, must continue for ever! And the meaning of this language is indisputably that which belongs to it literally. The object of this and the simile that precedes it, and that which is affirmed of them, cannot in these instances, by any possibility, have a mere symbolic office. It is an invariable and necessary law of this figure that the things that are named as the subjects of the verbal affirmation, are the things that are compared, and have that nature which their names express, and that relation to each other, which the affirmation respecting them declares. Otherwise, the proposition would not be true. On the supposition, then, that these passages are symbolical, still the subjects of the comparison must be those that are named in them, *and must have that resemblance to each other which the comparison asserts*. Otherwise, *they and their similitudes cannot*, as is assumed, *be the symbols*; and if they are not the symbols, then as there are no other agents or objects named in them, the passages cannot be symbolic. As therefore the things that are compared, actually have that relation to each other which the comparisons affirm, it still would remain as absolutely certain, were it even admitted that they are used as symbols, as though no such supposition were made, that what they affirm respecting God and man, the stars of heaven, the seed of David, the sands of the sea and the Levites, is true,—that God will so multiply the seed of David his servant, and the Levites his ministers, that it will be as impracticable to man to number them, as it is to count the stars of heaven, or measure the sand of the sea; and that it is as impossible to God to break

his promise that David shall never want a son to sit on the throne of the house of Israel, nor the Levites descendants to offer sacrifices continually, as it is to man to stop the earth's revolution on its axis, and put an end to the succession of night and day! The attempt, then, to erase from this prophecy its true meaning under the pretence that it is symbolical, cannot be successful even on the supposition that its objects are used in that relation. So far from it, *the fact that they are what they are, and sustain that relation to each other which the affirmations declare, must be admitted and made the basis of the use of them as symbols!* On whichever theory then the passage is construed, it remains an indisputable fact, that it is as impossible to God to break his promise that a descendant of David shall reign on the throne of Israel through eternal ages, as it is to man to baffle his omnipotence and prevent him from continuing the succession of day and night; and that he is so to multiply the seed of David and the Levites, that it will be as impossible to man to number them, as it is to count the stars, or measure the sands of the sea! It is equally certain, therefore, that the Israelites are to be restored to their own land, be re-organized as a nation, and reside and multiply there for ever; and thence that their restoration is future. Such is the vastness and resplendence of the demonstration of this great truth, of which these figures are the vehicle! Instead of obscuring the meaning, they invest it with a dazzling effulgence! In place of veiling the divine purposes in ambiguousness and uncertainty, they place it out of the power of man, either by blunders or art, to wrench from them their true meaning. And God, in using them, has displayed that beauty of wisdom which is ever seen in the adaptation of the means he uses to the ends for which he employs them.

We might allege many other passages in which their restoration is foretold with equal clearness, either in literal or figurative terms, but these are sufficient to exemplify the differing forms of the predictions, and the principles on which they are to be interpreted. Were it revealed in but a single passage, it would be entitled to our implicit belief. But the frequency with which it is announced, the absolute impossibility, from the figures through which it is foreshown, of

erasing it and infusing another meaning without violating the most indubitable and essential laws of speech, and the extraordinary exemplifications which God has given of its certainty, raise it to a grandeur of demonstration that has scarcely been given to any other future event, and should make doubt impossible. Let those who still question or deny it consider, that to justify their denial, they must confute the principles of interpretation on which our constructions are founded, and offer and demonstrate others that lead legitimately to the opposite results. If unable to accomplish that, how can they vindicate themselves in rejecting the issues to which these principles lead? Is it any less worthy of them as critics, than it is as believers, to deny that that is foreshown in the word of God which they cannot demonstrate is not its genuine and sole meaning—which they cannot assail, except on grounds that make language universally ambiguous, and divest us of all certainty of knowledge? But to set aside the constructions which we have given of these prophecies they will find no easy task. They can accomplish it in no other way than by proving either that the Israelites are not the subjects of these predictions, or else, that that which is foretold of them is not their restoration. If they attempt the former, it must be on the ground either that the predictions are symbolical, and that the Israelites therefore are not the subjects of that which is foreshown, but mere representatives of another class of men; or else, that the predictions are figurative, and therefore, that in a metaphorical prediction, *the subject* of the affirmation is used by that figure as well as the affirmation itself. If they assume that they are symbolical, it must be on the ground, either that—conformably to the theory of Origen—the whole Scriptures are representative, or else, that these predictions have the peculiarities of the symbolical prophecies of Ezekiel, Daniel, Zechariah, and John; that their agents, objects, and events, therefore, were seen by the prophet either in vision or naturally, and are described as having been beheld by him, and as being the media of the prediction; and in either case they must be interpreted conformably with the laws of symbolization, and the analogous agents, objects, and events, pointed out, which they represent. They must show, accordingly, not only whom the Israelites, Jerusalem, and Judea

symbolize, but what analogous class are represented by the Gentiles, the condition from which they were to return, and what analogous act or event their return itself denotes. If they find themselves baffled in that absurd and impracticable task, and assume that they are metaphorical, and yet that the Israelites are not the subjects of the predictions, they must then prove that in the metaphor the figure embraces the subject of the affirmation, as well as the affirmation itself, and that in the declaration, therefore, "God is a consuming fire," God is not the being of whom the affirmation is made, any more than he is literally a fire, as he is affirmed to be: but that the name denotes some resembling agent, on precisely the same principle as fire denotes something analogous in him in relation to his enemies; and they must accordingly allege instances of such a species of metaphor, show it to be their law universally, demonstrate that it is with that meaning that we are conscious that we employ them, and finally—which will be a task of equal difficulty—show who or what it is which the subject of the metaphorical affirmation—if it be used in that manner—denotes. Who is it, for example, that the word God denotes in the expression, "God is a consuming fire," if God is not the being for whom the name stands? Who or what is it that wisdom denotes, if used on that principle, in the affirmation that "she is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her?" If they abandon that theory as untenable, and admitting that the Israelites are the subjects of the predictions, still affirm that they are figurative, and do not foreshow their restoration to their own land, but some event of a different kind, they must, in order to maintain that position, prove that that which is affirmed in a metaphor is not incompatible with the subject to which it is applied, and that passages therefore are metaphorical, that are nevertheless wholly without a metaphor! Whatever course they may choose to pursue, let them, ere they reject the plain meaning of the predictions, demonstrate the grounds on which they proceed with a clearness and certainty adequate to the refutation of the views we have advanced, and proportionable to the greatness, the dignity, and the importance of the subject.

ART. III.—GOD IN CHRIST. Three Discourses delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language. By Horace Bushnell. Hartford: Brown and Parsons.

BY THE EDITOR.

DR. BUSHNELL treats, in his Discourses, of the Trinity, Christ's death, and the proper means of reviving religion; and instead of the doctrines of revelation, presents views of them much like those of a class of German rationalists, who reject the inspiration of the Scriptures, and substitute in place of their teachings a philosophic system, made up of elements taken partly from the material pantheism of Swedenborg, and partly from the idealism of Kant and Hegel. The ground of the names, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, he holds, is not a distinction in the nature of the Deity, but only a diversity in the manifestations which he makes of himself. He regards Christ's death as merely expressive of his thoughts and feelings in relation to sinners, not as making an expiation for their sins; and the method he proposes for the revival of piety, is the rejection of systematic theology, the disuse in a large degree of doctrinal teaching, and the cultivation of the imagination and of feeling in religion, in place of clear views and an exact knowledge of what God has revealed of himself and his government.

The design of the Dissertation is to unfold the process by which he was led to adopt the doctrines of the Discourses, by a theory of language, which exhibits it as inadequate to an exact expression of thought, ascribes vagueness and ambiguity to the phraseology of the Scriptures, and represents that their meaning is to be determined rather by the fancy and heart, than by the intellect and the laws of philology and logic. He says:—

"There is . . . a single subject in regard to which I was long ago brought, in the way of self-extrication, to take up views somewhat different from those which seem more generally to prevail; and, as I have

been drawn partly in this manner, into what may seem peculiar in the doctrines and argumentation of the Discourses that follow, I deem it my duty to conduct my reader, if possible, into the views I hold of that subject, that I may assist him thus to understand my position more fully. The subject of which I speak is language."—P. 11.

Whether the theory he advances on this subject lays any foundation for the doctrines of the Discourses or not—if it be true, it undoubtedly shows what he employs it to prove, that language is not an adequate vehicle of thought, and that the revelation accordingly which God has made through it is not suited to be the means of a clear and accurate knowledge of the subjects of which it treats. It is entitled, therefore, to consideration, and we shall make it the object of the present article to ascertain what it is, and what the results are to which, if true, it must necessarily lead, without consideration of the question whether he follows it to its legitimate issues, or whether it was the cause or is a consequence of his theological system.

The first element of his theory is the representation, that all names of physical things are literal, and employed, with few exceptions, arbitrarily. The next, that all names of spiritual things are figurative, and drawn from things that are physical. The third, the assumption, on the ground of that asserted origin and use of words, that they are not exact representatives of the things for which they stand, but vague, ambiguous, and suggestive merely. The fourth, the assertion of what that position implies, that, therefore, they are not an adequate vehicle of thought, and cannot be made the media to the intellect, of an absolute knowledge of God, or his will. The fifth, the inference from that inadequacy, that a true knowledge of him is not to be drawn from the Scriptures by the interpretation of their language by its proper laws. The sixth, that it is by the imagination, rather than the understanding, that just views are to be formed of him and his government. And the conclusion which he deduces from this result and wishes his readers to apply to his Discourses is, that a greater latitude should be admitted in the construction of the Sacred Volume, and a readier toleration allowed of diversities of opinion in the ministers of the gospel.

Or, to vary the order of the steps by which he attempts to reach that conclusion: he assumes and asserts, that the signs of thought employed in the Scriptures are wholly incapable of being made the media of a clear and certain revelation to the intellect, of God and his will;—on the ground that they are not exact signs or representatives of the things for which they stand; and because—as he holds—those of them which are names of spiritual things, are used by a figure drawn from things that are physical; and those which are names of physical things are used arbitrarily, or without any adaptation more than others to bear the meaning which they are employed to express. He thence assumes, that theology is to be the work of the fancy more than the intellect, and consequently that a greater liberty of interpretation should be allowed, and a fuller toleration of different theological systems.

These are certainly intrepid views. It is a novelty for a professed minister of the gospel openly to build his theological system on the assumption, on the one hand, that language is universally ambiguous and unfit for the exact expression of thought, and that God therefore cannot clearly reveal himself through that medium; and on the other, that the obstacles which baffle his Omniscience and Omnipotence, man himself is able to overcome with little difficulty; and thence that his speculations under the guidance of his fancy and heart are of higher authority than God's revealed will. His theory will be found, however, on examination, to be as mistaken as it is novel. We shall quote sufficiently to show the mode in which he presents it, and point out its defects and mistakes.

I. He represents the names of physical things as universally literal, and with rare exceptions used arbitrarily, or without any ground in analogy. As under their literal names he comprises not only the names of all physical objects, but also of all their "demonstrations, including the names" of their actions, inasmuch as "verbs, prior to the formation of grammar, are only nouns or names of actions;" the meaning of his proposition is, that no words are ever used *figuratively* in the designation or description of physical objects, or their acts or phenomena, but that universally, when appropriated to that office, they are employed in their literal sense. The confidence with which he advances it may be seen from the following passages.

"There is no difficulty in perceiving how our two unlanguageed men will proceed, when thrown together in the manner supposed, as far as the naming of sensations or physical objects is concerned. For the object is always present as a mediator or interpreter between them, so that when a sound is uttered as a name for it, or in connexion with it, they may always know to what the name refers. Thus all sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, or feelings, or what is the same, their objects, are easily named, and their names will come into currency without difficulty, when sounded as representatives of the objects. As to the sounds adopted, they will generally be determined arbitrarily, or at least by causes so occult or remote, that we must regard them as arbitrary. No theory of sound, as connected with sense in the names of things, will be found to hold extensively enough to give it any moment.

"We have now seen how our two language-makers will get on, in the naming of things, or physical objects. In this manner they will make out a string of *nouns* or names, which may be called a noun-language. *It will comprise the names of all physical objects and demonstrations, including, of course, the names of actions*; for verbs, prior to the formation of grammar, are only the nouns or names of actions. Thus far we have only generated a physical language, or terms of physical import. And thus far animals are capable of language: they can learn, though not as easily and on so large a scale as we, to associate names or sounds, with outward things and actions.

"There now remains to be formed another sphere of language, wholly distinct, which the animals cannot learn, viz. *the language of intelligence*; that which, under an outward form, carries an inward sense, and so avails to serve the uses of mind."—*Dissertation*, pp. 19–21.

"We find, then, that every language contains two distinct departments:—*the physical department*,—that which provides names for *things*; and *the intellectual department*,—that which provides names for *thought and spirit*. In the former, names are simple representatives of things which even the animals may learn. In the latter, names are used as the representatives of thought, and cannot therefore be learned, save by beings of intelligence."—P. 24.

"There are, as we discover, two languages, in fact, in every language. Or perhaps, I shall be understood more exactly, if I say, that there are, in every human tongue, two distinct departments. First, there is a *literal* department, in which sounds are provided as names for *physical objects and appearances*. Secondly, there is a department of analogy or figure, where physical objects and appearances are named as images of *thought or spirit*, through the physical images received into them. . . .

They raise a distinction between what they call the *literal* and *figurative* uses of the word. But this distinction of literal and figurative, it does not appear to be noticed, even by philosophers, runs through the very body of the language itself, making two departments: one that comprises *the terms of sensation*, and the other *the terms of thought*."—*Dissertation*, pp. 38–43.

He thus represents that figures are never used in the designation and description of physical things, whether external objects, their phenomena, or the sensations they excite; and alleges that the tropical use of terms is confined to the expression of what relates exclusively to spiritual things. No mistake, however, could be greater or more singular. The use of terms figuratively in the denomination and description of physical objects, if less frequent proportionately than in reference to the mind, is yet so common as to form a very conspicuous feature of language. As figures are founded on analogy, and analogies subsist between physical things of different species, as well as between material and intellectual, their use is as legitimate, as natural, and as customary, wherever analogies exist in the physical world, as in the spiritual. The verb, to fly, for example, literally denotes a bird's or insect's movement of itself through the air by its wings: but it is used by a metaphor to express the motion of any other physical object, either through the air, along the ground, or on the water, that presents a resemblance, in ease and rapidity, to that winged movement. Thus a cloud that is moved swiftly by the wind through the air, is said to fly, and a ship that is driven rapidly by a gale along the surface of the water. The verb is used also to express the rush of a locomotive engine on the track of a railroad. In like manner, the verb to sail, which literally denotes the movement of a boat or ship along the water by the action of the wind on its canvas, is employed to express the slow and regular motion of a cloud borne along by the air; the flight of a bird when it advances onward, or wheels in a circle, without moving its wings; and other motions of physical objects that resemble the movement of a vessel impelled by the wind. The verbs float and waft are used also in a similar manner. There is, indeed, not only an

analogy between physical things that is made the basis of figures, but it is much more palpable and conspicuous than that which subsists between material and spiritual things, and is the ground of by far the most numerous, beautiful, and effective of the figures of rhetoric and poetry. Thus the noblest figure in the *Paradise Lost*, is the comparison of Satan's

"Ponderous *shield*

Hung on his shoulders to the *moon*, whose orb,
Through optic glass, the Tuscan artist views
At evening from the top of Fesolè,
Or in Valdarno, to descry new lands,
Rivers, or mountains on her spotty globe."

Both of these objects are certainly physical. The finest figures of Homer, also, are his comparisons of men, *as objects of the senses*, to other physical things: as of the agitation of the Greeks at Agamemnon's proposal to abandon the siege of Troy, to the heaving of a sea in a storm, and the bending of grain under a surging wind.

"Commotion shook

The whole assembly, such as heaves the flood
Of the Icarian deep, when south and east
Burst forth together from the clouds of Jove,
And as the rapid west descending shakes
Corn at full growth, and bends the loaded ears.
So was the council shaken."

The loftiest and most elegant of Lord Byron's comparisons is founded on a similar analogy between the dignity and grace of a beautiful lady, and the splendors of the sky in a cloudless night.

"She walks in beauty like the night
Of cloudless climes and starry skies,
And all that's best of dark and bright
Meet in her aspect and her eyes."

We add another of this species, from Milman :

"The *calm* of that old reverend brow, the *glow*
Of its thin silver locks, was like a flash
Of sunlight in the pauses of a storm."

The Greeks, the daughter of Abraham, and the brow and locks of old age, are as truly physical objects as the sea, the grain, the starry firmament, and the flash of sunlight, with which they are compared. These figures are similes indeed, not metaphors; yet the principles on which they are used are essentially the same. The objects are employed by the figure to illustrate that which is compared with them, and that is the office of the metaphor. This analogy, however, is quite as frequently the ground of metaphors as of comparisons, and of those of the highest significance and beauty. The following are examples. The words which are used metaphorically are put in italics.

"Flowers are the *alphabet* of angels, whereby
They *wrote* on hills and fields mysterious truths."

"So doth the greater glory dim the less;
A substitute shines brightly as a king,
Until a king be by; and then his *state*
Empties itself, as doth an inland brook
Into the main of waters." Shakspeare.

"Gold, thou valiant *Mars!*
Thou ever young, fresh, loved, and delicate *wooer*,
Thou visible *God*,
That *solderest* close impossibilities,
And makest them *kiss!* that *speakest with every tongue*
To every purpose." Shakspeare.

"An eye,
As when the blue sky *trembles* through a cloud
Of purest white." Thomson.

"The spider's most attenuated thread,
Is *cord*, is *cable*, to man's tender tie
On earthly bliss:—it breaks at every breeze." Young.

"See, how round yon branching elm, the ivy
Twines its green *chain*, and poisons what supports it."

"I'm an old *oak* from which the *foresters*
Have *hewed* four goodly *boughs*, and left beside me
Only a *sapling*, which the fawn may crush
As he springs over it." Scott.

"Dark storms passing over, perhaps may have *scared* thee;
The moss of old age be thy *livery* now;
 But much still survives which has justly endeared thee;
 Some *greenness* still graces each gently bent *bough*."

Barton.

"One I saw,
 Who in this *wilderness* had trod, till life,
Retreating through the bloodless veins, *maintained*
Faint stand at her last fortress. His wan brow
 Was lightly *furrowed*, and his lofty form
 Unbent by time."

Sigourney.

"That brow which was to me
 A *blooming* heaven."

Moore in a passage on Byron, like Shakspeare in one of those quoted from him, founds both a metaphor and a comparison on this analogy.

"What desolating grief, what wrongs had *driven*
That noble nature into *cold eclipse*—
 Like some *fair orb*, that once a *sun* in heaven,
 And *born*, not only to surprise and cheer
 With warmth and lustre all within its sphere,
 Is now so *quenched*, that of its grandeur lasts
 Naught but the wide cold shadow which it casts."

"Methinks if you would know
 How visitations of calamity
 Affect the pious soul, 'tis shown you there—
 Look yonder at that cloud which through the sky
Sailing along, doth cross in her career
 The *rolling* moon. I watched her as it came,
 And deemed the deep opaque would *blot* her beam;
 But *melting* like a wreath of snow,
 It *hangs* in *folds* of *wavy silver* round,
 And *clothes* the orb with richer beauties than her own;
 Then passing, leaves her in her light serene."

Southey.

We might quote volumes of passages from the poets and orators in which terms that are literal names of one class of sensible objects or acts, are thus used by a metaphor to ex-

press those of another. But the use of the figure to illustrate physical things is not confined to analogies that subsist between such objects. A large class of great beauty and expressiveness are drawn from the attributes, affections, and acts of the mind. Such are the following.

"The breeze that *mourns* the summer's close
With *melancholy wail*."

"I've seen ere now
On some wild ruin moss'd and grey,
A flower as fair, as sweet as thou,
Blessing with bloom its latest day."

"At God's almighty will,
The *affrighted* world falls headlong from its sphere."

"The tree of deepest root is found,
Least *willing* still to quit the ground."

"How delicate is the *golden thread* of life !
How slightly *broken* ! Oft the *whispering* wind,
That murmurs by man's morning path, doth *sing*
A *mournful dirge* above his midnight grave."

"That solar shadow, as it measures life,
It life resembles too ; life *speeds* away
From *point to point*, though seeming to *stand still*,
The *cunning fugitive* is *swift by stealth*,
Too subtle is the movement to be seen ;
Yet soon man's hour is up, and we are gone." , Young.

"O sun,
Soul of surrounding worlds ! in *whom* best seen
Shines out thy maker." Thomson.

"They tell us of an Indian tree,
Which howsoever the sun and sky
May *tempt* its boughs to wander free,
And shoot and blossom wide and high,
Far better *loves* to bend its arms
Downward again to that *dear* earth

From which the life, that fills and warms
Its *grateful* being, first had birth."

This species of metaphor is often used in the Scriptures.

"The wild beasts of the field shall *glorify* me."

"The land *mourneth*, it languisheth.

Lebanon is *put to shame*.

The desert and the waste shall be *glad*.

And the wilderness shall *rejoice* and flourish."

But Dr. Bushnell confutes his theory himself, by the use of terms in the denomination and description of physical things that are drawn by a figure both from other physical things and from the mind. The following passage is an example. The words used tropically are put in italics.

"The *winged* words are *required* to *serve* as beasts of burden; or, what is no better, to *forget* their *poetic life* as *messengers* of the air, and *stand still*, *fixed upon the ground*, as wooden *statues* of truths. Which, if they *seem* to do—if to *comfort* our studies of dogma, they *assume* the *inert faces* we desire, and *suffer* us to *arrange* the *fixed attitudes* of their *bodies*, yet, as little Memnons touched and made *vocal* by the light, they will be *discoursing* still of the *free empyrean*, *disturbing* and *scattering* by their *voices*, all the exact meanings we had thought to *hold* them to in the nice *corporeal* order of our science."—P. 72.

Here out of one hundred and twelve terms—taking the phrase "upon the ground" as but one—there are thirty-one that are used figuratively in the description of words which, whether the term is used to denote the motions of the air which act on the ear, and produce the sensations of hearing, or the sensations themselves which those movements of the air excite, are physical motions or phenomena. Twenty-seven of them are taken from other physical things; winged, serve, poetic, life, messenger, stand, still, fixed, upon the ground, statues, seem, assume, inert, faces, arrange, fixed, attitudes, bodies, vocal, discoursing, free, empyrean, disturbing, scattering, voices, hold, and corporeal; the other four, required, forget, comfort, and suffer, are transferred by a

metaphor from the mind. Is this to be taken as an index of his acquaintance with the subject which he treats with such an air of originality and research? Is this an exemplification of the penetrating "glance" of which he speaks—which "suffices to show that the only real and true reasoning on moral subjects, is that which never *embarks on words and propositions*, but which holds a *constant insight* of all terms and constructions, diligently examining the analogy or relation betwixt words and things?"—P. 61.

The use of figures in the designation and description of physical objects, appearances, and actions, then, instead of being wholly unknown, as Dr. Bushnell represents, is as common as it is in the description of the attributes and acts of the mind; and they are drawn from physical objects themselves, as well as from the intellect and heart; the analogies that subsist between different species of material natures, and between physical and intellectual existences, forming as adequate a basis for the use of figures in the designation of material things, as those which subsist between the physical and mental world present for the figurative denomination of the attributes and acts of the mind. That this great and conspicuous fact should have wholly escaped Dr. B.'s notice, is truly singular, and indicates that in place of a careful examination, he has cast but a superficial glance at the subject. As in this first element of his theory he is thus wholly mistaken, his representation fails proportionally that the names of physical things are, with rare exceptions, used arbitrarily. Those which are used figuratively are not employed arbitrarily, inasmuch as they have a reason for their use, in the analogy on which the figures are founded.

II. His next representation, that all the names of intellectual and spiritual things are figurative, that they are universally drawn from things that are physical, and that that is the only source from which they can be derived, is a still more singular and a more mischievous error. Its meaning is, that in the denomination and description of the mind, its attributes, affections, and acts, and in treating of God and his will, words are never used literally, but universally with a tropical meaning. He says—

"There are, we discover, two languages, in fact, in every language. Or perhaps I shall be understood more exactly, if I say that there are, in every human tongue, two distinct departments. First, there is a literal department, in which sounds are provided as names for physical objects and appearances. Secondly, there is a department of analogy or figure, where physical objects and appearances are named as images of thought or spirit, and the words get their power, as words of thought, through the physical images received into them. . . . This distinction of literal and figurative language . . . runs through the whole body of the language itself, making two departments; one that comprises the terms of sensation, and the other the terms of thought."—Pp. 39, 40.

"In order, now, that I may excite our younger theologians especially to a new investigation of this subject, as being fundamental, in fact, to the right understanding of religious truth, I will dismiss the free form of dissertation, and set forth under numerical indications, a series of points or positions, inviting each their attention, and likely, though with some modifications, perhaps, to be finally verified.

"1. Words of thought and spirit are possible in language, only in virtue of the fact, that there are forms provided in the world of sense which are cognate to the mind, and fitted by reason of some hidden analogy, to represent or express its interior sentiments and thoughts.

"2. Words of thought and spirit are, in fact, names of such forms or images existing in the outward or physical state."—Pp. 40, 41.

He thus asserts that the words employed in the designation and expression of mental and spiritual things, are universally figurative, and drawn from things that are physical, and that that is the only mode in which words expressive of sentiment and thought can be formed. A more palpable and consummate misapprehension, however, could not have been embodied in language.

Were no literal terms used in the denomination and description of spiritual things, such as agents, attributes, acts, and truths, and in the expression of sentiments and affections in respect to them, there could be no designation of the subject of a proposition which is expressed by words of thought and spirit, or indication who the being, or what the thing is of which the affirmation is made. For example, in the proposition, "God is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth," if the word *God*

were not used literally, to denote Jehovah, the being who had revealed himself to the Hebrews, and given them their laws, then in the first place *it would not denote him*, and in the next, there would be no knowing who it is whom it would denote. A metaphor, it should be considered, is equivalent to a comparison. To denominate Joseph, for example, "a fruitful bough by a well," is equivalent to affirming that he is *like* such a bough. To say that "flowers are the alphabet of angels," has the same meaning as though the expression were,—flowers are *like* an alphabet to angels. They write truths with them on the hills and fields. The meaning of the affirmation therefore—God is a Spirit, if the word God were used metaphorically, would be—The being who is *like* God, is a Spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth. But what being is there that is thus like God, a spirit, and has a claim to the homage of man in spirit and in truth? No such being has revealed himself; and none is or can be known, or believed to exist. Dr. Bushnell would thus, at a stroke, debar us from the homage and knowledge of the true God, and direct us to worship a being of whom we neither have nor can have any knowledge, and who must therefore be to us as an absolute non-existence. Can he have seen this result of his theory? Is this a specimen of its adaptation to free religion from the perplexities and contradictions in which it has been involved by superficial and ill-judging theologians, who regard language as an adequate vehicle of thought, and have such faith in definitions and logic, as to rely on them as effective means of expressing and demonstrating the truth?

His theory would render the other terms of the passage also equally uncertain. If the word Spirit is not used literally, but by a metaphor, then it does not denote that God is, in reality a Spirit, but only that he is *like* a spirit. But if he is not in truth a Spirit, but only resembles one, then in what respect is it that he bears that resemblance? Can anything be more certain than that no one can know or conceive? We can only know first, that he is *not a Spirit*, but *material*; and next, that he is in some relation *like* a spirit, but what the nature of that likeness is, must be wholly undiscoverable and inconceivable. The second step of Dr. B.'s theory would thus force us to regard the object which we

were to worship, as a *material* instead of a spiritual being; and yet while it affirmed that he bears a resemblance to a spirit, would leave us in total uncertainty of the nature of that resemblance. So likewise in respect to the verb worship—if it is used figuratively, then it does not in fact mean the offering of homage to God, but only some act that is *like* offering him religious homage, but what that act is there is no means of knowing. We only know positively, that it is *not* religious adoration, praise, nor thanksgiving. It is not a recognition and celebration of him as the creator, ruler, and benefactor of men. It is only *like* such a recognition and adoration; but in what respects it resembles them, is an inscrutable mystery. In like manner, if the words, “in spirit and in truth,” are used metaphorically, then they do not in fact mean in spirit and in truth, but only that the worship that is to be offered, is to be offered in a manner that is *like* worshipping in spirit and in truth; while the nature of that resemblance is wholly unknown. For aught that can be seen, it may be such as the homage of the hypocrite bears to that of the true worshipper.

Such are the splendid results of this new theory of language. When translated into terms which express the meaning Dr. B.'s representation ascribes to it, the Saviour's sublime declaration is emptied of all its true significance, and turned into the senseless and atheistic announcement that—The being who is like God is like a spirit, and they who exert an act towards him that is like worship, must do it in a manner that is like acting in spirit and in truth; or, converted into the positive form,—The being to whom men are to offer their supreme regard, is not in fact a Spirit, but a material existence, and they are not to worship him, nor act in sincerity towards him, but are only to address him in a form that is like religious homage, and in a manner that resembles sincerity! Into what deeper or darker abyss of error and absurdity could Dr. Bushnell have precipitated himself! We trust “our younger theologians” will pause and cast a glance of observation down this horrid gulf, before they resolve on plunging with him into its bottomless recesses!

Instead of a universal employment of figurative terms in the denomination and description of spiritual things, and expression of thoughts and affections in respect to them,

which would lead to such portentous results, in passages in which figures are used, the subjects to which figurative expressions are applied, are universally designated by literal denominatives, and the figures are confined wholly to that which is affirmed of them. Those who may desire to see this verified at length, are referred to the analysis of figures in the January number of the Journal; where the nature of the metaphor, and other figures, is explained, and the laws stated by which they are to be interpreted. The reader may test its truth, indeed, by referring to the metaphors we have quoted, on a preceding page, from the poets. He will see that in each of them the subject to which the tropical expression is applied, is expressly named by a literal term. It is flowers that are said to be the alphabet of angels; gold that is denominated Mars, a wooer, and a visible god, and said to solder, kiss, and speak; the spider's web that is called a cord and cable; the ivy that is spoken of as a chain; a father that denominates himself an oak, his four sons who had been slain who are called boughs that had been hewed from him, a younger son who is called a sapling; and a cloud that is said to sail, blot, melt, hang in folds, and clothe the moon. Dr. Bushnell's statement, therefore, instead of according with truth, is universally false in respect to the subjects of figurative affirmations. The names by which they are designated, are their literal names, and necessarily; as otherwise, as we have shown, it would be wholly unknown and indeterminable, who or what the subjects are to which the figurative affirmations are applied.

He is equally mistaken also in respect to terms used in the denomination and expression of spiritual things that do not stand for the subject of affirmation, but are employed in the affirmation itself. They are no more necessarily and universally figurative, than terms are that are employed in the description of physical things.

1. There is no such impossibility, as he supposes, of forming names expressive of sentiments and thoughts, without deriving them from physical things that present to them an analogy. No fancy could be more groundless; inasmuch as there are media by which thoughts and affections are manifested to the senses independently of language, that render it

as practicable to give them names that are literal, as it is to designate physical objects by such words. Such are the modifications of the countenance that are expressive of the affections and passions; and gestures and actions that indicate dispositions and designs. They are as full and infallible an index of the feelings, and often of the thoughts and purposes, as any that we possess; are common to all human beings, and are understood universally, and by the young as well as the old. Probably no instance was ever known, in which an infant mistook a smile for a frown or a frown for a smile, or failed to perceive that a countenance beaming with love was expressive of complacency and satisfaction. The face is thus a perfect mirror of all the affections and passions,—anger, rage, displeasure, hatred, malice, fear, grief, sorrow, sadness, shame, terror, dismay, despair, on the one hand;—on the other, love, joy, delight, cheerfulness, exhilaration, gladness, hope, confidence, courage, content. The modifications of the countenance in form and hue, by which they are revealed, are often associated also with attitudes and gestures of the body, that aid in expressing the same affections and passions, and indicate the thoughts and purposes likewise which they excite. As, then, these emotions and dispositions of the mind thus become known through the eye, as perfectly as the changes of the countenance and the gestures by which they are indicated, it is thence as possible and as easy to designate them by arbitrary or literal names, as it is to apply such words to those modifications themselves of the features and body, or to any other objects or appearances that are perceived by the senses. The names of the principal affections, accordingly, are perfectly literal, and formed as independently of analogies as the names of any objects in the material world. Thus, love, joy, hatred, fear, terror, grief, hope, are as absolutely literal as any names in the language; and instead of being founded on analogies in the material world, are never used figuratively, except when they are transferred from beings to whom they belong, to objects or appearances without, in which they have no actual existence. The corresponding verbs, also, by which these affections are expressed, are perfectly literal. Here is thus a very large number of the most important denomina-

tives of the affections and the acts in which they are exerted, that have no ground whatever in analogy, but are in the most absolute sense literal. How happened it that this great fact wholly escaped Dr. Bushnell's notice? Did his dislike of logic prevent him from inquiring whether his views might not be confuted, if compared with the modes in which we actually gain our knowledge of each other's affections, and appropriate to them their names? Or did he devolve on his imagination the task of constructing his theory of the origin of language, as well as of forming his conceptions of God and his government?

2. But apart from this fact, there is no such impossibility as he represents, in the appropriation of names to sentiments and thoughts independently of analogies in physical things; inasmuch as the mind is *conscious of its affections and thoughts*; and thence is as able to designate them by arbitrary names, as it is to appropriate such denominatives to objects which it perceives through the senses. Why should it find any difficulty in forming words, without any reference to external objects; to distinguish its affections and passions, and the forms in which it exerts them, of which it has a clear apprehension, any more than in applying literal terms to physical objects, forms, motions, or appearances? The supposition is groundless, and is confuted by the fact that there is no power or affection of the mind, nor any act that it exerts, that has not at least one literal term as its denominative, and that is of more frequent use than any other. Thus the whole intellectual nature is denoted by the words, mind and soul; all its perceptive acts by thought; and all its emotions and passions by feeling and affection; and every species of these, also, and every form in which it exercises them, has a literal word for its name, as love, fear, hate, rejoice, grieve, mourn.

3. Instead of its being impossible to give to thoughts and feelings any but figurative names drawn from physical objects, it is in fact impossible to give to them *such metaphorical names*, without *such a knowledge of their nature as to render it equally practicable to give them literal denominatives*. For, as a figurative name is founded on an analogy subsisting between that from which it is drawn and that to which it is

applied, the nature of each must be at least so far understood that that analogy may be discerned. But, if the nature of an attribute, thought, feeling, or act of the mind, is understood to such a degree, that the resemblance which it bears to an external physical thing is discerned so adequately that it may be easily named from that resemblance, then its nature must also be sufficiently apprehended to enable the mind with equal ease, if it choose, to designate it by a literal term. As from the necessity of the case it has, and must have, an actual consciousness or conception of what it literally is, before it can select a figurative name for it, why is it not as able to select a literal term for its denominative, as one that is drawn by a metaphor from some resembling object or action? It is probably, indeed, more natural to the mind to name analogous acts of external things from its own exercises, of which it has a vivid consciousness, than to denominate the forms of its consciousness by terms drawn from external objects. It is at least quite as natural to talk of angry skies, angry waves, and wrathful winds, as it is of tempestuous anger and stormy passions. This fancy, then, of an impossibility of giving any but figurative names, drawn from the physical world, to mental and spiritual qualities and actions, is wholly mistaken.

4. But, apart from the fact that the mind is thus able, from its consciousness of its own thoughts and affections, and perception of those of others, to give them literal names, and the fact that many of the names of the thoughts and affections, and many of the verbs that denote the acts in which they are exerted, are perfectly literal, there is also a very large body of affiliated terms that are employed in the description of mental and spiritual things that are likewise wholly literal, and are formed in perfect independence of analogies in the physical world. All verbs have not only a noun that is either identically the same word, or varied only in the termination, that stands for the quality or characteristic of the action which the verb expresses; but have also several kindred words formed of the same elements that are employed in expressing the same characteristics or qualities, contemplated in other relations. Such are all abstract nouns, and all adjectives and adverbs that denote the powers and qualities of the mind. Thus the noun, love, is at once the name of the

affection and of the act in which it is exercised. But *loveliness* is the name of the quality that excites love ; *lovable-ness*, an adaptedness to excite it ; *lovingness*, a disposition to love, or facility in exerting the affection ; and *lover*, one who exercises love.

There is also a corresponding class of adjectives. Thus, *loving* denotes one who is disposed to love ; *lovely*, one whose form or character excites love ; *lovable*, one who has the requisite qualities to inspire love ; *loveless*, one who is devoid of love ; *lovelorn*, one who is deserted by a lover.

There is, likewise, a correlative set of adverbs, as *lovelily*, in a manner that awakens love ; and *lovingly*, in a manner that expresses love. Now these terms are not founded on any analogies in the physical world, but on the forms in which love actually exists in the mind, manifests itself outwardly, and is contemplated by spectators. They have the ground of their use in our consciousness, not in anything external to us. Love actually assumes the shapes and manifests itself in the modes indicated by these terms ; our nature leads us to contemplate it in all the varying forms and relations which it assumes ; the exact expression of our perceptions and consciousness renders it necessary that terms should be framed that represent all their different modifications ; and it is for those reasons that these different terms are employed. While these varying forms of feeling and conception, and the necessity of a corresponding diversity of words to express them, have their ground in our nature, the reason that these different terminations of the same parent word are employed to express their several meanings lies in the genius of our language. They are appropriated universally to express those forms and relations of qualities. It is a law of words, and a law of the utmost importance, as, from its simplicity and uniformity, the principle on which they are framed for the expression of the different forms of thought and affection, is easily understood, and the meaning of each epithet rendered specific and exact ; and the learner enabled, on discovering either the parent noun or verb, or any of the affiliated terms, to determine what the form is of all the others ; inasmuch as abstract nouns, adjectives, and adverbs universally have certain terminations peculiar to them.

selves. This is so settled a usage, and so well understood, that were any one to invent a new noun or verb, or appropriate a word to the denomination of a characteristic or quality that is displayed in action, any one familiar with the language could immediately determine what the forms would be of all the affiliated terms that would be required to express the various shapes and relations in which that characteristic would be displayed. Of this, we have frequent exemplifications. Thus, from the noun *Mormon* are formed—1 and 2, the denominatives *Mormons* and *Mormonites*; 3, *Mormonism*, the doctrine and practice of *Mormonites*; 4, 5, and 6, the adjectives *Mormonly*, *Mormonish*, and *Mormonitish*, after the manner or on the principles of *Mormons*; 7, the verb *Mormonize*, to exercise *Mormonism*, and teach its principles; 8, *Mormonableness*, an adaptation to *Mormonism*; 9, *Mormonization*, the act of *Mormonizing*, or being *Mormonized*; and, 10, *Mormonability*, the capacity of being *Mormonized*, with, 11, the kindred adjective *Mormonable*; and, 12, the adverb *Mormonably*.

In like manner, were Dr. Bushnell to acquire such conspicuity and rise to such influence as to form a school of disciples, and cause his name to become the denominative of their characteristics, their sentiments, and their party, the verb to *Bushnellize* would be employed to express the cultivation and exercise of his qualities; *Bushnellization*, the act of *Bushnellizing*, or being *Bushnellized*; *Bushnellability*, the capacity of *Bushnellizing*, or adaptedness to be *Bushnellized*; *Bushnellism*, his peculiar doctrinal or speculative system; and *Bushnellites*, his followers. And these nouns, with their kindred adjectives and adverbs, and the different forms of the verb in its two voices and several moods and tenses, would amount to *more than three hundred words* or combinations of the same word with auxiliaries; and the meaning of each would be literal. For on what analogy in the physical world could they be founded? What other reason could be given or required for these modifications of his name, and their appropriation to express their several meanings, than that mental characteristics like his, in the conditions we have supposed, actually assume the forms, and are contemplated in the relations, which these several terms denote; and that it is the law of our

language that such modifications of the parent name of such characteristics should be employed to express them in those forms and relations?

We have thus a vast body of words employed in the expression of mental and spiritual things, that are wholly independent of external analogies, and have their ground exclusively in our nature, and the laws of our language. They form by far the largest part of the words that are appropriated to that office, are all in their primary sense absolutely literal, and are never used metaphorically except when transferred from moral or sentient beings to inanimate objects. The word, justice, for example, has, besides the verb, six affiliated terms to express the different forms and relations in which that quality is exercised and contemplated. Thus, justness is the conformity of an act to justice; just, is possessing or exercising justice; justly, is in a manner that is conformed to justice; justice, as a verb, is to administer justice; justicer and justiciary, an administrator of justice; and justiceable, a liability to be made a subject of legal justice. The kindred verb, to justify, has seven associated words; as justifiableness, a merit of being justified; justifiable, a capableness of being justified; justifiably, in a manner that is justifiable; justifier, and justificator, one who justifies; justificative, that is of a nature that justifies; and justification, the act of justifying and being justified; and each of these verbs, in its different forms and combinations, amounts, with its kindred nouns, adjectives, and adverbs, to more than three hundred words. The noun, joy, has ten other forms: joyance, joyfulness, joyful, joyfully, joyous, joyousness, joyously, joyless, joylessness, joylessly. Hope has eight affiliated words: hopefulness, hopeful, hopefully, hoper, hopefully, hopeless, hopelessness, and hopelessly, which, with the different forms of the verb, are also more than three hundred in number.

No more absolute and ample demonstration, then, can be desired, than we thus possess in our consciousness and the laws of our language, of the total error of Dr. Bushnell's representation, that all the names of mental and spiritual qualities and acts, or words used in treating of them, are

metaphorical, and drawn from analogies of physical things. There are terms, indeed, that are sometimes employed by a metaphor, to denote the qualities, affections, or acts of the mind, such as upright, uprightness, and uprightly; steadfast, steadfastly, and steadfastness; but there is not a single affection of the mind of which the genuine English name, and its affiliated verb, nouns, adjectives, and adverbs, are not purely literal, bestowed on it independently of any analogies in material things, and founded on the law which we have specified, of our nature and our language. If there are any exceptions, let them be designated. If Dr. Bushnell's theory can be verified, let it be shown from what material analogy those denominatives are drawn, and how that analogy is the ground of their different terminations, which are the medium of their peculiar meanings.

III. He has fallen into an equal mistake in the representation that the principles on which terms are used figuratively, or the reason of their being employed in that relation, is unknown and incomprehensible. He says:

"2. Words of thought and spirit are, in fact, names of forms or images existing in the outward or physical state.

"3. When we investigate the relation of the form, or etymological base, in any word of thought or spirit to the idea expressed, we are able to say negatively, that the idea or thought has no such form, or shape, or sensible quality, as the word has. If I speak of *right* (*straight, rectus*), it is not because the internal law of the conscience, named by this word, has any straightness or lineal quality whatever; or if I speak of *sin, peccatum, aquapria*, where, in so many languages, as I might also show in a great variety of others, the image at the root of the word is one of lineal divarication (as when an arrow is shot at the mark, and misses or turns aside), it is not because sin, as a moral state of being, or a moral act, has any lineal form in the mind. Thoughts, ideas, mental states, we cannot suppose have any geometric form, any color, dimensions, or sensible qualities whatever.

"4. We can only say (*positively*) in reference to the same subject, that there is always some reason in every form or image made use of, why it should be used; some analogic property or quality which we feel instinctively, *but which wholly transcends speculative inquiry*. If there is no lineal straightness in rectitude, no lineal crookedness, or

divarication in sin, taken as an internal state, still it is the instinct of our nature to feel some sense of correspondence between these images and the states they represent.

"Milton, I suppose, could not tell us why he sets any form in connexion with any spiritual thought. He could only say that he has in him some internal sense of concinnity which requires it. And yet, when he speaks of sin, he makes everything crooked as the word is; when of law, everything straight as rectitude. Thus he writes: 'to make a regularity of sin by law, either the law must straighten sin into no sin, or sin must crook the law into no law.' Something doubtless may be said, which in a certain superficial and pathological sense may be called an explanation of the uses of these symbols; for example, that in sin, a man divaricates bodily, or goes to his mischief in a manner that is oblique or awry; and that when he is in the simple intention of duty, he lets his 'eye look right on,' and follows his eye. I accounted for the symbols chosen to denote *hope* and *expectation* by a similar reference to the pathology of hope and expectation. But this, if we do not wish to deceive ourselves, is only a mediate, and not a final explanation. Still the question remains, why the form of outward divarication has any such original relation to sin as to have been made the natural pathological demonstration of it;—why a crooked line, which is the more graceful, should not have been the natural instinct, and so the symbol of the right, as it now is of the wrong. Here we come to our limit. All we can say is, that by a mystery transcending in any case our comprehension, the Divine Logos, who is in the world, weaves into nature types or images that have an inscrutable relation to mind and thought. On the one hand is form; on the other, is the formless. The former represents, and is somehow fellow to the other—how, we cannot discover. And the more we ponder this mystery, *the closer we bring it to our understanding, the more perfectly inscrutable will it appear*. If we say that the forms of the reason answer to the forms of nature and the outward life, that is true; but then there are no forms in the reason, save by a figure of speech, and the difficulty still remains."—Pp. 41–43.

We have before occasionally seen an ingenuity in misconception, a dexterity in blundering, in what we thought extreme degrees; but in none that equalled these. They are here in an excess that is "a mystery." "*The closer we bring them to our understanding, the more perfectly inscrutable they appear*." Can Dr. Bushnell ever have considered what the import of analogy in rhetoric is; or attempted to

analyse a simile or metaphor, and ascertain the principle on which it is founded? We presume not. Had he given the slightest attention to the subject, he could not have failed to see the total groundlessness and absurdity of the views on which he here proceeds. He plainly supposes that in order that the analogy on which a figurative term is used may be intelligible, the thought expressed by it must, like an image in statuary, have the same form to *the understanding*, or *imagination*, which the material object from which the figurative name is drawn, has to the eye; for he makes the fact that there is no such form in the thought, the ground of his denying the conceivableness of the analogy. "If I speak of sin, where the image at the root of the word is one of lineal divarication, it is not because sin, as a moral state of being, or a moral act, has any lineal form in the mind. Thoughts, ideas, mental states, we cannot suppose have any geometric form, any color, dimensions, or sensible qualities whatever; and THEREFORE—he infers—"the reason" "why" any "form or image" is "used," "*wholly transcends speculative inquiry.*" "All we can say is that by a *mystery* transcending in any case our comprehension, the Divine Logos, who is in the world, weaves into nature types or images that have an inscrutable relation to mind and thought. On the one hand, is *form*; on the other, *the formless*. The former represents, and is somehow fellow to the other; but how we cannot discover." Could he see that there is a form in the thought that corresponds to the physical form, from which he represents the name as taken, he would then have what he would regard as an intelligible analogy for the use of the figurative name. That there are any analogies except such as subsist between physical forms—lines, curves, circles, angles, dimensions, and colors, it seems, has never entered his thoughts. He supposes it absolutely impossible that there can be any perceptible resemblances between the physical world and the intellectual, unless the mind itself be material, and have within it a literal geometry and "chemistry," like that of the exterior world! What originality and brilliance of imagination! What a profound insight into the philosophy of our nature! What gigantic strides "our younger theologians" may be expected to make in "a new investigation of this subject"

under such guidance! And what a new and beautiful turn it gives to the figures of the Scriptures? When God says,

“For as the rain cometh down,
And the snow from heaven,
And returneth not thither,
But watereth the earth,
And maketh it germinate and put forth its increase,
That it may give seed to the sower, and bread to the eater;
So shall be the word that goeth forth from my mouth,
It shall not return unto me *fruitless*,
But it shall effect what I have willed,
And make the purpose succeed for which I sent it;”—

Isaiah iv. 10, 11.

Dr. Bushnell cannot conceive of any way in which the message of God can be communicated to men, so as to answer to the comparison, unless the thoughts of which they consist have a visible form, and descend from Him as a shower of rain or a storm of snow falls from a cloud! He cannot imagine any mode in which God's word can cause those to whom it is announced, to be *fruitful*, in a manner resembling the fruitfulness of the earth, under the influence of the rain and snow with which it is watered, unless the thoughts and affections which it excites, have *forms* like those of the vegetable world, which are used in the comparison! That there is a resemblance between *the efficacy* of the two causes, *which is the relation in which they are compared*;—between their uniform and infallible connexion, with their respective effects, Dr. B., notwithstanding the express assertion of the passage, is unable to perceive! Jacob's prediction, “Judah is a lion's whelp; from the prey, my son, thou art gone up; he stooped down, he couched as a lion, and as an old lion; who shall rouse him?” is an equal puzzle to him. It surpasses his comprehension how there could be any ground for denominating Judah a lion, and ascribing to him such actions, unless his mind, at least, actually had the shape of a lion, hunted prey within its domain, and stooped and couched like that animal! That there are any resemblances between the appetites, passions, and habits of that bold and ferocious brute, and the dispositions and acts of Judah and his descendants,

in relation to other tribes and nations, Dr. Bushnell has not the slightest suspicion! When Isaiah says, "*The vineyard of Jehovah, God of Hosts, is the house of Israel, and the men of Judah are the plant of his delight,*" Dr. Bushnell cannot understand how they can be in any other than a literal relation. He supposes, that in order to give intelligibility to the allegory, the mind of each one, or their minds as a nation, must be of the shape, or something like it, of a vineyard on a fruitful hill, that is fenced, cleared of stones, and planted with the vine of Sorek; has a tower built, and a lake hewed in it, and brings forth poisonous berries!—Isaiah v. That there is a resemblance between such a vineyard yielding such fruit, and the Israelites revolting from God, and tyrannizing over one another in the manner the passage represents, he cannot perceive, although the prophet expressly states that the similitude lay between the vineyard's yielding poisonous berries, and the Israelites exercising such unjust actions towards the oppressed. Is there anything in the annals of misapprehension and folly that surpasses this? Were we not aware of the theory that lies concealed beneath it, and the source from which it is drawn, we should find it difficult to persuade ourselves that Dr. Bushnell can have meant what his language expresses. It is, however, one of the elements of the pantheism that pervades his whole system.

There is nothing in the nature of our thoughts and language more palpable, or more thoroughly a matter of consciousness to persons of every age and grade of intellect and cultivation, than that every figure of speech, whatever its species may be, is founded on a resemblance, either of nature, condition, agency, or effects, that subsists between that from which it is drawn and that which it is employed to illustrate, and owes to that correspondence its whole use. The first and simplest of them, the comparison, is a formal affirmation of the likeness of one thing to another: The metaphor differs from the simile only in omitting the term of likeness, and directly affirming that a thing is that which it merely resembles. The allegory and hypocatastasis, also, are founded on a similarity that subsists between that which is used in the figure and that which it is employed to exemplify; while per-

sonification has its ground in a resemblance of the position of the objects to which it is applied, to that of intelligent spectators; so that, had they the organs of sight and hearing, which the figure assumes that they possess, they could witness the acts which they are summoned to observe. The resemblance, accordingly, which is the basis of a figure, whatever may be its nature, *must be perceived* in order to the possibility of its being expressed. A likeness of one thing to another cannot be affirmed, without being seen and felt, any more than the portrait of a countenance can be drawn without any perception of its features; nor would a figurative expression, on the supposition that it happened to coincide with fact, answer the purpose for which it is employed, unless the similitude be comprehended and felt by the reader. How can the use of a word figuratively illustrate the nature of that to which it is applied, if there is no perception of the similitude which it expresses? What would Job have accomplished by saying, "my days are swifter than a post," if no analogy were seen between the haste with which his days passed, and the rapidity with which a post advances on his journey? Were the word post, for example, taken to denote the stem of a tree set in a fixed position in the earth, or in a building, so that there should be no analogy between them? The affirmation would then be, that his days were swifter than a thing that is absolutely stationary; which is the very opposite of his meaning, and is preposterous. To have made such a comparison would have been to ridicule the progress of his life as too slow, and likely to be prolonged through too great a period, in place of expressing his sense of the rapidity with which it passed, by representing its flight as swifter than the progress which man makes in his most hurried journey. Yet according to Dr. Bushnell, all the figures of language are precisely such, as to their intelligibleness and force, as that would be, were the word post taken in that or some other false sense, that presents no perceptible resemblance to the rapidity with which life passes. What the nature of the relation is that subsists between the subject to which a metaphor is applied, and that from which it is drawn—which it is the office of the figure to express—he holds is wholly undiscoverable and inconceivable. When it is said, "Wis-

dom is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her," there is nothing, according to him in the nature and office of a tree of life that can justify that declaration or give it significance, any more than in any other tree. The ground of the metaphor is absolutely inscrutable. It would have had equal beauty, and been equally intelligible and impressive, had a larch tree, a box, a sycamore, a pine, a hemlock, a thorn, or a bramble, been employed instead of a tree of life. The announcement, accordingly, for aught that can be seen, may, instead of a commendation, be a depreciation of wisdom,—a denunciation of it as a source of danger and a cause of misery! For, if the relation on which the figure is founded is unknown and undiscoverable, then, as far as we can see, it is as compatible with it to suppose that it is adverse to wisdom, as that it is favorable to it. But if the proposition might as well have been that wisdom is a thorn to them that lay hold upon her, it must be regarded as a reproach of her as a source of annoyance and injury, instead of a recommendation! And if a bramble might as well have been used as a tree of life, then it must be regarded as ridiculing wisdom as worthless, instead of commending her as a means of salvation! Such is the pitiable result to which his theory leads! All the figures of the Sacred Word are not only emptied by it of their true significance, and divested of their beauty, but turned, for aught that can be known, into the grossest and most revolting misrepresentation of the truths which it is their office to illustrate and adorn!

But the error of his theory is as obvious and absolute as its injustice is to the word of God. There is not a figure in the Scriptures, nor in any other book, expressed in terms whose literal meaning is known, the principle of which is not perfectly intelligible. And their easy comprehensibleness is essential to the end for which they are employed, as their office is, not, as Dr. B. teaches, to obscure, confound, and misrepresent, but to aid in the description of that which they are employed to illustrate, by pointing out resemblances that are borne to it by something else that is already well known.

How then can it have happened that he fell into so gross a misconception, of what no one, it would seem, who gave it the least consideration, could fail to understand? The solu-

tion probably is, that he has adopted, and founded his speculations on the subject, on Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondences between physical, and intellectual, and spiritual things, and in his confidence of its accuracy neglected to make any trial of its truth by a reference to the figures of the Scriptures, and other works, or his own consciousness. His theory may be seen from the following passages.

"The English reader is to understand that all the terms in language, which are devoted to spiritual and intellectual uses, have a physical and outward sign underlying their import, as in the cases here named. Of this the scholar has never a doubt, although he cannot always, or in every instance, trace out the physical sign or base of the word, so as to be certain of it. *All things out of sense get their names in language through signs and objects in sense that have some mysterious correspondence* or analogy, by which they are prepared beforehand to serve as signs or vehicles of the spiritual things to be expressed.

"When propositions are advanced which relate to thought or spirit, where in one view, the *over*, the *under*, the *through*, the *by*, are totally irrelevant, thought and spirit not being under the laws of space, *still there is a mysterious relation in these outward analogies of space* to the workings of the mind, such that the external grammar of the creation answers to the internal grammar of the soul, and becomes its vehicle."—pp. 25–28.

And referring to an essay by Professor Gibbs on "case in the Indo-Germanic languages," he says,

"Here it is shown that as *words themselves, or the bases of words, are found in space, so they are declined or formed into grammar under the relations of space*. Thus it is ascertained that there is one case which represents the *where* of a predicate, a second the *whence*, a third the *whither*, a fourth the *by, or through what place*. This in regard to words taken in their most external and physical senses. And then, precisely as physical objects become types or bases of words having an intellectual significance, so, or in virtue of the same kind of analogy, the relations of space under which we find these objects, ascend with them to partake of their elevation and shape their fitness to the uses of the mind. Thus in the department of mind and spirit, four cases are found answering to the four just named, employed no longer to denote external relations, but the internal relations of thought and action—an internal *where, whence, whither, and by or through what place*. Prof. G. does not undertake to verify these deductions, except in the particu-

lar families of languages under examination. Still, it is very obvious that such results in grammar do not take place apart from *some inherent law or system* pertaining either to *mind* or to outward *space*, or to *one* as related to the *other*. Indeed, it is impossible, with such a revelation before us, not to take up at once the sublime conviction just now named, that grammar itself is, in some sense, of the outer world—in the same way as the terms or names out of which language is constructed. In this view, which it is not rash to believe will some time be fully established, the outer world is seen to be a vast menstruum of thought and intelligence. There is a *logos* in the forms of things by which they are prepared to serve as types or images of what is inmost in our souls; and then there is a *logos* also of construction in the relations of space, the position, qualities, connexions, and predicates of things, by which they are framed into grammar. In a word, *the outer world which envelopes our being, is itself language, the power of all language*. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge; there is no speech or language where their voice is not heard,—their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world.

“And if the outer world is the vast dictionary and grammar of thought we speak of, then it is also itself an organ throughout of intelligence. Whose intelligence? By this question we are set directly confronting God, the universal author, no more to hunt for Him by curious arguments and subtle deductions, if haply we may find Him; but He stands *expressed* everywhere, so that turn whichever way we please, we behold the outlooking of His intelligence. No series of Bridgewater treatises, piled even to the moon, could give a proof of God so immediate, complete, and conclusive.

“In such a view of the world too, and its objects, there is an amazing fund of inspiration elsewhere not to be found. The holding of such a view is in fact sufficient of itself to change a man's intellectual capacities and destiny; for it sets him always in the presence of Divine thoughts and meanings, makes even the words he utters luminous of Divinity, and to the same extent, *subjects of love and reverence*.”—Pp. 29–31.

This is Swedenborg's theory of *correspondences*, with this difference, that Dr. Bushnell not only regards all external forms as expressions of God's thoughts, but as the basis of all our names of spiritual things, and as types or images of the thoughts which those names are employed to express. Professor Bush says :—

"Why not regard it as the all-pervading law of the universe that *form corresponds with essence*, and as all essence is spirit, that every material object is the *correspondent* to some spiritual principle of affection or thought? Why is a lamb a symbol of innocency, but because it is a living form of the affection so denominated? Is not the form and organism a reflection of the interior quality? Can we conceive that the quality of the lamb should exist in connexion with the form of the wolf; or that of the dove under the form of the vulture? Will not the ruling affection of every creature mould the organic structure by which it manifests itself? But we stop not here. We hesitate not to subscribe to Swedenborg's doctrine, that the whole universe is an out-birth from the Deity, every part and portion of which *corresponds* to some one of the infinite perfections and attributes; just as the human body, in whole and in particular, *corresponds* to the faculties and properties of the human soul. The relation in both cases is that of *cause and effect*, and as the body is the mirror of the soul, *so the universe is a mirror of its Author*. If this position be admitted, the principle of correspondence, as maintained in Swedenborg's system, rises at once to the dignity of the highest laws that are recognised in the whole circle of our being."—*Swedenborg Library*, Part I. pp. 118, 119.

On the theory that all outward forms are thus "out-births from the Deity," and expressive of his attributes, thoughts, and affections, Swedenborg held that they are signs or indices of those attributes, thoughts, and feelings, and fill to us, as they do to angels—according to his representation—and disembodied souls in the spiritual world, the office of a visible language.

"Few know what representations are, and what are correspondencies, nor can any one know what they are, unless he knows that there is a spiritual world, and this distinct from the natural world, for between things spiritual and things natural are given correspondencies, and the things which exist from things spiritual in things natural, are representations; they are called correspondencies because they correspond, and representations because they represent.

"It has been given me to know from much experience, that in the natural world, and in its three kingdoms, there is not the smallest thing which does not represent something in the spiritual world, or which has not something there to which it corresponds.

"The men of the most ancient church, inasmuch as in everything of nature they saw something spiritual and celestial, *so that natural things*

served them only as objects of thinking concerning things spiritual and celestial, were for that reason able to discourse with angels, and to be with them in the Kingdom of the Lord, which is in the heavens, at the same time that they were in his kingdom on earth, or in the church. Thus natural things with them were conjoined with spiritual things, and wholly corresponded."—A. C., in the *Swedenborg Library*, pp. 120-122.

This is obviously Dr. Bushnell's theory, except that he regards external forms as the basis also of the words which we employ to express our thoughts, and of the modes in which we use those words to represent the relations to one another of the thoughts, objects, and actions, which they respect. It is not easy, however, to see on what ground he can entertain this view.

In the first place, it is impossible, on his scheme, to present any proof of it, inasmuch as he represents the *nature* of this correspondence or analogy, by which the forms of external things are representative of spiritual, as absolutely unknown and undiscoverable. "We can only say there is always some reason in every form or image made use of, why it should be used; some analogic property, or quality, which we feel instinctively, but which wholly transcends speculative inquiry;"—"that by a mystery transcending in any case our comprehension, the Divine Logos, who is in the world, weaves into nature types and images that have an inscrutable relation to mind and thought."—Pp. 42, 43. But if this analogy is thus not only unknown, but absolutely undiscoverable, what proof can there be of its existence, or what ground for the assumption that it is the basis of our language, and exerts the influence which he ascribes to it? How can he demonstrate the existence of that which, by his own representation, lies wholly beyond the scope of our faculties, and absolutely "transcends speculative inquiry?" But what can exceed the indiscretion and folly of erecting such a towering fabric on a basis of the being of which, by the terms in which he defines it, there can be no evidence nor probability? By his own showing, his whole theory is the mere work of his fancy, to which he assigns, it seems, the task of fabricating his philosophy as well as his theology.

But in the next place, on Kant's and Coleridge's theory of the understanding, time, and space, on which Dr. B. proceeds, there not only is no proof of such an analogy between external forms and "thought and spirit," but there, in fact, are no external forms whatever. Instead, the whole series of the apparent objects of our sense perceptions are mere forms and products of the understanding, and exist only in the mind that perceives them. There is no room, therefore, for an analogy between them as external things, and the thoughts and acts of the mind; as they are themselves mere mental phenomena. It is, in truth, on that scheme only by a metaphor that they are called *external*; and accordingly, instead of a derivation of all words of thought and spirit, as he represents, from physical things, all names of physical things are in reality only names of the phenomena of the mind! How is it that so palpable a result of his philosophy was overlooked by Dr. B.? Is he, notwithstanding his adoption of the vocabulary of Kant and Coleridge, wholly unaware of the system which they employed it to express? What a creditable predicament for one who talks so learnedly of insight, and expects by his oracular fiat to revolutionize philosophy and religion!

In the third place, this theory that all things out of sense get their names in language through signs and objects in sense, that have some mysterious correspondence or analogy, is in contradiction to his admission and statement that they are "generally determined *arbitrarily*, or at least by causes so occult or remote, that we must regard them as arbitrary."—Pp. 19, 20. If they are determined arbitrarily, whether it be by us or not, then analogy cannot be the ground of their determination, as that were to determine them for a reason, instead of without one. If they are not determined by us, but by God, either directly, or indirectly by some invisible and undiscoverable cause, then there can be no *proof* that analogy is the ground of their appropriation; and his theory becomes a mere baseless assumption. Whichever view he takes, therefore, his system falls;—an admirable condition for one who aspires to produce by it a new, purer, and more efficacious form of theology than that which has hitherto prevailed!

IV. He holds that words that are used figuratively always retain their tropical meaning, and cannot become literal names of the thoughts which they are used to denote, or be employed in a literal sense in treating of them.

"It will perhaps be imagined by some, indeed it is an assumption continually made, that words of thought, though based on mere figures or analogies in their original adoption, gradually lose their indeterminate character, and settle down under the law of use, into a sense so perfectly unambiguous, that they are to be regarded as literal names and real equivalents of the thoughts they signify. There could not be a greater mistake. For, though the original type or historic base of the word may pass out of view, so that nothing physical or figurative is any longer suggested by it, still it will be impossible that mere use should have given it an exact meaning, or made it the literal name of any moral or intellectual state."—Pp. 46-47.

It is Dr. Bushnell, however, who here mistakes, not those whom he represents as erring. There certainly is no impossibility that a word that is employed metaphorically should lose its tropical use, and acquire a literal sense. Nothing is requisite to it, except that it should cease to be employed to express that which it denotes, *on the ground of the analogy* on which its figurative use was founded. The moment it is employed without reference to analogy, it is used literally; and there are thousands and millions of instances in which that takes place. Of the possibility of a word's losing its original meaning and obtaining a wholly new use, we have many exemplifications in the Scriptures, in the names of persons. They are common words of the language, appropriated as denominatives of persons in their natural sense, as names of objects or events, or expressive of thought or sentiment: as Adam, taken from the earth; Abraham, father of a multitude; Adonizedek, justice of the Lord; Cephas, a stone; Jacob, he that supplants; Joseph, increase. Yet as these and others of the kind are used by modern nations, they have wholly lost that original meaning, and sunk into mere personal denominatives, as absolutely as have the Egyptian, Greek, or Roman names, that have gained admission into our language. No one now associates the idea of increase with the appellative

Joseph, any more than though it had never borne that signification. These names were not, indeed, used metaphorically, but they exemplify the possibility of the loss of a word's original meaning by its appropriation to a new use, or its transference to another language: and the same change takes place in innumerable instances, in the passage of words of all classes from one dialect or language to another. The words alleged by Dr. Bushnell as examples of the derivation of the names of spiritual things from physical objects, are themselves instances of it. Thus *spirit* from *spiro*, to breathe or blow, has lost that meaning and become the name of mind; and in respect to us of the mind, or the intelligent part of our nature, or of other beings considered separately from the body. It now retains nothing of its original meaning. There probably is not one individual in a million, of those who use it, who have any knowledge of its primary form or derivation. In like manner *expectation* is to us the mere name of an act of the mind; it retains not a trace of the office it originally filled of denoting an attitude of the body. And so also *sincerity*, if derived, as is supposed, from *sine* without, and *cera* wax, and originally employed in the description of something in which wax was objectionable, or the mark of a defect. When at first applied to objects in respect to which wax was never used, it was indeed employed metaphorically, to indicate that they were without defect, or free from an objectionable element that was sometimes intermixed with them. But who now associates the thought of wax with the word? It is as completely divested of its original meaning as though it had never borne any but its present literal signification. And such is the fact, we apprehend, with by far the largest portion of the words that have been incorporated in our language from the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. It is at least certain that no word drawn from these or other foreign sources retains its metaphorical use, except when it is also employed by us in its literal signification; inasmuch as from the nature of a metaphor, it cannot be employed, except when the analogy on which it is founded, is perceived. A term can no more be used in a metaphorical relation without a perception of that relation, than it can be used in a literal sense without a con-

sciousness of the sense in which it is used. There is not a proposition which our language is capable of expressing, more indubitably without an exception, than that all the terms of our speech that are used by us metaphorically, are also used by us in their literal meaning; as the literal use is necessary in order to the possibility of a tropical one.

And this transition of words from a figurative to a literal meaning is natural and inevitable from the manner in which we learn our language. Dr. Bushnell writes very much as though he supposed all those who use words with the meaning which they acquire by a metaphor, were led to employ them in that sense by observing the analogous objects or acts from which they are transferred. That is not, however, the fact in one instance, probably, in many millions. There are thousands and myriads, for example, who use the word *redeem*, and in a tropical sense, who never witnessed the restoration of a slave or captive from bondage by the payment of an equivalent in property. And the mode in which we acquire our knowledge of the meaning of terms precludes the possibility at first of a knowledge of the analogies on which their figurative use is founded. We learn the meaning of words by observing the manner in which they are used by others, and adopt that use by imitation, without any consideration of the reason that their several peculiar meanings are assigned to them. The basis on which children proceed universally is usage. They call objects by the names which their parents, associates, and instructors appropriate to them; use the same verbs to denote the same acts; and the same abstract nouns and adjectives to express the same qualities. They accordingly at first use those terms literally, which their parents employ metaphorically. It is not till they have become acquainted with the objects from which the metaphors are drawn, and learned what the literal meaning of words is, in distinction from their tropical use, that they become capable of employing them by a metaphor. When, therefore, the usage of words does not reveal to them this primary and literal meaning, as well as that which they have acquired by a metaphorical use, as is the fact with many that are derived by us from other languages, they never employ them in any except

a literal sense, though that sense may be that which originated in a metaphor, as in the example we have mentioned of the words spirit, expectation, and sincerity.

The erroneousness and absurdity of Dr. Bushnell's representation may be seen by applying it to the terms which he holds are transferred by a metaphor from physical to spiritual things. If they retain their figurative meaning, then the sense which they convey might be expressed by the substitution of other terms that are synonymous with that tropical sense. But such a substitution would convert the passages of the highest and clearest significance into the grossest nonsense. Thus, if the word spirit still denotes breath, or air in motion, as he holds it originally meant, then, if breath or air in motion be put in its place, the sense expressed will be the same as that with which it is now used. The Saviour's declaration, accordingly, God is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth, must have identically the same meaning as though it had been—God is a breath, or air in motion, and they that worship him, must worship him in a breath, or air in motion, and in truth!

The declaration, But to be spiritually minded is life and peace, becomes by this process, But to be windy minded is life and peace; which, should his readers even think it might be true of him, will hardly command their assent as a general maxim, or be regarded as indicating a deep knowledge of the nature of religious affections. In like manner, Paul's direction to Titus, as expressed in our version, In doctrine showing uncorruptness, gravity, sincerity, must convey the same meaning as though it had been rendered—Showing uncorruptness, gravity, without wax; and the expression to prove the sincerity of your love, the same signification as though it had been—To prove that your love is without wax. The reader must be aware whether or not he has been accustomed to attach such a preposterous sense to those and similar passages, and can judge from the relation of this absurd theory to his consciousness, how profound Dr. Bushnell's acquaintance is with the subject which he treats in so learned and airy a manner.

V. Dr. Bushnell has fallen into an equal error, in the representation—if that be the theory, as we suppose it to be,

which he means to express in the passages we are about to quote—that there is a *logos* of *language* as well as of ideas, in the physical world, and that that *logos* is the basis of the words which we employ in the denomination and description of material and spiritual things. He says:—

“I only indicate the manner in which the relative qualities of subject and predicate are developed in language. *Nature having them in her bosom*, existing there in real grammatical relations, not only gives us the *words*, but shows us how to *frame them into propositions*. And in the same way, it will be observed in the hints just given concerning other parts of speech or grammatical elements, that they really have their birth in the *grammar of the world*. . . Still it is very obvious that such results in *grammar* do not take place apart from some inherent law or system, pertaining either to mind or to outward space, or to one as related to the other. Indeed, it is impossible, with such a revelation before us, not to take up at once the sublime conviction just now named—that *grammar itself is in some sense of the outer world, in the same way as THE TERMS OR NAMES out of which language is constructed*. In this view, which it is not rash to believe will some time be fully established, *the outer world* is seen to be a vast menstruum of thought or intelligence. There is a *logos* in *the forms of things*, by which they are prepared to serve as types or images of what is inmost in our *souls*; and *then there is a logos also of construction in the relations of space, the position, qualities, connexions, and predicates of things*, by which they are framed into *grammar*. In a word, the outer world, which envelopes our being, is itself *language, the power of all language*.”—Pp. 28–30.

“And if the outer world is the vast dictionary and grammar of thought we speak of, then it is also itself an organ throughout of intelligence.”—P. 30.

“We have thus seen in what manner our two language-makers will proceed to construct a tongue. It is not my intention to say that the process will go on in the exact order here described—first, physical terms; second, intellectual; third, a grammar. *The several departments of the work will be going on together*, under the guidance of the *Word or Divine Logos in the forms, images, activities, and relations of the outer world*.”—P. 32.

“How plain is it, also, that ‘*the name of anything holds in itself the essential idea of its innermost being*,’ and becomes ‘united to the idea of the word,’ *not as a sound*, but *simply as having in the sound, or named by the sound, a physical type or base*, which is the real supporter and

law of its meaning, and the reason of its connexion with the Logos."—P. 35.

"When we investigate the *relation* of the *form*, or *etymological base* in *any word* of thought or spirit, to the *idea expressed*, we are able to say (negatively) that the *idea or thought has no such form, or shape, or sensible quality, AS THE WORD HAS.*"—P. 41.

In his remarks, also, under his fourth division, pp. 48, 49, quoted on a subsequent page, he represents words as "*images* of that which has no shape or sensible quality whatever; a kind of *painting* in which the speaker or the writer leads on through a gallery of *pictures or forms.*"

He thus represents words as having in themselves a *form or shape*, that has a *relation to the idea* which they are employed to express, and as having "a physical type or base which is the supporter and law of their meaning;" that that type or form exists in the physical world; and that the physical world therefore is the basis of language, and a logos both of "the terms or names out of which it is constituted," and of their grammar;—the meaning of which is, that there is a correspondence between external things and the *words* by which we designate and describe them, like that which subsists between material things, and material and intellectual, that bear an analogy to each other; for there is no sense in which the outer world can be a logos of language, except that of presenting a resemblance to certain vocal sounds, that is a natural and adequate ground for their being used instead of any others to designate the objects of our thoughts, and express our affections in regard to them. But what fancy could be more baseless and absurd! It is between agents and objects of different species, between actions and motions that are perceptible, or of which we are conscious, of one kind, and such acts and motions of another, and between discernible qualities and objects of one species or order, and discernible qualities and effects of another, that analogies exist; not between such things and the mere words which are used to denominate them. There is no such resemblance between agents, objects, acts, and effects in the physical world, and the words which are employed as their names, as to constitute a natural and adequate reason for the use of the names we em-

ploy to designate them, instead of any others. If there be, why is it that the same vocal sound is not used by all mankind to denote the same external object, and the same acts and affections of the mind towards it? There is, in truth, no analogy between them whatever. The term word is sometimes used to denote the mere sensation of the ear excited by the action of the air produced by the speaker in uttering it, as when it is said, "he heard the word which you pronounced." It is sometimes used to denote the mere movement of the air itself, produced by the organs, which excites that sensation, as when it is said, "Pronounce that name;" but whether it is used as the name of the sensation, or of the cause of it, it has no resemblance whatever, in any instance, to the physical form which it is employed to denote. There are no two species of things more wholly devoid of similitude. What likeness is there, for example, between a tree, and the auditory sensation which we experience when we hear the word tree? Has that sensation anything like a stem, boughs, leaves, fruits, a green color, or roots that penetrate the earth? Is it in a condition in respect to other sensations like a visible scene in which a tree is situated—a region of hills and valleys, of streams and cascades? Has it a motion like that of a tree, that bends to the breeze and sways its branches to and fro as the air swells and subsides? Is there any resemblance between a tree as it appears to the eye, and that motion of the air produced by the organs of speech which causes that sensation? Does the air which acts on the ear and raises the sensation, assume a form like that of a tree? Has it anything like roots that pierce the earth, a stem that stretches up towards heaven, or boughs that extend on every side? Has it anything that answers to leaves or fruit? Does it produce any effect that corresponds to a shadow cast by a tree? Is there any such difference between the word tree and trees, whether they are used as names of the sensation or its cause, as answers to the difference between one tree and two or many, an orchard, a grove, or a forest? What can be more manifest than that there is no resemblance whatever between them? Dr. Bushnell may search through the universe without finding any two things that are more totally destitute of any species of correspondence. This pretence, therefore, of

a logos of language and grammar in the exterior world, or analogy between external things and the words which we employ to designate them, is mistaken and absurd in the utmost degree.

Should Dr. Bushnell, however, disclaim this theory, which, though not so formally and fully taught by him as the other elements of his system, is yet clearly embodied in his expressions, and cannot be rejected without an admission that, contrary to one of his main doctrines, he has, in treating this part of the subject which is physical, used a large number of terms in a figurative sense ; still, his representation that "there is a logos in the forms" of external "things, by which they serve as types or images" to the mind, and its thoughts, affections, and actions, in such a sense, that the names of the former are necessarily employed as the names of the latter, is equally mistaken. If an analogy, of which the mind is conscious, subsists between the forms of the external world and "that which is innermost to our souls," then, as their resemblances are reciprocal, and must be equally perceived and felt, the powers and acts of the mind may as easily and naturally be the ground of naming the external objects, acts, or appearances to which they correspond, as the forms or phenomena of the external world are of giving their names to the analogous powers and acts of the mind. There, at most, can no more be a logos, in the forms of physical things, by which they are made to furnish types and images for the denomination and expression of mental and spiritual things, than there is a logos in mental and spiritual things, by which they are made to serve as types and images for the denomination and expression of physical things. It is, accordingly, as common in the description of material existences to employ terms by a metaphor that literally denote the powers, affections, or acts of the mind, as it is in the description and expression of mental and spiritual things, to employ terms by a figure that literally denote the forms, properties, or phenomena of physical things. Thus it is as natural to denominate the skies, the wind, the ocean, floods, and waves angry and wrathful, as it is to speak of hot and tempestuous passions. It is as appropriate and natural to talk of the ivy's loving the oak, as it is of a child's twining itself round the

hearts of its parents. It is as legitimate and common to represent plants and trees as *fond* of the soils that suit their constitutions, and as *delighting* in the rain that refreshes, and the sun that warms and *cheers* them, as it is to represent men as *making an idol* of their wealth or station, *dwelling* in their thoughts on the objects of their chief regard, and *clinging to the hope* of life or advancement. Dr. Bushnell's theories are thus in every respect a complication of misconceptions and absurdities.

The forms of external things are not, in fact, in any degree the ground directly, either of our appropriating to them the names which we do, or of our using the words which we employ as their denominatives, to denote analogous things of the mind ; but, instead, the reason of the appropriation of each class lies absolutely in the mind itself. It is of choice, not of necessity ; for a reason of which the mind is conscious, and of which it is master, not from a blind instinct. As there is no analogy or natural affinity between a word and that which it is employed to denote, the reason of its first appropriation as the name of a particular thing, whether it be physical or mental, must necessarily be one of mere choice or convention. When the root or parent word of a family of kindred terms is once appropriated as the name of a particular thing, then the reason that the several affiliated terms, which are formed from that parent word, have the several meanings that belong to them, is that those who use the language, universally and uniformly employ words with those peculiar terminations, to express such modifications and relations of that which the original word denotes. When the meaning of the noun and verb love, for example, is determined, then the kindred words loveliness, lovely, and lovingly, have their several peculiar significations, because such derivatives of the parent word are, by an invariable law, used to denote such modifications of that which the original word signifies. The appropriation of these several terminations to denote those several modifications of the primary idea, is a matter of choice and usage, not of instinct or physical necessity ; as otherwise they would prevail in all languages as well as our own. And finally, when words are transferred by a metaphor from the things which they literally signify, to denote or

express something of a different, but resembling species, then the reason that the mind employs them in that new relation is, not absolutely the resemblance itself that subsists between the old and new object, but, instead, the mind's perception of that analogy, and choice for the pleasurable or utility of it, to use them for that purpose, in place of literal terms. It is not from a physical necessity, because, from the mind's consciousness of what it desires to express, it might, if requisite, as easily invent a literal term to denote it; and, because, in all languages that are copious like ours, there are literal terms that denote every species and modification of meaning that can be expressed by the use of figures. As the mind is then free to use them or not, the reason of its employing them lies absolutely in itself, and not in the form of things without it.

All the elements, then, of Dr. Bushnell's theory, which we have thus far considered, are wholly mistaken. He is grossly and absurdly wrong in the representation that no words are ever used figuratively in the denomination and description of physical things. He mistakes in a still more extraordinary manner, in the assertion that none but figurative terms are ever used in the denomination and expression of mental and spiritual things; and his fancies that the principle on which terms are used figuratively is wholly unknown, that their tropical sense never becomes their literal meaning, and that there is a *logos* or analogy in physical things, which is the basis and law of language, and ground of the appropriation of words to the meanings which they are employed to express, are all marked in like manner by the most singular and extravagant error. We shall now proceed to notice the views which he deduces from this theory, and shall find that the lofty fabric, also, which he has attempted to erect on it, is as dreamy and false as the principles are which are its basis.

VI. The first proposition which he advances on the ground of his theory is, that words are neither exact representatives of the things for which they stand, whether physical or mental, nor to such a degree as to render their meaning specific; but that instead, they are but vague and ambiguous, and need to be subjected to a critical process to determine their signification, as much as material substances need to be analysed, in

order to ascertain what the elements are of which they consist. Thus, he says :—

"There are no words, in the physical department of language, that are exact representatives of particular physical things. For whether we take the theory of the Nominalists or the Realists, the words are in fact and practically names only of genera, not of individuals and species. *To be even still more exact, they represent only certain sensations of sight, touch, taste, smell, hearing—one or all.* Hence the opportunity, in language, for endless mistakes and false reasonings, in reference to matters purely physical."—P. 43.

"It follows, that as physical terms are never exact, being only names of genera, much less have we any terms in the physical department of language that are exact representatives of thought. For, first, the word here used will be the name only of a genus of physical images. Then, secondly, it will have been applied over to signify a genus of thoughts or sentiments. And now, thirdly, in a particular case, it is drawn out to signify a specific thought or sentiment, which, of course, will have qualities or incidents peculiar to itself. What now can steer a word through so many ambiguities and complications, and *give it an exact and determinate meaning in the particular it is applied to prove?*"—P. 44.

"What, then, it may be asked, is the real and legitimate use of words when applied to moral subjects? for we cannot dispense with them, and it is uncomfortable to hold them in universal scepticism, as being only instruments of error. Words, then, I answer, are legitimately used as the signs of thoughts to be expressed. They do not literally convey or pass over a thought out of one mind into another, as we commonly speak of doing. They are only hints, or images, held up before the mind of another, to put *him* on *generating or reproducing the same thought*, which he can do only as he has the same personal contents, or the generative power out of which to bring the thought required. Hence, there will be different measures of understanding or misunderstanding, according to the capacity or incapacity, the ingenuousness or moral obliquity, of the receiving party, even if the communicating party offers only truth in the best and freshest forms of expression the language provides.

"There is only a single class of intellectual words that can be said to have a perfectly determinate significance, viz. those which relate to what are called necessary ideas. They are such as time, space, cause, truth, right, arithmetical numbers, and geometrical figures. Here, the names applied are settled into a perfectly determinate meaning, not by any peculiar virtue in *them*, but by reason of the absolute exactness of the

ideas themselves. *Time cannot be anything more or less than time ; truth cannot in its idea be anything different from truth ; the numerals suffer no ambiguity of count or measure ; a circle must be a circle ; a square a square.* As far as language, therefore, has to do with these, *it is a perfectly exact algebra of thought, but no farther.*"—Pp. 45, 46.

"Words of thought and spirit are not only inexact in their significance, never measuring the truth or giving its precise equivalent, *but they always affirm something which is false, or contrary to the truth intended. They impute FORM to that which is really out of form.* They are related to the truth, only as form to spirit—earthen vessels in which the truth is borne, yet always offering their mere pottery as being the truth itself. . . . They palm off upon us too often their 'dark and cloudy' qualities as belonging inherently to the golden truths they are used to express. Therefore we need always to have it in mind, or in present recollection, that they are but signs, in fact, or *images of that which has no shape or sensible quality whatever ;* a kind of painting, in which the speaker or the writer leads on through a gallery of pictures or forms, while we attend him, catching at the thought suggested by the forms. *In one view they are all false ;* for there are no shapes in the truths they represent, *and therefore we are to separate continually, and by a most delicate process of art, between the husks of the forms and the pure truths of thought presented in them.*"—Pp. 48–49.

He thus not only denies that words are exact representatives of the things for which they stand, or have a clear and determinate meaning, but represents them as absolutely equivocal and deceptive ; as wearing a form that is a mask to the meaning that lurks beneath ; and as needing, therefore, like wolves in sheep's clothing, to be divested of their disguises in order that their true significance may be seen. And such would indisputably be the fact, and in a mode and on a scale, not improbably, little conceived by him, were his theory of figurative language true. For if, as he holds, all the terms that are employed in the denomination and expression of mental and spiritual things are used figuratively ; if the principle on which words are used figuratively is wholly unperceived and undiscoverable ; and if, consequently, the only known meaning of those words when employed in reference to intellectual and spiritual things is a false one ; then by the terms, they cannot possibly, in those instances, have a known and determinable meaning that is true ! There is not, on that view, a proposi-

tion in the whole circle of intellectual and moral science or theology ; there is not a term that is used in treating of rational and moral beings, or of God, that is employed with a genuine meaning that is known or discoverable. There is not one, the whole ascertained or determinable import of which is not absolutely false ; and the whole fabric accordingly of religion and ethics, of jurisprudence and social life, is annihilated at a stroke !

The mode in which his theory empties all such words and affirmations of their true significance, and charges them with a false and revolting meaning, has already been seen in the manner in which it converts Christ's declaration that God is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth, into falsehood and blasphemy ;—turning the affirmation that God is a Spirit into the opposite assertion that he is not a Spirit, but material ; and the affirmation that they who worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth, into the contradictory statement, that they must neither worship in spirit and in truth, nor worship him at all !

It works a similar result in regard to every proposition in the word of God that treats of moral and spiritual things, whether revelation, law, promise, or threatening. There is not one of them, nor one of their terms, which it does not exhibit as totally misunderstood by mankind ; there is not one, the true meaning of which it does not represent as wholly unintelligible ! Thus, for example, in respect to the first of the two great commandments on which hang the law and the prophets ; “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength,”—the verb love, according to it, does not signify,—as all who have heretofore used it, have presumed,—to regard God with benevolent affection, complacency, delight, or desire ; instead, in the first place, it is taken from the outer world of material things, and properly denotes some act, motion, state, or relation that is purely physical ; and is applied to the mind only by a metaphor. In the next place, the principle on which it is thus applied to the mind ; or what the nature of the relation or analogy is, that subsists between the physical thing from which it is taken, and the mind to which it is transferred ; or between the physical act, motion, state, or

relation, which it literally denotes, and that which it is employed in its metaphorical use to signify, is wholly unknown, and "transcends speculative inquiry." It is absolutely certain, then, that it does not mean *love*, or the exercise of a benevolent and complacent affection towards God; and hence that he has not required that affection from men; and consequently that love to him is no part of religion! Such is the short process by which Dr. Bushnell's theory gets rid of the law of God, releases men from the obligations which are the foundation of his government over them, and places indifference towards him, contempt, or hatred, on a level with the supreme regard which he requires!

But while on the one hand, according to Dr. B., we thus know with absolute certainty that the word love does not mean that affection which theologians and others commonly suppose it is employed to denote; we, on the other, are as absolutely uncertain what it is which it is used to express. First, because by the theory, the principle on which it is employed metaphorically, is wholly unknown, and an inscrutable mystery; and next, because we have no knowledge what the physical thing is from which, as he represents, it is drawn, nor what the sense is with which, if his statement be true, it is used in relation to that physical thing! Most certainly the only literal use of the word of which we have any consciousness or knowledge, is in relation to rational and sentient beings. Its only literal meaning is that of complacent affection, benevolent regard, or desire; and it is never used by a trope, except when it is transferred from rational and sentient beings, to objects that are devoid of affection; as when it is said, the willow loves a wet soil, the margin of springs and streams; the oak, uplands and hills; the fir a cold, the palm a hot climate. We appeal to the consciousness of the reader, whether it has any other use. If any other is known, let it be designated. If Dr. Bushnell can show that its application to rational and sentient beings is always metaphorical, let him point out the physical thing from which it is drawn; and specify the act, motion, state, relation, or whatever else it is, which it denotes in its primary and literal use.

His scheme expunges its true meaning, in like manner,

from every other term of that great commandment, and substitutes a totally false and unintelligible one in its place. Thus the names of Jehovah, and thy God, being denominatives of a Spirit, are not, according to Dr. B., used literally, but by a trope. They do not then really mean the Self-existent; but some other being to whom his denominative is transferred. The command is no longer, therefore, a command to love, or exercise any other affection or act towards *Jehovah*. He is not the object of the regard which is enjoined! And what is thus true of this law, is equally true of all others; and consequently, the Self-existent, the Creator and Ruler of the universe, and the God of men, is not the true object of their religious regard; and thence, all the holy affection and adoring homage of which he has been the object, has been misdirected! His purest and most fervent worshippers are as sheer apostates from the true deity, and in as open and absolute rebellion, as the worshippers of idols or the blankest atheists! But while Dr. B.'s scheme thus teaches us that Jehovah is not the object of the regard which the command requires, it leaves us wholly uncertain who the being or what the object is, to which it is to be directed, inasmuch as, according to him, we know nothing of the principle on which his names are here transferred by a metaphor to another being or object, and cannot therefore reason from his nature, rights, station, or acts, to those of the being or object which they are employed to denote. To obey the command, then, is absolutely impracticable by a double impossibility; first, because we have no knowledge who the being or object is to whom the regard is to be directed; and next, because we know nothing of the nature of the regard itself, as before shown, of which he is to be the object. What sublime results of this boasted theory! How it removes ambiguities! How it simplifies religion! Men are not only released by it at once from their allegiance to the Almighty, but freed by its impracticability from all the obligations of piety!

The theory fills a similar office also to the other terms of the commandment, that define the degree in which the regard it requires, is to be exercised;—with all the heart, and soul, and mind, and strength. As these words,

which properly denote our whole spiritual nature, are, according to Dr. B., used figuratively, they do not signify the heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, but something else of an analogous kind. The service, therefore, which the command enjoins, is not an affection of *the heart*, nor an act of any species whatever of the *mind*; but of some analogous part of our nature; and of *the body*, therefore, as we have no other to present a correspondence to the mind: and as it must be an act of the body in which the mind takes no share, it must be a merely involuntary motion, such as the circulation of the blood, the process of digestion or growth, the evolution of heat, or some other in respect to which we are wholly passive! The theory thus erases from the commandment every trace of its true meaning; denies that God is the object of the regard which it requires; that love is the affection which it enjoins; and that the act which it prescribes is to be exerted by the mind: converts it into a command to exert a wholly unknown and involuntary corporeal act or process, towards a being who is wholly unknown and undiscoverable; and represents the Son of God as pronouncing that senseless and blasphemous injunction, the first and great commandment imposed by the Almighty on men, on which hang all his other commands and revelations! It reverses in the same manner every other law, every direction, and every promise of the Sacred Word, and transforms the whole revelation which God has made into a jargon of contradiction and nonsense, immeasurably more shocking than was ever devised by the most artful and audacious of the open enemies of religion. Nor is its application confined to theology. It works a like conversion of all the language of morals, of jurisprudence, and of social life, also, which is employed in the expression of thought and affection. The great prohibition, "Thou shalt not covet," no longer forbids that sinister act of the *mind* which men have heretofore employed it to signify, nor any mental act whatever; but instead, some wholly unknown and involuntary act, process, or condition of the body; so that the mind can neither break nor obey the precept, nor know whether it is broken or obeyed! All civil laws, also, that treat of rights and obligations and prescribe duties, all judicial decisions, and all social contracts, in which

terms of thought or spirit occur, are swept of their genuine meaning, and made the vehicle of an opposite and impossible sense. There is not a title deed, a will, a contract, of any species, nor a verbal promise, that does not, on Dr. Bushnell's theory, *divest* the party to whom the conveyance or promise is made, of the possessions or rights which it is its object to transfer and insure, instead of conveying and confirming those rights. The word *promise* on bank-bills, is emptied by it of all its true significance, and made to denote—not a sacred mental engagement—but an undefined and wholly unknown mechanical act or state of the body, which, as far as can be determined, is as likely to be hostile to the rights of the holder of the promise, as favorable to them. The engagement between Dr. Bushnell and his parishioners, by which they assumed the obligation to pay, and he acquired the right to receive a salary, no longer expresses an obligation and a right, but treats instead of some mere bodily act or condition, and may, for aught that can be shown, be accomplished by not transferring the sum to him, by simply assuming the attitude of listeners to his discourses; or by not assuming it, but by avoiding his ministrations! What an issue for an expositor of revelation; a minister of the Almighty! What admirable qualifications it indicates for the task Dr. B. has undertaken of striking the whole fabric of theology, morals, and philosophy from their foundation, and substituting a new system in their place! And what resistless inducements it presents to "our younger theologians" to discard as guides the mere word-interpreters and "logickers" who are so weak as to suppose that language means that which it is employed to express, and take him as their oracle!

It is clear, then, that were Dr. Bushnell's theory of the origin and nature of language true, the conclusion would be legitimate and inevitable which he draws from it respecting the ambiguousness and deceptive meaning of its terms. His views, however, of its inadequacy as a vehicle of thought, are as mistaken and absurd as the premises are from which he deduces them. He seems to suppose that a word cannot be a specific and adequate representative of that for which it stands, unless it expresses everything that pertains to it, so that the mind, in grasping its meaning, grasps the whole

circle of facts and truths that may be affirmed of that subject. No fancy, however, could be more groundless, or offer a grosser contradiction to our consciousness. It would make omniscience, or a faculty of omniscience, requisite to the comprehension of a vast portion of the words that are in common use, such as God, the universe, matter, mind, the solar system, heaven, eternal life, and thousands of others. But words are not employed with such meanings. Instead, they are used to denominate things as of particular kinds or natures, without any consideration of the numerous subordinate truths that may distinguish, or propositions that may be affirmed of them. Thus, the word house simply denotes a building formed to be inhabited, or used in some relation by men, without any reference to the materials of which it consists, its size, form, color, beauty, convenience, ownership, or any other of the numerous particulars that would be comprised in a full description of it. The office of denoting those particulars is assigned to other words, and there is one for every genus, species, and individual that is known or conceivable, and in every form and relation in which they can exist. Dr. Bushnell might spend a lifetime in analysing the elements of a building without finding a species of matter, a combination, shape, hue, relation, office, or any other characteristic or ground for a predicate, that has not a specific name as its denominative, or for the exact description of which, at least, our language does not furnish the requisite terms. And this distribution of words to separate offices, and limitation of them to peculiar and specific meanings, instead of obscuring their signification, and making them an inadequate vehicle of thought, adds immeasurably to the certainty of their import, and gives them a beauty and perfection of adaptedness to the end for which they are employed, that is possessed by no other instrument. There is no such ambiguity, therefore, or deceptiveness, as Dr. B. represents, in the meaning of terms. Instead, every word has an individual and specific office assigned to it, as clearly and absolutely as the letters of the alphabet, or the vocal sounds which they are employed to represent. Nor have the words "time, space, cause, truth, right, arithmetical numbers, and geometrical figures," any such peculiarly specific and "perfectly

determinate significance above others," as he ascribes to them. So far from it, there is not in the whole circle of things in the universe an individual or class, of which Dr. Bushnell has a more inadequate and limited knowledge than the truths that are predicable of arithmetical numbers, or the things of which those numbers are predicable; as, of all the individual existences in the universe; all their relations; all the events of which they have been the subjects; all their future destiny; and all their possible modifications. In like manner, there is not a noun in the vocabulary of physical things with which men are familiar, the meaning of which is not as specific and determinate as that of the word circle. It denotes the figure; but it does not signify that figure any more clearly and specifically than the word triangle denotes a triangular figure; parallelogram the figure of which that is the name; or trapezium the combination of lines which that represents. It does not stand for all the truths that are predicable of a circle, any more than the word house stands for all the elements considered separately of which it consists, or the propositions that may be affirmed of it as a whole, or of its several parts. Instead, if all or any of the truths that may be affirmed of a circle in geometry or otherwise are to be expressed, they are to be expressed either altogether by other words, or by other words in connexion with the word circle, such as line, angle, space, and the several terms used in the definitions and demonstrations of geometry, and their application to physics. That word itself never acquires any higher or other meaning than as the mere denominative of the figure. So likewise of the words, time, space, right, truth, cause; if they are used by Dr. B. as representatives of all the countless particulars that may be affirmed of the several things for which they stand, then their meaning is as inadequately known as of any other terms in the language; as none but the Omniscient can comprehend the infinite multitude of the propositions that may be affirmed of them. On the other hand, if they are not used in that relation, but as the mere denominatives of the things of which they are the names, without consideration of the particular truths that may be affirmed of those things, then they are no more determinate in their significance, and no more adequate representatives of

the several things which they are used to designate, than any other words in the language. And it is in this relation unquestionably that these and all other terms are in fact used. Were the question put to men universally: Do you not attach as precise a meaning to the word line, dot, curve, angle, wall, house, shrub, tree, grove, forest, hill, mountain, stream, sea, or their equivalents in your tongue, as to the word circle? They would without exception answer in the affirmative. And were the inquiry made: Do you use the word tree simply to mean a tree; or do you employ it to signify the propositions that may be affirmed of a tree? The reply would be as unanimously: We use the word to denote a tree simply, not to signify its height, form, girth, color, fruits, motion, the shadow it casts, the shelter it yields to the animals that lodge in its branches, or repose in its shade, the uses to which it may be put, or any of the other innumerable things that may be predicated of it; and so of all other terms. The mathematician would indeed say, "I have a clearer knowledge of the propositions that may be affirmed and demonstrated of a circle, and of the uses to which those truths may be applied, than I have of the propositions that may be asserted and proved respecting a tree or house; but I do not use the word circle to express those truths. It has no such office; other words are employed for that purpose. I use the word circle simply as the denominative of the figure, with a perfectly clear and settled meaning, therefore, *and because its office is limited to that individual thing*; but I use it with no more exact and settled meaning than any other denominative of an object of the senses with which I am familiar." In like manner, the house-builder would say, "I am aware of a greater number of the propositions that may be affirmed of a house, than may be affirmed and proved of a circle; and am more familiar with the uses to which the materials of a house and a house itself may be appropriated, than of those to which the demonstrable truths in respect to a circle may be applied; but I do not employ the word house to signify those materials or uses. They are expressed by other terms. I use the word house, simply to denote the building, without any other consideration; and the meaning which I attach to it, therefore,

is as clear and determinate, as that with which I use the word circle, or any other geometrical name.

The whole of Dr. Bushnell's oracular declamation respecting the inadequacy of language as a vehicle of thought, proceeds, accordingly, on the grossest and most singular and discreditable misapprehension. The difficulty with him is not at all, as he represents, that there are no words that are adequate to convey the thoughts with which his mind teems ; but instead, that he has not the thoughts which it is the office of the words he uses to convey ! He wholly mistakes the proper function of words, and supposes that they must stand, not only for the things of which they are the names, but for all the truths or propositions that may be predicated of those things ; the effect of which would be, by embracing in their meaning an infinite number of particulars, millions and myriads of millions of which are wholly unknown to us—to render their signification wholly vague and indeterminate to any but a being of all comprehensive intelligence. His name, for instance, in order to "pass over" to his readers that for which it stands, must, on that theory, be taken by them not merely as his denominative as a person, but as signifying also, everything that can be predicated of him, past, present, and future ; all the particles, therefore, that have entered, or are ever to enter into his corporeal nature, all their modifications, properties, motions, and relations ; his spiritual being, all the perceptions, thoughts, sensations, emotions, passions, volitions, of which he has been the subject or agent, and all that are to occupy him through his future existence ; all his acts, corporeal and mental, words, writings, discourses, publications, hitherto and hereafter ; and all the effects they produce ! This is, on his theory, a brief definition of his denominative ! It will be news to his readers, we presume, that they are accustomed to use, or at least, should use it with such a signification. He is under a misapprehension, also, of the other topics of his Dissertation. There is not one on which he has hitherto touched, in respect to which he does not betray either the most extraordinary ignorance or the most absurd misconception ; and it is owing to his neglect to study them, that he has fallen into such unparalleled errors. Had he taken the precaution to give

them even a cursory notice ; had he considered for a moment the manner in which he is accustomed to use words, or compared any one of his principles with his own consciousness, or the most palpable facts within his observation, he would have been incapable of giving publicity to such a tissue of crude and ridiculous speculation. So far from there being any ground for his accusation of language, it has, as a vehicle of thought, a higher degree of adaptation to its end, and a more admirable perfection, than any other instrument we employ possesses for the purpose for which it is used ; and the fulness and absoluteness of its adequacy, arises from the peculiarities which Dr. Bushnell denies or misrepresents ; the limitation of each word, in each instance of its use to the denomination of some one individual thing ; and appropriation of a different term to every different genus, species, kind, individual, form, office, relation, quality, and degree that is the subject of affirmation. This diversity of the office of words is so completely coincident with the diversities of things themselves and our thoughts, emotions, and actions in respect to them, and the meaning of each class of words is so accurately defined by its termination and usage, that there is not a solitary form of thought, or shade, or degree of feeling in respect to any subject of which we have a knowledge, for the clear and easy expression of which our language does not furnish appropriate and adequate terms. Dr. Bushnell will hunt in vain for a solitary thing physical or spiritual, that has not a proper denominative in our language ; and for the description of which there is not an amplitude of terms to express everything that is predicable of it, with, at least, as great a degree of precision, as he can conceive them. If the reader doubts it, let him make the trial. He will find that just in proportion as he has a knowledge of things, he is able to designate them by their proper names, and describe their qualities, conditions, relations, and uses ; and that his power of expressing his thoughts and emotions is in the exactest sense commensurate with the clearness of his ideas, and his acquaintance with the peculiar import of words. Such writers as Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas, Shakspeare, Bacon, Milton, Edwards, and Webster, find no difficulty in uttering their thoughts and sentiments, and with the utmost intelli-

bleness. And the clearness and precision with which men universally utter their ideas, may be held as a measure of the clearness of their apprehensions, and the accuracy of their knowledge of the meaning of the terms which they employ : and a want of intelligibleness and accuracy, as the fault, not of the language, but of the thinker and writer ; and an infallible proof of a corresponding confusion of ideas, ignorance or misapprehension of the subject, or unskilfulness in the selection and use of terms.

Dr. Bushnell, on the ground of the vagueness and deceptiveness which he ascribes to words, recommends a careful investigation into their origin and meaning. He says :—

“ But if we are liable thus to be carried away by the forms contained in our words, into conclusions or impressions that do not belong to the truths they are used to signify, we are also to peruse their forms with great industry, as being at the same time a very important key to their meaning. The original type or etymology of words is a most fruitful study. Even when they pass into meanings that seem contrary one to another, it will yet be found, in almost every case, that the repugnant meanings are natural growths, so to speak, of the same vital root, as some kinds of trees are seen to throw out leaves having different shapes.”—P. 53.

“ Since all words, but such as relate to necessary truths, are inexact representations of thought, mere types or analogies, or, where the types are lost beyond recovery, only proximate expressions of the thoughts named, it follows that language will be ever trying to mend its own deficiencies, by multiplying its forms of representation. As, too, the words made use of generally carry something false with them, as well as something true, associating form with the truth represented, when really there is no form, it will also be necessary, on this account, to multiply words or figures, and thus to present the subject on opposite sides, or many sides. Thus, as form battles form, and one form neutralizes another, all the insufficiencies of words are filled out, the contraries liquidated, and the mind settles into a full and just apprehension of the pure spiritual truth. Accordingly, we never come so near to a truly well rounded view of any truth as when it is opposed paradoxically ; that is, under contradictions ; that is, under two or more dictions, which, taken as dictions, are contrary one to the other.”—P. 55.

No such effect, however, can, on his views of language, spring from the multiplication of words ; so far from it, the

more terms are used, the more numerous will be the masks that are drawn over their meaning, and the greater the number of false significations that will be liable to be taken for the true. How can the addition of two, five, or ten vaguenesses diminish ambiguity and give birth to precision and certainty? How can the accumulation of darkness generate light? According to his representation of the deceptiveness of words, every effort to define the meaning of a term, or illustrate the nature of a subject by exemplification, is but uttering a new falsehood respecting it, and interposing a new obstacle to the discovery of the truth. The attempt, on his principles, to give instruction through the medium of language is a solecism, as absurd as it were to undertake to enable men to see clearly by placing a blind over their eyes, or to present objects to their sight by removing them from the sphere of their vision. And if his views are true, there is no remedy for the evil, either in the skill of man or the power of God.

VII. As language is, in his judgment, thus vague and deceptive, he holds that it is a wholly unfit instrument of proving the truth of ideas; and that reasoning in it can serve no other purpose than to present a false show of demonstration and impose on the superficial and credulous.

"It is a part of the same view, that logic itself is a defective and often a deceitful instrument. I speak not here of logic as a science, but of that deductive, proving, spinning method of practical investigation commonly denoted by the term *logical*. It is very obvious that no turn of logical deduction can prove anything, by itself, not previously known by inspection or insight. And yet there is always a busy-minded class of sophists or speculators who, having neither a large observation *nor a power of poetic insight*, occupy themselves as workers in words and propositions, managing to persuade themselves that they are great investigators, and even discoverers of truth. It being generally known that John, James, and Peter are men, they advance, by a strict logical process, to the conclusion that Peter is a man! in which they seem to themselves, and possibly to some others, to have added a valuable contribution to the stock of human knowledge. They do not see that their premise contains their conclusion, and somewhat more, and that the only real talent of investigation lies in a *power of insight by which premises are seen or ascertained*. They impose upon themselves, too, the more readily, because it is so generally true, that their conclusion is not con-

tained in their premise; hence, they seem to themselves to be really multiplying truths with great facility and rapidity—only it happens that, inasmuch as their conclusions were not in their premises, they are false! And so it turns out that these great investigators and provers, the men who think that nothing is really established until it has been proved, that is, deduced from something else, are generally the worst propagators of falsity in the world.”—Pp. 57, 58.

Were his theory true respecting the ambiguity and deceptiveness of words, they would unquestionably be unfit to be used as an instrument of reasoning; inasmuch as if the meaning of the premise could not be determined with certainty nor probability, there, then, could be no assurance that it presented ground for the deduction from it of the conclusion. That is not the objection, however, which he here urges; but instead, first, that a deduction made according to the laws of logic cannot contain anything more than is embraced in the premise from which it is drawn! He regards that, it seems, as so consummate a defect as totally to disqualify logic to be an instrument of knowledge. Were its nature reversed, so that a conclusion might legitimately contain what is not comprised in the premise, and what therefore is not demonstrated by the proofs which are the media of the conclusion, it would then, in his judgment, it seems, be a suitable instrument of investigation, and rapid progress might be made by its aid in the discovery and development of truth! There would then be room for “the power of poetic insight” to see what might and ought to be in the premise, as well as what is, and to deduce any conclusions that fancy might suggest! Such a species of logic would doubtless suit Dr. Bushnell’s peculiar necessities, and be a fit organ of constructing such a theory as that which he advances. To most, however, instead of a defect, it will be regarded as a merit of logic that it does not admit that an inference should comprehend more than is contained in the premise from which it is drawn, nor than is involved in the proofs which are alleged that it is contained in the premise. The premise and conclusion which he offers as an exemplification of syllogistic reasoning will be regarded as a novelty, we presume, by those who are familiar with logic. Aristotle would scarcely have acknowledged it as an example

of the pure syllogism. Syllogisms are sometimes framed like the following. All Christ's apostles were men. But Peter was one of Christ's apostles. Therefore Peter was a man. But we have never seen any formed like Dr. Bushnell's. "John, James, and Peter are *men*;" therefore, "by a strict logical process, Peter is a *man*." Dr. Bushnell's proficiency in logic, however, is like his knowledge of other subjects.

His next objection to the art is, that those who attempt to employ it often reason inaccurately, by deducing conclusions that are more comprehensive than their premises. That is certainly a legitimate objection to such reasoners, but not to the art itself, which they misunderstand and abuse. So far from being a good reason for the disuse and reprobation of logic, it creates a new necessity for its use in the confutation of their errors, and vindication of the truth from their misrepresentations.

VIII. As words are thus, in his view, totally unequal to an exact expression of truth, and logic an inadequate means of demonstrating it, he holds that no dogmatic propositions or doctrinal statements can be framed, that will present a just exhibition of the truths of mental science or religion. He says—

"The views of language and interpretation I have here offered, suggest the very great difficulty, if not impossibility, of mental science and religious dogmatism. In all such uses, or attempted uses, the effort is to make language answer a purpose that is against its nature. The 'winged words' are required to serve as beasts of burden, or, what is no better, to forget their poetic life, as messengers of the air, and stand still, fixed upon the ground, as wooden statues of truth."

"In algebra and geometry, the ideas themselves being absolute, the terms or names also may be; but in mental science and religion, no such exactness is possible, because our apprehensions of truths are here only proximate and relative. I see not, therefore, how the subject matter of mental science and religion can ever be included under the fixed forms of dogma. Definitions cannot bring us over the difficulty, for definitions are, in fact, only changes of symbol, and if we take them to be more, will infallibly lead us into error. In fact, no man is more certain to run himself into mischievous error, than he who places implicit confidence in definitions. After all, definitions will be words, and science will be

words ; and words, place them in whatever shapes we may, will be only shadows of truth."—Pp. 72, 73.

But if the views he advances of language are correct, this is but a very faint and inadequate statement of the conclusion to which they lead. Not only are definitions and doctrinal creeds defective and unequal to a just expression of the truth, but they are positively false and deceptive ; they are absolute and consummate misrepresentations, and misrepresentations that cannot be corrected or counteracted by explanations, retractions, or modifying statements, and that must thence, of necessity, lead to delusion, precisely in proportion as they command assent. The use of them, therefore, is not only inexpedient, but criminal, and ought to be discontinued. And this is as true, also, of every declaration, precept, promise, or threatening of the Scriptures, as it is of affirmations in catechisms and professions of faith. It is as true of Christ's sayings—"Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy ; blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God ;" "He that believeth shall be saved ;" "The hour is coming in which all that are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth ; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation,"—as it is when the doctrines of the beatitudes, of faith, and of the resurrection, are expressed in equivalent terms, in catechetical answers, or the propositions of a confession. It is as true of the Apostle's asseveration, "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life ;" as it is of the creed, "I believe in God the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ, his only Son, and in the Holy Ghost." It is idle to suppose that such a theory of language universally, can be limited in its application to catechisms, creeds, and confessions. It charges the words which God addresses to us with deception, as much as it does those which are uttered by man. It is as applicable to the Scriptures as it is to uninspired writings. It exhibits the whole revelation which God has made, as nothing else than a stupendous deception,—a vast complication of false shows, so intrinsically and necessarily treacherous, that to attempt to pierce the

disguise and discover the truth, is only to advance into an inextricable labyrinth,—to sail on to a shoreless ocean of darkness and uncertainty. It involves a denial, indeed, of the reality of a revelation, the fact and possibility of a moral government, and the existence of an incorporeal deity, by representing all the terms employed in treating of them as figurative, and literally denoting nothing but what is physical; and then denying, with equal directness, the existence of physical things, by representing all perceptions of them as mere forms of the understanding, that have no counterpart or ground in anything exterior to the mind itself. The whole material and social universe, as well as God and his government, is thus swept from existence, *and nothing left to any individual but what is in his own consciousness!* Why did Dr. Bushnell undertake to confine the application of his doctrines to catechetical definitions, denominational creeds, and theological dogmas? Why did he not apprise his readers that it strikes not merely at formularies of faith and religious doctrines, but at the great Being whose teachings and will they profess to express, at the government which they exhibit him as exercising, and at all the faith and hopes of man of which he is the object? Why did he not apply his principles to morals, jurisprudence, and social life, and notify his readers that he holds that those terms, and all the names of the mind itself, its affections, and its acts, denote nothing but unknown and inconceivable physical things; and that, consequently, right, obligation, virtue, and the social affections of which we are conscious, and in the exercise and reciprocation of which we find all our happiness, have no denominatives in our vocabulary, and are never expressed by us in language! Is he so unaware of the import of his system, as not to see its bearings on these great subjects? or is he so eager to overturn Christianity, as not to care what he overwhelms, if he can but strike that from its foundation?

IX. As he thus denies that the Scriptures are an intelligible revelation, and the possibility of a specific and exact expression in language, of any intellectual or spiritual truth, or religious, moral, or social affection, how are men to acquire mental and spiritual knowledge, and frame their views of the great

subjects of theology? Their religion—the answer is—can be nothing but a vague naturalism, and must be the work of the fancy instead of reason or inspiration.

"We find little, therefore, in the Scriptures, to encourage the hope of a complete and sufficient Christian dogmatism, or of a satisfactory and truly adequate system of scientific theology. Language, under the laws of logic or speculation, does not seem to be adequate to any such use or purpose. The Scriptures of God, in providing a clothing for religious truth, have little to do with mere dialectics, much to do with the freer creations of poetry; and that for reasons, evidently, which ought to waken a salutary scepticism in us, in regard to the possibility of that which so many great minds have been attempting with so great confidence for so many hundreds of years.

"But when we come to religion and mental science, our terms are only analogies, signs, shadows—so to speak—of the formless mysteries above us and within us. Here we see nothing, save in refracted or reflected rays; therefore, with but a limited capacity of mental understanding.

"It accords also with this, that while natural science is advancing with so great rapidity and certainty of movement, the advances of mental science and theology are so irregular and obscure, and are wrought out by a process so conflicting and tortuous. They seem, in fact, to have no advance, save what may be called a cultivation of symbol, produced by the multifarious industry of debate and system-making. *There is, however, ONE HOPE for mental and religious truth, and their final settlement, which I confess I see but dimly, and can but faintly express or indicate. It is that physical science, leading the way, setting outward things in their true proportions, opening up their true contents, revealing their genesis and final causes and laws, AND WEAVING ALL INTO THE UNITY OF A REAL UNIVERSE, will so perfect our knowledge and conceptions of them, that we can use them in the second department of language with more exactness.* There is, we have also seen, in what we call nature, that is, in its objects, an outward grammar of relations, which constructs the grammar of language; or what is not far different, the logic of propositions. In the laws of nature, I suppose there is, in like manner, an internal grammar, which is certain, as it is evolved, to pass into language, and be an internal grammar in that, systematizing and steadying its uses. And then *language will be as much more full and intelligent, as it has more of God's intelligence, in the system of nature, imparted to its symbols. For, undoubtedly, the whole universe of nature is a perfect analogon of the whole universe of thought and spirit.* Therefore, as nature becomes truly a universe only through

science revealing its universal laws, the true universe of thought and spirit cannot sooner be conceived."—Pp. 76–79.

The only attainable knowledge of mental and spiritual things is thus, by his representation, to be drawn from the material universe, and the medium through which it is to be acquired is the analogy which subsists between "the whole universe of nature," and "the whole universe of thought and spirit," which weaves "all into the *unity of a real universe*;" or in other words, such a correspondence between natural and spiritual things, as is contemplated by Swedenborg's pantheistic theory, which exhibits the material universe as an outbirth of the deity, and as owing all its individual forms to the divine efflux or emanation that works within them, and causes them to indicate the thoughts and affections of the divinity with which they are animated, as one's countenance expresses his thoughts and passions. Such is the cheering prospect which Dr. Bushnell presents of a genuine and satisfactory knowledge of ourselves and of God. If the language of intellectual science and theology ever acquires a legitimate and determinate sense, it is to be "*imparted* to it by the system of nature." But how, even on this pantheistic theory of outbirths and correspondencies between the interior and exterior deity, is the knowledge of the one to be derived from the other, consistently with Dr. B.'s theory, which represents the nature of the analogy that subsists between them as wholly unknown and undiscoverable, and the use of logic, or the ratiocinative faculty, in respect to it, as wholly illegitimate and deceptive? The task of interpretation is devolved by him on the imagination. "Poets," he says, "are the true metaphysicians, and if there be any complete science of man to come, they must bring it. Is it to be otherwise *in religion*? Can there be produced in human language a complete and proper theology?—can the Christian truth be offered in the molds of any dogmatic statement?"—Pp. 73, 74. Certainly not on his theory. If there are no media by which God can be known to the intellect, and no words by which theological thoughts can be expressed, then the intellect can have no share in the perception or utterance of knowledge respecting him, and any conceptions of him that can be gained, must be

the mere creatures of the fancy. How then are the Scriptures to be treated? Not as a real and intelligible revelation from God, but as an infinite complication of contradictions and absurdities.

"Never was there a book uniting so many contrarious aspects of one and the same truth; the more complete, therefore, because of its manifoldness; nay the more really harmonious for its apparent want of harmony. How then are we to receive it and come into its truth? Only in the comprehensive manner just now suggested; not by destroying the repugnances, but by allowing them to stand, offering our mind to their impressions, and allowing it to gravitate inwardly, towards that whole of truth, in which they coalesce."—Pp. 70, 71.

That is—it is to be interpreted according to his theory of its language, as altogether unintelligible and contradictory. All terms that treat of God, law, right, virtue, sin, worship, the mind, affections, volitions, are to be regarded as wholly figurative, and derived from physical things. Not one of them, therefore, exhibits God as a spiritual being, the soul as immaterial, or any of the acts prescribed by the divine law, as acts of the mind. Instead, in conformity with Spinoza's theory, they represent God and moral creatures as purely material, and all their acts, as mere acts of matter. There are no such realities, according to it, as dependent existences, moral subjects, or a moral government, but all things are alike material, and all alike divine. In like manner, by his theory of figures, God is not the object of the regard required by the first and great command, but some material being; love is not the affection which it enjoins, but some mere physical act or quality; and the act by which it is to be obeyed, is not an act of the mind, but a mere corporeal one; and thus every law, doctrine, promise, and threatening is to be interpreted by denying to it that meaning which it expresses, according to the laws by which we are all conscious we are accustomed to use and interpret language, and a sense ascribed to it that makes it treat of a wholly different subject, and is absolutely false and impossible. What must be the effect of this system, if allowed to exert its natural influence on a family, a congregation, a community? What would be

the condition of a society, whose principles and practice were conformed to it? Has infidelity itself ever made a more undisguised and daring effort to sweep away the whole fabric of Christianity? Have the apostles of atheism ever made a more open attempt to confound truth and falsehood, and convert religion and morality into a sham?

X. But what is the object for which Dr. B. puts forth this theory? What is it that he would accomplish by it? Is it the discontinuance of theological instruction and study? Is it the abandonment of public worship, and the disuse of all attempts at the expression of thought and feeling through the medium of language, in the pulpit, in the halls of legislation, at the bar, in the occupations of life, and at the fireside; a universal rejection of speech, because of its deceptiveness? That certainly would be the legitimate result of his theory,—the only conclusion to which it could rationally lead. Such is not the effect, however, of which Dr. B. would make it the instrument. His violent antipathy to logic withholds him from so natural and appropriate a result. He has not the slightest design of relinquishing the ministry, or of persuading his readers to discard the Scriptures, and dismiss religion and morality as delusive dreams. He only wishes to persuade them that his theory is as trustworthy and authoritative as God's word; and his speculations as orthodox as their revealed theology, and gain permission thereby to preach his system without losing his position as a professed believer and expositor of Christianity.

“That I may not seem to be offering to the public, doctrines, the real import of which I have not considered myself, something must be said of the consequences likely to result to religion, from the admission of views such as I have here presented; only be it observed, that their truth depends, in no degree, on any expectations of good or any vaticinations of evil, which the faith of one or the panic of another may raise. Unquestionably the view of language here presented must produce, if received, a decided mitigation of our dogmatic tendencies in religion. It throws a heavy shade of discouragement on our efforts in this direction. It shows that language is probably incapable of any such definite and determinate use, as we have supposed it to be in

our theological speculations; that for this reason dogma has failed hitherto, and about as certainly will hereafter. Taking away thus the confidence of the speculative theologian, it will limit proportionally his eagerness. It will also reduce the very excessive eminence he has at present in the public estimation, requiring a readjustment of the scale that now pertains (?) between this, and the historical, literary, and practical departments of Christian study. Or better still, showing that the advancement and the real amount of true theology depends not on logical deductions and systematic solutions, *but principally on the more cultivated and nicer apprehension of symbol*, it may turn the industry of our teachers more in this direction, *giving a more æsthetic character to their studies and theories*, and drawing them as much closer to the practical life of religion."—Pp. 91, 92.

† "The two principal results, then, which I suppose may follow, should these views of language be allowed to have their effect in our theology, are a more *comprehensive, friendly, and fraternal state, than now exists between different families of Christians*; and as the confidence of dogma is mitigated, a more present, powerful, and universal conviction entering into the Christian body, that truth, in its highest and freest forms, is not of the natural understanding, but is rather, as Christ himself declared—spirit and life. *We shall have more union, therefore, and more of true piety*, enlightened by the spirit of God—neither of which involves any harm or danger."—Pp. 96, 97.

That is, if the public can be brought to the persuasion that no theological doctrine, religious feeling, or moral sentiment, can possibly be expressed in words; that the pretence, therefore, of a revelation from God through the medium of language is a farce; and that consequently, Coleridgism, Swedenborgianism, Hegelianism, or any other form of mere human speculation, has as good a title to be considered true as the teachings of God's word; then all predilection for the doctrines of the Scriptures must pass away, and he and those who concur with him may be allowed to inculcate their peculiar views under the name of Christianity, without loss of office or reputation! He must feel the pressure of a violent necessity, it would seem, to think it requisite to resort to such an expedient to secure that result. He must entertain a low estimate of the intelligence and principles of his readers, to flatter himself that he can work that effect by such means:—First, the use of the identical media which he

denounces as wholly false and delusive—for language is the instrument which he employs to accomplish his object, as much as it is of the theologians whom he assails; and his theory is a dogma, or combination of theoretical and speculative propositions, positively affirmed and fortified by logic, as much as the doctrinal statements of catechisms, creeds, and confessions are; and next, by contradicting all the facts of consciousness and observation on which not only theology, but the whole fabric of social life is founded. His readers, however, will not be likely to be so far misled by his mere dictum, as to believe that they have never made an intelligible expression of any of their thoughts or affections in conversation with their families, in their transactions with one another, nor in their homage of the Almighty; and that all their knowledge of God, their faith in his promises, their hope in his favor, their joy and peace in his service, are but an inexplicable dream. Common sense will maintain its dominion; conscience and the heart will assert their prerogative with all who have not become the victims of a fanatical delusion, or surrendered themselves to the sway of a violent hostility to the truth.

Such is Dr. Bushnell's theory of language, put forth with an air of originality and research, as though it were the work of a genius that necessarily soars beyond the limits of ordinary intellects, and sees that what all others take for realities, are but shadows, and what they regard as truths, are but deceptions; and is destined by its transcendent powers to overturn the systems of theology, morals, jurisprudence, and social life, with which the world is now encumbered, and introduce a millennium of wisdom and piety better even than the Almighty proposes to the hope of the church!—false in every one of its elements, marked by a superficiality and ignorance, that were he of any other profession, would consign him to universal laughter and disgrace,—offering the most open contradiction, at every step, to our consciousness, and aiming to establish and propagate principles, under the name of Christianity, that would make religion impossible, and sink mankind to a lower depth of debasement and misery than they have ever yet reached;—for what would be their condition, were they universally convinced that none but the

most vague and delusive expression can be made by them of their thoughts and affections through speech ; that language is necessarily an instrument of misrepresentation and fraud ; and that consequently no right of person, relation, office, or property—no safeguard of life, liberty, or happiness, that is dependent for its efficiency on the use of language in constitutions, laws, titles, and contracts—has any certainty whatever ; and that the words, thought, indeed, and feeling, right and obligation, liberty and happiness, have no intelligible meaning ! Can Dr. Bushnell be aware of these results to which his speculations lead ? Will he not himself shrink back from the spectacle, as the hideous features of his system are unfolded to his gaze ? We wish he may ; yet nothing, in our judgment, is less probable. He has, in fact, given notice at the close of his Dissertation, that to be convicted of contradiction and absurdity will form no reason for abandoning his theory.

The superficiality and erroneousness of the views he has advanced on the subject form a new proof of the necessity of a re-examination of the laws of figurative language. He has proceeded in his Dissertation on the assumption which is very common, that tropical expressions are, from their nature, extremely obscure and equivocal, and instead of illustrating a writer's meaning, render it uncertain ; and his object is to present a theory of the mode in which it takes place. Had he not fallen into that misapprehension ; had he noticed the peculiarities that distinguish figurative from literal language, and made himself familiar with the principle on which the metaphor is used, he would have been incapable of indulging in so false and absurd a theory ; and the only method of correcting his mistake, is the confutation of that false notion, and exhibition of the true laws of figures. How can his theory be adequately refuted, as long as it is held, as it is by many, that a figure is not necessary in order to render an expression figurative ; and that in a passage that is really figurative, the subject to which the tropical expression is applied, is itself used figuratively, as well as the terms in which the affirmation in respect to it is made ? The moment, however, it is seen on the one hand, that no expression can be figurative without a figure ; and on the other, that the subject

of a metaphorical affirmation is always denoted by a literal term, the erroneousness of his whole system becomes apparent; as there are thousands and millions of figurative propositions in which terms of thought and spirit stand for the subject of the affirmation; and thousands and millions that involve no figure, in which the affirmation itself also is expressed by terms of thought and spirit. Of the latter class are such propositions as these: God is a spirit. God is just. God is omniscient. His name shall be called Immanuel. The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul. He that believeth shall be saved. Of the former the following are examples: The mind always *clings* to some favorite object. The soul *surrenders* itself to some strong passion. The sympathetic affections are naturally *roused*, or *drawn out* by spectacles of misery—in which the words that stand for the subject of the predicate are terms of thought and spirit, and are used literally, and the figure lies wholly in the verbs which express the affirmation. There is no theme in the whole circle of biblical inquiry that more deeply needs to be re-studied than this; and none a just understanding of which is more essential, in order to the refutation of the great errors of doctrine and interpretation that prevail.

Though the doctrines Dr. Bushnell has put forth in his Dissertation are thus crude and absurd, they are nothing more, we apprehend, than natural results of the theories he has adopted of our nature. They who begin their speculative and theological system by denying the veracity of our senses, and misrepresenting the office of our intellectual powers, excite no surprise when they advance other theories that contradict our consciousness, and overturn the foundations of morality and of religion. Having renounced the guidance and authority of both the body and mind; having cut wholly adrift from themselves; they have no criteria by which to test their opinions;—no ground as they float out on a shoreless ocean, on which they can cast anchor,—and no anchor, as they are swept back, to cast and preserve themselves from wreck upon the shore. Wild and preposterous as Dr. Bushnell's paradoxes are, therefore, they involve no solecism on the philosophical views he has adopted from Coleridge and Kant of our senses and understanding; and though they may

not all have been held by them, cannot be confuted on their theory of our nature. If our understandings are, as they taught, the absolute creators of all our perceptions of things without us, and all our sensations; if we have no knowledge whatever of an external universe; and consequently no proof of the being either of God or of one another; then it not only is not possible to prove any truth respecting the word of God as an intelligible revelation, which Dr. B. denies, but it is not possible to prove that there is any such thing either as his word or language itself, but they likewise are converted into mere ideas, without any reality that corresponds to them, and the whole discussion is made a mere parade of deceptive and senseless fancies. These or other errors equally crude and mischievous may naturally be expected from those who adopt that theory. They are the legitimate fruits of the German metaphysics and theology on which they are founded, and may be expected to prevail in proportion as those delusive and atheistic systems are held.

The facility with which these preposterous speculations, that contradict our nature, outrage our noblest and most cherished affections, and aim to exterminate religion from the world, command the public ear, and gain apologists, disciples, and advocates, seems adapted to check the confident expectations which many entertain, that truth, without any extraordinary aids from above, is about to gain a conquest of the intellect and heart of man, universally, extricate him from the thralldom of error, raise him from debasement, and convert him into a wise, a holy, and a happy being. Was there ever a time when worse errors were taught under the name of Christianity than at present? Were bolder assaults ever made in or out of the church, on the foundations of morals and religion? Has there ever been a time when the principles of infidelity were taught on such a scale under the guise of biblical learning? Was there ever a period when a doubt or denial of the inspiration of the Scriptures was so slight a barrier to admission to the ministry, or elevation to the office of a theological instructor? Has there been an age in which the church was less shocked by the advocacy of gross error, or in which organizations were

more easily formed to give it currency, or parties induced to countenance and defend it in their leaders? Not at least, we believe, since the Reformation; and if there have, these evils are indisputably characteristic, in an alarming degree, of the present time. Men are now, at best, as ready to apostatize from the truth as they ever were; pride, ambition, worldliness, a daring spirit of philosophizing, infidelity, atheism, are as rife as in other ages, and leave as little hope as ever, that Christianity can make progress or even maintain its ground against its formidable enemies, without a special interposition from heaven.

ART. IV.—THE CITIES AND CEMETERIES OF ETRURIA. By George Dennis. In two volumes, 8vo. London, John Murray, 1848.

THAT that part of Italy which extends northward from Rome to the Appenines, and from the Tiber on the east to the Mediterranean on the west, anciently called Etruria, was studded with fortified cities, and occupied by a population that had made much progress in the arts, anterior to the rise of the Roman state, is known from the Greek and Latin historians. But from their early incorporation with the Romans, the demolition of many of their cities, the destruction of their conspicuous monuments, the transference of those which escaped the havoc of war to the hands of their conquerors, and the speedy disuse of their language, and loss of authentic records of their deeds and institutions, all that distinguished them was soon swept from the memory of man, and has for ages been almost as absolutely unknown as though they had never existed. It is among the extraordinary events of this century, that after an oblivion of more than two thousand years they have obtained an historical resurrection by the opening of their hidden sepulchres, and discovery in them of symbols of their religion, exemplifications of their manners, and monuments of their arts, that reveal their character and indicate their life, almost as adequately as they could have been depicted on the page of history.

It has been known that they were accustomed to place their dead in tombs excavated from the rocks, from great numbers that have for ages been open in the cliffs that surround some of their cities, emptied of their relics and furniture, and made the habitation of birds, wild beasts, domesticated animals, and often of men. But that there were scarcely less extensive excavations at the bases of the rocky declivities on which their cities stood, and beneath the cultivated fields of the vicinity, was forgotten, probably, soon after the extermination of the ancient families at the overthrow of the western empire and usurpation of their places by a foreign race, and has remained in a great degree unknown and unsuspected till the present century. The most important of the discoveries have been made within a few years, and the work is still in progress, the search after sepulchres having become a regular occupation, and the sale of the sculptures, vases, jewellery, and other works of art which they contain, a branch of commerce. Besides these vast relics, which are scarcely surpassed in number by those of a similar kind in Asia Minor, Syria, or even Egypt, there are also many architectural remains, walls, fortifications, aqueducts, bridges, and amphitheatres. Mr. Dennis's volumes are the record of his own observations, made in several tours between 1842 and 1847. He gives the following description of the country generally, and the position of the cities:—

"Etruria was of old densely populated, not only in those parts which are still inhabited, but also as is proved by remains of cities and cemeteries, in tracts now desolated by malaria and relapsed into the desert. What is now the fen or the jungle, the haunt of the wild boar, the buffalo, the fox, and the noxious reptile, then yielded rich harvests, and contained numerous cities, into whose laps commerce poured the treasures of the East. Most of these ancient sites are now without a habitant; and such as are still occupied are, with few exceptions, mere phantoms of their pristine greatness.

"The sites of the cities varied according to the nature of the ground. In the volcanic districts, where they were most thickly set, they stood on the level of the plains, yet were not unprotected by nature, those tablelands being everywhere intersected by ravines—the cleavings of the earth under volcanic action—which form natural fosses round the cliff-bound islands or promontories on which the towns were built. The

favorite position was on a tongue of land at the junction of two of these ravines. In the northern district the cities stood in more commanding situations, on isolated hills."—Introduction, Vol. i. pp. xxix, xxx.

Mr. Dennis began his record at Veii, a few miles north of Rome. We transcribe his description of a tomb opened there in 1842-3.

"Half way up the slope of a mound is a long passage about six feet wide, cut through the rock towards the centre of the hill. At the entrance on each side couches a stone lion of the clumsy ludicrous form which Etruscan sculptors gave to the king of beasts. At the farther end of the passage couch two similar lions, on each side of the door of the tomb, intended as figurative guardians of the sepulchre.

"The door is modern, the ancient one, which was a slab of stone, having been broken by former excavators; for it is rare to find an Etruscan tomb that has escaped the spoilers of previous ages, though the earliest riflers, after carrying off the precious metals and jewellery, often left other articles, even the most beautiful vases, untouched. It is entered by a low obscure chamber, hewn out of the rock, whose dark-greyish hue adds to the gloom. Some jars of large size, and small pieces of crockery and bronze, lie on benches or stand on the floor; but the visitor's eye is soon riveted on the extraordinary paintings on the inner wall of the tomb, facing the entrance. The first figure is an ill-shaped horse, painted in different parts black, red, and yellow. His groom, who is naked, is red; a boy of similar complexion bestrides the horse; another man precedes him, bearing a hammer on his shoulder, while on the croup crouches a cat, parti-colored like the steed, with one paw resting on the boy's shoulder. Another beast, with the head of a dog, stands beneath the horse. This is but one scene, and occupies a band about three feet deep, on the upper half of the wall.

"Below is a sphinx, standing, not crouching, as is usual on ancient Egyptian monuments, with a red face, and bosom spotted white, black hair, short wings with curling tips, and striped black, red, and yellow. A panther, or large animal of the feline species, sits behind, rampant, with one paw on the haunch of the sphinx; and beneath the latter is an ass, or deer. Both are painted in the same party-colors as those already described.

"On the opposite side of the doorway in this wall, opening into an inner chamber, in the upper band, is a horse with a boy on his back, and a spotted pard behind, sitting on the ground. In the lower band is another similar beast of great size, and a couple of dogs beneath him.

All these quadrupeds are of the same patch-work of red, yellow, and black.

"To explain the signification of these figures, I pretend not. In quaintness and peculiarity of form, they strongly resemble the animals represented on the vases of the most archaic style, and like them, had probably some mystic or symbolic import; but who shall now interpret them? Panthers are frequently introduced into the painted tombs of Etruria, as figurative guardians of the dead, being animals sacred to Bacchus, the Hades of the Etruscans. The boys on horseback, I take to be emblematical of the passage of the soul into another state of existence, as is clearly the case with many cinerary urns of later date; and the figure with the hammer is probably intended for the Charon of the Etruscans.

"On either side of this tomb, and projecting from the walls, is a bench of rock about two feet and a half high, on each of which, when the tomb was opened, a skeleton was found extended; but exposure to the air caused them in a very short time to crumble to dust. One of them had been a warrior, and on the right hand bench you still see portions of the breast-plate and the helmet entire, which once encased his remains. The helmet is a plain casque of the simplest form, rather Greek than Roman. On one side of it is a hole which seems, by the indention of the metal, to have been caused by a hard blow; and on the opposite side a gash, evidently formed by the point of a sword or lance from within, proves it to have been produced by the stroke which deprived the warrior of life. On the same bench are the iron head much corroded, and the bronze rest of a spear.

"The skeleton on the other bench, was probably that of the wife of this warrior, as no weapons or armor were found on the couch. The large jars on the floor contained human ashes, probably of the family or dependents of the principal individuals. There are four of them about three feet high, of dark-brown earthenware, and ornamented with patterns in relief or colors; also several that are smaller, with archaic figures painted in the earliest style of Etruscan art. A bronze *praefriculum* or ewer, and a light candelabrum of very simple form, stand on the bench by the warrior's helmet. Several bronze *specchi* or mirrors, and small figures of men or gods in terra-cotta, and of animals in amber, were also found, but have been removed.

"Of similar description is the furniture of the inner and smaller chamber. The ceiling has two beams carved in relief, showing that even at an early period Etruscan tombs were imitations of the abodes of the living. A low ledge of rock runs round three sides of the chamber, and on it stand as many square cinerary urns or chests of earthenware,

about eighteen inches long, and a foot high, each with an overhanging lid, and a man's head projecting from it, as if for a handle—probably intended for a portrait of him whose ashes are stored in the urn. On the same ledge are eight tall jars, some plain, others painted—banded red and yellow. Two stand in pans of terra-cotta, with a rim of animals of archaic form, beautifully executed in relief. There are other smaller jars or vases, all probably of cinerary character. In the centre of the apartment stands a low brazier of bronze, nearly two feet in diameter, which must have served for burning perfumes to destroy the effluvium of the sepulchre.”—Vol. i. pp. 48–58.

At the entrance of this double tomb, and opening on the same passage, is a small one, which appears to be an appendage to that. It has a bench of rock on one side, on which are carved the legs of a couch, to indicate that here was the last resting-place of its occupant. The body was probably extended on its rocky bier without coffin or sarcophagus. No vestiges of it now remain, nor any of the furniture, except a few perfume vases, drinking cups, plates, and bronze mirrors. In the outer passage, beside the guardian lions, were found two small stone urns, containing, probably, the remains of the slaves of the family, who were not unfrequently buried at the doors of the sepulchres. In most Etruscan tombs, the name of the family or occupant is found either on the door, the interior wall, the urns, or some other article, but this has no inscription to indicate who was its owner.

From Veii Mr. Dennis passed to Fidenæ, several miles south-east, where there are a few remains, and then proceeded to Sutrium, about thirty miles N. north-east of Rome, where, among other curiosities, he found a Christian church, excavated from the rock, and probably formed from an ancient tomb. It has three aisles, and is lighted by windows cut in the rock which forms one of the walls. It is supposed to be the work of the early Christians, at a period when their worship was proscribed within the town. It was adorned at a later period, probably in the thirteenth or fourteenth century, with frescoes, traces of which still remain on the ceiling and walls. In an adjoining cave, which served as a sacristy, a door, which is now closed, led to catacombs, where the Christians of the early ages were wont, it is supposed, to

conceal themselves from persecution, hold their religious assemblies, and bury their dead.

Near the church is an amphithéâtre, with corridors, seats, and vomitories, hewn from the solid rock, and fringed at the upper edge with shrubs and trees, the ilex and cypress, which on one side thicken to a forest, and cast over it a deep shade. It is an ellipse, the arena being one hundred and fifty-four feet in length, and one hundred and thirty-two in its greatest breadth. Many parts of it are in nearly perfect preservation. Mr. Dennis regards it as of Etruscan origin. It was for ages overrun with trees, and concealed from the observation of the neighboring inhabitants. It is only within a few years that it was discovered and cleared of the grove which had sprung up in it, and the earth beneath which it had been buried. Its outside is in keeping with the simplicity of its interior. Cliffs of red tufo, in the ruggedness of nature, colored with white and grey lichens, hung with a drapery of ivy or shrubs, and crowned with a circling diadem of trees, with the ilices and cypresses on the table land above, Sutrium itself at a little distance on another rocky height, and the deep glens around, with their yawning sepulchral caverns, form a scene in which life and death, beauty and gloom, are mingled in a very unusual manner.

"A little down the road, beyond the amphitheatre, is a range of tufo cliffs, hollowed into sepulchral caverns, some of which are remarkable for their sculptured fronts. None of these façades remain in a perfect state, but there are traces of pediments, pilasters, and half-columns, with arches in relief, and fragments of mouldings, of a simple character. In some there are benches of rocks for the support of sarcophagi; in others, these benches are hollowed out to receive the same, or the body alone; and in many are semicircular cavities, recessed in the walls, for a similar purpose. All these features are Etruscan characteristics; but most of these sepulchres bear traces of an after appropriation to Roman burial.

"None of these sepulchres remain in a perfect state: they have in all ages been misapplied. The Romans, both Pagan and Christian, introduced their own dead. In the dark and turbulent ages preceding the fall of the Empire, they were probably inhabited by a semi-barbarous peasantry, or served as lurking places of banditti; and now they are frequently used as wine cellars, sties, or cattle stalls, and their sarcophagi

converted into binns, mangers, and watering troughs."—Vol. i. pp. 101, 102.

There are vast excavations of a similar kind at Civita Castellana, the ancient Falerii, situated ten miles east of Sutrium.

"The cliffs above and below the bridge, are perforated in every direction with holes,—doorways innumerable, leading into spacious tombs,—sepulchral niches of various forms and sizes,—here, rows of squares, side by side, like the port-holes of a ship of war,—there, long and shallow recesses, one over the other, like a bookcase,—and now, again, upright. This seems to have been the principal necropolis of the Etruscan city. If you enter any of the tombs, which are all in the faces of the low cliffs into which the ground breaks, you will find one general plan prevailing: the door opens into a small antechamber, seldom as much as five feet square, which has an oblong hole in the ceiling, running up like a chimney to the level of the ground above. The tomb itself is generally spacious, from twelve to twenty feet square, or of an oblong form, never circular, mostly with a massive square pillar in the centre, hewn out of the rock, or, in many cases, with a thick partition wall of rock instead, dividing the tomb into two equal parts. The front face of this, whether it be pillar or projecting wall, is generally hollowed out, sometimes in recesses, long and shallow, and one over the other, to contain bodies; sometimes in upright niches, for cinerary vases or votive offerings. Around the walls are long recesses for bodies, in double or triple tiers, just as in the catacombs and tombs of the early Christians. The door posts are frequently grooved, to hold the stone slabs with which the tombs were closed."

"A few of these tombs have a vestibule or open chamber in front, sometimes with a cornice in relief, benches of rock against the walls for the support of the sarcophagi and niches recessed above, probably for votive offerings. Sometimes a large sarcophagus is hollowed out of a mass of rock. It is not uncommon to find graves of the same form sunk in the rock in front of the tomb, probably for the bodies of the slaves of the family, who in death, as in life, seem to have lain at their masters' doors."—Vol. i. pp. 122–124.

On the front wall of one of the tombs is a word in Etruscan letters, which retain traces of the red paint with which, as on the sarcophagi and urns generally, they were filled to render them more legible. On the inner wall of another is an

inscription of two lines in those letters a foot in height, rudely graven on the rock round one of the long body-niches, which are excavated in the sides. These show that those sepulchres were prepared and occupied while that language was in use. The niches and sarcophagi indicate that it was the custom of the inhabitants to bury rather than burn the dead. A massy stone bridge crosses one of the ravines on the side of the city, parts of which are of an early age. Mr. Dennis represents it as an object of grandeur as it is beheld from the bottom of the channel, spanning the gulf with its stupendous double tier of arches: and the whole scene as peculiarly imposing.

"The cliffs both above and below the bridge are excavated into tombs and niches of various forms, but few have retained their original shape. The Etruscans often displayed great taste in selecting the sites of their sepulchres. Where could be found a more impressive, a more appropriate cemetery than a ravine like this—a vast grave in itself, sunk two hundred and fifty feet, full of grandeur and gloom! Here far below the noise of the city, they might sit by the tombs of their departed relatives, listening to the incessant murmurs of the stream, which to their imaginations, so prone to symbolize, might seem an emblem of eternity. The lofty perpendicular cliffs shutting them out from the world, the narrow strip of sky overhead, the subdued light, the damp chill, would combine with the sacredness of the spot, to impress them with solemn feelings."—Vol. i. p. 126.

There are several towns in the circuit around Civita Castellana, where there are tombs, walls, towers, roads, and other remains of an early age; but we pass to the description Mr. Dennis gives of those at Ferento, which is near twenty miles northeast of Civita Castellana.

"The area of the town is covered with ruins of the three epochs into which its history may be divided. The greater part are foundations of houses and other structures of the Middle Ages. There are considerable remains of Roman pavement of polygonal blocks of basalt; and several Roman structures in ruin, among which a tower with a vaulted roof is prominent. Some of the ruins of later date are raised on foundations of Roman antiquity. The walls of the town are in great part overthrown, but fragments of them remain, and many of the

rectangular blocks which composed them lie scattered around. The sites of several gates are distinctly traceable.

"But the grand monument at Ferento is the theatre. In its perfect state, it must have been a truly imposing edifice; even now, though all the winds of heaven play through its open arches, it is a most majestic ruin. It has every advantage of situation to increase its effect on the senses, for it stands on the brink of a precipice overhanging a wooded and picturesque ravine, amid solitude and desolation, where for centuries man has left his dwelling to the falcon, the owl, the bat, the viper, and the lizard, and where his foot or voice rarely now calls forth echoes; with the wide plain on every hand, the dark gloomy mass of the Ciminian in front, the swelling mount of Fiascone behind, and the snowy ranges of the Umbrian Appenines in the horizon.

"The stage front of the theatre is one hundred and thirty-six feet in length, of massy masonry, of large rectangular volcanic blocks uncemented; not, as in some other Etruscan walls, laid lengthways and endways in alternate courses, but promiscuously according to the form and size of the blocks. From its peculiar character, and its evidently superior antiquity to the rest of the structure, I am of opinion that this façade is Etruscan. There are seven gates, all of flat architraves composed of cuneiform blocks holding together on the principle of the arch, though without cement.

"This massive masonry rises to the height of ten courses. On it rests a Roman brickwork of imperial times, with several arched openings, intended to admit light. Within the theatre all is ruin—a chaos of fallen masonry, shapeless masses of rock and brickwork overgrown with weeds and moss. The arches which surrounded the *cavea* are of regular and most massive masonry, of a hard grey tuff whitened by lichen—a whiteness quite dazzling in the sunshine. They are beautifully formed, of blocks shaped alike, and fitted with great nicety, though without cement."—Vol. i. pp. 204–207.

There are important remains near Bomarro, a few miles east of Ferento. The existence of an Etruscan town on that site had for ages been forgotten till within a few years, when it was learned by the discovery of tombs containing articles of interest and value. Excavations were begun in 1830, and have been carried on almost every winter since with success. The high level grounds in the vicinity of the town seem to have been the chief depositories of the dead. A few tombs are in the cliffs beneath the walls, but most are sunk below the surface, and are entered by long narrow passages that

descend obliquely. Though many have been excavated, few remain open. The greater part have been reclosed in order to save the earth at the entrances for tillage, and their sites are forgotten. The principal are still open on the edge of the hill. Two of them are of peculiar interest.

"One is called the *Grotta della Colonna* from a massive pillar of Doric simplicity supporting the ceiling. The chamber is about thirteen feet square and seven in height, with a roof slightly vaulted. The door is of the usual Etruscan form, smaller above than below, and the wall on each side of it, within the tomb, is lined with masonry—a very rare feature in Etruscan tombs, especially in those of subterranean excavation. It is of very massive character, and neatly rusticated—a clear proof that this style was used by the Etruscans, and that the Romans were indebted for it to them.

"The character of this tomb is most solemn and imposing. The single pillar in the midst, the bare damp walls of dark rock, the massive blocks of masonry, the yawning sarcophagus with its lid overthrown, and the dust of the long-forgotten dead exposed to view, with the deep gloom, strike the soul with a feeling of awe, not unmingled it may be with some admiration of the good taste which constructed so appropriate a home for the dead.

"Let us leave this tomb and enter another hard by. Can we retain this opinion? We are in a chamber whose walls, gaily painted, are alive with sea-horses, snorting and plunging—water snakes uprearing their crests, and gliding along in slimy folds—dolphins sporting as in their native element—and grim and hideous caricatures of the human face. All are drawn in a broad and careless style, with red and black crayons. In the centre of one wall is a head, which is probably the portrait of the individual for whom the tomb was constructed, and whose ashes were found in the sarcophagus. The others may represent, respectively, Charon and Typhon, i. e. the angel of death, and the principle of destruction, both of whom are usually depicted as hideous as the imagination of the artist could conceive.

"*Hippocampi* and water snakes are symbols frequently found in Etruscan tombs, rarely indeed depicted on the walls, but sculptured on sarcophagi and urns. They are generally regarded as emblematic of the passage of the soul from one state of existence to another, an opinion confirmed by the frequent representation of boys riding on their backs. The dolphins which form a border round the apartment, painted alternately black and red, are a common sepulchral ornament, and are supposed to have a similar symbolical reference.

"Next to the Typhon head is a large jar sketched on the wall, out of which two serpents with forked tongues are rising. These confirm the demoniacal character of that head; for the deities or genii of Etruscan mythology are very commonly represented with these reptiles bound round their brows or waists, or brandishing them in their hands, and sometimes, as in this case, having them by their side. That snakes were also made use of by the Etruscan priests and soothsayers, as by the Egyptian, to establish their credit for superior powers in the minds of the people, may be learned from the painted tombs as well as from history; and it is possible that those used in the service of the temples, were kept in such jars as this.

"In this tomb was found the sarcophagus, now in the British museum, of temple shape, with a pair of serpents in knotted coils on the roof; and it appears highly probable, from this and other adornments, as well as from the serpent jar, that this was the sepulchre of some priest skilled in the mysteries of the Etruscan Discipline. His name, we learn from his sarcophagus, was *Vetus Urinates*, a family name met with in other parts of Etruria, and his portrait is probably still seen on the right-hand wall.

"This is the only painted tomb yet found in this necropolis;—not one in four or five hundred Etruscan sepulchres being so decorated. The generality in this site are quadrilateral, of moderate size, with a broad ledge or bench of rock round three sides, on which lay the bodies, sometimes in sarcophagi, sometimes uncoffined, with a lamp of terra-cotta or bronze at the head of each; weapons, vases, and other sepulchral furniture around. These benches were occasionally hollowed into sarcophagi, which were covered by large sun-burnt tiles, three feet or more in length, precisely like those used at the present day in Italy. . . . In some instances sarcophagi have been found, not in tombs, but sunk like our modern coffins a few feet below the surface of the ground, covered with large tiles or stone slabs. These were for the bodies of the poor. At this site, they did not always bury their dead, for vases are often found containing ashes.

"The beautiful painted vases of Vulci and Tarquinii are not common; those, however, of the later style, with yellow figures, are not so rare as the more archaic, with a black or a yellow ground. Articles of bronze, often of great richness and beauty, are peculiarly abundant; and are very valuable as proofs of native skill and records of the Etruscan mythological creed. They consist principally of helmets, mostly gilt, shields, greaves, and other portions of armor; vases frequently gilt, *specchi* or mirrors, often beautifully figured with scenes from the Etruscan mythology; tripods and candelabra; and long thin plates of this

metal gilt, covered with designs in relief. Besides these have been found swords and bows of steel. But the most remarkable article in bronze discovered here, is a circular shield, about three feet in diameter, with a lance-thrust in it, and its lining of wood and braces of leather still remaining, after the lapse of more than two thousand years. It was suspended from the wall near the sarcophagus of its owner, and the rest of his armor hung there with it—his embossed helmet, his greaves of bronze, and his wooden-hilted sword of steel. In one tomb on this site a skeleton was discovered, still retaining fragments of its shroud, and in another, a purple mantle was found covering two vases, and a garland of box. In a third, was a little cup of ordinary ware, but bearing on its foot an inscription, which proved to be the Etruscan alphabet—a present, perhaps, to a child who was interred there. Though originally of little worth, it is now a rare treasure, being the sole inscription yet found of an alphabet in the Etruscan character.”—Vol. i. pp. 218–225.

There is a vast body of tombs and other relics at Castel D’Asso, a site six miles south of Ferento, and among them a street of sepulchres, the entrances of which are wrought into architectural forms of great beauty. The visitor descends into a deep glen, on each side of which there is a succession of tombs with fronts hewn into façades with bold cornices and mouldings in high relief, and engraved inscriptions in the characters and language of Etruria. The spectacle is adapted to make a deep impression on the beholder. These vast works which were designed to preserve the dust of their owners inviolate, and perpetuate their memory to the latest ages, have become monuments of their oblivion. They now merely show that men of a distant period formed them for their repose ; but they have ceased to protect their relics, or indicate who they were or of what epoch. The seclusion and stillness of the scene, the absence of all habitations, the ruined castle on the opposite precipice, and the dark mass of the Ciminian mount, which looks down on the glen, makes this more imposing, it is said, than any other of these cemeteries.

These tombs extend nearly half a mile. The façades are formed by hewing the face of the cliff, and extending from the base to the top, are, as the elevation of the rock varies, from twelve to thirty feet high. Their form is like that of Egyptian edifices and Doric door-ways, narrower above than below,

and their fronts retreat from a perpendicular. The horizontal cornices are massy. A similar moulding is carried round the sides also of many, and each is separated from its neighbor either by a broad groove or a flight of steps cut in the rock, and leading to the plain above. The first division of a tomb is a small chamber which appears always to have been open, and was designed, perhaps, for the annual festivities which were observed in honor of the dead. From that, a passage descending sometimes twenty or thirty feet, leads to the sepulchre itself, which is now generally found encumbered with earth, and strewn with upturned sarcophagi, fragments of pottery, and bones. They differ very much in size, some being small and some very spacious. They are but roughly hewn. Some have ledges at the sides for the support of sarcophagi; others double rows of coffins sunk in the rock at right angles with the wall; in one they are formed in circles round the centre. The bodies placed in these cavities were probably covered with tiles. From their position it is probable that they were rifled at an early period; and they were lost to the knowledge even of the population in the neighborhood for many ages. It was not until 1808 that they were discovered, though they are within six miles of Viterbo, the largest city in that region. Vast remains of much the same kind are found also at Norchiá and Bada; but we must pass to a notice of the painted sepulchres at Tarquinii, near the Mediterranean coast, directly east of Sutrium. They are not, like those at Castel D'Asso, excavated in cliffs, but lie beneath the surface. The principal is called the Grotta Querciola, from the owner's name.

"A descent of about twenty steps leads to the entrance of the tomb, which is closed by a modern door. This opens into a spacious chamber in the form of an Etruscan tomb. The first impression is one of disappointment, but as the eye becomes adjusted to the gloom, figure after figure seems to step forth from the wall, and two rows are seen separated by a striped colored ribbon; the upper being four feet, the other only half that in height. In the pediment left at each end of the chamber is a third row not more than twelve inches high.

"The next impression is one of surprise. Can this be the resting-place of the dead! Can these scenes of feasting and merriment, this

dancing, piping, and sporting, appertain to a tomb! On the inner wall and occupying the principal row is a banqueting scene; figures in richly-broidered garments recline on couches, feasting to the sound of the lyre and pipes; attendants stand around, some replenishing the goblets from the wine-jars on a sideboard hard by; a train of dancers, male and female, beat time with lively steps to the notes of the instruments, on which some of them are also performing; while in the lower are depicted field-sports, a boar hunt being the most conspicuous.

"On the central couch reclines a female of exquisite beauty, with her husband. Other guests are quaffing wine. The elegant form of the couches and stools, the rich drapery, the embroidered cushions, show this to be a scene of high life, and give some idea of Etruscan luxury. Even the dancers are richly attired, especially the females in figured robes of bright colors, with embroidered borders of a different hue. . . . The dancing girls, like those of modern times, are decorated with jewellery, earrings, necklaces, and bracelets—and have also a frontlet on their brows, while the men wear chaplets of myrtle."—Vol. i. pp. 281–284.

In the hunting scene in the lower row of figures, the wild boar is exhibited as brought to bay by the dogs. Men, on foot and horseback, are rushing eagerly to the attack; the former have axes to cut their way through the thickets, as well as spears to dispatch the game. There is a representation also of a chariot race. In each pediment there are two warriors, with short curved swords, leading their horses, and in the angles are panthers.

This tomb was discovered in 1831, and is larger and loftier than any other in that necropolis, whose walls are wholly covered with paintings, and in its original state must have been very brilliant; but the colors have now nearly faded, and will, probably, from exposure to the air, soon entirely vanish. One of its peculiarities is that the two sexes are exhibited on the same couch, and are not, as in other sepulchres, distinguished by their hue. The colors used in these paintings are red, yellow, blue, grey, black, and white. Nearly opposite this sepulchre is the Grotto Triclinio—as it is called from its proprietor; or Tomb of the Funeral Feast, from the subject of the paintings. It is entered in the same way as the other, and when first beheld is very imposing—especially

if entered in the afternoon when illuminated by the sun's rays, from the blaze of rich color on the walls and roof, and the life of the figures of the dance. The brilliancy of the hues, which are almost as fresh after two or three and twenty centuries as when first laid on, the richness of the costumes, the strangeness of the attitudes, the spirit and joyousness of the scene, and its decidedly Etruscan character, render it one of the most attractive that have been opened. The subjects of the pictures are a banquet at the upper end, and dances on the side-walls. On each side of the door is a man on horse-back. At the banquet figures of each sex recline in pairs on couches, attended by a female servant with a pot of ointment, and a boy with a wine jug; while a *sabulo* stands in the corner playing the double pipes. The sex of the figures is distinguished by the color; that of the men being a deep red; that of the females a rich creamy white. In front of each couch is an elegant four-legged table with dishes, and beneath, a cock, a partridge, and a cat. Whether these delineations, so unappropriate to a sepulchre, were designed to represent the pleasures to which their occupants were devoted in this life, or symbolize the enjoyments on which they were supposed to enter in the invisible world, it is not easy to determine. That the Etruscans had a full belief in the continued existence, consciousness, and happiness or misery of the soul after death, is indisputable from many of the death scenes that are depicted in their sepulchres, and delineated on their vases. In the tomb next to this, called the Dead Man's Chamber, discovered in 1832, is a painting in which death and the dance are united in such a manner, as to indicate that the latter was a funeral rite. On one of the side-walls the corpse of a hoary bearded man is stretched on an elegant couch, and a young female leaning over him in the act of drawing a covering over his eyes; while a man standing at the bottom of the couch seems with one hand drawing the shroud over the feet; the other is raised to his head in expression of grief. Behind him stands another, who with more frantic gestures is manifesting his sorrow in a similar manner. On the opposite wall a gay and mirthful dance is delineated. The men, unrobed and crowned with chaplets, are tripping and leaping with the fury of bacchanals! Others

are quaffing from a bowl, or whirling a chaplet. On one of the end walls are two panthers, and on the other two parti-colored lions, and two pigeons. But there are other tombs in which their views of the destiny of the dead are much more clearly indicated by the presence of demons, who are exhibited as conducting the souls of the departed into the invisible world. Such is the Tomb of the passage of Souls:—

“It is the largest tomb in this, or perhaps any other Etruscan necropolis, being fifty-four feet square, with a flat ceiling, so low that a tall man can scarcely stand upright, coffered in concentric squares and oblongs, and supported on four pillars six or seven feet square, hewn out of the rock in which the chamber is hollowed. . . . The paintings are on one side only on the walls and pillars, in a frieze of small figures scarcely a foot high, and are now almost obliterated by the smoke of the fires which the shepherds of several generations have made in it. These subjects are nevertheless unquestionably from delineations taken of them a century ago, Etruscan, and representative of the passage of souls into the unseen world, and their condition there, presenting a clearer view of the Etruscan religious belief than is to be gathered from any other single monument extant.”—Vol. i. pp. 318, 319.

The figures are of three classes, the living, the dead, and demons, or messengers from the other world. The living are combatants on the frieze and pillars, armed with sword and shield; and are highly spirited. The mythological scenes represent souls in the form of men robed in white, conducted into the other world by genii of opposite characters, the good being painted red or flesh color;—the evil black, like the furies of Grecian fable; both in human form, but with wings red or white at their shoulders. In some groups a good and evil spirit seem contending for the possession of a soul,—the good genius leading—the malignant pursuing it. In others they are harnessed together to a car and driven by an old man, the Minos perhaps of the Etruscans. In another a pair of antagonist spirits are drawing a car, in which a soul is seated shrouded in a veil. The good demons have sometimes a wand in their hand; the evil a heavy hammer, a symbol of their office as destroyers. They are sometimes exhibited with them uplifted, and threatening terrified souls who are kneeling and seemingly imploring pity. In a scene

in which a soul is represented as in the power of two of these demons, a good genius interferes and seizes one of them by the wing. In another the soul is exhibited as seizing the wing of the good genius who is withdrawing from him. Souls are often exhibited on horseback to represent their transition into another state of existence, which is frequently symbolized on Etruscan monuments by that animal. They are sometimes led by a good genius; at another a genius is contending with an unmounted horse, as though to conduct it to a soul that was waiting to be conveyed into the other world: but most are on foot; some full of horror and eager to escape; others imploring pity from their tormentors; and others still calm and resigned, though melancholy. They usually bear rods in their hands. These pictures indicate in the clearest manner their belief in a future existence, and in punishments and joys, according in some relation to the life led here; but what the grounds were of their hopes of happiness, or the characteristics by which they expected the favor of their benignant deities, it is not easy to determine.

One of the most interesting of these cities of the dead is that at Vulci, from the vast number of painted vases of extraordinary beauty which have been found there. The sepulchres, with few exceptions, are not painted, but adorned with architectural ornaments. A large share of them are beneath the surface of cultivated fields; others are above, and covered with mounds, in some instances of a wide circuit and great height. Those beneath the soil are generally of moderate size, oblong, and surrounded by rock benches, on which the dead were laid without any other covering than their armor or shroud. Some sarcophagi, however, have been found there of great beauty. The frequency of bones and the variety of cinerary urns indicate that it was customary to bury, rather than burn the dead. More than six thousand tombs are said to have been already opened since the discovery of the necropolis in 1828, and the excavations are still continued, and yield a rich harvest to the proprietors of the ground, from the value of the vases and bronzes with which the sepulchres are stored. Nineteen-twentieths of the Etruscan vases that are in the hands of individuals, or

in the museums of Europe, are said to have been drawn from this site, and they amount to many thousands.

There are many sepulchres and other remains also at the site of the ancient Tarquinii and Cære. Among the most interesting at the latter, which is the modern Cervetri, is the tomb of the Tarquins, of which Mr. Dennis gives the following description :—

- “The first chamber you enter is surrounded by benches of rock, and contains nothing of interest; but in the floor opens a long flight of steps, which lead down to a lower chamber of much larger size. It is called by the peasantry ‘The Tomb of the Inscriptions,’ and it merits that title, as every niche, every bench, every portion of the walls, exhibits in Etruscan the name of Tarquin. The chamber is a square, or nearly so, of thirty-five feet, with two massive pillars in the centre, and a row of long recesses for corpses in the walls, while below is a double row of rock-hewn benches which also served as biers for the dead. The walls, niches, benches, and pillars, are all stuccoed, and the inscriptions are painted in red or black, or in some instances were marked with the finger on the damp stucco. These scratched epigraphs are remarkable for their freshness. The mortar has hardened in prominent ridges, precisely as it was displaced, and is so unchanged, that the inscriptions might be supposed to have been written but a day, instead of more than two thousand years.”—Vol. ii. pp. 43, 44.

The name of Tarquin, either in Etruscan or Latin, still occurs thirty-five times, though it has disappeared probably in several instances in which it was painted, from the fading of the colors. Most of the niches are double, or formed for two bodies. Some, besides inscriptions, have painted decorations, such as wreaths, musical instruments, or perfume vessels. Between the niches are elegant pilasters, and in front the legs of couches, and long paw-footed stools painted on the stucco, to make each bed resemble a festive couch. In the ceiling, behind the pillars, is a shaft cut through the rock to the plain above.

The sepulchre at Cervetri, which has excited the greatest interest from its antiquity, the peculiarity of its structure, and the singularity of its contents, is that called the Grotta Regulini-Galassi. It was opened in 1836, and is one of a very few that had never been violated. It opens in a low

bank in the middle of a field, and consists of a passage about fifty feet long, divided into two chambers. Its high antiquity is indicated by its contents, which, instead of pottery, were articles of gold, silver, and bronze, of an archaic character. In one of the chambers lay a bier of bronze, formed of cross-bars, with an elevated place for the head. The corpse which had lain on it had fallen to dust. By its side stood a small four-wheeled car or tray of bronze, with a basin in the centre. On the other side of the bier lay a large number of earthenware idols. At the head of the bier stood a small iron altar; and at the foot a bundle of darts and a shield. Several other shields rested against the wall. All were of bronze, elegantly embossed, but they were apparently designed for ornament merely, as they were too thin for service in battle. Nearer the door stood a four-wheeled car, which from its size was probably used as a hearse to bear the bier to the sepulchre. Just within the entrance stood two cauldrons on tripods, in which it is supposed perfumes were burned to fumigate the sepulchre. This chamber was doubtless the burial-place of a warrior. The inner chamber was separated from this by a wall filling the doorway to half its height, on which two other bronze vessels were stationed, and a vessel of silver hung against each of the door-posts. The roof of this chamber was hung with bronze vessels, and others were suspended from the sides. Near the centre stood two bronze perfume cauldrons, and near the further end lay, not on a bier, couch, or bench, but on the bare floor, what had once been a human form, but of which no traces remained, except a profusion of gold ornaments, so arranged as to indicate that they were attached to it when placed there. Their number, richness, and beauty, were such as perhaps never decorated any other individual in death. Among them were a gold head-dress of singular character, a large breast-plate, elegantly embossed, a fine twisted chain and necklace of long joints, earrings of great length, a pair of massive bracelets of exquisite filigree work, eighteen brooches—one of which is of great size and beauty—several rings, and fragments of gold fringes and *laminæ*, in such quantities as to indicate that they had formed a robe. It is doubtful whether the person on whom these splendid decorations were lavished, was a female or a priest.

These articles are preserved in the Gregorian Museum at Rome.

Among the most interesting of the relics of that ancient people, are the urns found at Volterra and Chiusi, on which are representations of historical events, domestic scenes, and religious rites. Some exhibit games—some judicial, triumphal, or funereal processions—some the offering of sacrifices in which men are sometimes the victims ; but the most affecting are those which are representative of death scenes. Here a female is stretched on a couch, her father, husband, and sisters, weeping around, and her children at her side, awaiting her death, the approach of which is indicated by the presence of a winged genius with a torch on the point of expiring. Sometimes the dying woman is delivering to her husband her tablets, as though she had just been inscribing her thoughts on them. There a youth is represented on horseback, about to depart to the invisible world : his little sister rushes before him, and endeavors to arrest the horse, but is prevented by the messenger of death, who seizes the bridle and hurries him away. The most common of these representations is the parting of husband and wife. Here, the husband is mounted and driven away by Charon with his hammer, while a group of females rush out frantically to stop him. There, he is mounted, and passes away, while a female genius throws her arms round the neck of the weeping widow, and endeavors to assuage her grief. In one scene, the parting takes place at a column, beyond which the living cannot proceed ; at another, at a doorway, where, one being within and the other without, they give the last grasp of the hand ere the door closes. Many urns represent the passage of the soul without the parting scene, and in these the messenger of death, with a savage aspect, generally takes part ; sometimes leading the horse by the bridle, sometimes grasping it by the mane, at others driving it before him ; while a spirit of a gentle countenance, and holding an inverted torch, leads the way. The good and bad demons are not distinguished by their color, as in the paintings in the tombs, but by their features and expression, and the offices they perform. The good are handsome and gentle ; the evil, ill favored and truculent. These death spectacles often present very pathetic

and beautiful exhibitions of the affections, but indicate that the religious forebodings of the Etruscans were dark and terrific.

These relics of the great, the beautiful, the gay, the wealthy of a distant age, present an affecting exemplification of the deep illusions under which men act in many of the favorite pursuits of life,—of the vanity of the objects to which they often most ardently aspire. The passions by which the builders of these splendid mausoleums were animated, were like those that have swayed the race at all other periods—the love of pleasure, distinction, fame, power, riches, a desire to attract the gaze and admiration of their contemporaries, and seize the transient enjoyments which were within their grasp. And it was to perpetuate their memory, and invest their names, even in death, with a species of dignity and grandeur, that they lavished their means on these apparently imperishable monuments of their taste, their luxury, and greatness. But how worthless to them would a remembrance and commemoration by their survivors have been, through the long tract of ages that has followed their departure, could they have secured it! They, perhaps, would have been wholly unaware of it, and could they have known it, it would have only served to deepen their sense of the strange delusions under which they here acted,—of their immeasurable folly in neglecting all preparation for their immortal being, and building a hope of enduring happiness on such a foundation! When the pageant has passed, and they have entered on the dread realities of the invisible world, the recollection of the pomp, the power, the station, the riches, and the pleasures on which they here wasted their thoughts and affections, fills the departed, doubtless, with disgust and horror if they are lost, and with astonishment and humiliation if they are redeemed. What empty shadows for immortals to grasp as their treasures! But could the knowledge and celebration of their names, their achievements, and their history, by the generations that followed, yield them a solace, how ineffectual were the means which they employed to procure them! Into what absolute oblivion have they sunk! A few days, a few seasons, or, at most, a few years after they were laid upon their rocky couches, they passed from the cognisance of men as com-

pletely as though they had never existed; not one remained who had ever known them! For thousands of years not a human bosom has felt for them an emotion of love, sympathy, veneration, or regret. For ages, not an individual has had it in his power to make them objects of his thoughts. Their descendants, who they expected would join them, from generation to generation, in their last abode, conquered by the Romans, soon ceased to exist as a separate people. That nation, after a career of victory, glory, and decay, were swept from existence by the barbarians of the north. After thousands and myriads of the sepulchres which they had formed to preserve their dust and commemorate their names, had been rifled and destroyed by those savage hordes, a long night of darkness and forgetfulness gathered over the remainder, and hid them from the knowledge even of those who owned and cultivated the soil beneath which they were buried! And they can never, now, by any possibility, as individuals, be again known on earth, till they shall be raised from their slumbers by the fiat of the Almighty. What a bubble is human greatness! What a mockery is fame!

What awfulness and grandeur invest the future life! Though those distant generations have thus passed away from our knowledge here, they have not ceased to be. They have but gone to other spheres, where they live in consciousness and activity; and their history, which is now hidden from us, is not to be shrouded in oblivion for ever. As we enter the invisible world, the veil is to be withdrawn, and we are to learn not only all that is past,—their names, the dispensations of God towards them, their conduct as the subjects of his government here, the scenes to which they passed at death—but their immortal destiny! Who can contemplate those infinite disclosures without awe! How immeasurably must their disembodied life transcend in interest their brief existence here!

ART. V.—ESSAY ON THE UNION OF CHURCH AND STATE. By Baptist Wriothlesley Noel, M. A. London: James Nesbit & Co. 1849.

THIS work, the object of which is to show that the union of the church with the state is unlawful and inexpedient, has been violently assailed in the religious and political journals of Great Britain, and ridiculed as wholly unequal to the end for which it is designed; false in its views, weak in its arguments; presenting little that is novel, and without the literary merits that are requisite to a public influence; and their criticisms have been received in a degree as just, and repeated by the press here. It is in fact, however, not only respectable in a literary relation, but of far greater merits, as to the truth of its principles, the legitimacy of its interpretations of the sacred Word, the accuracy and force of its arguments, its superiority to selfish and party predilections, its freedom from a spirit of theorizing, and the independence, nobleness, and candor with which it is marked, than any of the works which we have read, that are devoted to the defence of the establishment: and it is the force of the blow which Mr. Noel has struck, not its feebleness; the conviction that it must exert a powerful influence unless counteracted, not the certainty of its failure, that has drawn on it such a storm of depreciation and reproach.

It is his object in the first part of the volume to demonstrate the unlawfulness of the nationalization of the church, by showing the inadequacy of the grounds that are offered by its supporters for its justification, and its inconsistency with the word and rights of God. This last, which is by far the most important consideration in the discussion, unhappily is less adequately treated than any other; and it is because of the slightness with which it is presented and urged, we think, more than on any other ground, that the work may be considered as defective. Mr. Noel clearly sees and specifically indicates that the assumption by the state of the authority which it exercises over the church, is a usurpation of the rights of God. "This supremacy of the state without divine authority, is incompatible with the rights of Christ. The Scripture declares that Christ is the king of his church, and therefore

to allow the state to rule over it without his authority is as treasonable as it would be in Ireland or in Canada to elect a foreigner for its ruler without reference to the will of our sovereign. Christ is the head and master of his church, as a man is head and master of his own household. And when any churches without authority from him allow spiritual dominion over them to a stranger, they are revolting against his authority as much as servants would be, who in their master's absence should invite another to assume the direction of his house."—P. 178. These illustrations are wholly disproportionate, inasmuch as the revolt of which they treat is only a revolt from human rulers; but that of which they are guilty who submit to a usurpation of Christ's rights is a revolt from God;—a rejection of his prerogatives as supreme ruler, and ascription of them to usurping creatures,—the greatest offence, undoubtedly, of which men are guilty, most injurious to God, and most fatal when understood and deliberately perpetrated, to themselves. It is accordingly represented by the Scriptures as equivalent to offering a religious homage to civil rulers, a worshipping of the beast. This terrible truth should have been set forth by Mr. Noel in all its greatness and awfulness, and enforced on the consciences of his readers. He would have found ample grounds in the Scriptures to support him in it, it would have presented the subject in its true relations, and would have furnished him with new and more effective arguments against his opponents, and added strength to his subordinate objections to their theories.

His arguments in the second division of his work against the union are founded on its disastrous effects on the clergy, the church, the population remaining under the jurisdiction of the establishment, and the dissenters; and in this, which is the most effective part of the volume, he presents not only a sad, but an appalling picture of its mischievous agency. He represents the emoluments and honors of the great offices on the one hand, as necessarily objects of desire and ambition, and inducing many of the talented and aspiring to enter the sacred profession from mere worldly motives; and the presentation to livings by patrons on the other, as introducing a crowd into the ministry who are wholly unfit for its duties; and that

consequently a vast portion of the officials of the establishment are without theological learning, and without piety, mere occupants of stations that yield them support without qualifications or care for their duties. "What," he asks, "are the pastors of the Anglican Churches? I grieve to write it. Chosen by peers and squires, by colleges and church corporations, by chancellors and state-made prelates, many are made pastors by a corrupt favoritism, many are allured to an uncongenial employment by the income which it offers them, and many embrace the profession of a pastor, because they are too dull, inert, or timid for any other. They have scarcely any theological training, they are pledged to all the abuses sanctioned by the union, they dread reforms, they are servile to patrons, they are intolerant to dissenters, their zeal is crippled by state restrictions, and their indolence tempted by unbounded liberty to indulge it."—P. 294.

Such must inevitably be the effect. What but disastrous in the utmost degree would be the consequence, were the annual income of a thousand of the stations occupied by the ministers of the different churches of this country raised to ten thousand, twenty thousand, fifty thousand dollars; were the incumbents appointed by the national president, governors of the states, the great literary corporations, and wealthy merchants or landowners; and finally were they invested by their ecclesiastical offices with a large political and legislative influence? Would not a crowd wholly unfit for the profession find their way into it? And would not the most aspiring, the most artful, the most subservient to those in power, and the most unprincipled, be often the most sure to reach the positions in which vanity, ambition, and the love of riches would find their largest gratification?

We have been accustomed to regard the English as enjoying in an eminent degree the blessings of religious liberty. The power of the state, however, in spiritual things, is as absolute as any autocrat possesses over his subjects; and the members of the establishment of every grade live under what we should deem an iron despotism. The churches and congregations have no voice whatever in the selection of their pastors—they are presented by the patrons of the livings; and in thousands of instances, persons are forced on them

whom they dislike, and whose ministrations they refuse to attend. No one can enter the sacred office in the establishment without formally assenting to the assumption by the state of supreme authority over the church, and pledging himself to yield implicit obedience to all the ecclesiastical laws which it enacts, which is, in fact, surrendering his allegiance to God, or making it subordinate to his allegiance to man. The laws compel the bishops to license any applicant for orders, unless they can justify their refusal by proving a *legal* disqualification, which is often impossible, even when there is the most obvious moral unfitness. If they are disposed, therefore, to exclude those who are unsuited to the office, it is seldom practicable. On the other hand, the bishop has the right without assigning any reason to refuse a license to any one whose doctrinal views he dislikes, and thereby prevent, if he pleases, the induction into the churches of his diocese of those who are best fitted for the office. On the transfer of the right of presentation from one patron to another, a nomination by the new patron, and a re-license by the bishop, are requisite in order that an incumbent may continue in the living of which he is already in possession; and the bishop has then again the power, if he chooses, by refusing a license, to exclude him from his station without a reason. They who take orders in the establishment are prohibited from relinquishing or discontinuing the office, and liable, if they refuse to exercise it, to heavy penalties. They are prohibited, also, from exercising the office without license, and subject to fine and imprisonment, if they voluntarily quit the establishment and attempt to continue their ministry as dissenters. To question the lawfulness of the supremacy of the state over the church, to dissent from any of the doctrines of the articles, or disapprove and discountenance any of the language of the ritual, or its rites, is made a legal offence, and punishable with deprivation of office, excommunication, forfeiture of property, and imprisonment. The theory of the establishment, therefore, is that of absolute despotism. Not a shadow of religious freedom is left to the ecclesiastics, and scarcely more than a shadow to the private members of the church. If any is in fact enjoyed, it is by mere concession and sufferance, not by legal right, and the system is

in reality in its practical operation, in a large degree, an iron tyranny.

The efficiency of the establishment for its object has become greatly impaired by changes in the population of many districts, which render it disproportionate to the ministers as they are now distributed, and an absolute barrier in many instances to their fulfilling the duties of their office towards those who are intrusted to their care. The parishes are generally the same in number and limits as they were ages ago, when the population was comparatively sparse. The increase in the capital and other great cities has, consequently, carried the number in many parishes wholly beyond the accommodation furnished for public worship, and the power of the ministers to give them instruction. Thus, in the metropolis, the population in the city or old part of the town, consisting of 98 parishes, is, owing to the appropriation of the buildings to commercial purposes, but 54,626, or about 500 each; while the population in the other 92 parishes amounts to 1,967,756, or 21,388 to each minister, and 10,694 to each, counting both the ministers and the curates, whom in those parishes the incumbents are required to employ. Out of the 11,077 parishes of England and Wales, 1907 have less than one hundred each; and 2867 others, but one hundred to three hundred. The result is, that in the capital and other large towns a great part of the population are left by the establishment without any religious instruction. Many of these defects might be mitigated by a division of the crowded parishes, if that be legally practicable, or the erection of chapels proportional to the population.

Mr. Noel expresses a confident persuasion that the sense of these great evils will soon rouse both the members of the establishment and the dissenters to such remonstrances, as will induce the government to relinquish its usurped dominion over the faith and worship of the subject, and free the church from its enthrallment. Great numbers, he represents, both of the ministers and members of the state church are extremely dissatisfied with its principles and its administration, and desirous either of an absolute dissolution of the union, or important modifications of its terms; while the growth and political influence of dissent are such as may soon, in some

crisis of parties, place the establishment at their disposal. The chapels of the four principal evangelical denominations in England and Wales are already as numerous as the parishes of the establishment, and are supposed to embrace in their congregations 4,000,000, or one fourth of the inhabitants. A large share of these have been erected within the last fifty years. The increase of the Catholics during that period has also been very rapid, their number having reached, it is said, almost two millions, and their chapels advanced from thirty to near six hundred. Mr. Noel is mistaken, however, we doubt not, in his anticipation of a speedy denationalization of the establishment. It is indeed most certainly to take place; but it is to be preceded, the Scriptures foreshow, by a series of great and terrible events, of which we see no indications that he is aware, that must naturally occupy a very considerable period. One of them is the alienation of the people of the ten kingdoms from their legalized churches; which is signified by the drying up of the Euphrates, and is now very obviously in progress in all the principal nations of Europe, especially those of Italy and Germany; where until the last year they have been held in the most abject vassalage. Another is a public and efficient testimony of the witnesses against this usurpation by the civil rulers of the rights of God over the church. Mr. Noel himself is beginning that testimony, and may be the means not improbably of raising up many who shall utter it in a more efficient manner. A third is the persecution and slaughter of those witnesses for their testimony. It will not be till that dread moment arrives, that the worshippers in any of the nationalized churches will, as a body, be led to a realization of the false position in which they stand, and return to their allegiance to Christ.

Mr. Noel presents an example in the course he is now taking of independence, disinterestedness, and fidelity to the truth, that will command the sympathy and respect of the friends of religious freedom universally in this and other nations, and must exert a powerful influence at home. As his volume has been re-published here, it will have, we trust, a wide circulation in our churches. It presents much interesting information; the principles it advocates deserve to be carefully studied; and it is eminently adapted to impress us

with a realization of the distinguished blessing which we enjoy in our perfect religious freedom.

ART. VI.—THE HARMONY OF THE APOCALYPSE WITH THE OTHER PROPHECIES OF HOLY SCRIPTURE, with Notes, and an outline of the various interpretations. By the Rev. William Henry Hoare, M. A., late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. London. John W. Parker, 1848.

MANY of the agents and objects which are employed as symbols in the Apocalypse, are also used in the ancient prophets, either in the same relation, or in similes, metaphors, or some other species of figure; and many of the important terms and forms of expression employed by John, occur also in other parts of the Scriptures. It is the design of this work to point out these parallelisms and resemblances, in order to show the harmony of the Revelation with the other prophecies, and aid in determining its meaning. The analogous passages are not transcribed at large, but many of their terms and expressions are inserted in a paraphrase which the author presents of the text, and references given to the others. He does not indeed confine himself in his selection to the prophecies, but alleges kindred terms and phrases often from the historical parts of the Old Testament, and from the gospels and epistles. There are many passages which admit, in this way, of a very large and beautiful illustration. Thus the darkening and fall of the heavenly bodies that followed the opening of the sixth seal, are in a degree similar to those which it had been predicted should attend the overthrow of Babylon, and the capture and slaughter of the king of Egypt; and immediately precede the second coming of Christ; while the office which they fill is quite different. "And the sun became black as sackcloth of hair, and the moon became as blood, and the stars of heaven fell unto the earth, even as a fig-tree casts her untimely figs when she is shaken of a mighty wind; and the heaven departed as a scroll when it is rolled together." Some have supposed that the obscuration and fall of the heavenly bodies,

Isaiah xiii. 10, are employed to show that the capture of Babylon was to take place in the night, and in a night of extraordinary darkness, caused by a storm, and that the prediction had a literal fulfilment. "For the stars of heaven and the constellations thereof shall not give their light; the sun shall be darkened in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine." They are, however, more probably used by a hypocatastasis for the monarch and princes of Babylon, to indicate that they would at that crisis be involved in darkness of mind, and uncertainty and confusion of counsels; that instead of efficient protectors, they would be to the population of the city, what the sun, moon, and stars, would be were they wholly prevented from giving light. The language is not, as some have represented, metaphorical, as the events predicted of the sun, moon, and stars are not incompatible with their nature.

In foreshowing the slaughter of Pharaoh, and the exclusion of his family from the throne, it is predicted; "And when I shall quench thee, I will cover the heavens; and make the stars thereof dark; I will cover the sun with a cloud, and the moon shall not give her light; all the bright lights of heaven will I make dark over thee, and set darkness upon thy land, saith the Lord God," Ezekiel xxxii. 6-8. Here they are used doubtless in the same manner as substitutes for the royal family, in order to show that by their exclusion from the throne, the condition of the Egyptians in respect to their fostering care, was to be such as that of the land of Egypt would be, were the heavens covered with blackness, and the sun, moon, and stars, prevented from shining. They are used on the same principle also in reference to the rulers of the nations generally, Isaiah xxxiv. 4. "And the host of heaven shall be dissolved, and the heavens shall be rolled together as a scroll; and all their host shall fall down, as the leaf falleth off from the vine, and as a falling fig from a fig-tree." As the events here affirmed of them are unnatural, and would involve the dissolution of the solar and stellar system, they indicate that the monarchs, princes, and subordinate rulers, whose overthrow they are employed to illustrate, are to be hurled from their stations, and their several governments wholly annihilated. They are used in a similar relation also

doubtless, Joel ii. 10, 32, Matthew xxv. 29, and the parallel passages of Mark and Luke, in which the obscuration of the sun and moon, and the fall of the stars, are represented as taking place at the same time. Those orbs, it should be considered, were not in any of these instances seen by the prophet in vision, undergoing these changes, and they are not employed, therefore, as prophetic symbols, but instead are merely used to illustrate by the resemblance which they present, the nature and circumstances of their destruction, whose overthrow is distinctly foreshown in the prophecies in which they occur.

In the Apocalypse, however, they are not used to exemplify or illustrate something predicted in connexion with them, in literal language, but absolutely as prophetic symbols, whose meaning lies wholly in themselves, and is to be determined by the laws of analogy, independently of what precedes and follows; and they actually foreshow therefore first, such disastrous changes of the civil governments of the world, as will make them to their subjects, what a blackening of the sun and bloodiness of the moon would render those orbs to men; and next, such a dejection of monarchs and princes from their stations and annihilation of their governments, as will be to them, what a fall of stars and a departure of the heavens as a scroll, when it is rolled together, would be to those bodies.

A discrimination of the differing relations in which they are thus used, and the objects for which they are employed, is essential, accordingly, to a just understanding of their meaning; and a knowledge of the principle on which they are used in the figurative predictions, is an important aid to the discovery of the office which they fill as symbols. There are many other passages that admit of a similar illustration, from correlative or resembling predictions, in other parts of the sacred volume.

Mr. Hoare gives explanations of many of the symbols in notes, and presents in a series of appendices, short essays on the laws of interpretation, the coming of Christ, the state of the departed, and several other topics, in which his object is to exhibit the constructions which have been advanced by eminent commentators, rather than to offer new theories. His views, like all theirs, we believe, in Great Britain, who expect the personal advent of Christ, anterior to the millennium, are evangelical.

The publication of a book like this, which treats of the Apocalypse in a single relation, indicates the high interest that is there felt in the subject. There are there so many who are in a degree familiar with the prophetic Scriptures, and desirous to gain a further knowledge of them, that an author who discusses any one of their numerous themes with learning and piety may look for a large body of readers; and every year thousands of volumes are issued and gain a wide circulation. When will the subject, instead of being shunned and discountenanced, attract an equal attention here? At no distant day we trust. It needs but to be studied to awaken a profounder interest than almost any other; and but to be presented aright from the desk, to render it more attractive than almost any other, the medium of a larger knowledge of the great things of God, and a happier means of strengthening the faith, quickening the love, and giving cheerfulness and energy to the labors of the church.

ARTICLE VII.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. LECTURES ON THE SECOND ADVENT OF MESSIAH, and other important subjects, by the Rev. Edward Winthrop, M.A., Rector of St. Paul's Church, Norwalk, Ohio. New York: Stanford and Swords, 1849.

THE author, in the first part of this volume, treats in a series of spirited and effective Lectures of the folly of atheism, the divine origin of Christianity, the popular objections of infidelity, the blessings of redemption, and man's responsibility for his belief—themes that are peculiarly appropriate at the present time, when not only enemies without the church are assailing religion, but individuals in the sacred office, and some even who are intrusted with the education of candidates for the ministry, question or deny the inspiration of the Scriptures, and employ themselves in the inculcation—under the guise of metaphysics and philology—of the infidel and atheistic theories held by the rationalists of Germany, that aim, not merely at the overthrow of the most essential doctrines of the Christian system, but at the extermination of religion from the world. We believe it to be a mistaken and fatal policy to allow these bold, unscrupulous, and fanatical men to pursue their course without counter-

action;—superficial, contradictory, and absurd as they are. Some of them are armed with a large power by the positions which they occupy. They are, in effect, organized as a party, and act in concert. The press is, in a degree, subservient to them. They beguile the enthusiastic and aspiring by loud pretences to superior knowledge, and impose on the unsuspecting by professions of the faith and expressions of the religious feeling which it is the very object of their principles to discountenance and extinguish. If they are left without confutation; if no efforts are made to protect the truth from their assaults, thousands of the young will be deluded by their arts, and the church itself become the open propagandist here, as it is in Germany, of infidelity. The ministers of the different denominations would, we believe, render an important service to the cause of religion, were they, after the example of Mr. Winthrop, to deliver courses of lectures to their people on the evidences of Christianity, and, what is equally requisite, make them acquainted with the false principles of the fashionable philosophy, and point out the atheistic results to which it leads. Mr. Winthrop's lectures are happily suited to their design. He has made himself familiar with the subject by much reading and study. His style is perspicuous and energetic. He conducts an argument with clearness and force, and his appeals are bold and effective.

He treats in the second part on the premillennial advent of the Messiah, the restoration of the Jews, the first resurrection, the judgment of the great day, the personal reign of the Messiah and his glorified saints on the earth, the signs of the times, and the antiquity and practical utility of the doctrines of Christ's advent and reign. These, like the others, are written with an ease, intelligence, and force, that are adapted in more than an ordinary degree to interest, instruct, and convince. The views he presents are essentially like those entertained by the best writers of Great Britain, Cuninghame, M'Neile, Bickersteth, Anderson, Sirr, who, though they misjudge, we think, on several subordinate topics, hold that Christ's second coming and the resurrection of the saints are to precede the millennium, and that the Israelites are at that period to be restored to their ancient land, and again exalted to a peculiar relation to God. His views of the work of redemption are emphatically evangelical, and he makes appropriate and effective practical uses of his subject.

We wish the ministers of the gospel generally may be induced to follow his example also on this subject, and give lectures to their people on the great themes of the prophecies. Are there any who doubt the possibility of discussing them in such a manner as to engage the inte-

rest and conduce to the instruction of their hearers! They could fall into no greater misjudgment. These lectures, which are far superior to ordinary discourses, not only in the novelty, but in the attractiveness of their topics and the ability with which they are treated, are a sufficient proof of it. What other announcement is there so suited to rouse and awe the heart, give impression to all the great teachings of the sacred word, free the existence which follows this from the vagueness and uncertainty under which it is usually contemplated, and invest it with reality and grandeur, as that the holy dead are in a brief period to be raised from the grave and enter on their immortal life of beauty and glory with Christ! What other subjects are there of greater moment, or more adapted to give exalted conceptions of God's designs, and impart interest and beauty to the future, than Christ's descent from the skies, within a few years, in visible majesty, destruction of his armed foes, conversion of the surviving Gentile nations, restoration of the Israelites to their own land, and reign over the world, raised to virtue, beauty, and happiness, through an interminable series of ages!

We do not recommend their attempting to treat these themes without an accurate knowledge of them. They are not proper subjects for careless declamation, superficial excitement, or mere assumption and conjecture. But let them, rejecting the mistaken theories by which they have been heretofore misinterpreted, make themselves familiar with the laws of symbols and figures, and rigidly follow them in their explanations, and they will find the prophetic oracles, which are now so generally neglected and shunned as unintelligible and dangerous, an exhaustless treasury of means most happily adapted, not only to awaken the curiosity, aid the knowledge, and strengthen the faith of believers, but to rouse the attention and impress the consciences of hearers generally. These lectures drew, we understand, large audiences, and the intelligence, earnestness, and dignity with which they are written must have given them a deep impression.

2. AN INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED TENDENCY OF THE SEPARATION OF CONVICTS ONE FROM THE OTHER TO PRODUCE DISEASE AND DERANGEMENT. By a Citizen of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: E. C. & J. Biddle. 1849.

THE relative merits and demerits of the methods of separate and associate labor pursued in the Eastern State Penitentiary of Pennsylvania, and the State's Prison at Charlestown, Massachusetts, have for several years been very largely and zealously discussed by the members

of the Prison Discipline Society and others of Boston. In the Eastern State Penitentiary convicts are separated from each other as entirely as though each was the only individual confined in the prison. They lodge and labor in separate rooms. They are, however, visited every day several times by the officers of the establishment, and often by friends and strangers, and allowed to converse, make known their wants, and express their wishes freely. In the prison at Charlestown they are also lodged separately, but labor in gangs in the same apartment or yard, though precluded wholly from conversation with one another. The difference of the two institutions in this relation accordingly is, that in the Pennsylvania Penitentiary while the prisoners are wholly isolated from each other, they are allowed to converse daily with their overseers, and other officers of the establishment, and often with their friends, the ministers of the gospel, and virtuous and intelligent strangers; while in the Charlestown prison they enjoy less of the company of the uncontaminated, and instead, are allowed to work during the day in each other's presence, though without conversation. The preference is given altogether by the Massachusetts writers to the latter method, and the other denounced as wholly ill-judged and cruel, injurious in an extreme degree to the health of the convicts, and fatal to their mental powers. It is the design of this Inquiry to vindicate the discipline of the Eastern Penitentiary from these charges, by showing first, that the inmates of that prison are not, as the Massachusetts writers represent, consigned to absolute solitude, but are only precluded from intercourse with one another, while their need of society is supplied in a sufficient degree by the daily visits and conversation of the officers, and others. Next that of the deaths that take place, the largest share are from diseases that were contracted before admission to the prison; and the others from causes that are wholly independent of the peculiar discipline of the institution; and that the health of the inmates generally improves instead of declining during their residence there. And finally that of the convicts who are deranged, by much the largest number are insane on their admission; that the others owe their derangement to other causes than their exclusion from each other's society; and that with few exceptions even that class are, before their dismissal, cured by the medical treatment to which they are subjected. The discussion is throughout highly interesting. It displays the most ample acquaintance with the subject, is marked by candor, and while conducted with great keenness, is free from asperity; and forms an effective and noble vindication of the Pennsylvania Institution from the misrepresentation and obloquy with which it has been assailed.

3. PUNISHMENT BY DEATH, ITS AUTHORITY AND EXPEDIENCY. By G. B. Cheever, D.D. New York : John Wiley. 1849.

THIS work, of which a new edition is now issued, is entitled, by the importance of the theme and the ability with which it is treated, to the large circulation and general favor it has already received. Dr. Cheever founds his chief argument in proof of the lawfulness and expediency of the punishment of bloodshedding by death, on the great command addressed to Noah and his sons, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed;" and on the reason given for that command, "For in the image of God made he man." As that reason still subsists and must continue to subsist, it must still be an equal ground for the continuance of the law. What then is that reason? Man's moral nature, by which he is capable of the knowledge and service of God, and owes duties to him; and on the ground of which *he is placed under a law which makes death the penalty of revolt*. As God has thus actually assigned that dread evil as the sanction of his own law, the unlawful infliction of it by man on his fellow man is on that account, as well as in other relations, one of the greatest of all conceivable offences against him; as it implies either that the gratification of the murderer's anger, jealousy, revenge, avarice, ambition, or whatever other malevolent passion it is that prompts him to the deed, is as adequate a reason for his inflicting it, as revolt from God is for its infliction by him; and thence that the rights of the murderer over God's creatures are as great and absolute as his are; or else, that the being murdered is not made in the image of God, and that God therefore has no peculiar rights over him as a moral subject. In either form, it is an assumption of rights and prerogatives as absolute and sacred as those which belong to the Almighty! What a stupendous offence against him! How appropriate that he who thus arrogates his place, should be immediately confuted by an infliction that shows what his true relations are both to him and to man! Dr. Cheever's other principal arguments are founded on the re-enactment of the law given to Noah at the institution of the Hebrew code, and its recognition by Paul, as still obligatory on the race. These are confirmed by a variety of subsidiary considerations. The subject is treated throughout with ease, vivacity, and force, and is marked by a characteristic that is too seldom seen in the discussions of the present day—a deep sense of the rights of God, and a full and earnest belief of the truth and authority of his Word.

4. *LIFE AND TIMES OF THE REV. PHILIP HENRY, A.M.* New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1849.

THIS is a highly interesting narrative of the life of one of the eminent men who under the tyranny of Charles II. and James II. were ejected from the ministry in the established church, and persecuted for their fidelity to Christ. His father was keeper of the king's orchard at Whitehall, London, under Charles I., and it was there that he was born and spent his early years. He was religiously educated, and became pious before entering the university at Oxford. Soon after receiving his degree, he took charge of a small parish in Flintshire, and continued there until ejected for his nonconformity. On removing to a neighboring town, he still preached sometimes in his own house, and occasionally in churches in the vicinity, and like others was watched, obstructed, and harassed through six and twenty years, till on the accession of William and Mary, legal toleration was given to those who dissented from the national church. The history given by the biographer of the annoyances, the misrepresentations, the cruelty to which the faithful disciples of the Redeemer were then subjected, and the patience with which they submitted to injustice, and the joyfulness with which they took the spoiling of their goods for Christ's sake, is very affecting. God gave them a wisdom which was equal to their exigencies, and enabled them to display in eminent strength and beauty the integrity, meekness, and dignity of true religion in contrast to the debasement, treachery, and mercilessness of that which is false. Mr. Henry was the father of Matthew the commentator, and resembled him much in genius, temperament, and style. He was distinguished for amiableness, conversableness, discretion, and fidelity. Religion was the business of his life, and was heartfelt and practical, not imaginative and theoretical merely, and was exercised in the discharge of the duties of the sphere in which he was placed, not limited to a few occasions when he could act on a conspicuous theatre, and attract the gaze of a crowd; nor thrown away in the mere projection of vast and impracticable schemes for the accomplishment of good by others. He had a profound sense of his dependence, of God's all directing sway, of the truth of his word, and the wisdom and graciousness of his designs; and surrendered himself to his disposal in seasons of darkness and danger, with that filial acquiescence, that calmness and serenity of trust, that are usually displayed by the witnesses of God in the great crises of their spiritual life, and invest their faith and submission with a lofty dignity and grandeur.

5. **THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF PASCAL**, consisting of Letters, Essays, Conversations, and Detached Thoughts. With an Introduction and Notes, by George Pearce, Esq. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1849.

AN examination, a few years since, of Pascal's manuscripts, which have been preserved in public and private libraries, led to the discovery that a considerable part of them had not been printed, and that some important passages of those which had been published had been mutilated, or charged with another meaning by his editors. The curiosity which this announcement excited, and the disposition shown by some to misrepresent his sentiments and character, occasioned a new edition, embracing the whole of his works, and conforming them to the manuscripts. This volume is one of the new issue, and consists chiefly of letters, discourses, and detached thoughts that had not been embraced in former editions. They generally bear the marks very distinctly of his great mind. The tracts, especially on the geometrical spirit, the art of persuasion, and eloquence and style, and many of the miscellaneous thoughts, from the lofty powers which they display, and the ease, precision, and elegance with which they are expressed, leave no room to doubt their genuineness. It is scarcely just, however, to a great author thus to give publicity to all the unfinished treatises, fragments of discussions, and disconnected thoughts and memoranda that are found in his desk at his decease, many of which, perhaps, were written in preparation of the works which he lived to mature and publish. The volume which is to follow this is to contain an unfinished work in Apology for Christianity, or explanation of its nature, and proof of its truths, that has not before been printed, and is said to be of great interest.

6. **THE LIFE AND WORKS OF WILLIAM COWPER**, complete in one volume. Edited by the Rev. T. S. Grimshawe, A.M. New York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1849.

THIS beautiful volume has, from the largeness of the correspondence, the accuracy of the biographical notices and essay on his genius, and the taste with which the whole is executed, all the completeness and elegance which the admirers of the poet can desire in an edition of his works. The unrivalled ease, liveliness, and grace of the letters edited by Dr. Johnson, inspired readers generally with the wish that his whole correspondence might be published together and in its natural order. The entire series of his letters is accordingly here given and arranged with few exceptions as they were written. The narrative of his life, which, though founded on that by Hayley, is freed from the errors into which

that writer was betrayed by his want of religious knowledge, is incorporated with the letters, and presents the explanations that are needed of their details. To that is added the memoir of his early years, written by himself; a sketch also of the character of his brother, the Rev. J. Cowper; and brief notices of the younger Mr. Unwin, Mr. Hill, Lady Austen, and several others, who were his correspondents. These are followed by an elegant essay on his genius and poetry, by the Rev. J. W. Cunningham, of Harrow. The reader has thus the most ample means of a just estimate of his life, his poetic powers, his piety, and the nature and ground of the derangement with which many of his years were darkened. Mr. Grimshawe has fulfilled his office as editor with excellent judgment, presenting a true portraiture of Cowper's peculiar temperament, vindicating him from the misrepresentations into which other writers had fallen, referring his mental maladies to their real causes, and protecting religion from the imputation of gloominess and misanthropy, to which it had on his account unjustly been subjected.

It is almost superfluous to speak of the merits of Cowper's works. His letters are universally regarded as unsurpassed in propriety, ease, grace, and dignity of thought, and accuracy and elegance of expression. Unstudied, the effusion of the moment, and presenting all the variety of views and emotions with which his mind was filled by the themes which occupied him, they are far better models for the young than the elaborate epistles of Pope, Swift, Lady M. W. Montague, Mrs. Montague, or others of that class, which, with all their wit, refinement, and learning, are too much the work of art, and display even in their elegance a degree of stiffness and formality.

But the charms of Cowper's poetry, especially of the *Task*, equal those of his letters. That work is undoubtedly, in excellence of style, vivacity and grace of thought, dignity and beauty of theme, not only the finest poem of the last century, but one of the best in our language. Compared with it, most that have since been published scarcely deserve the name. A greater or worse revolution in taste was, perhaps, never wrought in so short a period as that which was introduced by the writers who succeeded him, and have risen to a degree of popularity—Coleridge, Wordsworth, and others of that class—who aimed at effect by the exhibition of the mean, the monstrous, or the impossible, rather than that which is natural, beautiful, and morally great. Their works, if not hostile to Christianity, are at least alien from it. If they treat of religion, it is as a vague naturalism or philosophy, rather than a divine reality. No one looks to them for portraitures of Christian character, or lofty expressions of the moral and religious sentiments with which they are usually familiar, who receive the Scriptures as a revelation. There

is no better means of correcting this false taste than the circulation of works like Cowper's, marked universally by truth, delicacy, and elegance, and abounding with beautiful delineations of the exterior world, touching pictures of the heart, just exhibitions of the work of redemption, lofty views of God;—realities, in a word, not shadows; symmetry, instead of distortion; the religion which God has revealed, in place of a cold and false philosophy. We wish this volume may find its way into every neighborhood, and become the companion and teacher of every family.

7. *THE LIFE, AND A SELECTION FROM THE LETTERS OF THE LATE REV. HENRY VENN, M.A.* Edited by Rev. H. Venn, B.D. Philadelphia: H. Hooker. 1849.

MR. VENN was one of the few distinguished men who preached the gospel with fidelity and success in the English establishment during the third quarter of the last century, and prepared the way in a degree for the large body of eminent ministers who have since adorned that church, and taken a conspicuous part in the projection and support of missions, and the distribution of the Scriptures. The Memoir, which was written by his son the Rev. John Venn, the rector of Clapham, and long the associate of Thornton, Wilberforce, Clarkson, and the other celebrated philanthropists, who resided or were accustomed to visit there, is highly interesting, and presents a beautiful exemplification of the wisdom, zeal, self-denial, disinterestedness, and faithfulness which become the ministers of the cross, and which, when seen in eminent degrees, are usually crowned by large success. His ministry at Huddersfield, like that of Edwards at Northampton, left an impression that survived for a long series of years. The letters, which abound with interesting incidents and useful counsels, display warm and generous affections, a deep knowledge of the heart, just views of the dispensations of providence, and an ardent delight in the piety of friends and fellow disciples.

8. *A SERIOUS CALL TO A DEVOUT AND HOLY LIFE*, adapted to the state and condition of all orders of Christians. By William Law, M.A. New York: Stanford & Swords. 1849.

THIS is a handsome edition of this excellent work, which loses none of the power of its truths by the lapse of time, nor any of its adaptation to interest, instruct, and impress. To what a lofty office God exalts those whom he thus makes the teachers of successive generations, and the instrument of awakening, enlightening, and strengthening thousands and myriads of the heirs of salvation!

9. **FAMILY PRAYERS**, and prayers on the Ten Commandments, to which is added a Family Commentary upon the Sermon on the Mount. By the late Henry Thornton, Esq., M.P. Edited by the Right Rev. M. Eastburn, D.D., Bishop of Massachusetts. New York : Stanford & Swords. Boston : Crocker & Brewster. 1849.

THIS volume is well suited for families that use a manual in worship. The style of the prayers is simple and scriptural, and their topics appropriate and sufficiently diversified. The Commentary, which occupies near half the volume, is evangelical and instructive. How seldom do those who reach important stations in the political world, or act a conspicuous part in any of the great movements of their age, employ their hours of leisure in the composition of works thus adapted to advance their knowledge of divine things, nourish their religious affections, and aid the piety of others !

10. **ORIGINAL THOUGHTS** on various passages of Scripture, being the substance of Sermons preached by the late Rev. Richard Cecil, A.M., never before published, taken down by Mrs. Hawkes, and now edited by Catherine Cecil. New York : R. Carter & Brothers. 1849.

THESE sermons are brief, and marked by the simplicity of thought, and spontaneousness and warmth of feeling, by which Mr. Cecil was characterized. His intellect and heart acted in harmony, and took an equal share in the exhibition and enforcement of the gospel. Every truth awakened in him its appropriate feeling, and every pious feeling was excited and prompted to utterance by its appropriate truth. He is in these discourses as in his other works highly practical, and displays an unusual familiarity with the peculiarities of the Christian life, and presents views excellently suited to aid the believer to a knowledge of himself, assist him in the cultivation of his affections, and teach him how to fulfil the duties and meet the trials of life.

11. **THOUGHTS AND MAXIMS** illustrating Moral and Religious Subjects. By Rev. H. Hooker. Philadelphia : H. Hooker. 1849.

THIS little volume presents many useful maxims, many excellent thoughts, many just delineations of the natural and sanctified emotions and passions, and many fine portraiture of the joys, the sorrows, and the hopes that distinguish the believer. It bespeaks a meditative mind that has observed widely and felt deeply, and learned to conform its judgment to the teachings of God's word, and will yield pleasure and instruction to the reader whether in the ardor of youth or the calm of old age.

12. **THE WHOLE WORKS OF XENOPHON**, translated by Ashley Cooper, Spelman, Smith, Fielding, and others, complete in one volume. New York : R. Carter & Brothers. 1849.

THIS is a beautiful edition of the works of Xenophon, the principal of which are the institution and expedition of Cyrus, the memoir and defence of Socrates, and the affairs of Greece. The translations are by scholars of reputation, and in good taste. Distinguished for his fine powers, large knowledge, and simplicity and grace of style, Xenophon is one of the most pleasing and instructive of the Greeks. His narratives and descriptions are eminently graphic. The reader vividly conceives every scene that he paints, every person whose character he draws, and every act and incident that he details; and they are of great variety and interest. He gives in his institution of Cyrus a portrait of the greatest warrior of the age, and in his memoir of Socrates of the greatest philosopher; while in his notice of the affairs of Greece and other tracts, he delineates the political institutions, the mental characteristics, the domestic manners, the arts, the contests, and the achievements of his countrymen.

13. **EXPOSITION OF PSALM CXIX.** An illustration of the Character and Exercises of Christian Experience. By Rev. C. Bridges, M.A., Vicar of Old Newton. New York : R. Carter & Brothers. 1849.

THE hundred and nineteenth Psalm is a record of the religious views, contemplations, desires, hopes, joys, and sorrows of a fearer and worshipper of God under the Mosaic dispensation; and presents a fuller exhibition of the thoughts and affections that are peculiar to the sanctified, than any other composition of the Old Testament. The delight in God which it expresses, the sense of his rights, the love of his law, the trust in his care, the feeling of dependence, the hungering and thirsting after righteousness, the fears, the dangers, the conflicts which it depicts, are common to the pious of all ages, and the degree in which any one finds that they are his own and embody his experience, may be taken as a measure of his sanctification. It is in this relation that it is contemplated by Mr. Bridges, and his aim is to unfold the views and sentiments which it expresses, and aid the reader to apprehend their full meaning and make them the means of exciting and nourishing the same thoughts and affections in himself; and it is well suited to that object. The style is plain; the views are scriptural; and the counsels judicious. The high estimation in which the work is held abroad is seen from the great number of editions through which it has passed, that from which this is printed being the seventeenth.

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ART. I.—GOD IN CHRIST. Three Discourses delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language. By Horace Bushnell. Hartford : Brown & Parsons, 1849.

BY THE EDITOR.

IN our former notice of this volume we confined ourselves to the statement of the theory which Dr. Bushnell advances in his Dissertation on the nature and origin of language, and exhibition of the results to which it leads in the exposition of the Scriptures and other works, in which terms of "mind and thought" are used ;—without entering into the question whether it lays a foundation for such views of the divine nature, of Christ's incarnation and death, and of the method of salvation through him, as he presents in the Discourses ; or whether those views, considered irrespective of his theory of language, are consistent with the teachings of revelation.

We now propose to inquire whether he treats the subjects of the Discourses conformably to the principles of his Dissertation ; examine the theories which he entertains of

the trinity, incarnation, and atonement, and ascertain whether they have the merits which he ascribes to them.

His theory of language, it will be recollected, is, on the one hand, that all the terms that are employed in the designation and description of mental and spiritual things, are used by a metaphor, and are not, therefore, in fact, the proper denominatives of the mental and spiritual things in respect to which they are employed, but instead, are mere names of analogous physical things; and on the other, that the nature of the analogy on which they are used, is wholly unknown and undiscoverable. It is, therefore, as was shown in our analysis of the scheme, equivalent to the representation, first, that mental and spiritual things are never the subjects of the affirmations in which those terms are used; next, that the physical things of which they treat and their relations to spiritual things, are unknown and incomprehensible; and, consequently, that the Self-existent is not the being whom the Scriptures reveal and exhibit as the object of worship; that love, awe, adoration, and trust, are not the acts which they enjoin; that the acts which they require are not acts even of the mind, but of the body, and are physical therefore and involuntary, but of what specific kind is unknown and indeterminable. Thus, as in the affirmation, "Joseph is a fruitful bough," the words "fruitful bough" are used by a metaphor; and thence are not employed to signify that Joseph is actually "a fruitful bough," but merely that he in some relation resembles one; so also, if the name Joseph is used by a metaphor, then it does not in reality stand for him; and it is not he who is affirmed to resemble "a fruitful bough," but some other agent of an analogous kind to whom his name is transferred; but who, unless either an express explanation is given, or the principle is understood on which the metaphor is used, must remain wholly unknown. Accordingly, if in the proposition, "God is a Spirit," the word Spirit is, as Dr. Bushnell's theory represents, used by a metaphor, then the meaning is not in fact that God is a Spirit, but only that he is like a Spirit—whatever that is; and if the word God, also, is employed by a metaphor, then God is not in fact the subject of the proposition, but some other agent who merely resembles him; and finally, if these terms are

used on a principle that is entirely unknown and undiscoverable, then it is unknown also who the being is who is declared to be a Spirit, and what the nature of the resemblance is which the affirmation that he is a Spirit is employed to denote; and so of all other expressions in which words of "thought and spirit" are used. Had Dr. Bushnell, then, written his Discourses conformably with the principles of his Dissertation, instead of directly treating of the trinity, incarnation, and atonement, he would have formally disclaimed all purpose and all power of discussing them: he would have denied that God, intelligent agents, a moral government, a redemption from sin, are in any degree the subjects of the revelation made in the Scriptures; and shown that the fancy that they treat of such themes is founded on a total misconception of the meaning of their language. In place of rejecting one construction of them and advancing another, he would have rejected all theories of their nature, and affirmed that we have no terms by which we can express any ideas respecting them.

Are his Discourses then framed in conformity with that theory? Not in the least. There is not the shadow of an indication in them that he does not, like all other persons, use the word God to denote God; the word Spirit to denote Spirit; law to signify law; and love, awe, joy, trust, sorrow, and all other terms of the kind, to denote the affections of which they are the literal names. He conducts his discussions throughout as though the words which he employs have the meanings that are usually assigned to them, and are an adequate vehicle of thought; he is as positive and dogmatical in the statement and affirmation of his theories, as were the authors of the thirty-nine articles, and of the Westminster catechism in the exhibition of theirs; and he relies as confidently on logic to maintain the views which he advances, and confute those of his opponents, as any of the reasoning theologians whom he denounces. This is certainly awkward in one who designs, by his theory, to introduce a new era in metaphysics and theology. It occasions no surprise, indeed, that he did not adhere to his principles, as they would render it physically impossible even to treat of such subjects. Dr. B. might spend ages in the effort, without being able to form

a proposition that would be intelligible without explanation, in which the subject of the affirmation should be a spiritual agent, act, or attribute; and yet be denoted by a purely metaphorical term. It is surprising, however, that he should have framed and put forth such a theory under the pretence that it at once indicates the process by which he reached the doctrines of his Discourses, and vindicates their truth. What then is the solution of this inconsistency? Is Dr. Bushnell, notwithstanding his "power of poetic insight," totally ignorant of the import of his own theory? While attempting to disgrace others as the dupes of words, has he unwittingly shown himself to be their thrall, and a false "logicker?" Or is his theory of language more a consequence than the cause of the doctrines of his Discourses, and devised for the purpose of puzzling his readers and critics, and justifying the license he has taken in the construction of the Scriptures? Whatever the explanation is, his disregard of his own doctrine is unfavorable to the credit of his speculations. The metaphysician who does not understand himself; the dogmatist who does not follow his own principles, cannot expect others to take him as their guide. The projector who has no faith in his own powers, ought not to be surprised if others decline to receive him as an oracle. To show what judgment is to be formed of him in these relations, we shall, as we treat of his doctrines, give examples of his contradiction of his views of language.

I. His theory of God and created things appears to be essentially that of the modern pantheists, whose system, drawn originally partly from Spinoza, and partly from Swedenborg, has received its final form from the idealism of Kant and Hegel.

The doctrine of the Scriptures and the church is, that God created the material universe out of nothing, as a theatre for the existence and agency of intelligent creatures, and a means of their activity, their knowledge of him, and their enjoyment; and displayed therein his boundless power, wisdom, and goodness; and next, that he then created intelligent agents with the requisite powers for seeing the material objects with which they are surrounded, learning that they

are his work, and perceiving the perfections which he displays in them. The material world is not a part of God, or an efflorescence from him that assumes a substantial form in consequence of its emanation ; nor is it of the same nature as he, or an image of him ; no more than the machine which a mechanician forms, is a part of the artisan himself, or like him in nature or shape. It is a wholly distinct, a wholly different, and a wholly dependent existence. Nor are the intelligent creatures whom God creates to inhabit his material worlds, a part of him, or like him in nature, except that they are intelligent and moral ; though their mode of knowledge is in the utmost degree dissimilar.

Instead of this representation of the Scriptures, Swedenborg held that all created things are parts or modifications of God ; that by his fiat, certain portions of his substance assume by emanation, the form of finite entities, or souls of different orders, corresponding to the different species of material things that now exist in the sensible world ; that then by an influx of the divine energy, they become causes by emanation or elimination from themselves, of the material forms in which they are enshrined, and that those forms are an image and expression of their psychical or spiritual nature.

"There is but one only substance which is really substance, and all things besides are formations from it. That one only substance rules throughout the formations not only as form, but also as non-form, such as form is in its origin. Unless this were so, it would not be possible for anything to subsist and act. *But this is spoken for the intelligent.*" —*A. C.*, n. 7270, quoted by *C. A. Tulk* in his *Spiritual Christianity*, p. 48.

"It is essential to form, whether of mind or body, that it be finite, or limited and imperfect. . . . Spiritual forms, or the forms of the human will and intellect . . . are the limitations of the mind by the peculiar disposition and extent of its powers to specific purposes, by which each mind has its own character or province, and is determined to certain uses in preference to others. This specific determination of the powers of the mind is its form." —*Tulk's Spiritual Christianity*, p. 61.

"The Lord Jehovah is *the Essential Substance*, because the spaceless omnipresence of his life sustains all things in being ; and he is *the Essential Form*, because the specific determination and co-ordination of

all forms, whether spiritual or natural, have their initiations in him."—*Tulke's S. Christianity*, p. 61.

"That nothing exists in nature but from a *spiritual principle* is, because there cannot anything be given, unless it has a soul; all that is called soul which is essence, for what has not in itself an essence, this does not exist, for it is a nonentity, because there is no *esse* from which it is. Thus it is with *nature*; its essence from which it exists is the spiritual principle, because this has in itself the *divine esse*, and also the *divine power of acting, creating, and forming*, as will be seen from what follows: this essence may also be called soul, because *all that is spiritual lives*, and what is alive, when it acts into what is not alive, as into what is natural, causes it either to have as it were life, or to derive somewhat of the appearance thereof from the living principle; the latter in vegetables, the former in animals. That nothing in nature exists but from what is *spiritual* is because no effect is given without a cause. . . . Thus it is with nature; the singular and most singular things thereof, are an effect from a cause which is prior to it, and which is *interior to it*, and which is *superior to it*, and is also *immediately from God*; for a spiritual world is given; that world is prior, interior, and superior to the natural world. Wherefore, *everything of the spiritual world is a cause*, and everything of the natural world is an effect."—*11th. Creed*, 94. Quoted by Mr. Bush; Reply to Dr. Woods, p. 58.

"If this is well founded, we can no longer recognise creation as the *immediate* product of the divine *fiat*, but as always proceeding through the *spiritual world*, which itself proceeds by emanation from the Lord himself. All living organisms, whether animal or vegetable, are the elaboration of spiritual essences which become fixed and sensibly mirrored in material embodiments, and this fact discloses the true ground of *correspondences*." . . .

"The essence of a bird, therefore, is a spiritual entity which becomes a living bird by being *fixed in*, or clothed with a material body, and this entity is from the *infinitude of the divine affections and thoughts*. In the first bird created, there is primarily existent a psychical form, or spiritual body, which by the *inflowing of the divine life*, and by the law which connects matter with spirit, *works out a material body corresponding* with what we may term the psychical or *soul-body*, and adapted to its uses and ends in the natural world."—*Mr. Bush's Reply to Dr. Woods*, pp. 58, 59.

This theory appears to differ in no important particular from that of Spinoza, except that it exhibits the divine essence as assuming a two-fold form in its emanation; first,

of a spiritual or psychical principle; and then, as the effect of that of a material organism, expressive of its own spiritual character. Swedenborg made this theory the ground of a denial that there is a trinity of persons in God, that Christ had a human soul, that his death was expiatory, that men are justified through him, and other kindred doctrines.

Dr. Bushnell's views of God and his works, are seen from the following passages:

"When God is revealed, it cannot be as the One, as the Infinite, or Absolute, but only as through media; and as there are no infinite media, no signs that express the infinite, no minds in fact, that can apprehend the infinite by direct inspection, the One must appear in the *manifold*; the Absolute in the *conditional*; Spirit in *form*; the motionless in *motion*; the Infinite in the *finite*. He must *distribute Himself*; He must let forth His nature in sounds, colors, forms, works, definite objects, and signs. It must be to us as if Brama were waking up; as if Jehovah, the Infinite I am, the Absolute, were *dividing off himself* into innumerable activities that shall dramatize his immensity. and bring him within the moulds of language and discursive thought. And in whatever thing he appears, or is revealed, there will be something that misrepresents, as well as something that represents him. The revealing process, that which makes him appear, will envelope itself in clouds of formal contradiction—that is of diction which is contrary, in some way, to the truth, and which, taken simply as diction, is continually setting forms against each other.

"Thus the God revealed, in distinction from the God Absolute, *will have parts, forms, colors, utterances, motions, activities, assigned Him*. He will think, deliberate, reason, remember, have emotions. Then, taking up all these manifold representations, casting out the matter in which they are cross to each other, and repugnant to the very idea of the God they represent, we shall settle into the true knowledge of God, and receive, as far as the finite can receive the Infinite, the contents of the divine nature."—Pp. 139, 140.

"There is in God, taken as the Absolute being, *a capacity of self-expression*, so to speak, which is peculiar—a *generative power of form, a creative imagination*, in which, or by aid of which, *he can produce Himself outwardly, or represent Himself in the finite*. In this respect God is wholly unlike to us. Our imagination is passive, stored with forms, colors, and types of words from without, borrowed from the world we live in. But all such forms, God has in himself; and this is the Logos, the Word, elsewhere called the Form of God. Now this

Word, this Form of God, in which he sees Himself; is with God, as John says, from the beginning. It is God, *mirrored before his own understanding, and to be mirrored, as in fragments of the mirror, before us.* Conceive him now as creating the worlds, or creating worlds, if you please, from eternity. In so doing, *he only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces Himself. He bodies out his own thoughts.* What we call the creation is, in another view, a revelation only of God, his first revelation.

"And it is in this view, that the Word, or Logos, elsewhere called Christ, or the Son of God, is represented as the Creator of the worlds." —Pp. 145, 146.

This theory, though expressed in different terms, appears in its main elements, to be the same as that of Swedenborg. Instead of emanations and outbirths from God, it exhibits all created things as his distribution of himself into parts,—as revelations of the contents of his nature,—as productions of himself outwardly,—as representations and expressions of himself in finite forms. They are, according to Swedenborg, a conversion of the divine essence into finite entities, psychical and material;—according to Dr. Bushnell, they are embodiments in finite entities, psychical and material, of "the contents of the divine nature." They are finite materializations, therefore, and intellectualizations of the Infinite. He formally asserts, accordingly, that the Logos is represented as the creator of the worlds, only as he in that manner outwardly produces himself; and that it is because he has in himself all the forms, colors, and types of the material world, that he is called the Form of God. His language can mean nothing less, therefore, than that the divine essence is intellectualized and materialized in these forms.

How can they be outward productions, distributions, and expressions of himself, unless they are elaborations out of his spiritual nature of psychical and material entities, in the same manner as Swedenborg represents all material organisms as elaborations out of their several psychical entities, that are expressive of their character? If they are not God Himself or parts of his "essence," then they are no more "productions of himself outwardly," or "distributions of himself," "lettings forth of his nature in sounds, colors, forms, works, definite objects, and signs," and a "dividing off Himself into

innumerable activities that dramatize his immensity," than a mechanic's construction of an engine is a distribution of himself, a letting forth of his nature in forms and colors, and a dividing himself into activities that dramatize him. Should Dr. Bushnell disclaim this material pantheism, and assert that instead of the language of Swedenborg, he has used the vocabulary of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, and in the sense in which they employed it, and that he means, therefore, not that the creation is a psychicalization and materialization of God, but only that it is a psychicalization and materialization of his ideas, or a distribution in finite forms of that manifoldness of ideas that constitutes his Infinity and Absolute-ness, he then only exchanges a material for an ideal pantheism, and involves himself in the solecism of treating God and the created universe as real entities, when by the theory of those German speculatists they have no real objective existence, but are the mere products of the human understanding, and exist only in the minds that conceive them. Should he disclaim both this ideal, and that material pantheism, he then divests himself of all ground for his representation that creation is such a division and distribution of God in finite forms. If God is absolutely distinct from his works, and of a wholly different nature and mode of existence, then they are not distributions of him, lettings forth of him in sounds, forms, and colors, and representations and expressions of him, any more than the works of art which men fabricate are divisions and distributions of them. They are proofs of his being; they display his power and wisdom; they indicate his designs; but they are not parts of him, productions of himself outwardly, nor representations of the contents of his nature, any more than the works of the sculptor, the architect, and the painter, are representations of the contents of their nature, and distributions of them into forms and colors. His language is, on such a theory, wholly senseless and preposterous. If Dr. Bushnell understands himself then, he is either a material or an idealistic pantheist; that is indisputably the dogma which his language expresses.

This is corroborated by his concurrence with Swedenborg in the representation that God has in himself all the forms,

colors, and other predicates of the outer world ; that that is the Logos, and the Word which is called the Form of God ; that in that Form, God sees himself ; and that it is God mirrored before his own understanding. God is himself, then, nothing but these finite, psychical, and material forms. In seeing them, he sees himself. In giving existence to the worlds, he only outwardly produces Himself. In what language could it be more clearly asserted that God and his works are the same ? Should Dr. Bushnell disown this, and aver that he merely means that God embodies his *thoughts* in his works, he will then become obnoxious to the charge of ideal, instead of material pantheism ; as to exhibit God and his ideas as identical, as on that supposition his language would, is equivalent to the representation that he is himself but an idea, or an infinite combination of ideas.

And finally, this is confirmed by the consideration that Dr. Bushnell, like Swedenborg, makes this theory the ground of a denial that there is a trinity of persons in the Godhead ; that Christ had a human soul ; that his death was expiatory ; and representing, that in place of making an atonement for the sins of men, the object of his incarnation and death was to manifest to them his infinite love. If God and his works are the same, then the idea of a mediation, an expiation, an intercession, and a justification by grace, is solecistical ; as it would be a mediation between different parts of God, an expiation for himself, and an intercession with himself. If, however, they are not identical, but he is wholly distinct from his creatures and infinitely unlike them, then it does not follow from that diversity, nor from his nature, nor man's, that a mediation, atonement, intercession, and gracious justification are not possible and necessary.

But whichever of these pantheistic theories it is on which Dr. Bushnell proceeds, it renders his whole discussion in his Discourses solecistical and absurd. His theory of God and his works should be as absolute a barrier to his treating of them as really distinct entities, as his theory that there are no terms by which things of thought and spirit can be literally designated, should be to his attempting to treat of them in words ; as it denies the fact and possibility of a moral government, by denying that there are any subjects for one ;

and denies the possibility of a work of redemption, by denying that there are any sinners to be redeemed. If there be but one being in the universe, no matter into how many forms he may be divided, there can be none but himself over whom he can legislate. There can be no law over subjects, no religion, no worship, no offence. There can be nothing predicable but what is predicable of that one being. If, on the other hand, according to the idealist, God and the universe are not real entities, having an objective existence, but are only ideas of the mind that conceives them, then there is no God to enact laws and be an object of worship, no law to be violated, consequently no sin; and, therefore, no redemption.

Why, then, did not Dr. Bushnell frame his Discourses in conformity to his theory? Why, after advancing views, that if true, make it absolutely certain that there are no such entities as moral subjects, and no such things as a moral government, law, sin, or redemption, did he, in open contradiction to his own teachings, go on to treat of them as realities and give a construction of their nature? Why did he not employ himself in endeavoring to free his hearers from the false belief that they have a real existence, and that a knowledge of them is of the utmost importance to their well-being? Does he not understand his own principles? Is he unaware of their plainest characteristics? Is he unable to see that if creatures are parts of God, they must necessarily partake of all his perfections and rights, and share in his acts; that to worship him as the Infinite, were to worship themselves; that to revolt from him were to revolt from themselves; that their imperfections and sins also must be as predicable of him as they are of themselves; and that the supposition, therefore, of ignorance, error, and malignant affections, and sinful acts in them, is a supposition of them in him? Or does he shrink from avowing the full import of his principles, and following them to their legitimate results? Whatever the explanation of it is, the total contradiction of this element of his Discourses with those that follow, bespeaks but very slight qualifications for the lofty task he has undertaken, and must divest his speculations of the authority which they challenge. If this part of his theory is true, all the other doctrines of his Discourses must be ground-

less and paradoxical in the utmost degree. If they are in any degree true, this theory must be wholly false. An admirable dilemma for the projector of so important a revolution of theology!

II. While he admits that the Scriptures represent that there is a trinity of persons in God, he denies that there is in fact any ground whatever in the divine nature for that representation, and asserts that it is merely dramatic, and designed to bring God into forms in which he may be known by men.

“And now the question comes upon us,—How shall we resolve the divinity of Christ, already proved, so as to make it consist with the proper unity of God? To state the question as boldly and definitely as possible, we have two terms before us: First, we have the essential unity and supremacy of God. This we are to assume. I am willing to assume it without argument. Indeed there is no place for argument; for if any one will say that he believes in three metaphysical or essential persons in the being of God, there is no argument that can set him in a more unsatisfactory position, whether intellectually or practically, than he takes himself. Or if any one endeavors to relieve his position by declaring that he only means distinctions by the word *persons*, he only flies into darkness and negation for his comfort, and there he may safely be left. We take, then, as a first point, to be held immovably, the strict personal unity of God—one mind, will, consciousness. Then, secondly, we have as a term to be reconciled with this, the three of Scripture, and the living person walking the earth, in the human form, called Jesus Christ—a subject, suffering being, whose highest and truest reality is that he is God. Such is the work we have on hand, *and it must be performed so as to justify the language of Scripture, and be clear of any real absurdity.*

“To indicate beforehand the general tenor of my argument, which may assist you to apprehend the matter of it more easily, I here suggest that the trinity we seek will be a trinity that *results* of necessity from the *revelation* of God to man. I do not undertake to fathom the interior being of God, and tell how it is composed. That is a matter too high for me, and I think for us all. I only insist that assuming the strictest unity and even simplicity of God's nature, He could not be efficiently or sufficiently revealed to us, *without evolving a trinity of persons, such as we meet in the Scriptures.* These persons or personalities are the *dramatis personæ* of revelation, and their reality is measured by what of the infinite they convey in their finite forms. As such, they bear, on

the one hand, a relation to God, who is to be conveyed or imported into knowledge; on the other, they are related to our human capacities and wants, *being that presentation of God which is necessary to make him a subject of thought, or bring him within the discourse of reason; that also which is necessary to produce mutuality or terms of conversableness between us and him, and pour his love most effectually into our feeling.*—Pp. 136, 137.

“Thirteen or fourteen years ago, Professor Stuart translated and published in the Biblical Repository, Schleiermacher's critique on Sabellius, adding copious remarks of his own. The general view of the trinity given in that article coincides, it will be discovered, with the view I have presented, though the reasonings are not in all points the same. . . . He sought indeed to throw in a modification of Schleiermacher's view which seemed to him to be important, viz. that while the names Father, Son, and Holy Ghost seem to be given principally in reference to the *revelation of God in these characters*, ‘there was from eternity such a distinction in the nature of the Godhead as would certainly lead to the *development of it*, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.’ ”

“Doubtless there is some reason or ground in the Godhead, or in God, for everything developed out of him in time, whether it be a stone or a fly. And if that is what the Professor means by the word *distinction*, I certainly agree. But if the word means something more, —if it means that the names Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are incidental to the process of ‘revelation,’ and yet referable to some equivalent distinction back of it, then Schleiermacher's opinion seems to be both accepted and rejected; for if, supposing the strict simplicity of God, it is still discovered that his revelation will involve a threefold impersonation, then to imagine that this latter indicates a threefold distinction in his nature as its ground, is in fact to abandon, or, by an inverse proceeding, to overthrow the solution accepted. I have said what is little different, but certainly not more remote from orthodoxy, viz. that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost being incidental to the *revelation of God*, may be, and probably are, from eternity and to eternity, inasmuch as God may have revealed himself from eternity, and certainly will reveal himself as long as there are minds to know him. It may be in fact the nature of God to reveal himself, as truly as it is of the sun to shine, or of the mind to think.”—Pp. 111–113.

He thus specifically admits that the Scriptures ascribe a threefold personality to God, and avers that such an exhibition is absolutely necessary, in order “to make him” even “a subject of thought, and bring him within the discourse of

reason;" and yet denies that it has any foundation in the divine nature, and treats it as a false show that is wholly to be discarded. This, however, does not meet the conditions which he admits are necessary to the vindication of his theory;—consistency with "the language of the Scriptures," freedom from any real absurdity, and harmony, therefore, with the other parts of his speculative system.

First. It is a formal and undisguised rejection of the admitted teachings of the Scriptures, as false, and a substitution of his own views in their place. This is worse than an absurdity in one who still attempts to maintain the attitude of an expositor of the sacred word, and professes to receive it as a communication from God. It is nothing less than charging him with infinite imperfection; for if there be no threefold personality in his nature, why cannot he reveal himself as without such a personality? Can there be any impossibility of such a revelation, unless it arise from a defect either of power or of wisdom? It is nothing less than charging him with infinite falsehood; for if there is no ground in his nature for such a representation of himself, the exhibition of himself as existing in that mode is as much a misrepresentation, as the ascription to himself would be of any other peculiarity that does not belong to his nature. Dr. Bushnell, to be consistent with himself, should formally announce his rejection of the Scriptures as a revelation from God, and avow himself without reserve an infidel.

Secondly. But how can he consistently with himself aver that the Scriptures ascribe to God a personal trinity; how can he even attempt to discuss the subject? If the theory be true, which he advances in his Dissertation, that all terms employed in the denomination and description of mental and spiritual things are figurative, then the Scriptures not only do not teach that there is a trinity of persons in God, but they do not even treat of him in any relation; nor has Dr. Bushnell really made him the subject of his discussion in his Discourses. If the words God, Lord, Father, Son, Holy Ghost, and all other terms that are used in the denomination of the divine being and description of his attributes and acts, are employed by a metaphor, then God is not the subject of the affirmations in which those terms are used, but some

different and resembling being; and if, as Dr. B. asserts, the analogy on which those terms are employed metaphorically is wholly unknown and undiscoverable, then it is also unknown and indeterminable who the being is to-whom those denominatives are transferred from God. Why, then, did Dr. B., in open contradiction to his Dissertation, proceed to treat of the divine being, on the assumption that the terms God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are his literal denominatives? and that all the other words employed in the discussion are used without a figure, and have the precise meaning that is usually assigned to them? If the doctrine of his Dissertation be true, then his attempt to treat thus of the divine nature and the teachings of the Scriptures respecting it is "a real absurdity;" while if he has actually treated of them in his Discourses, and used his terms with a legitimate meaning, then the doctrine of his Dissertation is false. Which side of the dilemma will he choose? When he has made his election, will he show how his theory of language can have led him, as he asserts it has, into these discussions, which, were the theory true, would be physically impossible?

Thirdly. His denial that there are any distinctions in God that are a ground of the ascription to him in the Scriptures of a threefold personality, is in contradiction to his pantheistic theory that all the forms exist eternally in God, which he assumes in the revelation of himself. "These persons or personalities are the *dramatis personæ* of revelation, and their reality is measured by what of the infinite they convey in these finite forms." "All such forms,—as those in which he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite,"—"God has in himself, and this is the Logos, the Word, elsewhere called the Form of God. Now this Word, this form, in which he sees himself . . . is God mirrored before his own understanding, and to be mirrored, as in fragments of the mirror, before us."—Pp. 137, 145. If, then, as Dr. B. admits, he has actually revealed himself in these forms; and if all the forms in which he reveals himself actually exist in him, and are literally predicable of him, then there is in fact such a trinity of persons in him as he has revealed. Either Dr. Bushnell's pantheistic theory, then, or else his denial that there is any distinction in the divine nature that is the

ground of the ascription to himself of a threefold personality. is false. Which side of the alternative will he choose?

Fourthly. If Dr. Bushnell's representation be just, that the supposition of such a trinity of persons in the divine being as he admits the Scriptures ascribe to him, is self-contradictory and absurd, then the revelation of himself as existing in such a threefold personality, in place of "importing him into knowledge," as Dr. B. asserts, and being "necessary to make him a subject of thought, or bring him within the discourse of reason,"—is an artificial and infinite obstacle to our just understanding of his nature. It not only presents a view of him that has no truth in it, but that is solecistical. What a position for a philosopher who is to clear up the intricacies of this subject by his "power of poetic insight!" who has risen to such a grasp of intelligence that he can dispense with the formalities of logic, and determine the greatest and most complicated questions by the shorter process of oracular asseveration! Does Dr. Bushnell expect us to believe that he has ascended to such a transcendental height as to discover that the infinitely Wise cannot make a revelation of himself. unless it be an infinite misrepresentation;—that he has looked with such a piercing glance into the depths of our nature as to see that we cannot gain a conception of God, unless it be a totally false one? What more daring impeachment of God;—what grosser detraction of our powers;—what more contradictory and self-destructive proposition was ever uttered! An ascription to God of what does not belong to him, were not a revelation, but a misrepresentation of him; the substitution in his place of a nonentity; and the homage of such a false object would not be a homage of the Eternal. but of a non-existence. A complication of contradictions indeed! He begins by representing that a threefold personality in the divine nature is so palpable and portentous a solecism, that no one who is not wholly bewildered can possibly regard it as a reality. He next admits that in the Scriptures, God actually exhibits himself as existing in that form. And finally, he undertakes to account for his making such a false revelation of himself, by the assertion that it is impossible to him in any other way to bring himself within our knowledge. But if that be true, then, on the one hand, Dr.

Bushnell himself cannot have by a revelation any other idea of God than that he exists in a threefold personality; and his whole pretence that he rejects that view and holds on the ground of the representation in the Scriptures that there is but one God, that there is but one person in his nature, is mistaken; and on the other, God has not in fact made a revelation of himself, but only a misrepresentation, that, instead of a just conception of him, makes our imagined knowledge the most absolute and remediless ignorance! What a splendid exemplification of Dr. B.'s "power of poetic insight!"

Fifthly. Dr. Bushnell contradicts himself also in averring that though there be no tri-personality in God, yet he cannot bring himself within the sphere of our knowledge and make himself the object of thought, unless he reveals himself as existing in a threefold personality. For he asserts that in the revelation which God made of himself anterior to Christ's incarnation, there were no indications of a trinity, and makes that a ground of his denial that there is a trinity in his nature.—P. 147. If God has then, in fact, brought himself within our knowledge, and made himself an object of thought to us without exhibiting himself as existing in the threefold form in which since Christ's incarnation he manifests himself, what but the weakest and most absurd self-confutation is it in Dr. B. thus to turn and assert that it is impossible to him to make himself the object of thought to us as a single personality, and offer that asserted impossibility as the reason of his exhibiting himself as existing in a tripersonal form? Is this one of the contrasts and repugnances of which Dr. B. speaks in terms of enthusiastic commendation as the grand instrument of unfolding and setting off the truth? Is this the method with which he is so charmed of exhibiting the two sides of a subject? Or has he lost the power of seeing and feeling what is false and absurd, and become so bewildered and perverted, that paradox has acquired the sway over his æsthetic nature, which properly belongs to truth; and nonsense become invested with the beauty and authority of wisdom?

But if there be no tri-personality in God, what obstacle can there be to his revealing himself to us as but a single person?

There is no impossibility on our part. We are certainly capable of conceiving of him without a trinity. Dr. B. avers that that is the conception which we naturally form, and that it is only by a confusion and contradiction of thought that we entertain any other. If there be any impossibility then, it is on the part of God. But what can surpass the audacity of asserting that God cannot reveal to us a truth which we are ourselves able to conceive, and to which our nature resistlessly leads us! Are we capable of a knowledge of him which he is inadequate to express to us? Such is not the doctrine of the Scriptures. They represent that it is the depth of the riches of his wisdom and knowledge that surpasses our comprehension,—not our power of comprehension that transcends his capacity of manifesting himself; that it is his judgments that are unsearchable by us, and his ways that are past finding out,—not that our powers “of poetic insight” and research are such that they cannot be baffled by the intricacies of his ways, or the mysteries of his being. Why should there any more be an impossibility to God of revealing the truth on this subject, than any other? Or why, if a false exhibition of himself be unavoidable, should a representation of himself as existing in a threefold, be any more necessary than in a quadripersonal or quinquipersonal form? No more pitiable position can be assumed by a theological reformer, than one in which, in order to maintain his theory, he thus finds it necessary to detract from the power and wisdom of the Eternal; to claim for himself a grasp of intelligence that transcends omniscience; and an ease and perfection of expression to which the Almighty is unequal! And finally, how is this denial to God, by Dr. B., of the power of a true revelation of himself, to be reconciled with his representation of it as a peculiarity of “the Absolute Being,” that he has “a capacity of self-expression, a generative power of form, a creative imagination in which, or by the aid of which, he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite;” and that “in this respect, he is wholly unlike us?” (P. 145.) Is this one of the “antagonisms” which serve to disentangle the truth from complication, and set it forth in its self-consistence and certainty?

Sixthly. Dr. Bushnell represents it as possible, and probable.

that God has revealed himself in this threefold form from eternity :

"I have said that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, being incidental to the revelation of God, may be, and probably are, from eternity to eternity, inasmuch as God may have revealed himself from eternity, and certainly will reveal himself as long as there are minds to know him : it may be, in fact, the nature of God to reveal himself, as truly as it is of the sun to shine, or of living mind to think."—P. 113.

"Conceive of him, now, as creating the world, or creating worlds, if you please, from *eternity*. In so doing, he only represents, expresses, or outwardly produces himself. He bodies out his own thoughts. What we call the creation, is, in another view, a revelation only of God,—his first revelation."—P. 146.

"But some one, I suppose, will require of me to answer Whether the three persons are eternal, or only occasional, and to be discontinued ? Undoubtedly the distinction of the Word, or *the power of self-representation in God, thus denominated*, is eternal. And in this we have a permanent ground of the possibility for the threefold impersonation, called Trinity. Accordingly, if God has been *eternally revealed*, or revealing himself to created minds, it is likely always to have been, and always to be, as the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ; consequently it may always be in this manner that we shall get our impressions of God, and have our communion with him. As an accommodation to all finite minds in the universe, it may be the purpose of Jehovah to be known by this divine formula for ever."—P. 177.

This is another of his "antagonisms ;" as the supposition of a creation from eternity is a solecism. To represent that a thing is created, is to represent that it had a beginning, and that there was a period, therefore, when it was not ; but that which is from eternity has no beginning, and cannot, therefore, have been created. Dr. B.'s supposition, accordingly, that God created the worlds from eternity, is, in fact, a supposition that they have existed as long as he has, and thence have not been created, but are, like him, self-existent. Is this a part of his pantheistic theory ? Is it on this ground that he holds that it may be as much the nature of God to reveal himself by the creation of his works, as it is of the sun to shine, or the living mind to think ? But as God cannot have revealed himself, that is, made himself known to creatures

until creatures existed to behold his revelation of himself, this representation that he has revealed himself from eternity, implies that creatures have existed from eternity, and are, therefore, without a beginning, and thence self-existent. Is this, again, an element of his pantheism, which makes all things that are predicable of God, predicable of the created universe ; and all that is predicable of the created universe predicable of God ?

Seventhly. Dr. Bushnell should, if he would command the assent of his readers, point out the reasons that, on the supposition his theory is true, God has revealed himself in a tripersonal form, rather than any other. His mere asseveration that he cannot reveal himself as of but a single personality, we have already shown to be unauthorized and presumptuous in the extreme ; but on the supposition that the reason of his revealing himself in a manifold form does not lie in his nature, but in our necessities, or in some other ground that is external to himself, why is it that he has exhibited himself as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, rather than a greater number of persons ? Dr. Bushnell neither gives, nor can give, any reason. A tri-personality is absolutely inconsistent with the principle of his theory. If the reason that God exhibits himself as of a plurality of persons is, that he exercises a plurality of dispensations, or acts towards us in a diversity of relations, then he would exhibit himself as of a greater number of persons than a trinity, as he acts towards us not only as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, but also as Upholder, Benefactor, and Providential Ruler ; as Lawgiver and Teacher ; as Judge, Rewarder, and Avenger. On the ground, indeed, of Dr. B.'s theory, not only the ascription to God of a mere trinity of persons, but a plurality as great as the dispensations which he exercises, or the relations in which he acts, is immeasurably short of the truth ; as if, according to his pantheistic doctrine, all intelligent creatures are parts of God, then there are as many distinct personalities in him as there are intelligences in the universe.

But finally, on that theory there can be no such thing as a revelation, and the pretence that God dramatizes himself as a trinity through that medium, is wholly contradictory and absurd ; for if God and his works are identically the same,—

if his works, material and psychical, are coetaneous with him, and self-existent, then there is no existence besides himself to whom a revelation can be made. To act towards finite intelligences is only to act towards himself; to communicate his will to them is only to communicate it to himself. There cannot be a revelation, therefore, because there is no one who can be its recipient.

Dr. Bushnell, instead of presenting a clearer view of the subject, thus, by his false theories and rash assertions, adds immeasurably to its complexity. In place of one incomprehensibility, because, like thousands of other things, it is out of the sphere of our knowledge, he raises a crowd of contradictions, absurdities, and impossibilities, detracts from God's perfections, denies the truth of the revelation he has made of himself, exalts man above him, makes God and man one, ascribes to the Divine Being, in effect, an infinity of personalities, and finally exhibits a revelation as impossible; and he would have us, on his mere asseveration, receive this hideous system as the truth, in place of the clear teachings which God has given us in his word.

III. His views of Christ's person, and the object of his incarnation and death, are equally erroneous, contradictory, and subversive of the whole system of evangelical truth.

1. He admits that Christ is divine.

"By the *divinity* of Christ, I do not understand simply that Christ differs from other men in the sense that he is better, more inspired, and so a more complete vehicle of God to the world than others have been. He differs from us not in degree, but in kind, as the half-divine parentage under which he enters the world most certainly indicates. He is, in such a sense, God, or God manifested, that the unknown term of his nature, that which we are most in doubt of, and about which we are least capable of any positive affirmation, is the human."—P. 127.

What, however, does this mean on Dr. Bushnell's theory that all terms that are used in the denomination of spiritual things, are employed by a metaphor drawn from the physical world? Not that Christ is in reality divine, but only that he in some relation resembles a divinity; yet in what, is wholly

unknown and undiscoverable. His assertion of his deity, therefore, interpreted by his theory of language, which he represents as the ground of the doctrine of his Discourses, instead of being an assertion, is in fact a denial of it, and exhibition of him as created instead of divine, and a material in place of a spiritual being. Unless, then, Dr. B. retracts the views of language which he advances in his Dissertation, and consents to be interpreted as using his terms in the literal sense in which they are ordinarily employed, his whole discussion respecting the person and work of Christ, is a jumble of words that either have no intelligible meaning, or that assert propositions the direct converse of those which he manifestly employs them to express. Which will he choose? If he abandons his theory of language, he relinquishes what he alleges as the ground and justification of the doctrines of his Discourses. If he adheres to that theory, he then completely reverses the subject and the import of those doctrines. Christ then is no longer the being of whose incarnation and death he treats, but some other to whom his name is transferred by a metaphor; the being of whom he treats is not divine, but created, and not a spiritual, but a material existence.

2. He regards Christ as without a human soul, and having assumed, in becoming incarnate, nothing of our nature except a body.

"The supposition of a human soul existing distinctly, and acting by itself, clears no difficulty; for the Son, the divine part, or, I should say, the whole Christ, is still represented as humbled, as weak, as divested of glory, and existing under limitations or conditions that do not belong to deity.

"Besides this theory of two distinct substances, still maintaining their several kinds of action in Christ—only creates difficulties a hundred fold greater than any that it solves. It virtually denies any real unity between the human and the divine, and substitutes collocation or co-partnership for unity. If the divine part were residing in Saturn, he would be as truly united with the human race as now. Instead of a person whose nature is the real unity of the divine and the human, we have two distinct persons, between whom our thoughts are continually alternating; referring this to one, that to the other, and imagining all the while, not a union of the two, in which our possible union with God is signified and sealed for ever, but a practical, historical assertion

rather of his incommunicableness, thrust upon our notice, in a form more oppressive and chilling than it has to abstract thought. Meantime the whole work of Christ as a subject suffering Redeemer, is thrown upon the human side of his nature, and the divine side standing thus aloof, incommunicably distinct, has nothing in fact to do with the transaction, other than to be a spectator of it.

"There is, then, I conclude, no solid foundation for the common trinitarian theory of two distinct, or distinctly active substances in the person of Christ. It is not scriptural. It accounts for nothing. Indeed it is a virtual denial we should say, of that which is, in one view, the summit, or highest glory of the incarnation, viz. the union signified, and historically begun between God and man."—Pp. 154–156.

This view of Christ's nature was held also by Swedenborg. Mr. Tulk says :

"But not content with a division of the Godhead into three persons, the second of whom is said to have been begotten by the first, and the third to have proceeded from both, the recognised creed of the Christian church makes a still further division of the second person into two ; which is irreconcilable with a unity of being in that second person. It is taught and believed that God the Son has a kind of two-fold nature, or is made up of two parts, which, notwithstanding their utter incongruity, are said to form, like the soul and body of man, but one person."—*Spiritual Christianity*, pp. 251, 252.

Dr. Bushnell's view of Christ's nature, in this respect, is thus the same as Swedenborg's. This denial that he had a human soul, is inconsistent, however, with Swedenborg's theory that every material form has a psychical principle intermediate between that form which it elaborates from itself, and the deity who inflows into the psychical nature, and causes it to project or form from itself a material body. If that theory be true, Christ must, as much as any other individual of the race, have had a human soul from which his body was an elaboration.

It is inconsistent with the representation of the Scriptures, that he took upon himself the seed of Abraham, and became a man, and a man who could be tempted in all points like as we are. The soul is an integral and most essential part of our nature. No one can be a man without a soul, any more

than the mere dust of a human form can be a perfect human body without organization and life. No one without a soul can exert the acts that are peculiar to humanity; any more than a body without life can perform the functions of one that is living. In denying, therefore, that Christ had a human soul, he denies that he was united to our nature, or entered into humanity. •

It is inconsistent with Dr. Bushnell's theory that Christ's assumption of our nature signified and sealed our possible union with God, p. 155. If there was no union in Christ of his deity with our spiritual nature, but only with our material form, then his incarnation cannot signify and seal the possible union of any but our corporeal nature with God. Does Dr. Bushnell regard it as denoting such a union? Does he suppose that our souls are to be annihilated, and that God is to become incarnate in our mere bodies, in the same way as he holds that he became incarnate in the mere body of Christ? From what quarter does he derive such a portentous dogma? Is this a part of his pantheistic system? Is this one of the "sides" from which he contemplates the "landscape" of our destiny?

The supposition, indeed, that the Eternal Logos was incarnate in Christ, is, on Dr. Bushnell's views of the nature of the Logos, wholly irreconcilable with Christ's agency while in the world. According to Dr. Bushnell, it is the peculiarity of the Logos that he has in himself all the forms of the psychical and material things that constitute the created universe; and that it is the law of his nature to project or elaborate these forms from himself, as much as it is the law or nature of "the sun to shine, or living mind to think."—P. 113. Had such a being then become incarnate in a mere human body, he would necessarily have exerted the acts that are appropriate and peculiar to such a spiritual nature. He would have created worlds, psychical entities or souls, bodies and all the infinite variety of dependent natures that constitute the created universe. Not to have given birth to such effects, would be not to have acted according to his peculiar nature? To have exerted acts of a different species that are appropriate to a wholly different nature, would have been to give proof that he was not the

Logos, but a being of the order whose actions he exerted. But no such agency was exerted by Christ, as corresponds to Dr. Bushnell's views of the Logos. He did not employ himself in giving existence to psychical natures and material forms. He did not act as a creator that is perpetually materializing and humanizing his own nature ; as material pantheism represents. Instead, he acted as a teacher. How is Dr. B. to explain this antagonism of his theory with the facts of Christ's life ? If his views of the Logos are correct, it is impossible to believe that he was incarnate in Christ. If Christ's agency in the world was what the Scriptures represent, it is impossible to believe that the Logos who was incarnate in him, is of such a nature as Dr. Bushnell ascribes to him.

And finally, on the supposition that God was incarnate in Christ, either with or without a human soul, still on Dr. Bushnell's pantheistic theory that in the creation of worlds and dependent existences, he only "distributes himself, lets forth his nature in sounds, colors, forms, works, definite objects and signs, and divides off himself into innumerable activities, that dramatize his immensity and bring him within the molds of language and discursive thought ;" he was no more incarnate in Christ than he is in any other being who has an organized and living body. He, by the very terms, is still the subject of the "language and discursive thought," into the moulds of which he brings himself. Everything predicated of that which they respect is as absolutely predicated of him as though he were the formal subject of the affirmations. Dr. Bushnell's admission, therefore, that Christ is divine, interpreted by his theory of God and his works, amounts to nothing more than that like all other agents and existences, he was an emanation or elaboration from the divine nature. He was, on that scheme, no more divine than Dr. Bushnell or any other human being : and God was no more incarnate in him than he is in any other individual of the race, or any of the mere brute species.

Dr. Bushnell thus, instead of freeing the subject from difficulty, by the denial that Christ had a human soul, only embarrasses it by a host of gratuitous and immeasurably greater perplexities. He has nothing to justify his theory.

It is irreconcilable with the teachings of the Scriptures. It makes his own system a hideous complication of contradictions and monstrosities.

3. He holds that the object of Christ's incarnation and life in our nature, is to express God's dispositions towards us, and exhibit himself in humanity.

"The reality of Christ, is what he *expresses of God*, not what he is in his physical conditions, or under his human limitations. He is here to *express* the Absolute Being, especially his feeling, his love to man, his placableness, conversableness, and his real union to the race; in a word, to communicate his own life to the race, and *graft himself historically into it*. Therefore, when we see him under the conditions of increase, obedience, worship, suffering, we have nothing to do but to ask *what is here expressed*. . . . To insist on going beyond *expression*, investigating the mystery of the person of Jesus, when it is given us only to communicate God and his love, is, in fact, to puzzle ourselves with the vehicle, and rob ourselves of the grace it brings. . . . God certainly is able to assume the human, to become incarnate in it so far as to express his union to it, and set himself as eternal Life in historic and real connexion with it. He tells us plainly that he has done it. That we may know by what law to receive and interpret his proceeding, his object is declared, viz. to express or manifest himself in the world; and thus to redeem the world."—Pp. 156, 157.

"It was just now made to appear that the human person was originally and specially related to the expression of God, specially fitted to be the organ of the divine feeling and character. It is also clear that if God were to inhabit such a vehicle, one so fallen as ourselves, and live himself as a perfect character into the biographic history of the world, a result would follow of as great magnificence as the creation of the world itself, viz. the incorporation of the Divine in the history of the world—so a renovation at last of the moral and religious life of the world. If, now, the human person will express more of God than the whole created universe besides,—and it certainly will more of God's feeling and character—and if a motive possessing as great consequence as the creation of the world, invites him to do it, is it any more extravagant to believe that the Word will become flesh, than that the *Word has become*, or produced in time, *a material universe*."—P. 149.

Here is a direct exhibition of his pantheism, in the representation that "the Word has become a material universe;" and his use of the phrase "has produced," as equivalent to

"has become a material universe," shows that that and the other terms of that import which he employs, in describing the creation of the worlds and their inhabitants, are to be interpreted as expressive of the identity of God and his works.

The idea he here advances, that "the human person is specially fitted to be the organ of the divine feeling and character," and "specially related to the expression of God," appears to be drawn from Swedenborg, who held that God is in fact a man; and because he is an intelligence and has affections. But if the fact that God is intelligent, and has affections, proves that he is a man; then the fact that man has these powers must prove with equal conclusiveness that he is God; and he is represented as such by Swedenborg's pantheistic scheme. Yet it would not follow either from Swedenborg's or Dr. Bushnell's theory that the universe is an elaboration from God, an intellectualization and materialization in finite forms of his infinite nature; that man is "specially fitted to be the organ of his feeling and character," or "will express more of him than the whole created universe besides." For if the universe is but a projection outward and embodiment of the divine nature in finite forms, then that which is material in him must be held to be as much greater in proportion than that which is intelligent, as the material part of the universe is greater than that which is psychical; and the adaptation of the one to express him must, therefore, be in a like degree greater than the other.

But apart from that, his idea that the design of Christ's incarnation and life was simply or chiefly to "express his real union to the race," "to communicate his own life to it," "to graft himself historically into it," and "to live himself as a perfect character into the biographic history of the world," is false, preposterous, and shocking in the utmost degree. What a horrid caricature of the Eternal to represent that the grandest expression that he can possibly make of himself, is to become a man; to shrink his infinitude into the narrow dimensions of an intelligence, who, according to Dr. B., has not the power of uttering one of his thoughts or emotions with clearness or certainty!—that the loftiest height of glory to which he can ascend, is to introduce himself, as a human being, into the biographic history of the world! We know

of no sentiment ever expressed by one of the race that bespeaks a more dark and besotted mind. This representation of the design of his incarnation and life is wholly contradictory to the Scriptures. They teach that he became incarnate "that he might through death destroy him that had the power of death," and "that he might be a merciful high priest to make reconciliation for the sins of the people," by being "set forth a propitiatory sacrifice through faith in his blood, to declare God's righteousness in the remission of sins," and render it just to justify those who believe in him. They present no intimation that his design was mainly or in any degree, simply "to graft himself historically into the biographic history of the world." Does Dr. B. hold that Satan's object in entering into Mary Magdalen, Judas Iscariot, and others, whom he possessed, was simply to live himself into the biographic history of the race? Did the legion of devils enter into the herd of swine merely that they might live themselves into the biographic history of that order of animals as it forms a part of the history of the world? Is the great struggle between the devil and the Redeemer who came to destroy his power, only a contest for a mastery in engrafting themselves historically into the annals of man; and the ruin or redemption of the world merely secondary, or incidental to that object? What conception could be more foreign to the teachings of the Sacred Word, or form a more offensive misrepresentation of Christ's mediation! It is wholly irreconcilable with Christ's life in the world. His first thirty years were spent in seclusion, without any display of his divinity. It was not until he entered on his ministry, which continued but three years and a half, that he openly announced himself to be the Messiah, and demonstrated his deity by his miracles. His life was not, therefore, in fact, devoted to the object to which Dr. Bushnell refers it. It was not suited to it, nor compatible with it. It is incredible, had it been his design to "live himself into the biographic history of the race," with a conspicuity proportional to the greatness of his attributes, that he would have spent thirty years of his life in a station of extreme obscurity under the guise of a mere man, without a solitary signal of his deity.

Nor was his public ministry suited to such a design. He

announced himself as the Messiah, the Son of God, and the office which he exercised was that of a divine teacher, attesting his doctrines by miraculous works. He lived himself as God into the history of the race only in that relation. He did not attempt to exercise all the functions of the Deity as creator, upholder, providential disposer, lawgiver, judge, executor, in his humanity, as he would, had it been his object to display himself fully as God in his life as man. He as God, therefore, is incorporated by his life in the history of the race, only as far as the acts which he exerted in his life were divine. What a solecism to represent those acts that were so limited in their number, as a living of himself, as the self-existent, in all the infinity of his perfections and agency, into the history of the world; the annals of his ministry as the annals of his eternity! For how could his life in his humanity express him more adequately than all his other agency, unless it at least expressed him in all the forms and degrees in which his other agencies exhibit him?

But, finally, on Dr. Bushnell's theory that God and the universe are the same, he did not "live himself into the biographic history of the race" in his incarnation and life in Christ, any more than he does in other human beings. He was no more incarnate in him than he is in all others of the race: He did not graft himself historically into the race in him any more than he does in his incarnation in others. Or if there be a difference, it is only a difference in degree, not in kind. How if the whole race and the whole universe are but mere embodiments of him in finite, psychical, and material forms, can he any more be incarnate in one, or live himself into the history of the race in one than in any other? The supposition is solecistical; and this whole representation, accordingly, which Dr. Bushnell gives of the design of Christ's incarnation and life, is in contravention of his own principles, as well as of the Sacred Word.

4. He denies that Christ's death was suffered by him as the penalty of sin, or that it was vicarious or expiatory.

"I am well aware that in offering such a statement as the true doctrine of Christ and his work, I affirm nothing that is distinctively orthodox, and shall even seem to rule out that view of Christ as a *sacri-*

fice, an *expiation for sin*, a *vicarious offering*, which to the view of most orthodox Christians contains the real moment of his work as a Saviour. It will be found, however, that I am proceeding exactly in the line of the Scriptures.

"I know of no definite and fixed point on which the orthodox view, so called, may be said to hang unless it be this, viz. that Christ suffers evil as evil, or in direct and simple substitution for evil that was to be suffered by us; so that God accepts one evil in place of the other, and being satisfied in this manner, is able to justify or pardon.

"As to the measure of this evil there are different opinions. . . . A very great number of the Christian teachers, . . . maintain that Christ suffered exactly as much pain as all the redeemed would have suffered under the penalty of eternal justice. But this view . . . has been gradually giving way, till now under its most modern form . . . he is only said to have suffered under a law of *expression*.

"Thus God would have expressed a certain abhorrence of sin by the punishment of the world. Christ now suffers only as much pain as will express the same amount of abhorrence. And considering the dignity of the sufferer, and his relations to the Father, there was no need of suffering the same or even any proximate amount of pain, to make an expression of abhorrence to sin, that is of justice, equal to that produced by the literal punishment of the race. Still it will be seen to be a part of this more mitigated view, that Christ suffers evil as evil, which evil suffered is accepted as a compensative expression of God's indignation against sin. . . .

"It will probably be right then to distribute the views of those who are accepted now as orthodox teachers into two classes—one who consider the death of Christ as availing by force of what it is; the other by force of what it *expresses*; the former holding it as a literal substitution of evil endured for evil that was to be endured; the latter holding it as an expression of abhorrence to sin, made through the suffering of one, in place of the same expression that was to be made by the suffering of many.

"As regards the former class of representations, we may say comprehensively that they are capable, one and all, of no light in which they do not even offend some right moral sentiment of our being. Indeed, they raise up moral objections with such marvellous fecundity, that we can hardly state them as fast as they occur to us."

"Thus if one evil or pain must be repaid by an equivalent, what real economy is there in the transaction? What is effected, save the transfer of penal evil from the guilty to the innocent?"

"And if the great Redeemer, in the excess of his goodness, consents.

freely offers himself to the Father, or to God, to receive the penal woes of the world in his own person; what does it signify when that offer is accepted but that God will have his modicum of suffering somehow—if he lets the guilty go, will yet satisfy himself out of the innocent? in which the divine government, instead of clearing itself, assumes the double ignominy, first of letting the guilty go, and secondly of accepting the sufferings of innocence!”

“In the second class of orthodox opinions a very important and really true position is at last reached, viz. that the value of Christ’s life and death is measured by what is therein expressed, only it is needed to go a step further, investigating what he expresses, how or under what æsthetic conditions the expression is made, and the object for which it is made.

“The objections I have to this more mitigated mode are these:—First, it assumes that as punishment expresses the abhorrence of God to sin, or, what is the same, his justice, he can sustain his law, and lay a ground of forgiveness without punishment only by some equivalent expression of abhorrence—an assumption that is groundless and without consideration, as I may cause to appear in another place.

“Secondly. This latter seems to accord with the former view in supposing that Christ suffers evil as evil, or as a penal visitation of God’s justice, or by doing it in a less painful degree, that is, suffering so much of evil as will suffice, considering the dignity of his person, to express the same amount of abhorrence to sin that would be expressed by the eternal punishment of all mankind. I confess my inability to see how an innocent being could ever be set even for one moment in an attitude of displeasure under God. If he could lay his frown for one moment on the soul of innocence and virtue, he must be no such being as I have loved and worshipped. Much less can I imagine that he should lay it on the head of one whose nature is itself co-equal with Deity. Does any say that he will do it for public governmental reasons? No governmental reason, I answer, can justify even the admission of innocence into a participation of frowns and penal distributions. If consenting innocence says, ‘let this blow fall on me,’ precisely there is it for a government to prove its justice even to the point of sublimity; to reveal the essential, eternal, unmitigable distinction it holds between innocence and sin, by declaring that under law and its distributions it is even impossible to suffer any commutation, any the least confusion of places.”—Pp. 193–199.

He thus denies in the most emphatic manner that Christ died as a substitute for men, or suffered death as an evil due

to them ; and in any sense a penalty for sin. And such a denial would doubtless be natural and necessary were Dr. Bushnell's pantheistic theory true. If men are finite parts of God ; if he is as much incarnate in each one of them as he is in Christ, it is absurd to suppose that Christ died as a substitute for the others, and to make expiation for their sins. It is solecistical indeed to suppose that they are sinners, and need an expiation. It is to suppose that God himself in one of the forms in which he exists, sins, is obnoxious to corporeal death, and needs redemption by a mediator who can make expiation for him by bearing the penalty of his offence in his place ; which is the greatest impossibility and blasphemy.

It is, however, in total contradiction to the teachings of the Scriptures. We are expressly told in them that "Christ once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in flesh, but still living in spirit ;" and that he "appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself," and "was offered to bear the sins of many ;" and this Dr. B. himself admits.

"To show that a view is offered of Christ, in the writings especially of the apostles, *which is wholly different from this*, one that speaks of him as a propitiation, a sacrifice, as bearing our sins, bearing the cross for us, obtaining remission by his blood, is altogether unnecessary. In the Epistles to the Romans, the Galatians, the Hebrews, those of Peter and John, this altar view or form of Christ appears even as the eminent or super-eminent truth of the Gospel."—P. 191.

No contradiction to the Scriptures, therefore, can be more absolute than he offers in this denial of that which they explicitly teach, that Christ bore our sins in his death, died as a sacrifice for us, and obtained remission for us by his blood. They are formal opposites, and if the Scriptures are true, Dr. Bushnell's construction of Christ's death must be false.

The assertion, moreover, that Christ did not die as our substitute, or representative, and suffer death as a penalty of our sins, *is inconsistent with his innocence* ;—a consideration of infinite moment, and that alone confutes Dr. Bushnell's scheme, and shows it to be at once one of the most shallow and one of the most revolting that folly and rashness have

ever generated on the subject. Death is the penalty of sin, "of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat, for in the day thou eatest thereof, dying thou shalt die." And that death is the death of the body; for that is the death to which he was sentenced after his transgression. "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." And that is the death that entering the world by Adam's sin, has passed upon all, Rom. v. As then it is the penalty of sin, and as such is suffered by every individual of the race, who dies, and neither has, therefore, nor can have any other character, the supposition that Christ, though innocent, suffered it, and yet did not suffer it as a substitute for us, is infinitely contradictory and revolting. If he did not die as a substitute for us, then the infliction on him of death, and his voluntary submission to it, was equivalent to a public declaration and confession that he was guilty,—and was itself, therefore, if he had not before transgressed, an offence against rectitude. If innocent, how, without surrendering his uprightness, could he in effect utter such a false testimony against himself? Was he not bound to shield himself from such an infinite aspersion, and maintain the truth inviolate in the eye of the universe, that death is the penalty of sin? To inflict death on a holy moral being, unless it were as a legal substitute for offenders, would be infinitely inconsistent in God also. It would be either to confound innocence and guilt, and make the penalty of sin no distinctive consequence of it, or else it would be to treat innocence as guilt; and would be obnoxious, therefore, to the objection, which Dr. B. urges with so much vehemence, of setting a holy being in an attitude of displeasure under him, and of laying "his frown on the soul of innocence and virtue." How, without a governmental or any other reason, could "the admission of innocence into such a participation of frowns and penal distributions," be justified? Christ's death, then, unless he had met it as the substitute of men, and borne it as the penalty of their sin, would be subject to the identical objection, as an incredible solecism,—an infinite blot on the Divine character,—which Dr. Bushnell alleges against his suffering it as an evil due them. His view brands it with the

very stigma from which he undertakes to clear it. There is no solution of Christ's death, except either that he died on his own account, and was therefore a sinner ; or else that he died solely on account of others who were sinners, and was himself therefore innocent. Dr. Bushnell will strive in vain to escape this conclusion. He cannot prove that death is not the penalty of sin, or that it can have any other character. He cannot prove, that to inflict death on an innocent moral being, and especially on the Son of God, unless it were as the substitute for sinners who are obnoxious to death as the penalty of transgression, would not be to treat him as a sinner, and by an act infinitely more expressive than a momentary frown ; as it would be to fix on him a stigma as a sinner, that must continue to be borne by him through his immortal existence ; for a being subjected to death in such a relation could never be raised from it. To raise him from it without a mediator, would be publicly to declare that he was subjected to it without any legal ground. But that would be to declare, that although he was innocent, he had been treated as a sinner ; which would be to convict the Almighty of infinite unrighteousness. On the other hand, to raise him from death on account of the agency of some other being as a mediator, would be to treat him as unentitled to a resurrection on his own account ; and that would be to pronounce him justly subjected to death, and therefore a sinner. While not to raise him at all, but leave him for ever under the dominion of death, would be to stamp him with eternal ignominy, and cause him to bear, in the eye of the whole intelligent universe, through his endless being, the marks of an offender ; which would be the most stupendous injustice, and would brand the government of the Almighty as a capricious and horrid tyranny, under which innocence is smitten with disgrace and punished as though it were atrocious guilt ! Christ accordingly, immediately after such a period had passed as showed that his death was real, was raised from it, *and declared thereby*, we are told in the Scriptures, *to be the Son of God* ; to be *innocent*, therefore ; and thence to have suffered death, *not on his own account*, but on account of men, as whose representative he bore it as the penalty of their sin. And his resurrection thus was necessary to demonstrate his innocence ; as had he been

left under the power of death, it would have been a resistless proof that he was justly subjected to it on his own account. His resurrection demonstrated that he was innocent; as otherwise he could not, on his own account, have been released from death. And his resurrection as innocent, showed, therefore, with equal certainty, that it was on behalf of others that he had suffered.

Which side, then, of this dilemma will Dr. Bushnell elect? If he adheres to his denial that Christ bore death on account of others, and as the penalty of their sins, he then charges God with the infinite falsehood and injustice which he alleges is imputed to him by the doctrine that Christ suffered death vicariously, and as the penalty of sin. If he retracts that denial, and admits that he died as the substitute of men, he then abandons his theory of the ground and import of his death, and ascribes to it the office of an expiatory sacrifice, and satisfaction for the sins of men.

5. He holds that Christ's death, in place of being vicarious and expiatory, accomplishes its object by what it expresses. He supposes that the first and greatest design of his life and death was to demonstrate to men that God loves them, instead of regarding them with displeasure, and is disposed, instead of punishing, to accept and bless them.

"The reality of Christ is what he *expresses of God*, not what he is in his physical conditions, or under his human limitations. He is here to express the Absolute Being, especially *his feeling, his love to man, his placableness, conversableness*, and his real union to the race; in a word, to communicate his own life to the race, and graft himself historically into it. . . . To insist on going beyond expression, investigating the mystery of the person of Jesus, *when it is given only to communicate God and his love*, is, in fact, to puzzle ourselves with the vehicle, and rob ourselves of the grace it brings."—Pp. 156, 157.

"A kind of despair fills the heart of the race; they have no courage. Whether they know God or not, they know themselves, and they sentence themselves to death. If they have only some obscure notions of the Divine Being, then they dread the full discovery of him. If he lurks in their gods, they fear lest their gods should visit them in vengeance, or plague them by some kind of mischief. The sky is full of wrathful powers, and the deep ground also is full. Their guilty soul peoples the world with vengeful images of its own creation.

"And here now, if we desire to find it, is the true idea of Christian justification. We discover what it is by the want of it. *Justification is that which will give confidence again to guilty minds*,—that which will assure the base and humiliated soul of the world, chase away the demons of wrath and despair it has evoked, and help it to return to God in courage, whispering still to itself—soul, be of good cheer, thy sins are forgiven thee.

"And this result is beautifully prepared by the advent of Christ, as well as by the crowning act of his death. God thus enters humanity as the Word made flesh, and unites himself to it, declaring by that sign that he is ready to unite it unto himself. We perceive also, and hear, that he has come not to condemn the world, but to save it. No storm wraps him about when he comes. The hymn that proclaims him, publishes 'peace on earth!' *He appears in a form to indicate the gentlest errand, and the closest approach to our human lot; one, too, that never appals the guiltiest*—the form of a child. . . . In short, he lives *confidence into the world*. Apart from all theologic theories, *we know, we see with our eyes, that God will justify us, and give us still his peace.*" —Pp. 213, 214.

"Come, then, to the spectacle of Christ's suffering life and death, as to a mystery wholly transcendent, save in what it expresses of Divine feeling. Call *what of this feeling you receive*, the reality; all else, the *machina Dei for the expression of this*. With deepest reverence of soul approach that most mysterious sacrament of love, the agony of Jesus; note the patience of his trial, the meekness of his submission to injustice, and the malignant passions of his enemies; behold the creation itself, darkening and shuddering with a horror of sensibility at the scene transpiring in his death; hear the cry of the crucified, 'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do!' then regard the life that was manifested, dropping into cessation, and thereby signifying the deposit of itself in the bosom of that malignant world to whose enmity it yielded. Who, what man of our race, beholding this strange history of the Word, will not feel a new courage enter into his soul? *Visibly, God is not the implacable avenger his guilty fears had painted*; but he is a friend, he is love. And so great is this change, apart from all theology, that I seem to see another character produced by it in the Christian nations, *They dare to hope. God is closer to them, and in a way to inspire courage*. They are not withered, humiliated even to baseness under those guilty and abject fears that take away at last the spirit of other nations. It is not that they have all a theory of justification by faith, but that their current conceptions of God are such as the history of Jesus, the suffering Redeemer, has imparted. *They have a feeling of*

something like justification, even if they never heard of it,—a feeling, which, if it were to vent itself in language, would say, Therefore we are freely justified by grace. It is not that the suffering appeases God, but that it expresses God,—displays in open history the unconquerable love of his heart."—Pp. 215, 216.

Dr. Bushnell, thus, regards the idea that God is an avenger, and the sense of guilt and apprehension of punishment with which men are depressed, as false, base, and degrading; holds that the great object of Christ's life and death was to counteract them, and show that God, instead of a disposition to punish, is ready to forgive and accept men at all hazards; that Christ's patience under the injurious treatment which he received, the meekness of his submission to the malignant passions of his enemies, and his readiness to forgive them, are nothing else than exemplifications of *God's patience and submission under injurious treatment from men, and disposition to pardon them, however hostile, malignant, and incorrigible they may be*; and that they achieve their end accordingly, by releasing men from their superstitious and cowardly fears, inspiring them with courage, *and assuring them that they are to be saved at all events, whether they understand the principle on which their forgiveness is to take place or not.*

What more atrocious misrepresentation of the Redeemer's work, what more stupendous detraction of the Almighty was ever uttered! It exhibits it as the object of Christ's interposition to contradict and overturn the law of God, by showing that sin is not such an evil in his estimation as he represents in his threatenings, and is not to be visited with the penalty which he assigns it! Instead of mediatorial, it makes his work revolutionary; instead of being designed to produce a change in men, as demonstrating a change in God; or, at most, as intended to extricate them from a misapprehension of him and themselves. It is scarcely necessary to confute this misrepresentation. It is contradicted by Dr. Bushnell himself in the passages that precede and follow that in which he advances it. It was not the object of Christ's interposition to demonstrate to men that their apprehensions are groundless that God is an avenger. What statement could Dr. B. utter, more discreditable to his sense or fairness? Instead of such

self-contradiction, Christ taught that all who continue in impenitence are to perish; that multitudes are to be left to pursue the way that leads to destruction; and that at his second coming, a crowd still at enmity with him are to be placed at his left hand, and sentenced to everlasting death; and we learn from the Apostles, that he is then to be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. Men are not under a false or excessive apprehension that God is an avenger. No misrepresentation could be greater than that they generally regard him as implacable, and in looking forward to the future world, anticipate destruction as inevitable. So far from it, they are almost universally either regardless of their relations to God, or cherishing a hope of justification by their works, or designing to secure salvation at a later period of life by repentance. Despair of future happiness on the ground that God is absolutely implacable, or that the possibility of pardon has been lost by unbelief, is rare. Not one, probably, in many thousands, ever feels it. That of which men need to be convinced, is not that he is infinitely benignant and ready to pardon the penitent and believing, but that they are sinners, and need renovation and forgiveness, through the mediation of Christ; and the great office of the Holy Spirit, as a Teacher, accordingly is, to convince them of their sins, of God's righteousness, and of the judgment in which he is to assign their eternal rewards according to their character.

Another form, he holds, in which Christ's death accomplishes its end, by expression, is by manifesting the sanctity of the divine law, and God's abhorrence of sin; and he admits that such an expression is necessary.

"It is a fundamental condition, as regards moral effect on our character, that while courage and hope are given us, we should be made at the same time to feel the intensest possible sense of the sanctity of the law, and the inflexible righteousness of God. What we need in this view, is some new expression of God, which, taken as addressed to us, will keep alive the impression in us, that God suffers no laxity. In a word, we must be made to feel, in the very article of forgiveness, when it is offered, the essential and eternal sanctity of God's law,—his own

immovable adherence to it, as the only basis of order and well-being in the universe."—P. 218.

But how, according to Dr. B., does he accomplish this effect? Not by suffering the penalty of the law in the place of men, but chiefly "by his obedience, by his expense and painstaking; by the offering of his life as a sacred contribution." In respect to his obedience Dr. B. says—

"All that he does and suffers is but an expression of the homage rendered by God himself to that which we reject; and the only object of his mission is to bring us back into a like free obedience to the same lovely requirement. His poverty and patience, his weary persecuted life, his agony, his cross, his death;—exclude from these all thought of penal suffering or vindictive chastisement; regard him simply as supporting thus the call of duty, and signifying to mankind the self-renouncing and sublime obedience of the divine nature—what an expression of love to the right, and homage to law! How sacred now is law! How sacred, yet how lovely! Why the punishment of all mankind, even for eternity, could not signify as much."—P. 227.

But this homage of the law, vast and expressive as it is, in place of accomplishing the effect which Dr. Bushnell assigns to it, would, on his theory, give birth to precisely the opposite result, as it would serve to show more conspicuously and impressively the infinite inconsistency of setting aside the law, and pardoning and justifying transgressors without an atonement. What else could this honoring the law in such a form show so effectively as that he disregarded and dishonored it in an equal degree, in allowing it to be violated with impunity? The higher the sanctity he ascribed to it by his obedience, the more marked and emphatic the slight and discredit put on it in exempting offenders from its penalty, and bestowing on them the tokens of his favor. It was only by enduring its penalty on behalf of the guilty, in whose place he stood, that he vindicated and honored it as just and wise in its sanctions as well as its requirements, and laid a foundation for their release from its curse without setting it aside or impairing its authority; and that vindication he accomplished effectually by his death. As in obeying the law of God he

showed not only that it is the part of a wise and holy being to obey it, but with equal strength and impressiveness that it is wise and holy in God to maintain and execute it; so in suffering its penalty in behalf of those whom he represented, he showed with an infinite emphasis that it is right in God to inflict its penalty, and that its claims are not relinquished, nor its authority diminished by their exemption, on his behalf, from its curse, who accept him as their Redeemer.

Another mode he holds, in which Christ "sanctifies the law," is "through expense and painstaking."

"Regarding him not as acting here before the law in some abstract way, or with a view to some governmental effect in other and remote fields of being, but as being engaged simply to win us back to newness of life, and restore us to union with God, it results that, by his sufferings, he does express the intense love of God to his law, and also impress in our souls a most deep and subduing sense of its value and sacredness. And this he does not by saying 'see me suffer,' or 'see what suffering the Father lays upon me;' for by that volunteering of naked suffering, according to the known laws of expression, nothing would be expressed, as I have already shown. This suffering is expressive, because it is incidental to an effort to reveal the love of God, and bring the eternal life into the closest possible proximity to our human hearts. And the suffering we speak of has its power, not as answering to the sufferings of the victim in the sacrifice, for nothing is made of the sufferings of the victim, but as answering rather to the expense, and painstaking, and solemn preparation of the whole ceremony."

"If we look upon it as the very end and aim of Christ's mission to recover man to God and obedience, or what is the same, to re-establish the law as a living power in the heart, then, of course, everything he does and suffers, every labor, weariness, self-denial, and sorrow becomes an expression of his sense of the value of law; every pang he endures declares its sacredness. So that if he offers pardon, free pardon to every transgressor, we shall never connect a feeling of license, but shall rather feel a sense of the eternal sanctity of the law, and have a more tremulous awe of it in our conscience than we should if every transgressor were held to punishment by the letter of it. *Indeed, if that were the doctrine, we should reason away and reject the doctrine as incredible, so that it would have no verity, and of course no sacredness at all.* Whereas, having seen in the painstaking suffering life of Jesus what God will do for the practical establishment of his law, we are seized with a deep and awe-felt conviction that if we do not return to it

according to his call, *there is yet something different that must assuredly follow.*"—Pp. 228, 229.

On Dr. Bushnell's theory, however, that Christ did not suffer as the substitute of men, the demonstration formed by his death would be of directly the opposite nature, and would cast an infinite blot both upon the law and upon God. *For it would show that rectitude is not the rule of his administration;* that innocence—an obedience of perfect spotlessness, a sublime devotion to him, are no protection from the penalty of sin in its most painful and ignominious form. Instead, therefore, of adding sanctity to the law, it would divest it of authority, far more than the release would of an offender from its penalty, without an expiation. For if God is capable of the infinite injustice of treating the Son, resplendent with all the glories of a spotless obedience, as a sinner, by inflicting on him, on his own account, the penalty of transgression, how much more, we should necessarily reason, must he be capable of inflicting that penalty on mere creatures, whose virtue, though without defect, is, from the limitation of their nature, of comparatively little significance? What more terrible proof could be given that no certainty whatever could be felt that he will adhere to the law; that he is as ready to disregard its promises of life, safety, and blessedness to the righteous, as its threatenings of punishment to the wicked? Where was Dr. Bushnell's "power of poetic insight," that he did not see this terrific truth, which, if his views of Christ's death are correct, is flashed from it with ten thousand times more conspicuousness and awfulness than any other, and, like a resistless bolt, dashes all others to annihilation! What a horrid solecism to suppose that Christ consecrates and sanctifies the law, and sustains its efficiency by submitting to an infliction that is in every relation an infinite violation of it, giving thereby his sanction not only to the treatment of the guilty as though they were innocent, but to the treatment of the innocent as though they were guilty, by branding on their foreheads a stigma as sinners, which they must bear in the eye of the universe through their immortal existence! A public formal repeal of the law, and abandonment of the office of legislator and ruler, would be consistent, dignified,

and wise, compared to such a stupendous contravention of its principles and pledges, under the pretence of sanctifying and upholding it. What would be the effect were an earthly monarch to attempt by such an expedient to recall revolting subjects to obedience—to slaughter the innocent in order to manifest his love to the guilty; to inflict the penalty of the greatest crimes on the unoffending, to show malefactors that he is not an avenger of their evil, and that their fears of punishment are groundless? Would it not be the most emphatic demonstration that he could possibly give that he is in favor of criminals and crimes, and against virtue and the virtuous? Would it not be to show that the law is not the rule of his administration, but the direct opposite of it—that revolt is regarded as a virtue, and obedience as an offence? Would it not be to give license and encouragement to sin, and obstruct and disgrace obedience? And would it not indicate a deeper depravity, immeasurably greater and more wanton wickedness than merely to allow the evil to go unpunished? The latter might be the effect of weakness; the other could spring from nothing but a deadly malice towards the holy. Yet this is the view which Dr. Bushnell entertains of the work of Christ! It is by the imputation to him of this design, more directly and monstrously blasphemous than any other that was ever conceived, that he affects to vindicate his wisdom, and set forth the greatness and beauty of his love! What a midnight darkness of intellect—what a horrible obliquity of heart it bespeaks!

And, finally, he represents the law as “yet more impressively sanctified by Christ, if possible, in the article of his death considered as counterpart to the uses of blood in the ritual.” He regards the Mosaic ritual as having an intense force as an artistic plan to impress on the mind a sense of the holiness of God’s character, and the sacred authority of his government.

“The plan hangs on a sense produced of the essential sacredness of blood. At the very first institution probably of sacrifices, the eating of blood was prohibited, on the ground that the blood is the life, and that *life is a sacred thing*. There was in fact no greater crime than the eating of blood. It was capitally punished. Even a stranger was put

to death without mercy, who had been guilty of the crime. Now, the whole object of this prohibition was *to invest the element of blood with sacredness for the uses of the altar*. . . . Then when the worshipper comes before God, at his altar, there to offer blood and life for his sin—to see the sacred drops that contain the sacred life sprinkled for him before the holy of holies, and touched upon the horns of the altar—what is he saying, but that only the most sacred thing he knows, even life, can suffice to re-sanctify the law violated by his sins. Nay more, a sacred thing is something that belongs especially to the occupancy and right of God; and the impression was that blood, being the mysterious principle of life, is somehow specially near to the Divine nature—thus, and therefore, sacred. Accordingly when the man makes an offering of blood for the remission of his sins, doing it by God's command, he professes in the act, that only something derivable from God, some sacred element yielded by him, can suffice to cover his sin, and hallow again the violated majesty of broken law. Thus maintained, the sense of law cannot perish. The sacred throne of law stands naked ever before the people, and remission becomes a want, under the same process which makes it possible—possible, too, because the law, still upheld and sanctified in the conscience, makes it a want. *Were they simply assured, instead, of God's fatherly benignity and his readiness to forgive sins freely, the assurance would be virtually a declaration of impunity, and a half century of time would suffice to obliterate even the sense of religion.*

“After thousands of years spent under this regimen of sacrifice have wrought into the Hebrew mind, and indeed the mind of the race, this one great maxim—an almost universally accepted maxim of religion—that without shedding of blood there is no remission, Christ appears and closes his sanctified and sublime life, by submission to a violent death.

. . . How for the remission of sins, if there was no altar, no form of sacrifice, or offering? The analogy, I answer, is one remove further back, in that which rendered even the sacrifices themselves significant, viz. that only some sacred thing, something yielded by God, is sufficient to cover the breaches made by sin. . . .

“Looking now at the death of Christ in this manner, we are made, first of all, to feel, whether we can explain it or not, that it has a marvellous power over our impressions concerning ourselves and our sins, the law of God and his character. It brings an element of divinity into everything, sheds an air of solemnity and grandeur over everything. It is even more awful to the guilty conscience itself, than the thunders of Sinai. And then, secondly, we shall be able also, I think, to see that the whole effect, contemplated under the law of art, is produced by the fact

that the life, thrice sacred, so dimly shadowed before in the victims of the altar, is here yielded as a contribution from God to the pacification and re-consecration of his realm. The effect depends on the expressive power of the fact that the Incarnate Word, appearing in humanity, and having a ministry for the reconciliation of men to God, even goes to such a pitch of devotion as to yield up his life to it, and allow the blood of his mysterious person to redden our polluted earth."—Pp. 233–236.

But the nature of that expression depends on the relation in which Christ submitted to death. If he acted simply on his own behalf—not as a substitute for sinners—and yet voluntarily allowed himself to be treated as a sinner, by the infliction on him of the penalty of transgression, then he consented to the greatest misrepresentation of his character and violation of justice that is conceivable, and instead, therefore, of contributing to the sanctification of God's law, divested it for ever of its authority by showing that it is not the rule of his administration, but that the penalty which it threatens to sin is inflicted on the righteous as well as the wicked; and that a perfect obedience yields no certainty of the life which is promised as its reward! On Dr. Bushnell's theory, therefore, Christ's voluntary submission to death, on the one hand, and the Father's permission of it, on the other, were acts of immeasurable unrighteousness, and presented an infinite demonstration that his law is not the rule of his government, but that while he releases the guilty from punishment and exalts them to eternal life, he strikes the holy as though they were guilty, and consigns them to the death and ignominy that are the penalty of sin! Is it possible to conceive of any other act that would so perfectly prostrate the authority of his law, and render it impossible to regard him with confidence and love? Where, we ask again, was Dr. Bushnell's perspicacity that he did not see this, which is graven in the most palpable characters on the forehead of his theory? Why, after denying that Christ's death was borne as the penalty of sin, and thereby exhibiting it as an infliction infinitely unjust, and destructive of all law, does he still represent it as filling the office and making the expression that can only belong to it as it was borne as a penalty?

After, however, he has thus denied that Christ's death was

vicarious or expiatory, he formally admits that his views of it are not in accordance with the teachings of the Scriptures, but in direct conflict with them.

“Considered as a power moving the spiritual regeneration and redemption of man, this is the conception we form of it. Is it a true conception? I have a degree of confidence that it is. But there is yet another question; is it satisfactory—is it the gospel of Christ? However it may seem to others, for it certainly seems to be a plan not wanting in magnificence, I am still obliged to confess that, taken by itself, it is not satisfactory to me, and I could not offer it as the full and complete gospel of Christ.

“I observe, in the Scriptures, a large class of representations, such as speak of the *atonement* received by Christ, his *sacrifice*, his *offering*, his *bearing the sins* of many, the holiest opened by his *blood*, the *curse* he became, the *wrath* he suffered, the *righteousness* he provided, which do not seem to have their proper natural place and significance in the view here presented. I recollect, also, that around these terms of grace, the whole church of God, with but a few limited exceptions, have hung their tenderest emotions, and shed their freest tears of repentance; that by these the righteous good, the saints and martyrs of the past ages, have supported the trial of their faith. . . . And remembering this, I cannot convince myself that they were wholly mistaken, or that they were not receiving here, in the living earnest of their spirit, something that belongs to the profoundest verity and value of the cross.”—P. 245.

How then does he undertake to justify himself for thus contradicting the teachings of the Scriptures, and substituting his theory in their place? By the pretence that these representations and the rites in which they were embodied are not, in fact, expressive of the truth, but are a mere artistic contrivance to furnish us with effective conceptions, and excite sensibility, on the principle of a tragic narrative, fabricated for the purpose of suggesting ideas and awakening passion; that they exhibit Christ's death as really vicarious and expiatory, because such a conception of it, though false, is adapted to give it an effective influence on the heart, while the other, though true, is not!

“The Hebrew people . . . saw nothing in their religion but the altars, priests, confessions, sprinklings, and smoking fires, and these

they called their atonement, or the covering of their sin, as if there were some outward moment in the things themselves—taken outwardly, these were their religion. But, meantime, there was a power in these by which subjective effects were continually transpiring within them, and the outward moment of the rite, *which was a fiction*, had yet an inward moment correspondent thereto, *which made the fiction truthful*. *There was a reacting power, a power to produce reflex impressions in the rites by which the law was sanctified ; by which they testified and were made to feel repentance for sin ; by which they were exercised in faith to receive the remission of sins*. They had their religion, *as they thought*, in their altar which conciliated God to them, and what they had, *as they thought*, before their eyes, *was a religious experience in their hearts*.”—P. 252.

That is, according to Dr. B., that vast system of impressive and awful rites was wholly based on falsehood, and owed its efficacy to ignorance, credulity, and delusion ; yet it gave birth to the conceptions, faith, penitence, and love that were desired, in a far higher degree than the truth could, and was employed for that reason ! What a blasphemous imputation thus to represent the Almighty as founding his whole government on the stupidity, credulousness, and misconception of his creatures :—as instituting a religion of false rites, because the piety which he seeks must be the offspring of delusion !

“The plan was, *to frame a religion that would produce its results artistically, that is, immediately, without reflection*, by the mere liturgic force of forms. Endowed with an artistic power, these forms were to work their impression *in the immediate absolute way that distinguishes art, and without the interposition of thought, debate, choice, and self-application*.

“Christ, we have seen, is a power for the moral renovation of the world, . . . by his obedience, by the expense and painstaking of his suffering life, by the yielding up of his own sacred person to die, he has produced in us a sense of the eternal sanctity of God’s law, that was needful to prevent a growth of license. . . . The *moral propriety*, then, or possibility, nay, in one view, *the ground of justification*, is subjectively prepared in us, viz. in a *state or impression, a sense of the sacredness of the law* produced in us by Christ’s life and death. *But we cannot think of it in this artificial way ; most persons could make nothing of it*. We must transfer this subjective state or impres-

sion, *this ground of justification*, and produce it outwardly, if possible, *in some objective form, as if it had some effect on the law or on God*. The Jew had done the same before, and we follow him, *representing Christ as our sacrifice, sin-offering, atonement, or sprinkling of blood*. Now in all these terms we represent a work as done outwardly, for us, which is really done in us, and through impressions prepared in us, but the more adequately and truly still for the reason that we have it in mystic forms before us. *These forms are the objective equivalents of our subjective impressions. Indeed our impressions have their life and power in and under these forms*. Neither let it be imagined that we only happen to seize upon these images of sacrifice, atonement, and blood because they are at hand. They are prepared as God's form of art for the representation of Christ and his work, and if we refuse to let him pass into this form, we have no mold of thought that can fitly represent him. And when he is thus represented, we are to understand that he is our sacrifice and atonement, that by his blood we have remission, *not in any speculative sense, but as art*."—Pp. 253, 254.

Not only was the whole system of rites, then, that were typical of Christ's death a delusive pageant, but all the views also which the prophets and apostles present of him as having given his life a ransom for us, as our sacrifice and expiation, and as redeeming and justifying us by his blood, are equally false, and consequently all the penitence, faith, love, and hope that have been exercised by the church on the ground of those representations, have been the offspring of a mere farce ;—a vast masquerade of enactments, penalties, substitutions, slaughters, blood-sprinklings, and holocausts, that work their effect on the sensibilities independently of "*thought, debate, choice, or self-application*," in the same manner as other spectacles that cheat the senses, such as apparitions and false miracles, make their impressions on the superstitious and credulous; and this stupendous array of false shows and false teachings is, according to Dr. B., absolutely indispensable to the possibility of piety, because without it we not only "could make nothing" of redemption by "Christ's life and death," but could not even think of it! What would have been thought of this statement, had it come from the pen of Paine, Voltaire, or Rousseau? Have the lips of blasphemy ever uttered a more horrid detraction of God, or a baser misrepresentation of the piety of his worshippers? If it be true, what better is the

government of the Almighty than a vast system of quackery? And what are the religious emotions which it excites, but the product of deception? The whole success of the pageant, accordingly, if it be such, depends on its being misconceived. The moment it is seen to be a sham, it must lose its power, and become the object of contempt and disgust. It is impossible that such an array of impositions on ignorance and credulity should, on being comprehended, continue to inspire adoration, love, and trust. It must of necessity excite resentment and detestation. Dr. Bushnell's theory, then, if true, would necessarily, by its very reception, divest itself of influence with all who assent to it, and make love to God, and faith and hope in him impossible! What an admirable expedient for "reviving religion!" And what a brilliant exemplification of the truth and delicacy of his æsthetics! The only effective means, according to him, that the Almighty can employ to impress our moral sensibilities, and exalt us to a realization of "the Absolute" is, a deceptive pageant of blood, death, and fire, which, if comprehended, must inevitably make him an object of execration, and render the exercise of any other than contemptuous and hostile affections towards him impracticable!

Such is the scheme which Dr. Bushnell advances for the purpose of freeing Christianity from objection, and giving it a power over the heart with which its author has not invested it. Was there ever a more palpable failure of an ostentatious attempt to remodel theology? Was there ever a more ample confutation given of boastful claims to superior discernment, originality of views, and a power of revolutionizing the religious world, than Dr. B. has furnished, of his pretensions? Of what subject among those that he has treated has he a just understanding? What doctrine that is essential to his scheme has he succeeded in demonstrating? What element is there of his system that is not false? What theme has he touched that he has not disfigured by misrepresentation, or distorted by caricature? Not one. He begins with an ostentatious display of extreme sensitiveness and scrupulosity in respect to incomprehensibilities and inconsistencies, and attempts to strain out with a disdainful daintiness what he deems a gnat from the chalice of the gospel; but

immediately on having accomplished that delicate feat, loses his fastidiousness, and is seized with a rabid passion for paradoxes, contradictions, and monstrosities; swallows camels and whole caravans with the utmost ease, and protests that he feels lighter for it, that it is what his æsthetic nature demands, that it sharpens his "power of poetic insight," enables him to soar into "the free empyrean" with a more vigorous pinion, and gives him, from the expansion which it generates, a consciousness that is nearer to the Infinite! A more absurd spectacle of conceit of a vast genius, sublimated taste, and superior knowledge on the one hand, and narrowness and confusion of mind, superficiality, and insensibility to the great, the beautiful, and the holy on the other, the world has not often seen.

We have in the caricature which he gives in his *Discourses* of the work of redemption, the reason, probably, of his associating with it his theory of language. He is conscious, doubtless, of the antagonism of his views to the teachings of the Scriptures, and aware that he cannot maintain a credible profession of faith in them, if they are to be interpreted by the established laws of speech. Hence his fanatical attack on language, pretence that it is inadequate to a clear and certain expression of thought, and attempt to convince his readers that they have never intelligibly uttered by it a solitary conception or feeling either to their fellow beings or to God! He sees that the position he has assumed in assailing Christianity is hazardous, and is ready, if possible, to maintain himself in it by means as bold and desperate. This is "artistic," doubtless. He avails himself of the prejudice, credulity, and deceptibleness of his fellow men, and, perhaps, thinks to justify himself in it by the pretence that he is only imitating the Almighty, whose government he holds is nothing else than a bloody mask, contrived to strike the senses and fill the breasts of the race with a vague awe and horror. It is not creditable, however, to his courage. As he rejects what he acknowledges the Scriptures teach, and teach in a form in which he admits our nature makes it necessary that we should receive it, if we receive it at all, he should have the manliness to avow his rejection of them. Why, if he in any degree believes them, should he employ himself in en-

deavoring to induce his readers to reject them in that relation in which he confesses they must be received, if the redemption which they present to us is received at all? Is he animated with such a spirit of desperation that he would drag all those whom he may successfully influence down the precipice of ruin, rather than drop the disguise in which he wraps himself, and unveil to them his true features?

Adverse, however, to the Gospel, contradictory and absurd as his system is, he still will doubtless have apologists and approvers. Its main elements are not original with him. They have their ground in the rationalistic metaphysics and theology of the Germans, and a foundation is laid for the spread of this and other schemes of infidelity, very much in proportion as Coleridgism, Kantism, and other kindred systems are received, the object of which is to mould Christianity into the forms of a material or ideal pantheism; and no effectual check can be given to their diffusion till those false systems are exposed and rejected, and the church put on its guard against the works in which they are inculcated, and the teachers by whom they are spread.

ART. II.—A DESIGNATION OF THE FIGURES OF ISAIAH, CHAPTERS III. AND IV.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE prophet now announced that God was to continue to inflict a series of terrible punishments on that generation and their descendants that should confound their schemes of prosperity and happiness by revolt from him, and overwhelm them with suffering and shame. They were confiding in their riches and abundance. He would smite them with a famine, which wealth could not relieve. They were putting their confidence in men. He would take away their warriors, counsellors, and elders, and leave them to the dominion of

persons without knowledge or capacity, under whom anarchy and violence would prevail, all classes be left to act out their passions without restraint, and a full experiment be made in their injustice and cruelty, of the natural consequences of choosing such men as rulers in the place of God. Their women were proud, vain, worldly, devoted to dress, display, and pleasure. He was to punish them by divesting them of their rich attire, withering their beauty, and reducing them to misery and disgrace.

The last verse of Chap. II. should have been assigned to this, as the prophet now proceeds to state the reason that they should desist from man, whose breath is in his nostrils, and who is in every respect unworthy to be made a ground of reliance.

1, 2. Hypocatastases in the use of stay and staff. "For behold the Lord Jehovah of Hosts is taking away from Jerusalem and from Judah the stay and the staff;" v. 1. There is an unusual variation in the Greek, Latin, and English versions of the words rendered stay and staff. They are in the original synonymous, and denote a staff, a prop, a rod, on which persons sustain themselves in walking. They are put for the analogous supports on which the people of Judea and Jerusalem were relying, which are afterwards enumerated, food, warriors, counsellors, judges, and artificers; and the withdrawalment of the one employed to signify the removal of the others.

3, 4. Elliptical Metaphors in the use of the same words. "The whole stay of bread, and the whole staff of water," v. 1. The terms are here employed metaphorically, precisely as though it had been formally affirmed that bread is a stay and water a staff. The phrases "stay of bread" and "staff of water," are equivalent to the expression, "bread is a stay, and water is a staff;" as there is no stay of bread any further than bread is a stay, and no staff of water any further than water is a staff.

5, 6, 7. Metaphors in the words ruin, lift up, and healer, as rendered by Dr. Alexander. "Hero and warrior, judge and prophet, and divine and elder, the chief of fifty, and the favorite, and the counsellor, and the skilful artificer, and the expert enchanter; and I will give children to be their rulers,

and childish things shall govern them. And the people shall act tyrannically, man against man, and man against his fellow. They shall be insolent, the youth to the old man, and the mean to the noble. When a man shall take hold of his brother in his father's house—saying—thou hast raiment; a ruler shalt thou be to us, and this ruin under thy hand. In that day he shall lift up"—his voice—"saying,"—I will—"not be a healer, and in my house there is no bread, and there is no clothing; ye shall not make me a ruler of the people," v. 2-7. There is a resemblance between the condition of a house or temple that has been overthrown, and that of a city and kingdom that are disorganized by violence and anarchy; and it is to indicate that similitude that the word ruin is here used. There is an analogy between the lifting of a material body from a low to a higher place, and the elevation of the voice from the calmness of ordinary conversation, to the tones of earnestness and alarm; and the verb is here used to express that resemblance. There is an analogy between one who heals the diseases of the body, and one who corrects the political and moral disorders of the state; and it is on the ground of that resemblance that he who is solicited to become a ruler declares that he will not be a healer.

8, 9. Metaphors in the use of totters and falls. "For Jerusalem totters, and Judah falls," v. 8. The foundations of Jerusalem were not actually loosened and agitated so that the city rocked to and fro like a person who totters and is on the point of stumbling to the ground; nor had Judah as a kingdom been overthrown like a person who falls prostrate from inability to support himself. Those terms are used by a metaphor to signify that the moral causes of their overthrow had advanced to such strength as to render it as certain that they would soon fall, as though an earthquake were already heaving the city from its foundations, and a political shock were overturning the state.

10. Metonymy of tongue for the language it utters. "Because their tongue and their doings are against Jehovah to resist the eyes of his glory," or in rebellious opposition to the eyes of his majesty, v. 8.

11. Metonymy of the eyes of Jehovah's glory, for the

views he expresses and enforces in his government of his title to homage as the majesty of heaven and earth. It is against what God sees and claims as due him, and as obligatory on men, not against his eyes, that they rebelled.

12. A metaphor in the use of testifies. "The expression of their countenances testifies against them," v. 9. To testify, literally, is to bear witness in words. The verb is here used to denote that their countenances indicated their evil character, by a hardened and impudent expression, as clearly as it could be delineated by words.

13. A metaphor in the use of declare. "They declare their sin as Sodom: they hide it not," v. 10. To declare, literally, is to announce in words. It is here used to denote that their sin was as open and notorious as though they publicly proclaimed it.

14. A similitude. "They declare their sin like Sodom. Woe unto their soul, for they have done evil to themselves," v. 9.

15. A metonymy of Sodom, for the people of that city, v. 9. It was the people of Sodom who gave publicity to their sins; not the material city itself.

16. A metaphor. "Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well, for the fruits of their doings they shall eat. Woe unto the wicked; it shall be ill with him, for the thing done by his hand, shall be done to him," v. 10, 11. The blessings annexed to obedience, are by a metaphor denominated fruits, because they are the natural consequences of righteousness, as fruits are the natural product of trees that are formed to yield them; and it is promised that the righteous shall eat them, to denote that they shall enjoy the legitimate rewards of their obedience.

This warning to the wicked expresses the great law of God's providence under which the evils predicted in the preceding and following verses, were to be inflicted on the Jews;—that a full experiment should be made of the views on which they proceeded in their revolt, and a practical demonstration wrought out of their sin and folly in forsaking him, paying homage to idols, putting their trust in men, and seeking happiness in pride, display, and luxury. As they

forgot that Jehovah was their lawgiver and redeemer, withdrew their reliance from him, and looked for safety and prosperity to their princes, elders, and warriors; they were to be delivered into their hands, and left to learn by the horrors of oppression, violence, and anarchy, what man is as a master and benefactor, compared to Jehovah. That trial was to be continued till they had sunk to such a depth of misery, that the station of a ruler would be regarded with dread instead of desire, and no one be found willing to undertake its duties.

As they looked to their idols for protection, abundance, and happiness, rather than to Jehovah, and ascribed thereby a higher power and greater benevolence to them than to him, the question was to be put to the test, whether the gifts which they referred to the bounty of their false gods were in fact bestowed by them, or by the Almighty; and whether they were, as the Jews assumed, to shield them from the punishments which he threatened to inflict for their revolt. As they delighted in the society of the idolatrous, warlike, and tyrannical nations around them, adopted their manners, and professed to act on their principles, rather than obey the laws which Jehovah enjoined; they were to be surrendered to the dominion of those nations, and pillaged, abused, slaughtered, and carried into captivity by them, and learn by that terrible experiment their folly and madness in choosing fellow creatures, proud, apostate, false, cruel, and revengeful, for their friends, instead of the Holy One of Israel. As many of them regarded themselves as having the means of happiness absolutely in their own hand, in the wealth and luxuries that were at their command, disowned their dependence on him, and devoted themselves to dress, display, and pleasure, the question was to be tried whether their possessions were God's gift, and still under his control, or not; and whether their schemes of enjoyment would issue more happily than that which he prescribed. This great law of his procedure towards the Jews, thus specifically announced and exemplified in the peculiar evils to which it is here foretold they were to be subjected, is the law of his administration, also, over the nations at large, and must be seen and understood, in order to just views of the design of his present dispensation. Men pro-

ceed in their revolt, on false assumptions and assertions. They, in effect, deny God's existence, his dominion, his rights, or his truth, wisdom, and goodness; they assert an independence of him; they assume that they are better judges of what becomes them and will secure their well-being, than he is; they impeach his laws of imperfection; they treat his promises as unworthy of their reliance, and his threatenings of their fear; they ascribe his attributes and prerogatives to idols and imaginary beings; refer his gifts to their bounty, and pay them the homage that is due to him. They proceed on the assumption that true happiness lies in the gratification of their appetites and passions, and treat his service and favor as at best unnecessary to their well-being. Their course is thus at every point an open and audacious controversy with him; and he, accordingly, in his providence, puts those questions to a practical trial, and confutes them, and vindicates himself, by a visible, public, and full demonstration *in their experience* of their total error and sin, and of his perfect truth, righteousness, and wisdom. And the object of this exemplification on such a vast scale, and in such terrible forms, is with respect to the nations at large, as it is with the Israelites, to prepare the way for a dispensation under which it shall be discontinued, and the whole race be made the subjects of his renewing grace. As the rejection and punishment in these forms of the Israelites through a long series of ages is to be followed by the redemption of that nation for ever thereafter, so the verification of the truth which he is making in his present administration over the nations at large is to be followed by their conversion and salvation universally, when he comes to establish his throne on the earth. And this method of procedure is dictated by wisdom and goodness, and worthy of the perfections of its author. Such a trial of the principles on which he founds and conducts his government, and the assumptions on which men rebel, is the proper method of vindicating himself, confuting them, and giving his moral kingdom to see the truth in its certainty and greatness. Simply to assert that he is the self-existent, to proclaim his rights, to demand obedience, and to utter promises and threatenings, would not convince them of their error; for they proceed in their rebellion, on the assumption that he is

false, and they are true ; and were he not to refute them in the relations in which they impeach and traduce him, they would still continue to maintain their false views. Had he not, for example, withdrawn from the Jews the blessings which they ascribed to their false gods, they would have regarded their continued reception and enjoyment of them as a proof of the reality, dominion, and bounty of those deities, and a reward of their homage of them, as was shown by the resolution of those, who, after the capture of Jerusalem by the Babylonians, migrated into Egypt, to resume the worship of their Syrian goddess, on the ground that she was the real author of the prosperity which they had formerly enjoyed, and that the misfortunes with which they were then overwhelmed were in consequence of their having discontinued to worship her.

“ Then all the men which knew that their wives had burned incense unto other gods, and all the women that stood by, a great multitude, even all the people that dwelt in the land of Egypt, in Pathros, answered Jeremiah, saying : As for the word that thou hast spoken unto us in the name of the Lord, we will not hearken unto thee ; but we will certainly do whatsoever thing goeth forth out of our own mouth, to burn incense unto the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, as we have done, we and our fathers, our kings and our princes, in the cities of Judah, and in the streets of Jerusalem ; *for then had we plenty of victuals, and were well, and saw no evil. But since we left off to burn incense to the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her, we have wanted all things, and have been consumed by the sword and by the famine. . . .* Then Jeremiah said unto all the people, the incense that ye burned in the cities of Judah, and in the streets of Jerusalem, ye and your fathers, your kings and your princes, and the people of the land, did not the Lord remember them, and came it not into his mind, so that the Lord could no longer bear, because of the evil of your doings, and because of the abominations which ye committed ? Therefore is your land a desolation, and an astonishment, and a curse, without an inhabitant as at this day. Moreover Jeremiah said unto all the people and to all the women, Thus saith Jehovah of Hosts, the God of Israel, ye and your wives have both spoken with your mouths and fulfilled with your hand, saying, We will surely perform our vows that we have vowed to the queen of heaven, and to pour out drink offerings unto her ; ye will surely accomplish your vows, and surely perform your

vows, Therefore hear ye the word of the Lord, all Judah that dwell in the land of Egypt. Behold I have sworn by my great name, saith the Lord, that my name shall no more be named in the mouth of any man of Judah in all the land of Egypt, saying, The Lord God liveth. Behold I will watch over them for evil, and not for good; *and all the men of Judah that are in the land of Egypt shall be consumed by the sword and by the famine, until there be an end of them.* Yet a small number that escape the sword shall return out of the land of Egypt into the land of Judah; and all the remnant of Judah that are gone into the land of Egypt, to sojourn there, *shall know whose words shall stand, mine or theirs.*"—Jeremiah, chap. xlv. 15–28.

Here, notwithstanding the specific testimony of Jehovah to them through the prophet, and the innumerable proofs they had, that the ruin with which they were overwhelmed was inflicted in punishment of their revolt from him, they boldly and strenuously denied his agency in their misfortunes, and ascribed them to their apostasy from the queen of heaven; and they would unquestionably have continued in that persuasion, and been confirmed in it, had their offering incense and fulfilling their vows to that deity been attended by a return of safety, abundance, and happiness. There was no effective method, therefore, of convincing them of their delusion and madness but that of pursuing them with sword and famine, and showing them thereby, experimentally, that their imaginary goddess was not the giver of those blessings, and had no power to protect them from his avenging justice. God accordingly announced that he should pursue that course, and continue to consume them by the sword and famine, from which they expected to be delivered by the queen of heaven, till they should know whose words were true, his or theirs.

In like manner, had he not delivered them into the hands of their rulers, in whom they placed their trust instead of him, and abandoned them to the dominion of the idolatrous nations whom they chose to take as their guides, and left them to a full experiment of the injustice, mercilessness, and barbarity which man, when under the sway of his evil passions, is disposed to inflict on his fellows, they would never have been cured of their error, and brought to a realization and acknowledgment of the righteousness and wisdom of his rule.

This method of demonstrating the truth is adapted, therefore, in the utmost degree to its end ; and it is conceivable that there is a point at which the verification of it will become so vast and effective as to supersede the necessity of its being carried any further ; a foundation laid for so full a knowledge and perfect a realization of it by the whole universe of creatures, that God may extend salvation to all who thereafter come into existence, without any misconception of the ground of his procedure, or misunderstanding of the nature of his administration.

17. A hypocatastasis. "My people, children are their oppressors ; and women rule over them. My people, thy leaders lead thee aside, and cause the way of thy paths to engulf thee," v. 12. Here the Israelites are exhibited as proceeding from one place to another, under the direction of guides who lead them aside from the right course, and cause the paths in which they walk, like a quagmire, to absorb them ; and that representation is employed to illustrate the manner in which they were misled by their rulers, and kept from a knowledge of the course by which the blessing of God was to be obtained. The words leaders and lead are not used metaphorically ; inasmuch as that which is affirmed of the rulers was compatible with their nature, and possible to them and to the people. There is supposed, by some critics, to be a metaphor in the verb translated in the common version, destroy. Vitringa, Alexander, and others represent it as literally meaning to swallow, and interpret it as denoting, by a metaphor, to destroy. There is no analogy, however, between a person's swallowing a thing, and destroying a pathway. But there is a resemblance between a person's swallowing food or drink, and a pathway's absorbing or engulfing those who step on it ; and it is in that relation, doubtless, as was held by Michaelis, that the verb is used, as it is in the parallel passage, chap. ix. 16, where the people who are conducted by guides who lead them astray, are said to be swallowed up or engulfed. The verb is used literally, therefore, doubtless, and the meaning is that the paths into which the people were led were made like a quagmire, to engulf those who trod them.

18. A hypocatastasis. "The Lord standeth up to plead ;

and standeth to judge the people," v. 13. This is not metaphorical, inasmuch as the attitude and act ascribed to God are possible to him, and appropriate. That visible attitude is put in the place of the analogous acts by which he was about to vindicate himself and manifest his judgment of the people.

19. Hypocatastasis. "Jehovah will enter into judgment with the elders of his people and the chiefs thereof." To enter or come to judgment is not a metaphor, as it is not an impossible nor an unnatural action for God. But that act, which is customary with man when a criminal is to be tried, is put in the place of an analogous act, by which God was to manifest his judgment respecting his people.

20. A metaphor in the use of consumed. "And ye have consumed the vineyard; the spoil of the poor is in your houses," v. 14. The verb rendered consume, literally denotes to burn or devour by fire. It is used metaphorically to signify the resembling consumption of the vineyard by eating its fruits.

21. Metonymy of vineyard for its fruits. It was the fruit of the vineyard which the princes and elders had eaten; not the vineyard itself.

22, 23. Hypocatastases. "What mean ye that ye crush my people; and grind the faces of the poor? saith the Lord Jehovah of hosts," v. 15. These acts are not literally impracticable, and are not used metaphorically, therefore. They are violent and extraordinary, however, and are employed by substitution to signify analogous acts of extreme oppression and tyranny.

The prophet now proceeds to predict that the daughters of Zion who exhibited their pride, vanity, and folly, in their attitude and gait, and were devoted to display and pleasure, were to be punished by a deprivation of their gay attire, the conversion of their beauty to ghastliness, and subjection to all the miseries of poverty, disease, and disgrace. The passage is wholly literal, v. 16-24, and is the longest that occurs in the prophecy without a figure. The diseases here threatened are those which are enumerated as the curse of rebellion.—Deut. xxviii. 21, 22.

24. Synecdoche. "Thy men shall fall by the sword, and thy

strength in war," v. 25. Strength is put for those who possessed or constituted it.

25. A metaphor. "And her gates shall lament and mourn," v. 26. Gates cannot, literally, grieve and lament. Those acts are ascribed to them to indicate that, bereft of the princes and elders who sat in them, the warriors who guarded and defended them, and the people who thronged them, they would appear desolate and sad, like persons who mourn the loss of their associates and attendants.

26, 27. Metaphors in the use of the verbs emptied and sit. "And being emptied, she shall sit upon the ground," v. 26. Some interpreters erroneously regard Zion as here exhibited as a woman. It is Zion, however, as a hill, or a city, that is the subject of the affirmation, as is seen from the verb emptied, which is employed metaphorically, to denote that she was deprived of her population by the sword. The act of sitting upon the ground, which is natural to a woman in a condition of extreme distress and despair, is ascribed to the city, to denote that left without inhabitants, she would sink to dilapidation and ruin, and present a spectacle of misfortune like that of a woman, who, overwhelmed with calamities and sorrows, sits down upon the ground.

"And in that day seven women shall take hold of one man saying, We will eat our own bread, and wear our own apparel; only let us be called by thy name, to take away our reproach," iv. 1. This verse should have been annexed to chap. iii., as it closes the prediction of the wretched condition to which the daughters of Zion were to be reduced. It is regarded by some commentators as figurative, but without reason. It is not metaphorical, as the acts ascribed to the daughters of Zion, though unusual, would not, with their views of the desirableness of marriage, be unnatural, in the condition to which they were to be reduced. Their act is not representative of some other of an analogous species, as in the hypocatastasis. The supposition is inconsistent with the design of the prediction, which is to show the wretchedness of the state in which they were to be left, by the general slaughter of the men; and there is no analogous act which theirs is adapted to represent. What act of a different but

resembling species is there which the expression of a wish by seven women to be married to one man on such extraordinary conditions, and for such an end, can naturally denote?

CHAPTER IV.

1, 2. Elliptical metaphors. "In that day shall the Branch of Jehovah be for honor and for glory, and the Fruit of the earth for grandeur and beauty, to the escaped of Israel," v. 2. The terms branches and fruit were employed by the Hebrews, by a metaphor, to denote offspring. Thus Christ as the Son of David, is denominated a branch to him. "Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise unto David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper," chap. xxiii. 5. "In those days and at that time will I cause the Branch of righteousness to grow up unto David, and he shall execute judgment," chap. xxxiii. 15. The term fruit is used in the same relation also in a promise to David, and in reference doubtless to Christ. "The Lord hath sworn in truth to David; he will not turn from it. Of the Fruit of thy body will I set upon thy throne," Psalm cxxii. 11. It is employed in the sense of offspring in several other passages, as Isaiah xiii. 18, Hosea ix. 16, Micah vi. 7. It is used again in the New Testament to denote Christ as the Son of Mary. "And Elizabeth was filled with the Holy Ghost; and she spake out with a loud voice and said, Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb." As the terms were thus familiarly employed by the Hebrews with this meaning, it was not necessary that the prophet should complete the metaphor by formally declaring that the Messiah is the Branch of Jehovah and the Fruit of the earth. They would naturally regard the first as denoting the Son of God, and the other one who was to have a birth on earth; and the great Being therefore who is afterwards denominated Immanuel, God with us. "The man whose name is the Branch" is accordingly used by Zechariah, and with reference, doubtless, to this prophecy and those of Jeremiah, as the denominative of the Messiah. Addressing the high-priest, Joshua, on whom, as a symbol of Christ, several crowns were placed, the prophet was directed to say, "Thus speaketh the Lord of Hosts, say-

ing, Behold the man whose name is the Branch, and he shall grow up out of his place, and he shall build the temple of the Lord ; Even he shall build the temple of the Lord ; and he shall bear the glory, and shall sit and rule upon his throne ; and he shall be a priest upon his throne," Zech. vi. 12, 13. The Branch of Jehovah and The Fruit of the earth, therefore, are metaphorical names of the Messiah ; and with this accords the office he is to fill to those of the Israelites who survive the calamities predicted in the preceding chapter. He is to be to them "for honor and for glory, and for grandeur and beauty." He is to assume a relation to them that will reflect immeasurable glory on them. He is to recall them from their alienation, and raise them from their debasement and misery to a station in respect to himself, that will invest them with dignity and beauty.

3, 4. Hypocatastases. "And it shall be that the left in Zion, and the spared in Jerusalem, shall be called holy, every one that is written to life in Jerusalem ; when the Lord shall have washed away the filth of the daughters of Zion, and shall have purged the blood of Jerusalem from the midst of her in the spirit of judgment and in the spirit of burning," v. 3, 4. To be written to life—or enrolled among the living, is not a metaphor, as it is practicable and customary. But enrolment in a book as survivors of the judgments that had been foretold, is used, by substitution, to denote their being destined by the divine purpose to survive and live thereafter in Jerusalem. The phrases washing from filth and cleansing from blood are not metaphorical, as those acts are possible and natural. The daughters of Zion and the midst of Jerusalem are not literally to be the subjects of the washing, but the corporeal defilement of the one and the blood which the men had shed in the other are put, doubtless, for their moral defilement, and the washing away that filth and purging that blood are substituted for analogous acts, by which God will purify that people and make them holy ; and the relation in which he will accomplish it is that of judge and avenger by fire. It indicates, therefore, that interposition in fire, foretold in other passages, when he is to destroy his enemies. "For behold the Lord will come with fire, and with his chariots like a whirlwind, to render his anger with fury, and his

rebuke with flames of fire ; for by fire and by his sword will the Lord plead with all flesh ; and the slain of the Lord shall be many," chap. lxvi. 15, 16. And this is to be at the time that Jerusalem is to be redeemed, receive back her inhabitants, who are dispersed among the nations, and become the scene for ever of peace and joy. It is they, accordingly, who survive those last terrible troubles, and are enrolled among the living at Jerusalem, that are to be called holy. It is future, therefore, and is to take place at the second coming of Christ. Nothing in the past history of the Jews answers in any measure to the prediction. There has never been a period when the Branch of Jehovah was for honor and for glory and for grandeur and beauty to all the Israelites who survived the terrible judgments inflicted on them by the Babylonians or Romans. There has never been a period when the inhabitants of Jerusalem were purged from blood shed by them in the midst of her. It has been the scene of violence and slaughter through the whole series of ages that have followed the prediction. There has never been a period when all who were left in Zion and spared in Jerusalem were either holy or called such. Jehovah has not interposed in the manner indicated in the prophecy to purify that people from their sins. It is shown, also, by the visible manifestations of his presence which he is then to make there. There has never, since the incarnation of Christ, appeared "over the whole extent of Mount Zion and over her assemblies a cloud by day, and smoke and the brightness of a flaming fire by night." That great signal of his presence addressed to the senses, and fitted in an eminent manner to strike the heart, annihilate unbelief, and inspire awe, humbleness, and joy, is yet future.

Rosenmüller and Hengstenberg regard the daughters of Zion as used by a metaphor for the minor cities of Judea. It is, however, without authority, and founded in the mistaken assumption that Jerusalem is to be the subject of the cleansing instead of the blood which has been shed in it, and that the daughters of Zion, therefore, must be used by a parallelism to denote other cities. But it is filth from their own bodies with which the daughters of Zion defile themselves, and blood from the bodies of others which the men have shed in

the city that is to be washed and purged away, and those two forms of odious external defilement are put by substitution for moral defilement generally, or alienation from God in all the forms in which the apostate Jews exhibit it. In order to support their construction, they should have shown that the daughters of Zion were so customarily employed by the Hebrews to denote the minor cities of Judea, that the name would naturally be taken by them as standing by a metaphor for those cities, without a direct affirmation of it. But they neither have, nor could allege, any evidence of such a usage. The passages to which Rosenmüller refers yield him no support whatever, and Hengstenberg has in that which he alleges as a parallel, erroneously taken the herald who is exhibited as ascending the Mount of Olives, and announcing to Jerusalem and the neighboring towns of Judea the coming of the Messiah, for a personification of the metropolis. There not only is not anything in the passage to justify that construction, but it is incongruous to exhibit a city as ascending a mountain and making a proclamation in that manner. In the prosopopoeia, the objects personified are always addressed as being what they actually are ; and the figure lies in ascribing to them as such the organs and acts of intelligent beings.

The verse that follows is also regarded by the same critics as figurative. "And Jehovah will create over the whole place of Mount Zion, and over her assemblies, a cloud by day, and smoke and the brightness of a flaming fire by night ; for over all the glory shall be a covering," v. 5. There is, however, no figure in this language. It is not metaphorical. To create a cloud by day, and smoke and the brightness of a flaming fire by night over the whole of Mount Zion, is not impossible to God, nor unsuitable to the relations to him which that place is again to sustain as the appointed scene of the worship which his people are to offer him. It will only be to grant them again the same visible token of his presence with which they were distinguished on their journey from Egypt through the wilderness. That God is in that manner to signalize his entrance into the new temple that is to be erected on Mount Zion, is indicated, Ezekiel xliii. 1-7. And it is to that probably that the predictions, Isaiah lx. 19, 20, and Zechariah xiv. 4-7, refer. It is not representative of any

analogous manifestation of the Divine presence or agency on Mount Zion ; such as by an invisible influence, instead of a visible sign. It has no adaptation to serve as a substitute of a presence of such a different species. If it were a symbol of a presence of a different species, it would be of a presence by a different visible sign ; not by an invisible agency. Besides, it has no suitableness to symbolize a manifestation of favor, in exclusion of other manifestations ; inasmuch as it was on their departure from Egypt, and during their journey and residence in the wilderness, a signal simply of *the presence* of God, not of his *gracious presence* in contradistinction from his *avenging* presence ; nor of his presence to exert some extraordinary influence in distinction from his ordinary providence ; as it went before them, hovered over Mount Sinai, or rested on the tabernacle, without intermission, from their exit from Egypt to their entrance into Canaan. Vitringa and Professor Alexander regard Mount Zion in this, as in other similar passages, as a symbol of the Christian church, and interpret the prediction of the cloud and fire, as foreshowing a glorious manifestation of God's presence in Christian assemblies, not by such a visible sign, but by the invisible influences of the Spirit. Vitringa refers it to the times of the apostles ; Dr. Alexander chiefly to the future. It has none of the distinguishing marks, however, of a symbol ; and no adaptation, as has already been shown, to serve as a symbol of a mere spiritual presence, or a presence to exert one species of agency in distinction from others. How can a mere visible sign of God's presence *in all the relations in which he acts towards his chosen people*, serve exclusively as a sign of his presence in *one of those relations only* ? Besides, if Mount Zion as a place, as they assume, is a symbol of the Christian church, as a body of worshippers, of what are "the assemblies" of Mount Zion the representative ? As the Mount and the assemblies on it are distinguished in the prophecy, if it were symbolical, and the Mount denoted the Christian church, then those assemblies would represent a class and body of worshippers of a different species from the church. No such body, however, can be supposed to whom God is to make a glorious manifestation of his presence. The

laws of symbolization and of figures alike prohibit the ascription to the passage of any other than a literal meaning.

5. Synecdoche. "And there shall be a booth for a shade by day from heat, and for a covert and for a hiding place from storm and from rain," v. 6. Here a single booth made of boughs and leaves, and adequate to shelter only a single family, is put for a number proportional to the multitude who are to need them. Vitringa regarded the heat as a symbol of persecution; and storm and rain as representative of ordinary Divine judgments, such as famine and war, and interpreted the first of the persecutions of the church in the first three centuries, and the others of the sufferings of the Jews by famine in the reign of Claudius, and war under Nero, Titus, and Trajan. But it is wholly mistaken. The prophecy, as we have already shown, is not symbolical, nor if it were, would it indicate such events. If a booth, erected by the Israelites themselves as a shelter from heat and rain, were a symbol of the protection of the church from persecution, famine, and war, then, by the laws of symbolization, it would denote some analogous implement or means wrought also by their own hands, of protection from those evils. But what instrument of shelter from persecution, famine, and slaughter, did the church of Judea and other parts of the Roman empire fabricate and employ with success during the first, second, and third centuries? Vitringa indicates none, nor could he had he attempted it. They owed their protection from those and other calamities, as far as they enjoyed it, to Divine providence, not to themselves. They were not their own defenders and deliverers. Besides, the church was not in fact protected from persecution either in the age, as he endeavors to prove, of the apostles; in the second or third centuries; nor, even as he represents, after the accession of Constantine to the imperial throne. Nor was it exempted from the calamities of famine and war, with which Judea was desolated under Claudius, Nero, Vespasian, Titus, and Trajan.

Rosenmüller, Hengstenberg, and others, regard the booth as representative of shelter, generally, and the prediction as foreshowing that the worshippers are to be protected from every species of danger and annoyance. But a booth has no

adaptation to represent a shelter or protection from persecution, war, famine, pestilence, or spiritual foes; nor has rain any suitableness to symbolize injurious agents generally. It is, in its usual form, refreshing and fertilizing, not destructive. The prediction refers obviously to the feast of tabernacles, or booths. Among the assemblies on Mount Zion on which there is to be a cloud by day, and smoke and the brightness of a flaming fire by night, are the assemblies, doubtless, at that feast, which we learn from Zechariah xiv. 16-19, is to be renewed on the restoration of Israel; and the prediction fore-shows that they are again to erect booths in commemoration of the deliverance from Egypt.

The third and fourth chapters, thus, like the second, indicate, 1, That God in his providence over the Israelites has put, and is still putting the great principles on which they were acting to trial, and causing them to learn experimentally what the results are to which revolt naturally leads.

2. What a terrible proof of their total alienation from Him they gave in their persistence in rebellion, notwithstanding these forewarnings of his avenging judgments! They showed, in the most decisive form, that they placed a higher trust in their idols than in him, and preferred to make their passions the law of their life rather than his will.

3. What an awful exemplification of the natural consequences of apostasy from him, and abandonment by his Spirit, their history for the two thousand and six hundred years that have passed since these predictions were uttered forms, and especially their history since their dispersion by the Romans, after their rejection of Christ! What a tremendous demonstration that calamities inflicted in express punishment of sins, have no adequacy to subdue the hostile heart, and imbue it with rectitude and love!

4. How clear it is rendered by their long continuance in unbelief under these avenging judgments, that their conversion to faith in Christ must be the work of sovereign and infinite grace! What a demonstration their incorrigibleness forms, that extraordinary means must be employed to work that stupendous change! And what an adaptation to achieve it must the visible advent of Christ have in the dazzling majesty of his deity!

5. The prophecy shows that their alienation, debasement, and misery, are to continue till he comes to establish his throne on the earth.

6. It teaches that he is then to recall them to their ancient land, and restore them to a relation to himself that will invest them with dignity and beauty.

7. It teaches that he is then again to make a visible manifestation of his presence with them, by creating a cloud by day, and the brightness of a flaming fire by night, over Mount Zion, and over their assemblies.

8. It implies that they are then again to celebrate the feast of tabernacles, and, as in ancient times, erect booths that shall protect them from the heat and rain.

ART. III.—THE RESTORATION OF THE ISRAELITES.

BY THE EDITOR.

IN the article on this subject in our last number we pointed out a false view of language and symbols on which writers generally have proceeded, that has prevented them from a just construction of the passages that predict the restoration of the Israelites, or else from a full exhibition of the clearness with which they foreshow it; and then stating the laws of figures and symbols, alleged a number of prophecies from Jeremiah, which teach with the utmost certainty that that people are to be recalled from their dispersion and re-established in their ancient land, under Christ as their monarch; and showed that the metaphors and comparisons that are employed in them, instead of rendering them obscure or equivocal, as is generally imagined, give clearness and certainty to their meaning, and make it impossible to assign to them any other import without a violation of the fundamental laws of language. We shall now adduce several similar prophecies from Ezekiel.

Thus, in the prediction by that prophet of their restoration and establishment as a nation under the sceptre of the Mes-

siah, by an exhibition of the rulers as shepherds, and the people as a flock and herd, the figure renders it impossible, either by a theory of symbolization or any other process, to wrest from it that meaning. Though a metaphor, it is conducted much as though it were an allegory, and treats of the past as well as the future. That which relates to the shepherds, first describes their negligence, cruelty, and dispersion of the flock; next denounces their punishment; and thirdly, fore-shows the assumption of the office of shepherd by the Almighty, and restoration by him of the flock to its fold.

“And the word of the Lord came unto me, saying: son of man, prophesy against the shepherds of Israel; prophesy, and say unto them: Thus saith the Lord God unto the shepherds: Wo to the shepherds of Israel that do feed themselves! Should not the Shepherds feed the flock? Ye eat the fat, and ye clothe you with the wool, ye kill them that are fed; but ye feed not the flock. The diseased have ye not strengthened, neither have ye healed that which was sick, neither have ye bound up that which was broken, neither have ye brought again that which was driven away, neither have ye sought that which was lost; but with force and with cruelty have ye ruled them. And they were scattered, because there was no shepherd; and they became meat to all the beasts of the field, where they were scattered. My sheep wandered through all the mountains, and upon every high hill; yea, my flock was scattered upon all the face of the earth, and none did search or seek after them.”—Ezekiel, chap. xxxiv. 1–6.

They, who are denominated the shepherds of Israel and the flock, are expressly declared at the close of the prophecy to be men, and the house of Israel. The shepherds are, according to analogy and the usage of the Hebrews, the monarchs and rulers, and the flock the people. The part which the monarchs and rulers had acted towards the people, had been what the conduct of shepherds is towards their flock, who totally neglect to feed them, who appropriate the best of them to the gratification of their appetites and pride, who leave the diseased to die without care, and those that are driven away to be lost without any effort to recover them; whose only agency towards them is violent and cruel; and under whose negligence, recklessness, and wanton abuse of their power, they are scattered on the hills and mountains, and left to be

devoured by wild beasts. What a graphic description of the faithlessness, avarice, cruelty, and tyranny of the monarchs! What a vivid picture of the oppression, slaughter, exile, and vassalage of the people! Into what a distinct and impressive exemplification to the senses is the delineation raised by the use of this imagery? The imagination is filled by it with a correlative conception of the tyranny of the monarchs and ruin of the people, as effective as that which is raised by their literal history, and the reality brought home to the intellect and heart with a double energy. God then announces to the rulers his purpose to judge them for their faithlessness and cruelty, and remove them from the charge of his flock.

“Therefore, ye shepherds, hear the word of the Lord : As I live, saith the Lord God, surely because my flock became a prey, and my flock became meat to every beast of the field, because there was no shepherd, neither did my shepherds search for my flock, but the shepherds fed themselves, and fed not my flock ; therefore, O ye shepherds, hear the word of the Lord. Thus saith the Lord God : Behold, I am against the shepherds ; and I will require my flock at their hand, and cause them to cease from feeding the flock : neither shall the shepherds feed themselves any more ; for I will deliver my flock from their mouth, that they may not be meat for them.”—Ezekiel xxxiv. 7–10.

This, and the parallel prediction of the overthrow of the monarchy of Judah, Jeremiah xxii., was verified in the captivity of Zedekiah, at Babylon, during the remainder of his life, and exclusion thereafter of the line of David from the throne, and in the slaughter of Johanan and other chiefs, who had forced those whom the Chaldeans had left in Judea to migrate with them to Egypt. God next promises that he will himself take charge of his sheep, and gather them from their dispersion.

“For thus saith the Lord God : Behold I, I will both search my sheep, and seek them out. As a shepherd seeketh out his flock in the day that he is among his sheep that are scattered ; so will I seek out my sheep, and will deliver them out of all places where they have been scattered in the cloudy and dark day. And I will bring them from the people, and gather them from the countries, and will bring them to their own land and feed them upon the mountains of Israel, by the

rivers, and in all the inhabited places of the country. And I will feed them in a good pasture, and upon the high mountains of Israel shall their fold be; there shall they lie in a good fold, and in a fat pasture shall they feed upon the mountains of Israel. I will feed my flock, and I will cause them to lie down; saith the Lord. I will seek that which was lost, and bring again that which was driven away, and will bind up that which was broken, and will strengthen that which was sick; but I will destroy the fat and the strong; I will feed them with judgment."—Ezek. xxxiv, v. 11–16.

By this exemplification again, the work which he is to perform for the Israelites is presented with a vividness to which no literal language is equal. His agency towards his people in recalling them from their dispersion and vassalage, is to be what such an agency as a shepherd would be towards a lost flock. He is to gather them out of all places where they are scattered, bring them to their own land, establish them in their ancient inhabited places, and give them abundance and safety. And that gathering is to be universal. No country, no place in which they are scattered, is to be exempted from his search for them; and no classes or individuals are to be omitted. He is to seek the lost, and bring back the driven away. He is to bind up the broken and strengthen the sick. No restoration of a part would fulfil the promise; any more than a shepherd's gathering but a part of his lost sheep would be a recovery of his flock. It is most certainly, therefore, future. No such restoration has taken place since the Assyrian and Babylonian captivities. Jehovah next addresses *the flock*, and warns them that he will judge them.

"And as for you, O my flock, thus saith the Lord God: Behold, I judge between cattle and cattle, between the rams and the he-goats. Seemeth it a small thing unto you to have eaten up the good pasture, but ye must tread down with your feet the residue of your pastures! And to have drunk of the deep waters, but ye must foul the residue with your feet? And as for my flock, they eat that which ye have trodden with your feet; and they drink that which ye have fouled with your feet. Therefore, thus saith the Lord God unto them: Behold, I, I will judge between the fat cattle and between the lean cattle. Because ye have thrust with side and with shoulder, and pushed all the diseased with your horns, till ye have scattered them abroad. Therefore will I save

my flock, and they shall no more be a prey, and I will judge between cattle and cattle.”—Ezekiel xxxiv. 17–22.

By the rams and he-goats are meant—not the monarchs and princes, as they are represented by the shepherds; but the rich and powerful of the people, who oppressed and tyrannized over their inferiors and dependants, as those animals are accustomed to domineer over the weaker of the flock to which they belong. And what a striking picture is presented of their injustice and barbarity! They seized and appropriated everything to themselves, without regard to the rights and well-being of others, and wantonly wasted what they could not use, like the leaders of a flock, that, in their eagerness to satiate their thirst and hunger, plunge into the springs, and foul the waters which they cannot drink, and trample down and destroy the grass which they do not eat, so as to debar the rest from what would otherwise supply their wants! The lean, the diseased, and the scattered, denote those over whom these oppressors exercised their tyranny. God is to judge them and deliver his injured people from their power. The prophecy is then closed with a promise that he will establish one shepherd over them of the house of David, by whom they shall be fed, protected, and supplied with abundance.

“And I will set up one shepherd over them, and he shall feed them, my servant David; he shall feed them, and he shall be their shepherd. And I, the Lord, will be their God, and my servant David a prince among them. I, the Lord, have spoken. And I will make with them a covenant of peace, and will cause the evil beasts to cease out of the land; and they shall dwell safely in the wilderness, and sleep in the woods. And I will make them, and the places round about my hill, a blessing; and I will cause the shower to come down in his season; there shall be showers of blessing. And the tree of the field shall yield her fruit, and the earth shall yield her increase, and they shall be safe in their land, *and shall know that I am the Lord*, when I have broken the bands of their yoke, and delivered them out of the hand of them that served themselves of them. And they shall no more be a prey to the heathen, neither shall the beasts of the land devour them; but they shall dwell safely, and none shall make them afraid. And I will raise up for them a plant of renown, and they shall be no more

consumed with hunger in the land, neither bear the shame of the heathen any more. *Then shall they know that I, the Lord, their God, am with them, and that they, even the house of Israel, ARE MY PEOPLE,* saith the Lord God, *And ye my flock, the flock of my pasture, ARE MEN,* and I am your God, saith the Lord God."—Ezekiel xxxiv. 23–31.

It was the usage of the Hebrews to transfer the name of an ancestor to his posterity. Thus Jacob and Israel are used as the names of the whole of his descendants collectively; and Joseph, Judah, Benjamin, Ephraim, and others, as the names of their several tribes. In accordance with this custom, the name David, *the parent of the monarchy of Israel*, of which Christ was to spring, is, in the judgment of commentators, generally, used as his denominative, as the prince of his family, whom God was to raise up to sit on his throne for ever. And it was peculiarly proper, inasmuch as he was the only descendant of David who was to hold the sceptre of that people, after the period of this prophecy; Zedekiah, the last of that line, having already been deposed and carried into captivity, and his sons, who might have inherited his throne, had the nation regained its independence, exterminated.

The one shepherd, then, whom God is to set up over his flock is the Messiah, and his investiture with that office is to be after the flock has been called from its dispersion, and restored to its own land. V. 13, 14. And he is to feed them, protect them, and give them rich pastures, and abundant showers, and they are never more to be a prey to the heathen, nor be devoured by beasts, but are to dwell safely, with none to make them afraid.

This, then, is a prediction of the restoration of the Israelites, and re-establishment in their land under Christ as their king. There is no other construction that is compatible with the figures. It is expressly declared that the flock are men, and God's people the house of Israel. It is to offer a direct contradiction to the passage, therefore, to affirm that they are not the subjects of the prediction. As the flock, then, are the Israelites, they cannot stand for any other people. To regard them as standing also for the Gentiles, is not only without authority, but is to assume that the Gentiles sustain the same relation to God as a chosen people, as the Israelites,

inasmuch as those whom the passage denotes, are declared to be his people. But that is wholly unjustifiable, as they are not his people as the Israelites were. Nor can it be assumed that though the flock stands for the Israelites, yet the Israelites stand for the Gentiles. There is no affirmation that the Israelites, who are represented by the flock, themselves stand for the Gentiles, as is requisite to exhibit them as such by a metaphor. In like manner the shepherds who neglected and scattered the flock stood for the monarchs who neglected and oppressed the Israelitish people ; and cannot, therefore, denote any other order of persons. To hold that they denote the Israelitish monarchs, and then that those monarchs denote the kings of Gentile nations, is, as in the former instance, wholly without authority, and against the law of the figure. The metaphorical office of the shepherds and flocks is limited to the monarchs and people of Israel, whom it is declared they are employed to denote. Those monarchs and people can no more, then, be taken as used by a metaphor to denote another class, than that imagined third class can be taken as representative of a fourth ; and so on, in an interminable series. What reason can the advocates of this method of construction offer that the Gentile kings and nations, whom they hold the Israelites denote, are not as much to be taken as representatives of a still different order of monarchs and subjects, as the Israelitish kings and people are of Gentile monarchs and nations ? If this gratuitous and lawless ascription of a representative office to agents is allowable in any one instance, is it not equally in all others ? There is no process of interpretation, then, by which this passage can cease to be a prediction of the restoration of the Israelites to their ancient land, and residence there under Christ as their monarch.

We add now a literal prediction, in which the mountains and vales of Palestine are the subjects of the affirmation, and that which is foretold of them is, that they shall be again occupied and cultivated by the people of Israel.

“Thou son of man, prophesy unto the mountains of Israel, and say, Ye mountains of Israel, hear the word of the Lord. Thus saith the Lord God : Because the enemy hath said against you ; Aha, even the ancient high places are ours in possession : Therefore, prophesy and say,

Thus saith the Lord God ; Because they have made you desolate and swallowed you up on every side, that ye might be a possession unto the residue of the heathen, and ye are taken up in the lips of talkers, and are an infamy of the people ; therefore, ye mountains of Israel, hear the word of the Lord God ; Thus saith the Lord God to the mountains and to the hills, to the rivers and to the valleys, to the desolate wastes and to the cities that are forsaken, which became a prey and derision to the residue of the heathen that are round about ; Therefore thus saith the Lord God, Surely in the fire of my jealousy have I spoken against the residue of the heathen, and against all Idumea, which have appointed my land unto their possession, with the joy of all their heart, with despiteful minds, to cast it out for a prey. Prophecy therefore concerning the land of Israel, and say unto the mountains and to the hills, to the rivers and to the valleys : Thus saith the Lord God : Behold I have spoken in my jealousy, and in my fury, because ye have borne the shame of the heathen ; therefore thus saith the Lord God ; I have lifted up mine hand ; surely the heathen that are about you, they shall bear their shame. But ye, O mountains of Israel, ye shall shoot forth your branches, and yield your fruit to my people of Israel ; for they are at hand to come. For behold I am for you, and I will turn you, and ye shall be tilled and sown ; and I will multiply men upon you, *all the house of Israel, even all of it* ; and the cities shall be inhabited, and the wastes shall be builded ; and I will multiply upon you man and beast ; and they shall increase and bring fruit ; and I will settle you after your old estates, and I will do better unto you than at your beginnings ; and ye shall know that I am the Lord. Yea, I will cause men to walk upon you, *even my people Israel* ; and they shall possess thee, and thou shalt be their inheritance, and thou shalt no more henceforth bereave them of men ; Thus saith the Lord God : Because they say unto you, Thou land devourest up men, and hast bereaved thy nations ; therefore thou shalt devour men no more, neither bereave thy nations any more, saith the Lord God. Neither will I cause men to hear in thee the shame of the heathen any more, neither shalt thou bear the reproach of the people any more ; neither shalt thou cause thy nations to fall any more, saith the Lord God."—Ezekiel xxxvi. 1-15.

Here the land of Israel, its mountains, hills, and valleys, its wastes and deserted cities, are the subject of the prediction ; and that which is foreshown of them is, first that they shall be inhabited by the whole people of Israel, and be possessed by them as an inheritance ; next, that they shall be fruitful and yield an abundance for their support ; thirdly, that they

shall be settled after their old estates, and in a better condition than at their beginning ; fourthly, that the Israelites and their flocks and herds shall become very numerous there ; and fifthly, that their land shall never again be reproached for destroying them by its unfruitfulness. It is a direct and unequivocal prophecy, therefore, of their restoration and uninterrupted continuance there in peace, abundance, and prosperity. It is not a metaphorical prediction. That which is declared respecting the mountains and hills, the valleys and deserted cities, is not incompatible with their nature, but suitable to it. It is possible and appropriate, that they should be inhabited again by the Israelites, that they should be fruitful, and yield ample means for the support of a large population. It is consistent also with the nature of the Israelites, that they should return and possess them as an inheritance, multiply on them to great numbers, and live there in uninterrupted peace and prosperity. There is no room for the pretence, therefore, that the passage is figurative. The only metaphors in the prediction are in the expression, "I will *turn* unto the land," to denote that God will favor it ; and "man and beast shall bear fruit," to signify that they will bear a numerous offspring ;—figures that do not in any degree affect the nature of the general prediction. The prophecy that the land shall be inhabited by the Israelites, that it shall be fruitful, that they shall multiply there, that the land shall never again destroy or shame them by its barrenness, and that they are to enjoy it as an inheritance in peace and abundance, is absolutely literal, and must have a literal fulfilment. Its accomplishment is therefore still future, as the Israelites have never enjoyed such a restoration and residence there since the time of its utterance.

This cannot be evaded by the pretence that the mountains and hills, the valleys and cities, of Palestine, the Israelites, their return, residence, and multiplication there, the heathen and their reproaches, are symbols of analogous places, agents, acts, and events. The passage is wholly devoid of the characteristics of a symbolic prophecy. The places, agents, and events, of which it treats, were not actually present to the prophet naturally, nor exhibited to him in vision ; in one or the other of which modes he would have beheld them, had

they been symbols ; neither are the affirmations respecting them in the past tense, and in his own person, as they would have been, had they been present to him as symbols ; but instead, God himself utters the predictions, and they are in the future tense, instead of the past. Nor are there any analogous places, agents, and events, which they can represent. If the land of Israel is assumed to be a symbol of the countries inhabited by Gentiles, then, in order to the fulfilment of the prediction, those represented countries must be bereft of their original inhabitants, and made desolate, by their dispersion and exile in foreign lands, as Palestine was depopulated and made a waste by the banishment from it of the Israelites. But what Gentile countries are there that have been depopulated in that manner by the slaughter and exile of their inhabitants ? And what Gentile nations are there that, having been transported in that manner from their native seats into foreign countries, still, like the Israelites, subsist as a separate people, so that they may be restored, and again inhabit the original possessions of their ancestors ? Into what absurdities must they be willing to run ; of what portentous perversions of the prophecies must they be capable, who can resort to such monstrous assumptions in order to wrench from the passage the prediction which it utters and that constitutes its whole meaning, that the Israelites are to be restored to their ancient land, and reside and multiply there in peace and abundance for ever ! But even that expedient will not answer their end ; inasmuch as if the agents and objects of the passage are symbolic, still the representative acts and events that are affirmed of them must actually take place, in order that they may be symbols of the analogous acts and events which it is their office to foreshow. If they are only imaginary, then that which they represent may be only supposititious or imaginary, and the symbolization is not a prophecy of realities. As, then, the Israelites were not actually seen by the prophet, either naturally or in vision, restored to their national mountains and hills, their valleys and wastes, multiplying there to great numbers, and exempted for ever from famine ; and as no such return and residence there has since taken place, it is still to come to pass, before those events can be symbols of analogous acts and events of Gentile nations in dispersion

and exile. The passage remains, therefore, even on their false assumption, a prediction of a restoration of the Israelites, and a restoration that is still future. This construction is confirmed and raised to a resistless certainty by the remaining part of the prophecy.

“Moreover the word of the Lord came unto me, saying : Son of man, when the house of Israel dwelt in their own land, they defiled it by their own way and by their doings : Wherefore I poured my fury upon them for the blood that they had shed upon the land, and for their idols wherewith they had polluted it. And I scattered them among the heathen, and they were dispersed through the countries ; according to their way, and according to their doings I judged them. And when they entered unto the heathen whither they went, they profaned my holy name, when they said to them : These are the people of the Lord, and are gone forth out of his land. But I had pity for my holy name, which the house of Israel had profaned, among the heathen whither they went. Therefore say unto the house of Israel, Thus saith the Lord God : I do not this for your sakes, O house of Israel, but for my holy name’s sake, which ye have profaned among the heathen whither ye went. And I will sanctify my great name which was profaned among the heathen, which ye have profaned in the midst of them ; and the heathen shall know that I am the Lord, saith the Lord God, when I shall be sanctified in you before their eyes. *For I will take you from among the heathen, and gather you out of all countries, and will bring you into your own land.* Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean ; from all your filthiness, and from all your idols will I cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you ; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them. And ye shall dwell in the land which I gave to your fathers, and ye shall be my people, and I will be your God. *I will also save you from all your uncleanness ; and I will call for the corn, and will increase it, and lay no famine upon you ;* and I will multiply the fruit of the tree, and the increase of the field, that ye shall receive no more reproach of famine among the heathen. Then shall ye remember your own evil ways, and your doings that were not good, and shall loathe yourselves in your own sight for your iniquities, and for your abominations.

“Not for your own sakes do I this, saith the Lord God, be it known unto you ; be ashamed and confounded for your own ways, O house of

Israel. Thus saith the Lord God ; in the day that I shall have cleansed you from all your iniquities, I will also cause you to dwell in the cities, and the wastes shall be builded. And the desolate land shall be tilled, whereas it lay desolate in the sight of all that passed by. And they shall say : This land that was desolate, is become like the garden of Eden ; and the waste, and desolate, and ruined cities are become fenced and are inhabited. Then the heathen that are left round about you shall know that I, the Lord, build the ruined places, and plant that that was desolate : I the Lord have spoken it, and I will do it. Thus saith the Lord God ; I will yet for this be inquired of by the house of Israel, to do it for them ; I will increase them with men like a flock : as the holy flock, as the flock of Jerusalem in her solemn feasts, so shall the waste cities be filled with flocks of men ; and they shall know that I am the Lord."—Ezek. xxxvi., v. 16–38.

The Israelites are indisputably the subjects of this prediction ; and that which is foreshown of them is, that God will take them from among the Gentiles, and gather them out of all countries, and bring them into their own land ; that he will convert and sanctify them universally ; that they shall dwell in their land and shall be his people ; and he will be their God ; that their wastes shall be builded, and their desolate tracts tilled ; that he will make their fields and trees fruitful, and never subject them again to a famine ; that they shall multiply there to great numbers ; and shall then remember with shame their evil doings ; and know that he is Jehovah. It is as specific and absolute a prophecy, therefore, of their restoration to their own land, re-adoption as his people, and perpetual residence there in the enjoyment of his favor, as language can express. There is no room for the pretence that that restoration, redemption, and residence are merely tropical. There is no metaphor in the prediction, that God will take them from among the Gentiles, and gather them out of all countries, and bring them into their own land. There is none in the promise that they shall dwell there and be his people. There is none in the engagement that he will multiply the fruit of their trees and the increase of their fields, and that they shall no more suffer the reproach of famine. There is none in the prediction that their ruined cities shall be inhabited and their desolate land tilled, nor in the prophecy that it shall be said in regard to it : This land that was desolate, is

become like the garden of Eden. The only figures in the passage are those that are employed in foreshowing their conversion, sanctification, and obedience, as in the expressions, "I will sprinkle clean water upon you, and I will cleanse you from all your filthiness;" which are hypocatastases, in which an agency on the body and its effect, are put for an agency on the mind and its consequence. "I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh;" which are hypocatastases also in which an act producing a change in the body, is put for an act producing a resembling change in the mind: and in the promise, "I will cause you to *walk* in my statutes, and ye shall *keep* my judgments," and others of the like nature, which are metaphors; and denote, instead of such corporeal acts, analogous acts of the mind. That their restoration to Palestine is not employed to foreshow their conversion, is apparent also from the fact that their conversion, sanctification, and obedience, are thus directly foretold, both in figurative and literal language, and exhibited as wholly different events from their being gathered from the countries in which they are dispersed, and conducted back to their national land. No two events foreshown in the Scriptures are more wholly unlike each other. It can no more be pretended that their being gathered out of the countries in which they are scattered, and led back to their own land, denotes their conversion to Christianity, than it can that the gift to them of a new heart, and a new spirit, denotes their migration back to Palestine. Nor is there any room for the pretence that the Israelites are symbols of Gentiles, and that the event predicted is the conversion of the latter instead of the restoration of the former. The passage is not only wholly devoid of the marks that distinguish symbolic prophecies; but has those which are peculiarities of literal and figurative predictions, and prove that it cannot be symbolic. The Israelites are expressly distinguished from the Gentiles, from among whom they are to be taken. As the Gentiles are by that separation exhibited as remaining where they are, the migration of the Israelites from among them cannot symbolize their exerting an act, or being subjected to a change analogous to that migration, as the supposition is a contradiction. If the Israelites were symbols of the Gentiles,

then their removal from the presence of the Gentiles and migration to their own land, would represent an analogous separation and removal of the Gentiles from some other class of nations that sustain a relation to them resembling that which they sustain to the exiled Israelites. But where is there such a third species of nations? What Gentiles sustain a relation to other nations that are not Gentiles, like that which the Israelites sustain to them? The reason given for the restoration of the Israelites is, that their banishment from their country and captivity among their enemies, has given occasion to the Gentiles to reproach and defame God's name, as though he were unable to defend his people from the worshippers of other deities. If the Israelites, then, are symbols of Gentiles, those Gentiles must not only be in a condition analogous to that of the dispersed Israelites, but their being in that condition must be the occasion of a resembling reproach either of Jehovah, or else of their own deities. What Gentiles are there whose being in such a condition has been the occasion of such a reproach of his or their name? Into what an abyss of contradictions and impossibilities they involve themselves who undertake thus to wrest the prophecy from its legitimate meaning, and convert it into a figurative or symbolical prediction of the conversion of Gentiles?

The passage is thus a direct, plain, and emphatic prediction of the return of the Israelites from all the countries in which they are scattered to their own land, and re-establishment and residence there in prosperity as God's people, embracing such particulars, and expressed in such a form, as to render it impossible even to the most perverse ingenuity, to erase from it that meaning, or infuse into it any other, without the most wanton violation of the laws of speech and symbolization.

And the restoration which it foreshows is as indisputably future. The Israelites have never, since the prediction was uttered, been gathered out of all the countries in which they were scattered, and dwelt again in their own land. They have never been universally converted, and become obedient to God's statutes. Their land, which was desolate, has never been so restored as to become like the garden of Eden. It has never been raised to such fruitfulness that they were

wholly exempted from famine. They have never been so multiplied there, that their ruined cities were thronged with population, as Jerusalem was thronged at her great feasts with flocks and herds driven there for sacrifice. There has never been a period in their history since their first exile, when anything approaching to these stupendous temporal and spiritual blessings has been bestowed on them. Nothing can be more certain than that the accomplishment of the prophecy is still future.

We might add many other passages that announce their restoration with equal clearness and strength; but it cannot be necessary. If these are not predictions of it, there are no terms or forms of expression by which it can be foreshown. Let those who doubt it frame, if they can, a proposition that shall clearly and unequivocally declare that they are to be recalled from their dispersion and re-established in Palestine. They may accumulate affirmation upon affirmation, and volume upon volume, they will find it impossible to construct a prediction, or combination of predictions, of their return, that may not with equal ease, through the means by which they set aside the import of these passages, be wholly emptied of that meaning, and converted into a prophecy of some wholly different event. The denial that it is predicted in these prophecies, is equivalent to a denial of the possibility of its being foreshown through any terms or modes of expression which might be employed for that purpose. In place of alleging at large other similar prophecies of their restoration, we will point out some of the subordinate predictions of the mode of their return, the events that are to attend and follow it, and the reasons for which it is to be accomplished, that show indisputably that it is to be a literal return, and make the ascription to them of any other meaning absurd and impossible. The prediction of their return is not a mere prediction of their reconciliation to God, their reformation, or any other event of that nature; nor is it a mere prediction of a migration, without a specification of the country to which they are to go. Instead, it is a direct prediction of their migration from the places in which they are scattered to Palestine; and of a great number of circumstances and events that are to attend it, and appointments and conse-

quences that are to follow it, that united, give to the delineation a variety and manifoldness that make the supposition that they denote anything else than a literal restoration impracticable and preposterous in the utmost degree. Every element is incorporated in the prophecy, that could naturally be expected to enter into the prediction of such an event, serve to identify them as its subjects, and preclude the possibility of any other construction.

1. Thus, the prediction is not a mere announcement, that exiles and captives, without any specification who they are, are to be restored to their national country ; but the house of Israel is expressly named as the subjects of the restoration. "O house of Israel, I will take you from among the Gentiles, and gather you out of all countries, and I will bring you into your own land."—Ezekiel xxxvi. 22–24.

2. They are Israelites who have revolted from God, and are driven into exile because of their apostasy from him. "When the house of Israel dwelt in their own land, they defiled it by their own way and by their doings. Wherefore I poured my fury upon them for the blood that they had shed upon the land, and for their idols wherewith they had polluted it : and I scattered them among the Gentiles, and they were dispersed through the countries ; according to their way, and according to their doings I judged them."—Ezekiel xxxvi. 17–19. And this is a peculiarity of that nation. No other people has ever been driven into exile among nations of a different religion because of their apostatizing from their own deity, and paying homage to the gods of the foreigners, by whom they were conquered and carried into captivity.

3. They are Israelites, who, while they profess to be the chosen people and genuine worshippers of Jehovah, are yet to continue in apostasy during the whole period of their exile ; for they are still called Jehovah's people while among the Gentiles, and it is not till they shall be brought back to their own land that it is promised, "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean from all your filthiness, and from all your idols will I cleanse you : a new heart also will I give you ; and a new spirit will I put within you ; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and will give you a heart of flesh : and I will put my Spirit within

you, and cause you to walk in my statutes.”—Ezekiel xxxvi. 24–27. And this is a most conspicuous and singular peculiarity of the Israelites. They are in open apostasy from God, and yet regard themselves and are regarded by Gentiles as his chosen people, and actually offer him alone their homage. No other spectacle of the kind has ever been exhibited in the world. No other people ever apostatized from their deity, and yet continued to bear the name of his worshippers, and pay him exclusively their homage. The apostasy of the church, which still professes to be Christian, is quite unlike it; as they openly worship relics, images, departed spirits, and other objects and agents besides God, while they still profess to be, and even in that homage, his true worshippers. What other mark could so absolutely identify the Israelites as the subjects of the prediction, and make it impossible to confound them with any other people!

4. Their restoration is to be accomplished by a migration or journey; not by a mere change from captivity to freedom, misfortune to prosperity, or any other act which might take place in the same geographical scene. “I will take you from among the Gentiles, and gather you out of all countries, and I will bring you into your own land.”—Ezekiel xxxvi. 24. “I will gather the remnant of my flock out of all countries whither I have driven them, and will bring them again into their folds.”—Jeremiah xxiii. 3. This is precisely the language that would be used, if the restoration is to be literal; but it would not have been employed, were the event fore-shown of a wholly different nature. The terms are not metaphorical. A return to their own land is possible and natural to the Israelites; not unnatural and impracticable, as it must be, in order to be ascribed to them metaphorically. Their return is not symbolical of a moral return to God of a different order of persons. The journey or voyage of Israelites to Palestine has no adaptation to represent the conversion of Gentiles to God.

5. The countries from which they are to return are specified, and are all those into which they are driven. “I will gather the remnant of my flock out of all countries whither I have driven them.”—Jeremiah xxiii. 3. “From the east will I make thy seed come, and from the west will I gather thee.

I will say to the north give, and to the south, withhold not. Let my sons come from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth ; every one called by my name."—Isaiah xliii. 5-7. "And it shall come to pass in that day that the Lord shall set his hand again the second time to recover the remnant of his people which shall be left from Assyria, and from Egypt, and from Pathros, and from Cush, and from Elam, and from Shinar, and from Hamath, and from the islands of the sea."—Isaiah xi. 11. No element could have been introduced into the prophecy that would make it more absolutely certain that the restoration which it foreshows is literal, than this designation of the countries from which they are to return. There is no principle on which those names could be legitimately used, if the event predicted be any other than an actual migration from them. If the event predicted be not a migration, but a mere moral change, what relation have those places to it ? In what sense can repentance be from the east and west, or the north and south ; or from Assyria and Egypt, Cush and Elam, Hamath and the islands of the sea ? Is not rebellion as possible and as natural to Israelites in Palestine as in those countries ? Was not their apostasy in their own land the reason of their banishment from it to the regions from which they are now to be regathered ? These names demonstrably are not used metaphorically, inasmuch as a migration of the Israelites from these countries is not incompatible with their nature ; as it must be, in order to be ascribed to them by a metaphor. It is equally certain that they are not employed as symbols ; as the predictions are not symbolical ; and there are no analogous places of which they can be the representatives. There is no law by which they can fill any other office than that of literal names of the places of which they are the denominatives ; and there is no ground on which they can have been introduced into the prophecy as such names, except that the Israelites are actually to go back from those countries to their own land.

6. The modes are distinguished in which they are to be conveyed to Palestine. Some are to be borne in the arms and carried on horses and mules, and in chariots ; and some are to proceed by sea. "They shall bring all your brethren an offering unto the Lord, out of all nations, upon horses, and

in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith the Lord, as the children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessel into the house of the Lord," Isaiah lxvi. 20. "Who are these that fly as a cloud and as doves to their windows? Surely the isles shall wait for me, and the ships of Tarshish first, to bring thy sons from far, their silver and their gold with them unto the name of the Lord thy God, and to the Holy One of Israel, because he hath glorified them," Isaiah lx. 8, 9. "They shall bring thy sons in their arms, and thy daughters shall be carried upon their shoulders," Isaiah xlix. 22. What meaning can be assigned to these representations, unless their restoration is to be literal? There is no room for the pretence that they are metaphorical. Those modes of conveyance are not unsuited to the nature of the Israelites, and impracticable; but such as are customary, and essential in order to a rapid and easy passage, and cannot, therefore, be ascribed to them by a metaphor.

That subterfuge is precluded also by the comparison of these modes of journeying and being borne, with other modes of motion and carriage, to exemplify their nature. They are to "fly as a cloud, and as doves to their windows." They are to be brought "an offering unto the Lord," "as the children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessel into the house of the Lord." For in this figure the terms are always used in their literal sense, and the things compared actually have a resemblance in that relation in which the one is used to illustrate the other. The movement of the Israelites, therefore, must be a real motion, and their being borne a real carriage from one place to another, in order to a possibility of their likeness to those with which they are compared, which the simile asserts. A motion must be real that it may be like another real motion; and a mode of carriage real that it may be like another real mode of carriage. Otherwise there not only would not be a similitude between realities, but as one member of the comparison would be a nonentity, it would imply that the motion compared with it was also a nonentity, and convert the whole into a mere jumble of words, without a subject. What a confutation of the fanatical endeavors of expositors to blot from these predictions the revelation which

they utter? God, by inserting these comparisons, has stamped on them the great truth which they announce, in characters which no ingenuity, however perverse, can ever eradicate; nor ignorance or prejudice successfully disguise!

Nor are those modes of conveyance symbolical. What can a ride on a horse, a mule, a dromedary, or in a chariot or litter, represent? What can a voyage in a ship of Tarsish? Is there any analogy between them and the conversion of the Israelites? Do they all present the same analogy to their conversion? Is there any analogy between them and the conversion of Gentiles? Is there any more resemblance between a Jew's riding on a swift beast, or in a litter, and the conversion of pagan Gentiles, than there is between a Gentile's riding in that manner and their conversion? Into what pitiable puerilities must they be willing to descend, who can resort to such expedients to erase from these predictions their true meaning?

7. There are to be such extraordinary demonstrations that they are God's people, and that it is his will that they should return from their dispersion, that the Gentiles are to be prompted to aid them in their restoration. "It shall come that I will gather all nations and tongues, and they shall come and see my glory. And I will set a sign among them, and I will send those that escape of them unto the nations, to Tarsish, Pul, and Lud, that draw the bow, to Tubal and Javan, to the isles afar off that have not heard my fame, neither have seen my glory, and they shall declare my glory among the Gentiles; and they shall bring all your brethren for an offering unto the Lord," Isaiah lxvi. 18-20. "He shall set up an ensign for the nations, and shall assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of Judah, from the four corners of the earth," Isaiah xi. 12. "Behold, I will lift up to the Gentiles my hand, and set up to the people my standard; and they shall bring thy sons in their bosom, and thy daughters on the shoulders shall be carried. And kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and queens thy nursing mothers; they shall bow the face to the ground to thee, and the dust of thy feet shall they lick," Isaiah xlix. 22, 23. What can these extraordinary acts, that are to lead the Gentiles to aid them in their restoration, mean, if their gathering and migration

are not to be real? They are not expressed by a metaphor. To lift the hand to the nations and set up a standard to the people are not absolutely impossible or inappropriate to God; though they probably are not the acts that he is in reality to exert, but are used by a hypocatastasis as substitutes for other modes of indicating to them that they should aid the Israelites in their return. They denote, accordingly, as clear and emphatic a demonstration to them that the Israelites are his people, and that it is his will that they should assist them in returning to their own land, as could be formed by the most public and conspicuous signs; and the acts which they represent, are to be his acts, not the acts of creatures. As it is he who it is declared is to exert those which are employed in the figure, it is he who is to exert those which they denote. The passage is not symbolical; nor if it were, would it be consistent with his deity, that he should serve as the representative of creatures. What a resistless proof that their restoration is to be real! For what, on any other supposition, can this miraculous interposition of the Almighty mean—that is to impress the Gentiles with such respect for the Israelites, and inspire them with such a disposition to do his will? Not an act of creatures, for God is to be the agent. Not an act towards the Israelites, for it is to be directed to the Gentiles. Not the conversion of the Gentiles, for the agency to which it is to prompt them is an agency towards the Israelites, not an agency like conversion towards God. Nor is the conversion of the Israelites the effect to which it is to give birth; as the consequence of it to them is to be a change of the dispositions and agency of the Gentiles towards them, not a change of their dispositions towards God. This prediction, thus, like the former, presents insurmountable obstacles, both to a metaphorical and to a symbolical construction of their restoration, and invests the event with a significance and grandeur, that should restrain the presumptuous from attempting to wrest it from its legitimate meaning. It is no ordinary occurrence that is thus foreshown, but one of infinite moment both to God and to man. For the Almighty himself is visibly to interpose and give such signals to the nations, as to strike them universally with a conviction of his presence and will, annihilate their prejudice against his chosen people, inspire

them with a profound interest in his purposes respecting them, and lead them with cheerfulness and alacrity to aid them in their return to their land. In what other method could God have more effectually guarded the prophecy of their restoration from misconstruction, than by thus announcing his own visible interposition to accomplish it, in a form, which the laws alike of language and of symbols render it impossible, without the greatest violence, to pervert to any other meaning?

8. The country to which they are to proceed, and receive as an inheritance, is expressly designated. "I will bring again the captivity of my people, Israel and Judah, saith the Lord; and I will cause them to return to the land that I gave to their fathers, and they shall possess it," Jeremiah xxx. 3. "They shall bring all your brethren an offering unto the Lord out of all nations, . . . to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith the Lord," Isaiah lxvi. 20. It is in "the land of Israel," "on its mountains and hills, and in its vales, and by its rivers, that the house of Israel is to be multiplied, and the desolate wastes builded, and the forsaken cities inhabited and possessed by them for ever," Ezekiel xxxvi. 6-12. This prediction, also, makes it certain that their restoration is to be literal; as there is no law by which it can receive any other construction. The language is not metaphorical, as a return of the Israelites to their own land is not impracticable or unsuitable to their nature. The land of Israel is not used as a symbol. The predictions have none of the marks of symbolic prophecies. They are expressed in the future tense, not in the past, and they were written by the prophet as communicated to him by Jehovah, by whom they were uttered, not as descriptions of spectacles that he had himself actually seen, either naturally or in vision. Nor is there any other country, as we have already shown, of which the land of Israel can be taken as a symbol. There is none that is to the Gentiles what Palestine is to the Israelites, a gift to them by God as a chosen people, from which they have been banished because of their apostasy from their deity or deities. Nor, finally, were the land of the Israelites and their return to it used here as symbols of an analogous Gentile country and Gentile restoration, would it in the least preclude these predictions from foreshow-

ing that the Israelites are to be restored to their own land ; inasmuch as, in order that their restoration may be a symbol of an analogous Gentile restoration, it must be a real restoration. Otherwise the analogous restoration would also be an unreal one, and the event foreshown be like its representative, merely ideal. By what insuperable barriers has God thus put it out of the power of ill-judging men to pervert them from their true meaning.

9. On the arrival of a considerable body of the Israelites in Palestine, occupation of Jerusalem, organization of a national government, and institution of their peculiar worship, the Gentile nations of the north, especially, are to make war on them, besiege and capture Jerusalem, and threaten them again with vassalage or extermination. "For behold, in those days and in that time, when I shall bring again the captivity of Judah and Jerusalem, I will also gather all nations and will bring them down into the valley of Jehoshaphat, and will plead with them there for my people and for my heritage Israel, whom they have scattered among the nations and spoiled my land. . . . Proclaim ye this among the Gentiles. Prepare war, wake up the mighty men, let all the men of war draw near ; let them come up. Beat your ploughshares into swords, and your pruning-hooks into spears : let the weak say, I am strong : assemble yourselves and come all ye heathen and gather yourselves together round about : thither cause thy mighty to come down, O Lord. Let the heathen be wakened, and come up to the valley of Jehoshaphat ; for there will I judge all the heathen round about," Joel iii. 1-12. "Behold the day of the Lord cometh, and thy spoil shall be divided in the midst of thee. For I will gather all nations against Jerusalem to battle ; and the city shall be taken ; and the houses rifled, and the women ravished ; and half of the city shall go forth into captivity ; and the residue of the people shall not be cut off from the city," Zechariah xiv. 1, 2. It is to the same event, doubtless, that reference is made, Isaiah lxvi. 6. "A voice of noise from the city, a voice from the temple, a voice of the Lord that rendereth recompense to his enemies ;" and Daniel xii. 1, "when there shall be a time of trouble such as never was since there was a nation," and the Israelites "that shall be

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they foreshow and the restoration of which they are to be consequences, as literally to take place.

10. At that great moment, when the Gentile powers are about to triumph, Christ is to appear visibly, and deliver his people. "Then shall the Lord go forth and fight against those nations, as when he fought in the day of battle. And his feet shall stand in that day upon the Mount of Olives which is before Jerusalem, on the east," Zechariah xiv. 3, 4. His advent at that crisis is foretold also by Isaiah: "For behold the Lord will come with fire, and with his chariots like a whirlwind, to render his anger with fury, and his rebuke with flames of fire," chap. lxvi. 15. It is indicated likewise by Daniel: When "the king of the north" "shall plant the tabernacles of his palaces between the seas in the glorious holy mountain, and shall come to his end and none shall help him," "Michael shall stand up, the great prince which standeth for the children of thy people; and at that time thy people shall be delivered every one that shall be found written in the book," chap. xi. 45; xii. 1. It is foreshown, also, by Christ, Matthew xxiv. 29, 30, and in the Apocalypse under the sixth seal, and the symbol of the great battle of God Almighty, when the wild beast and false prophet are to be destroyed, chap. xix. 19-21. This interposition presents again the most absolute certainty that their restoration is to be literal. The prediction is not metaphorical. To come in person at that epoch and stand on Mount Olivet is not impossible to Christ, as it must be in order to be ascribed to him by a metaphor. To suppose it to be impossible to him, is to suppose that he is neither divine, nor invested with all power in heaven and on earth. To suppose it to be unsuitable to him, is to suppose that it does not become him to vindicate his rights, and verify his promises. It is as indubitable, therefore, as it is that he is Jehovah, and will fulfil his predictions, that this is not a figurative advent. It is equally certain that it is not symbolical. The prophecy is not made through symbols, but through language; nor if it were, could Jehovah be a symbol of any but himself; for as no created being, as is shown in the Apocalypse, chap. v., is able or worthy to take the place and exercise the functions that belong to Christ as Redeemer; so no creature is of such dignity and worth

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that it can be suitable that Jehovah should act as his symbol. It would be an infinite misrepresentation ; as it would be to exhibit a finite and dependent being as resembling God in prerogatives, and exercising actions towards creatures that imply divine attributes and rights. How can a being be of such a nature, and sustain such a relation towards creatures that Jehovah can be his proper representative, unless, like Jehovah, he be self-existent, almighty, and the creator and proprietor of those creatures ? He assuredly cannot. The supposition, then, that Jehovah is here a symbol, implies that the being whom he represents is also a self-existence and the creator of the creatures whom he appears to defend or destroy. But if that be so, then the world in which the symbolical advent is to take place is not our world, nor the creatures represented by the Israelites and Gentiles, on whom he is to exert his agency, of our race. Are the advocates of a symbolical interpretation of the prediction prepared for that result of their theory ? But there is no such self-existence besides Jehovah, and no world besides ours that can be the scene of such an interposition. We have the most indubitable certainty, then, that the Eternal Word is to appear in person at that great crisis ; and thence, that the restoration of the Israelites is to be literal, as it is to wrest them from the hands of their Gentile conquerors that he is to interpose. " Then shall the Lord go forth and fight against those nations, as when he fought in the day of battle," Zechariah xiv. 3. This comparison shows that he is literally to assail them with the instruments of destruction ; as it is a law of the figure that the things compared are those for which the names literally stand, and have that relation to each other which the affirmation literally declares ; otherwise the affirmation would be false. Should God not fight with those nations then, as he fought in the day of battle, his assault on them will not have that resemblance to the act with which it is compared, which the affirmation asserts. It is not only certain, therefore, that he is to interpose in person at that epoch, but the comparison makes it certain that he is literally to contend with the Gentiles, who are to capture Jerusalem and lead half its inhabitants into captivity ; and that again makes it indisputable that their restoration, and the war on

them by the Gentiles are to be literal. For how can God then deliver them from the Gentiles by a visible interposition, if they have not returned and resumed possession of the city? And how can he then fight against the Gentiles as their captors, if the Gentiles are not there to be fought against by him? In what a labyrinth of contradictions and outrages on language and sense they entangle themselves who undertake to force on these predictions a symbolical meaning! The annals of infatuation present nothing that surpasses it.

11. At the descent of Christ on Mount Olivet an earthquake is to sever the mountain into two parts, and overturn the fortresses of the neighboring region, on which his enemies are to depend for their protection. "The mount of Olives shall cleave in the midst thereof toward the east and toward the west, a very great valley; and half of the mountain shall remove toward the north and half of it toward the south; and ye shall flee to the valley of the mountains, for the valley of the mountains shall reach unto Azal; yea ye shall flee like as ye fled from before the earthquake in the days of Uzziah, king of Judah; and the Lord my God shall come, and all the saints with thee," Zechariah xiv. 4, 5. This is not a metaphorical prediction; as such a dislocation of that mountain involves no inconsistency with the laws of nature. Nor is it symbolical; as, without noticing other proofs, is made indisputable by the flight of the people into the valley which is to be created by it; for that flight is shown to be literal, not only by the verb which is used in its natural sense, but by the comparison of it with a flight from an earthquake in the days of Uzziah; as in the simile universally, the things compared are those which their names literally denote; and in this instance they are named by the same verb. The people cannot then flee to the valley of the mountain, as they fled from before the earthquake in the days of Uzziah, unless they actually flee to the valley; any more than men can hereafter die in the same manner as men have heretofore died, unless they actually die, and die of the same diseases. If the things compared are not those which the names by which they are designated denote, then they not only cannot have that resemblance to each other which the affirmation asserts, but there are no means of knowing what they in

reality are, nor whether, therefore, they in fact have a likeness to each other. This earthquake is foreshown also in the predictions by the other prophets of Christ's advent at that epoch. "The Lord also shall roar out of Zion, and utter his voice from Jerusalem, *and the heavens and the earth shall shake*, but the Lord will be the hope of his people, and the strength of the children of Israel," Joel iii. 16. "Surely in that day there shall be a great shaking in the land of Israel; so that the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the heaven, and the beasts of the field, and all creeping things that creep upon the earth, and all the men that are upon the face of the earth shall shake at my presence; and the mountains shall be thrown down, and the steep places shall fall, and every wall shall fall to the ground," Ezekiel xxxviii. 19, 20. "Enter into the rock and hide thee in the dust for fear of the Lord, and for the glory of his majesty. For the day of the Lord of hosts shall be upon every one that is proud and lofty, and upon every one that is lifted up, and he shall be brought low; and upon all the cedars of Lebanon that are high and lifted up, and upon all the oaks of Bashan, and upon all the high mountains, and upon all the hills that are lifted up, and upon every high tower, and upon every fenced wall, and upon all the ships of Tarshish, and upon all pleasant pictures; and they shall go into the holes of the rocks, and into the caves of the earth, for fear of the Lord, and for the glory of his majesty, when he ariseth *to shake terribly the earth*," Isaiah ii. 10-19. This language is not metaphorical; as the events foretold of the earth, the mountains, the hills, the cedars, the walls, and fortresses, are compatible with their nature. Nor is there any room for the pretence that their agitation and overthrow are symbolical. If the earthquake is symbolical, then must the mountains be also, the hills, the cedars, the oaks, the ships of Tarshish, and pictures, and the people who flee to the dens and caverns. But what can the earthquake symbolize? Not an analogous agitation of the people, for they are to flee from the earthquake, to the valley caused by it between the mountains. What can the mountains and hills, the cedars and oaks, the ships and pictures, the fortresses and walls, symbolize? Not men; for they are exhibited separately in their own persons; and the overthrow of these objects of

their pride and trust, and the vision of Jehovah at whose presence they are to fall, are represented as the means by which their loftiness is to be cast down, and their height brought low.

How singular that men of sense and learning should persist in treating these passages as metaphorical or representative in total disregard of the laws of figures and symbols, notwithstanding these portentous contradictions and absurdities, in which their constructions involve them! Into what error have enthusiasts run, that transcends it in extravagance! But how can this earthquake at Jerusalem contribute to the deliverance of the Israelites from the Gentiles, if they are not to return there, and be assailed by their enemies? On what other assumption than that their restoration is to be literal, can the miracle answer its end?

12. Christ is then to destroy the Gentile hosts by pestilence and fire. "For behold the Lord will come with fire, and with his chariots like a whirlwind to render his anger with fury, and his rebuke with flames of fire; for by fire and by his sword will the Lord plead with all flesh, and the slain of the Lord shall be many," Isaiah lxvi. 15, 16. "I will call for a sword against him,—throughout all my mountains, saith the Lord God; every man's sword shall be against his brother. And I will plead against him with pestilence and with blood; and I will rain upon him, and upon his bands, and upon the many people that are with him, an overflowing rain and great hail-stones, fire, and brimstone. Thus will I magnify myself, and sanctify myself; and I will be known in the eyes of many nations, and they shall know that I am the Lord," Ezekiel xxxviii. 21–23. "And this shall be the plague wherewith the Lord will smite all the people that have fought against Jerusalem. Their flesh shall consume away while they stand upon their feet, and their eyes shall consume away in their holes, and their tongue shall consume away in their mouth. And it shall come to pass in that day, a great tumult from the Lord shall be among them; and they shall lay hold every one on the hand of his neighbor, and his hand shall rise up against the hand of his neighbor," Zechariah xiv. 12, 13. This is the advent that is foretold, 2 Thessalonians i. 7–9. "The Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty

angels in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." What meaning can be assigned to these passages, except on the assumption that the restoration of the Israelites is to be real? That Christ's interposition is to be real and personal is shown not only by the language, which is literal, but by the comparison of his coming with fire and with his chariots, to the rush of a whirlwind; as in that figure, that which is compared is always real, and denoted by its literal name, as absolutely as that is with which it is compared, in order to show its nature. It is not symbolical of a coming of another species or of another agent, as it has no adaptation to symbolize any other than a real and personal interposition; and Christ cannot serve as a symbol of any being but himself. How, then, can he pour that storm of pestilence and fire on the Gentiles, unless they are actually assembled there? But why are they to be assembled there, unless it be, as these predictions represent, to make war on the Israelites? And how can the Israelites be delivered by their destruction unless their restoration and their conquest by the Gentiles are real? On that supposition the prediction is intelligible, and suitable to the attributes of God, and the teachings of his word in other passages. On any other, it is not only inexplicable, but a complication of irreconcilable contradictions.

13. Those who survive that terrible infliction, are to return to their several countries and spread the news of the event, and, in consequence, the nations are to assist the Israelites who still remain among them, to return to their own land. "It shall come that I will gather all nations and tongues, and they shall come and see my glory. And I will set a sign among them, and I will send those that escape of them unto the nations, to Tarshish, Pul, and Lud, that draw the bow, to Tubal and Javan, to the isles afar off that have not heard my fame, neither have seen my glory, and they shall declare my glory among the Gentiles. And they shall bring all your brethren an offering unto the Lord, out of all nations, upon horses and in chariots and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain Jerusalem, saith the

Lord, as the children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessel into the house of the Lord," Isaiah lxvi. 18-20. What, again, can this prediction mean, unless both this and the restoration of the Israelites, that is to precede the destruction of the Gentile armies, be real? How can the survivors of that catastrophe return and announce the tidings to their countrymen, if no such catastrophe takes place, and no such hosts have assembled in Palestine, to be its subjects? But how can they assemble there and be destroyed for such a reason, if no Israelites have returned there to be assailed by them and conquered? To construe the prediction on any other assumption, is not merely to pervert it, but to offer it a direct contradiction. The language is not metaphorical, as the acts ascribed to the agents are natural, and such as will befit their condition. Nor are the agents symbolical. The prediction is not only wholly without the marks of a symbolical prophecy, but no analogous agents can be found whom these can represent. Whom can the Gentiles of Tarshish, Pul, and Lud, Tubal, Javan, and the isles, symbolize? Whom can the Israelites, who are to be carried by them to Palestine? The assumption that they are representative, implies that there are other nations besides them, who are neither Gentiles nor Israelites, and is equivalent to the assumption that those whom they represent are inhabitants of another world.

14. On the return of the whole Israelitish nation to their land, a great variety of events of the utmost significance are to follow, that demonstrate that their restoration is to be real. Thus, they are to be re-organized as a nation under Messiah as their King. "I will raise unto David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper, and execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely: and this is his name whereby he shall be called, The Lord our Righteousness," Jeremiah xxiii. 5, 6. But how can the Messiah reign on their national throne, unless they have withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Gentiles, and formed a distinct political organization? "And the Lord shall be King over all the earth, and in that day shall there be one Lord, and his name one," Zechariah xiv. 9. Their country is to be freed from the curse of barren-

ness, and be rendered eminently fruitful : " I will call for the corn and increase it, and I will multiply the fruit of the tree, and the increase of the field. . . And they shall say, This land that was desolate is become like the garden of Eden," Ezekiel xxxvi. 29, 30, 35. But of what significance to them is this prediction, unless they are to be restored to their country, and enjoy the benefits of its fruitfulness? Jerusalem is to be rebuilt and enlarged, and adorned with magnificence. " Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that the city shall be built to the Lord from the tower of Hananeel unto the gate of the corner. And the measuring line shall yet go forth over against it upon the hill Gareb, and shall compass about to Goath ; and the whole valley of the dead bodies, and of the ashes, and all the fields unto the brook of Kidron, unto the corner of the horsegate toward the east, shall be holy unto the Lord ; *it shall not be plucked up, nor thrown down any more for ever*," Jeremiah xxxi. 38-40. " For Jehovah will have compassion upon Zion ; he will have compassion upon all her wastes. He will make her wilderness like Eden, and her desert like the garden of Jehovah," Isaiah li. 3. " Thou shalt be a crown of glory in the hand of the Lord, and a royal diadem in the hand of thy God. Thou shalt no more be termed forsaken ; neither shall thy land any more be termed desolate," Isaiah lxii. 3, 4. " The glory of Lebanon shall come unto thee, the fir tree, the pine tree, and the box together, to beautify the place of my sanctuary, and I will make the place of my feet glorious," Isaiah lx. 13. Of what moment to them are these predictions, if Jerusalem, when rebuilt, is not to be their capital, nor inhabited by them? It were, on that supposition, a prediction of the perpetuation of their exile, announced in a form to add to their humiliation. A temple for worship is to be erected on Mount Zion. " But in the last days it shall come to pass, that the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be established in the top of the mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills, and many nations shall come and say, Come, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to *the house of the God of Jacob*, and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths," Micah iv. 1, 2. " And the glory of the Lord came into the house by the way of the gate whose prospect is

toward the east. So the Spirit took me up and brought me into the inner court, and behold the glory of the Lord filled the house. And I heard him speaking unto me out of the house, Son of man, the place of my throne, and the place of the soles of my feet, where I will dwell in the midst of the children of Israel for ever : and my holy name shall they no more defile," Ezekiel xliii. 4-7. What can be the design of this prediction but to tantalize and add to the bitterness of their miseries, if they are still to continue in exile, and neither minister nor worship in the house nor witness the manifestations of God's presence there? How can Jehovah "dwell in the midst of the children of Israel for ever," in the temple at Jerusalem, if the Israelites are not to return and for ever reside there?

The descendants of Levi are to be the ministers of the temple, sacrifices are to be offered in it, and all nations are to go to it to worship. "Thus saith the Lord, David shall never want a man to sit upon the throne of the house of Israel, neither shall the priests the Levites want a man before me to offer burnt offerings, and to kindle meat offerings, and to do sacrifice continually." "As the host of heaven cannot be numbered, nor the sand of the sea measured ; so will I multiply the seed of David, my servant, and the Levites that minister unto me," Jeremiah xxxiii. 17-22. "They shall bring all your brethren an offering unto the Lord out of all nations ; and I will take of them for priests and for Levites, saith the Lord. For as the new heaven, and the new earth, which I will make, shall remain before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain. And it shall come to pass from one new moon to another, and from one sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord," Isaiah lxvi. 20-23. This most certainly can never come to pass, unless they not only return, but reside there for ever. To deny that the restoration is to be real and permanent, is nothing less than to charge the Most High with the utterance of a false prediction. God is to manifest his presence there by signs, as he did in the ancient tabernacle. "Then shall Jehovah create upon every station of Mount Zion, and upon her places of convocation, a cloud and a smoke by day, and the brightness of a flaming fire by night,

which shall be over all the glory for protection," Isaiah iv. 5. What but an aggravation can this be to them, unless they are to return and behold these manifestations, and share in the blessings of his presence? The whole of the Israelites are then to be converted, and are for ever thereafter to be a holy people: "As for thy people, they shall all of them be righteous; they shall inherit the land for ever: the branch of my planting, the work of my hands, that I may be glorified," Isaiah lx. 20. Here, their inheritance of the land for ever is promised in as positive terms as their universal sanctification. But how can they inherit it, unless they are its actual possessors? All the Gentile nations also are then to be converted. "The mountain of the Lord's house shall be established upon the top of the mountains, and all nations shall flow unto it. And many peoples shall go and say, Come ye and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths," Isaiah ii. 3. This prediction of the conversion of the Gentiles is no more unequivocal and absolute than the whole series are relating to the Israelites which we have quoted. Every consideration that justifies and requires the construction of this as foreshowing the actual conversion of the Gentiles, equally justifies and requires the interpretation of those which relate to them as foreshowing their real restoration, also, re-organization as a nation, under the reign of Christ, and perpetual residence there as God's chosen people.

Such is the peculiar form in which this great event is made known; such is the resistless proof which the mode of the prediction presents, that their restoration is to be real, and such as the language in which it is uttered, interpreted by its ordinary laws, indicates. It is not exhibited as an isolated event. It is not announced independently of its relations to other parts of God's purposes towards the world. Instead it is presented as an important element in the great scheme of administration which he is to exercise over it through eternal ages; and is wrought into the whole body of the prophecies in such a manner that it cannot be wrenched from them without overturning the whole structure. Nor is it an unimportant event, but one infinitely dear to God, and of infinite significance to him;—essential to his vindication, and indis-

pensable to the full display of his glory. That people are to be raised to a relation to him of immeasurable dignity ; and their office and agency are to be most important elements in the administration under which all the nations are to be sanctified, and the world made through an endless round of ages the abode of righteousness and bliss. No language in which it could have been expressed could have presented a clearer and more indubitable revelation of it. No incorporation of it with a great series of events, and introduction of it into a system of providence and moral administration that is to continue through interminable years, could have made it more indisputably an element of the Divine purpose. It is raised by the mode in which it is foreshown to a certainty proportional to that of all the other predictions with which it is connected as a cause, a consequent, or an associate. It is invested by the influence it is to exert, with a significance and greatness proportional to the grandeur of the administration of which it is to be a part.

We might add greatly to this array of demonstration, that they are to be restored and re-adopted as God's people ; but instead of alleging other passages, it will better serve our end, to confirm these constructions by showing that the principles on which they proceed who deny their restoration, are as applicable to all other parts of the Scriptures, as they are to these predictions, and if legitimate not only confute us, but place it as completely out of their power to prove that the interpretations which they put on any of the narratives, doctrinal statements, predictions, promises, or threatenings of the word of God, express their true meaning, or are not totally false. They do not proceed on any known and demonstrable laws of language and symbols. They do not found their constructions of these predictions on the rules by which they interpret other parts of the Scriptures. Instead, they arrogate the right of adopting any theory in respect to them, without regard to its falsehood or absurdity, by which they can stifle the announcement which they utter, of the restoration of the Israelites. Thus, the grounds on which they reject their teachings, and ascribe to them a supposititious meaning, are either that they are figurative, though they involve no figure whatever, or that being figurative,

the names of the agents or objects of which the figurative affirmations are made, are themselves also used metaphorically ; or else that the agents, objects, and events of which they treat are not those which they foreshow, but are symbols of others of a different species. But those theories are no more admissible in respect to the passages we have quoted than they are in regard to any others ; and if justifiable, they strike from the sacred volume every fact, truth, and purpose which it teaches, no matter what may be its nature, as effectually as that which is announced in these prophecies. Any one who may choose to adopt those theories, and apply them to the Scriptures at large, may baffle these interpreters in their attempts to demonstrate any one of the truths which they regard as most indubitably taught in them, and most important.

1. Thus they regard the Scriptures as foretelling that all the nations are at a future time to be converted to faith in Christianity, and the world become a vast theatre of righteousness and bliss ; and would deem it an outrage worthy only of an infidel to deny that they make such a revelation. On their theories, however, of figures and symbols, they cannot point to any passages that announce that event. An antagonist has only to apply their principles to those which they allege as foreshowing it, and they become the vehicle of a wholly different prediction, which they can never evade, except by rejecting their own system of explication, and adopting the laws by which we have interpreted the prophecies of the restoration of the Israelites. Thus, for example, let the prediction, Isaiah lxvi. 23,—“And it shall come to pass that from one new moon to another, and from one sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord ;” be offered, by them, as a proof that all nations and all individuals are to be converted and become pure worshippers. The objector has only to assume that it is metaphorical, and it is no longer available for their purpose, as on that supposition the verbs “come” and “worship” do not denote assembling before him, and offering him a religious homage, but acts of a different species, that merely *resemble* assembling in his presence and offering him homage. For how can they prove that the passage is not metaphorical ?

Not on the ground that it has no metaphor in it, as that were to contradict the theory on which they maintain that many of the predictions of the return of the Israelites are metaphorical. There are hundreds of passages which they treat as figurative, that have no figure whatever in them. To abandon this assumption and maintain that the prediction in question cannot be metaphorical, because there is no metaphor in it, were to overturn their whole system of explication. They therefore cannot prove that this prediction foreshows that all nations and individuals are to become pure worshippers. So far from it, on their principles, the event which it foretels must indisputably be of a wholly different nature. On the other hand, the objector may, with equal facility, put it out of their power to prove that the Gentiles are the subjects of that prediction. He has only to allege again that as it is metaphorical, and as in a metaphorical passage, according to their method of interpretation, the term which denotes the subject of the affirmation is used by the figure, as well as the affirmation itself,—the phrase “all flesh,” instead of signifying all mankind, denotes agents of a different species;—and they are cut off from all evidence that men, either Gentiles or Israelites, are the subjects of the prediction. For how can they disprove that allegation? Not on the ground that it is false; for they found their construction of many of the predictions respecting the Israelites on the assumption that that is a law of the metaphor; and to retract it were to abandon one of the main elements of their scheme of interpretation, and admit, what must force them to acknowledge that the passages we have alleged indubitably foreshow the restoration of that people. If the objector, instead of those methods of confuting them, chooses to assert that the passage is symbolical, and that the agents, therefore, whose acts the prophecy foreshows, instead of men are beings of a different order, and the acts which it foreshows of some analogous species; he renders it equally impracticable to them to maintain their construction. For how can they demonstrate that the passage is not symbolical? Not on the ground that it is wholly devoid of the peculiarities of symbolical prophecies, and expressed in a form that is absolutely inconsistent with their nature;—that the agents of which it

treats were not seen by the prophet exerting the acts which it ascribes to them ; that it was uttered by Jehovah, and recorded by the prophet as an announcement by him, not written as a description of a spectacle which he had seen ; and that it is in the predictive tense, not in the historical ; for these are no proofs on their theory that it is not a symbolical prediction. A great proportion of the passages which they undertake to divert from foreshowing the restoration of the Israelites by the pretence that they are symbolical, are framed precisely like this. If the principle on which they construe the prophecies that relate to the Israelites are legitimate, they are equally applicable to this ; and they are bound to adhere to them. To assume that this and similar predictions respecting the Gentiles are to be interpreted by directly opposite laws, is not only groundless and irrational, but is to accuse the Almighty of infinite inconsistency and deception. What would be thought of a counsellor or judge who should claim that the language of deeds, bonds, contracts, and other instruments by which property is conveyed and rights secured to Jews, is used in a sense directly the converse of that with which it is employed in similar conveyances to Gentiles, and that while, therefore, to the latter it forms a valid title, it debars the Israelites from that of which it professes to give them possession ? Would he not be regarded as guilty of an atrocious outrage on speech and on right ? And is it not to impute a similar injustice to God to assume that he employs the terms in which the predictions and promises respecting the Israelites are expressed, on a wholly different principle from that on which they are used in the prophecies that respect the Gentiles ?

Such is the position which these expositors occupy. They proceed in their construction of the predictions respecting the Israelites on theories that are directly the converse of those on which they found their interpretation of the passages that foreshow the conversion of the Gentiles, and thereby in effect exhibit the Most High as making his gracious promises to the Israelites a mockery that in a human being would be regarded as atrociously cruel, and raise in every breast a sentiment of indignation and horror ! If, instead of these two opposite systems of interpretation, they admit the applicability of the

principles on which they construe the predictions respecting the Israelites, to all other parts of the Scriptures, they then place it out of their power to prove that they foreshow the conversion universally of the nations. And if, to avoid that issue, they retract the theories on which they set aside the prediction of the restoration of Israel, they then divest themselves of their pretexts for denying their restoration, and place themselves under the necessity of admitting that it is foreshown. Yet these are the men who imagine that they are themselves actually to convert the world ; who proceed in all their public efforts for the spread of the gospel on that assumption, and regard it as absolutely indispensable as a motive to obey Christ's command to proclaim his salvation to the nations, and who receive the most indubitable demonstrations from the word of God that they are mistaken, not only with unbelief, but with sneers, and even in some instances with resentment and contumely ; and give proofs that were it in their power, they would stifle every endeavor to unveil the great purposes respecting his future administration, which the Almighty has revealed ! What an unhappy inconsistency ! What an effective proof that they have mistaken their qualifications for the task of rescuing the race from the thralldom of ignorance and sin ! They are, on their own principles, the greatest and most absurd fanatics in the world ; as, if consistent, their whole expectation of success must be founded on themselves. They cannot intelligently rely on the Spirit of God to give efficacy to their labors ; for *on their scheme of interpretation* they cannot point to a passage of the sacred volume that presents any indication that he is to accompany the truth which they proclaim with his renovating power : nor have they on their theories the slightest hint from him that the nations are ever to be redeemed ! Their trust, therefore, for the accomplishment of their object, must be founded exclusively on themselves ! What a spectacle to present to his all-beholding eye ! How long will those who fear, love, and adore him, be willing to maintain towards him such an attitude ! How long will it be deemed creditable to those who profess to be masters of the art of interpretation, to proceed on such preposterous theories, and confound and

pervert the revelation, which it is their business to unfold and maintain!

The disbelievers in the restoration of the Israelites are equally unable, on their principles, to prove that there is to be such a millennium of universal peace as they regard the Scriptures as predicting. Let the prophecy, Isaiah ii. 2-4—
“It shall come to pass in the last days that . . . he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people; and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more,”—be alleged by them as foreshowing a disuse of war by the nations; and an antagonist has only to pronounce the passage metaphorical, and remind them of their theory of the metaphor, and they are cut off from the pretence either that the nations are the subjects of the event foreshown, or that that event is a universal peace. Or, if he prefers another method of confuting them, he has but to assume that the prediction is symbolical; and the nations then, instead of being the subjects, are converted into the mere instruments of the prophecy; and peace, in place of being foreshown, is the mere representative of an event of a different and analogous nature! All their speculations, accordingly, of a millennium of harmony, security, and rest, are divested of authority from the word of God, and transmuted into presumptuous and delusive dreams! Is it worthy of the ministers of the Almighty, thus to interpret his word by theories that blot from it its most indubitable and important teachings, and convert it into a chaos of shadows, deceptions, and absurdities!

But their principles not only debar them thus from the proof that these and other events, which they justly regard the prophecies as foreshowing, are to take place, but divest them also of the power of proving that any of the other great truths, which they receive as inculcated in the Scriptures, are taught in them. There is not a precept, a narrative, a doctrine, a promise, a prediction in the word of God, that, on their views of language and symbolization, may not be swept from it, and another that is contradictory, or at least false, substituted in its place! Let them attempt, for example, to show that Christ's death was in order to our salvation, and is

the means of it, from such a passage as the following: "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in body, but still living in spirit," 1 Peter iii. 18. And an opponent has only to deny that it presents any such representation on the ground that it is metaphorical or symbolical, and they are unable, except by a renunciation of their principles, to prove that Christ is the subject of the affirmation which it makes; that the death of which it treats was a corporeal death; or that men are the beings for whose sake it was borne. And so of every other passage which exhibits him as suffering on our behalf, and procuring redemption for us by his death. They may exhaust all the resources of their learning; they may resort to every expedient that ingenuity can contrive; they can never, except by deserting their favorite theories, show that he is the subject of one of the passages which they regard as teaching that he died for us; or that the evil borne by him, and its design, were such as they persuade themselves the Scriptures represent. No device that infidelity has ever contrived, has a thousandth part of the efficiency of these theories to overturn the gospel. No engine that has ever been invented by the enemies of Christianity, is of any significance compared to these, which are put into their hands by its professed believers and expositors. Let a Voltaire or a Paine assail the facts and doctrines of the Scriptures by these instruments, and the whole body of popular expositors and teachers against whom we are arguing are silenced. Not a syllable can they utter in vindication and proof of the truth, till they have renounced the principles of explication on which they now proceed. Let those in like manner who, while they profess to receive the Scriptures as a revelation, deny all the great truths which they teach, and substitute an infidel philosophy in their place, avail themselves of these instruments, and they divest these antagonists of all power to assail them. Had Dr. Bushnell, for example, taken this method, his attack on the great truths of the gospel would have been wholly unanswerable by the great body of those who reject the system which he advances. Not one of the doctrines which they believe could they maintain against his assaults. Not one of his monstrous misrepresentations could

they confute ; till they had demolished their own systems, and adopted just views of language and symbols. In like manner, let their attempts to demonstrate the renovation of the mind by the Spirit, justification by faith, the future punishment of the impenitent, or any other doctrine of the Scriptures, be tried by their theory of interpretation, and they are failures. They not only cannot maintain the truths which they hold on those subjects ;—they cannot even show that they are themes of the sacred volume.

We have thus in the results to which their method of interpreting the prophecies leads in respect to other portions of the Scriptures, the most ample certainty of its erroneousness, and demonstration that the import we have ascribed to the predictions of the restoration of the Israelites, is their true and sole meaning.

This subject has, manifestly from these considerations, the highest claims to the most careful investigation, not only by the ministers of the gospel, but by the people of God generally. It is not only their duty to make themselves acquainted with what he has revealed in the prophecies for their instruction, but it is necessary in order to their enjoying a certainty in respect to the other teachings of his word.

We are aware that there are not a few, and persons from whom we might expect a wiser course, who will still either dismiss the subject with indifference, or repel it with aversion and ridicule ; some, under the pretence that it is unintelligible, as though they did not, in that judgment, act on an assumption, that if justifiable it is immeasurably more difficult to verify and explain, than to demonstrate and apply the principles by which the prophecies respecting the Israelites are to be interpreted. For they charge the Almighty with having chosen instruments for the communication of his will, that are wholly unsuited to it, that from their intricacy, indeterminateness, or susceptibility of opposite constructions, render it impossible to ascertain his real meaning. But do they evade difficulties by such an imputation ? Were such an act in the All-wise and All-good any more explicable than the prophecies themselves are ? Can these persons show how it can be consistent with infinite wisdom and rectitude to employ means that are wholly inappropriate to their end ;

that necessarily preclude its attainment? Have they risen to such a grasp of intelligence as to see that it is compatible with the justice of the Eternal to require men to exert acts and accomplish tasks to which their powers are wholly incommensurate ; to see what is invisible ; to comprehend what is incomprehensible ; to receive from him what he has not communicated? If not, if they cannot prove this accusation and make its consistency with his attributes intelligible, they should not offer it as a reason and justification of their neglect of his word. It is but an attempt to apologize for themselves by impeaching him ; to shield themselves from the charge of imperfection by traducing his infinite attributes !

But their impression that the prophecies are unintelligible, is wholly groundless. The difficulties with which they are embarrassed in the explication of them are altogether artificial, and the result of the false theories on which they proceed. Let them dismiss their preposterous views of the nature of metaphors and symbols, and interpret the prophetic word by its proper laws, and they will find no obstacle to the determination of its true meaning. It is as simple, as easily understood, and as demonstrable as any other branch of knowledge. There is no extraordinary intricacy in the metaphor, in the principles on which it is used, the criteria by which it is discriminated from other figures, or the rules by which it is to be interpreted. Nothing in the whole range of human inquiry is more easily understood, or in fact more familiar to the consciousness of all. Any one has but to pause and consider how it is that he is accustomed to use metaphors and interpret them, and the principles will be obvious and self-evident by which he is to construe those of the Scriptures. To allege an inability to comprehend them, as an excuse for not endeavoring to ascertain what it is that they are the means of revealing, is to plead an incompetence to master the simplest subject ;—to comprehend the principles on which language is used and construed every hour ; and to profess, therefore, to be wholly unfit for the office of a sacred teacher. But such a pretence cannot be admitted in respect to those who in effect allege it. They are as adequately endowed as others ; and many of them exhibit powers, and display a confidence in them in the treatment

of other themes, that render their self-depreciation in respect to this, contradictory and absurd.

Others will perhaps withhold from it their attention on the ground that it is not of sufficient moment to occupy their time;—that it is more a subject of curiosity than of duty; and that it will be wiser to devote their studies to other topics. A very unhappy method of displaying their discretion, to impeach the intelligence of the All-knowing, and discard the means he has instituted for their instruction and guidance in respect to the duties to which he calls them! But are they better able than he, to determine what is entitled to their attention, and will subserve their sanctification and usefulness? Are they competent to make that determination, before they have ascertained what it is that he has revealed in these prophecies? Ought they not at least to learn what it is that he has communicated, before they pronounce it unworthy of their consideration? Is it becoming, thus to impeach him of misjudgment in the structure of his word;—of assigning themes for their study, which are an obstacle, instead of an aid to their knowledge of him and his government? Are they any more justifiable in pronouncing this portion of his word unworthy of their attention, and excluding it from the faith of their fellow-men, than the Catholics are in a similar depreciation of the gospels and epistles? Is not such an arrogation of authority over it, as reprehensible in them as in Greek or Roman ecclesiastics? Are the great disclosures which he makes in it of no interest? Do they present nothing to enlarge the thoughts, and impress the heart? Has an administration that is to extend through eternal ages, nothing in it of greatness and awfulness? Does the purpose of God respecting the redemption of the world, present nothing to awe and overwhelm by the infinite interests which it is to affect? What are such sentiments, but a depreciation of the Almighty himself;—a detraction from the grandeur of Christ's work; a treatment of heaven, an immortal existence, and redemption as involving nothing of greatness and significance, that entitles them to consideration?

Others will, perhaps, with still greater zeal, attempt to justify their neglect and dislike of the subject, under the assumption that the designs which God is represented as here

revealing, are adapted to arrest the churches in their endeavors to convert the world, and induce them to abandon a work, that is not to be accomplished by their agency. But they can neither be aware of the results to which their own principles legitimately lead; nor of the influence which just views of the divine purposes are suited to exert. It is their own scheme, not God's, that is adapted to discourage endeavors to make known the gospel to the nations; and it is the prevalence of their views and misconceptions of God's designs, we believe, that is in fact the reason that so little zeal is felt to spread the news of salvation, and that such a struggle is necessary to induce the churches to sustain the organizations that have been instituted for that purpose: for, as we have already shown, on their system of interpretation, they have no authority, nor encouragement, in the word of God for their undertaking. They cannot show any command that construed by the theories of language which they apply to the prophecies, enjoins them to preach the gospel to all the world; they cannot allege a promise or assurance that God will attend their efforts with the influences of his Spirit; they cannot adduce from them any hint that the world is ever to be Christianized, and become obedient! Their views accordingly, if understood and sincerely received, would prove an insuperable obstacle to endeavors to enlighten and reform the nations. Instead of a work enjoined by God, it would sink to a mere human undertaking without any sanction from him; and in place of being encouraged by promises of his acceptance and co-operation, would have nothing to support it but the power of its projectors. If they were consistent, therefore, they would not make any more efforts to accomplish their schemes. It is only in disregard of their own principles that they go on. Every exertion they make, is in contradiction to themselves. Every appeal that they address to the consciences, the faith, the love, the zeal of God's people, to induce them to devote their wealth to the support of missionaries, the distribution of the Scriptures, and other Christian objects, is in contravention of the theory by which they discountenance the revelation which we have shown God has made, as unfriendly to the fulfilment of his commands. And one who wishes to evade

their solicitations and confute their arguments, has only to point out the relation of their theories of interpretation to their schemes of agency; and they will be silenced. Their whole procedure is turned into a system of delusion or quackery, as extravagant, as discreditable, and as absurd, as any of which fanatics or apostates are guilty! What a position for those who flatter themselves that they are intrusted with the task of converting the nations by their agencies, and are on the point of its accomplishment! How worthy of men who, or some of whom at least, deem themselves justified not only in dissenting from those who receive the revelation God has made of his designs; but in denouncing them as hostile to his cause, and misrepresenting and traducing them with a spirit which usually none but the most ignorant and most bigoted display! Let them pause! It will at least be the part of good sense to postpone their denunciations till they shall have become acquainted with the import of their own theories, and prepared themselves to vindicate them from the objections to which they are obnoxious! A candid examination of them, however, can have no other issue than a conviction that they are acting under a total misapprehension; that they are, in fact, themselves guilty of the opposition to God and the redemption of the world, which they now unjustly charge on those who receive his word in its genuine meaning, and witness to its truth.

So far, then, from there being any ground for the apprehension that the discussion of this subject, and the reception by the church of the designs which God has revealed respecting the redemption of the world, are adapted to discourage exertions for the christianization of the nations, it is only on the principles by which these designs are deduced from his word, that any encouragement or justification can exist for such efforts. But apart from this consideration, their apprehensions are wholly futile and absurd. On what ground can they hold that the expectation of Christ's advent is adapted to discourage efforts to evangelize the nations? Is it that the church can have no inducement to communicate the gospel to them, if their evangelization is not actually to be wrought by their agency;—if the Son of God is to interpose and

accomplish it by his presence and power? But do they expect to christianize the nations by their own independent agency? Do they not build their hope of success on the influences of the Holy Spirit? But if the necessity of his interposition to make the gospel efficacious, is no obstacle to their endeavoring to communicate it, why is the fact and expectation that Christ is to interpose to convince and convert the nations, when it has been made known to them, to prove such an obstacle? Is it not in either case to be wrought, not by human, but by divine power? Is not the glory to be wholly God's? And is it not his prerogative to determine in what form he will exert his omnipotence for its accomplishment? What can be more unbecoming in his people than to refuse obedience to his commands, and dismiss their interest in the redemption of men, unless he pleases to make it the consequence of their agency, and yields to them the gratification and honor of its achievement? But it is his purpose, in place of indulging the vanity and ambition of creatures, to demonstrate their weakness, and confound their pride. The loftiness of men is to be cast down at that dread moment, and the height of man brought low, and God alone exalted.

Is it on the ground that his people can be under no obligation to proclaim the gospel and endeavor to christianize the nations, unless their agency is actually to be the means of its accomplishment? Do they owe, then, no absolute allegiance to God? Has his command to preach the gospel to all nations, no title to their obedience, except on conditions which they may prescribe? Does their obligation to obey him, depend on their being assured that he will make their agency the means of the good which they aim to effect by it? Have they a certainty that the efforts they are now making to convert men, are actually to be the means of sanctifying and saving them? What can surpass the folly of thus alleging an objection that is as applicable to themselves, as it can be to those against whom they urge it; which denies the right of God to command and the duty of men to obey; and if legitimate, therefore, demonstrates that they can never, in any circumstances, be under an imperative obligation to make exertions for the christianization of the nations?

Is it that an expectation of Christ's speedy advent and

redemption of the world by his own power, must necessarily repress the zeal of his people in his service, and generate indifference to his commands? What more revolting solecism could be uttered? What grosser contradiction to the laws of our nature? Does the expectation of being speedily summoned to his presence usually produce such an effect? Do his disciples become regardless of his commands, and uninterested in the welfare of those for whom he died, as they find themselves about to ascend to the grandeurs of his kingdom? Does their eagerness to retain possession of their wealth, and indisposition to devote it to him, increase as they approach the moment when it is for ever to pass from their hands? If not, why should the prospect of Christ's speedy advent produce such unnatural effects? Why should they become animated with avarice, as they realize the vanity of wealth? Why should their disposition to rebel acquire new strength, as they become aware that they are immediately to be called to his bar? Why should his authority over them decline, as his designs are understood; and the motives to obey him lose their influence, as they are augmented in strength, and strike the heart with a deeper impression?

The objection is founded in every relation on misconception, and is absurd. It might as well be assumed that as the redeemed pass from life into the presence of the Eternal, they must become indifferent to his will, and indisposed to his service. So far from depressing the zeal, and discouraging the efforts of God's people to evangelize the nations, the knowledge and belief of his designs are indispensable to a just appreciation of the motives that should prompt to it. They will never, without them, comprehend the nature of the work to which they are called, realize its greatness, nor feel the beauty and blessedness of devoting themselves with all their energies to its accomplishment. Could the churches of this country be brought to a full understanding of this subject, it would add a hundred fold to their intelligence, faith, earnestness, and liberality, and God would crown their labors with a proportional success. And that time is at length to come, and we trust with no long delay. It is clearly indicated in the prophecies that ere the great conflict arrives, the witnesses are to become aware of the approaching

advent of the Redeemer, and are to announce it to the nations. The heralds of Christ, who are symbolized by the angel flying through the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to proclaim to every nation, are to enforce their exhortation to fear God and worship him who made the heaven and earth and seas, and fountains of waters, by the warning that the hour of his judgment is come; by which Babylon is to be overthrown, and the wild beast and false prophet destroyed. When that realization takes possession of the pure worshippers universally, their unbelief, worldliness, and ambition of honors and authority, will give way to awe, faith, love, and zeal. They will delight to consecrate their possessions, and devote their lives to him. His service, instead of a drudgery, will be a joy; and the redemption of the world, in place of a remote and doubtful event, become a present reality and invested with immeasurable grandeur.

ART. IV.—NARRATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES' EXPEDITION to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea, by W. F. Lynch, U.S.N., Commander of the Expedition. Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1849.

THIS expedition was proposed by Lieutenant Lynch to the Secretary of the Navy in the spring of 1847, and on receiving his sanction the requisite preparations were made by organizing the party, procuring the necessary instruments, and constructing a couple of metallic boats, one of copper, and one of galvanized iron. The party consisted, besides the commander, of a lieutenant, a midshipman, ten seamen, and a botanist. H. Bedlow, Esq., joined them at Constantinople, and H. Anderson, M.D., who acted as physician and geologist, in Syria. They sailed in November, in a vessel, of which Lieutenant Lynch had command, laden with stores for the squadron in the Mediterranean. On reaching Smyrna, he proceeded to Constantinople, and procured from the Sultan a firman authorizing him to explore the Jordan and Dead Sea, and ordering the Pashas, through whose territories he was to pass,

to yield him protection and render him such assistance as he might need. They reached the coast of Syria near the close of March, 1848, and after touching at Beirût, proceeded to St. Jean d'Acre, where they landed; and having made the necessary arrangements, by procuring horses, camels, and a small Arab escort, they, on the 2d of April, commenced their journey to Tiberias, on the lake of Genesareth, nearly east of St. Jean d'Acre, and at a distance of about thirty miles. The boats were mounted on wheels and drawn by camels. The country is extremely broken and precipitous;—rising now into rocky ridges one thousand or fifteen hundred feet in height,—and now descending into deep valleys. There is no regular road, and no wheeled vehicle perhaps ever before passed over that line. The hills, and many of the vales, are wholly bare of trees; many of the slopes were sown with grain, and the vales and sides of the hills adorned with a profusion of brilliant flowers. Tiberias, which they reached on the sixth, is one of the principal abodes of the Jews in Palestine. About one thousand now reside there. They have several synagogues, and are zealous in their worship. The party launched their boats on the lake, and on the tenth of April began the descent of the Jordan. Dr. Anderson, Mr. Bedlow, and Mr. F. E. Lynch, who had charge of the herbarium, proceeded with the Arab escort and the loaded camels along the bank of the river, keeping as near the boats as practicable to defend them if attacked, and halting at the same place at night. The Jordan runs, throughout its whole course from the lake to the Asphaltites, through a deep valley. Its banks are steep, its bed rocky, and its current rapid and extremely winding. He says:—

“The scenery as we left the lake and advanced into the Ghor, which is about three quarters of a mile in breadth, assumed rather a tame than a savage character. The rough and barren mountains, skirting the valley on each hand, stretched far away in the distance, like walls to some gigantic fosse, their southern extremities half hidden or entirely lost in a faint purple mist.”—P. 172.

When the current was strong they only used the oars to keep the boats in the channel, and floated with the stream.

When practicable the boats were taken round the most dangerous rapids in a side channel ; at others unladen, and let down gradually by ropes, till they could be shot in the deepest current over the main descent. He gives the following description of one of those passages :—

“The current increasing as we descended, we come where the river, for more than three hundred yards, is one foaming rapid ; the fishing weirs and another ancient bridge obstructing the passage. There were cultivated fields on both sides. We took everything out of the boats, sent the men overboard to swim alongside to guide them, and shot them successively down the first rapid. The water was fortunately very deep to the first fall, where it precipitates itself over a ledge of rocks. The river becoming more shallow, we opened a channel by removing large stones, and as the current was now excessively rapid we pulled well out into the stream, bows up, let go a grapnel, and eased each boat down in succession. Below us were yet five successive falls, about eighteen feet in all, with rapids between—a perfect break down in the bed of the river. It was very evident that the boats could not descend them.

“On the right, opposite to the point where the weirs and the ruined bridge blocked up the bed of the river, is a canal or sluice, evidently made for the purpose of feeding a mill, the ruins of which are visible a short distance below. This, at its outlet from the river, is sufficiently broad and deep to admit of the boats entering and proceeding a short distance.

“Bringing them thus far, we again took everything out of them, and cleared away the stones, bushes, and other obstructions between the mill sluice and the river. A breach was then made in the bank of the sluice, and as the water rushed down the artificial channel, with infinite labor our men, cheerfully assisted by a number of Arabs, bore them down the rocky slope and launched them in the bed of the river,—but not below all danger, for a sudden descent of six or seven feet was yet to be cleared, and some eighty yards of swift and shallow current to be passed before reaching an unobstructed channel.

“We accomplished this difficult passage after severe labor up to our waists in water for upwards of four hours. . . . We were surrounded by many strange Arabs, and had stationed one of our men by the blunderbuss in the bows of the Uncle Sam—a wooden boat obtained at the lake—and one by each of the other boats, while the remainder proceeded to bring down the arms.”—Pp. 177, 178.

The banks are in some places fifty or sixty feet high ; at

others only fifteen or twenty. Clusters of white and pink • oleanders bloom along the margin of the water. The soil of the narrow plain, between the river and the range of low hills that usually bounds it, is fertile, but generally uncultivated. The population is thin and extremely unsettled. Those who navigated the boats lodged at night in the camp of the land party, and always set sentinels and slept with their arms at their sides, to guard against attacks by the Arabs. They reached on the twelfth a rapid of still greater difficulty.

“ We shot down the first rapid, and stopped to examine more closely a desperate looking cascade of eleven feet. In the middle of the channel is a shoot at an angle of about sixty degrees, with a bold, bluff, threatening rock at its foot, exactly in the passage. It would therefore be necessary to turn almost at a sharp angle in descending, to avoid being dashed to pieces. This rock was on the outer edge of the whirlpool, which a caldron of foam swept round and round in circling eddies. Yet below were two fierce rapids, each about one hundred and fifty yards in length, with the points of black rocks peering above the white and agitated surface. Fortunately a large bush was growing upon the left bank about five feet up, where the wash of the water from above had formed a kind of promontory. By swimming across some distance up the stream, one of the men had carried over the end of a rope, and made it fast around the roots of the bush. In order not to risk the men, I employed some of the most vigorous Arabs in the camp to swim by the side of the boats, and guide them, if possible, clear of danger. Landing the men, therefore, and tracking the *Fanny Mason* up stream, we shot her across, and gathering in the slack of the rope, let her drop to the brink of the cascade, where she fairly trembled and bent in the fierce strength of the sweeping current. It was a moment of intense anxiety. The sailors had now clambered along the banks and stood at intervals below, ready to assist us, if thrown from the boat and swept towards them. One man with me in the boat stood by the line; a number of naked Arabs were upon the rocks and in the foaming water gesticulating wildly, their shouts mingling with the noise of the boisterous rapids, and their dusky forms contrasting strangely with the effervescing flood, and four on each side in the water were clinging to the boat, ready to guide her clear of the threatening rock if possible. The *Fanny Mason* in the meanwhile swayed from side to side of the mad torrent, like a frightened steed, straining the line which held her. Watching the moment when her bows were brought in the right direc-

tion, I gave the signal to let go the rope. There was a rush, a plunge, an upward leap, and the rock was cleared, the pool was passed, and half full of water, with breathless velocity, we were swept safely down the rapid. Such screaming and shouting! The Arabs seemed to exult more than ourselves. Two of them lost their hold and were carried far below us, but were rescued with a slight injury to one of them."—Pp. 189, 190.

The other boat soon followed in safety. They passed a short distance below, a bridge, on the road from Nabulus to Damascus, of four Saracenic arches below and six above. The river is there deep, narrow, and impetuous. There are two terraces to the river. Through the lower it runs its perpetually winding course. Above is another of low hills, like truncated cones, that extends to the base of the mountains. The hill sides, which are wholly without vegetation, have the appearance, in many places, of chalk, and reflect the glare of the sun with a dazzling brightness. There were many water-fowls on the river, and wild storks, pigeons, and other birds on the land. The nightingale was often heard at night. There were here and there patches of wheat and barley on either side, that were nearly ready for harvest. Where the soil is not cultivated, thistles and wild grass prevail. As the river descends towards the sea, trees are more frequent along its banks, and form in some places a continuous line for a long distance. It embosoms many islands, also, that are covered with rich vegetation.

"Its course forms a never ending series of serpentine curves, sometimes dashing along in rapids by the base of a mountain; sometimes flowing between low banks, generally lined with trees and fragrant with blossoms. Some places present views extremely picturesque, the rapid rushing of a torrent, the song and sight of birds, the overhanging trees, and glimpses of the mountains far over the plain; and here and there a gurgling rivulet pouring its tribute of pure water into the river."—P. 217.

"The prevailing trees on the banks are the willow, the ghurrah, and the tamarisk; the last was beginning to blossom. Of the many flowers, the oleander was the most abundant, contrasting finely with the white fringe blossom of the asphodel. Where the banks are low, the cane is ever at the water's edge. The lower plain was covered with a luxuriant

growth of wild oats, and patches of wild mustard in full flower."—Pp. 218, 219.

They determined as they descended the river the astronomical position of every encampment, and its relative level with the Mediterranean; and sketched throughout the topography of the river and the valley. It is in its perpetual windings and numerous rapids that the explanation is found of the difference of the level of the lake Tiberias and the Dead Sea. In a space of sixty miles of latitude and four or five of longitude, it traverses at least two hundred miles, and plunges down twenty-seven threatening rapids, besides a great number that are of slighter descent. They reached the vicinity of the Dead Sea on the seventeenth, and encamped on the bank of the river, and so near the place where Christian pilgrims go to bathe, as to be disturbed by a company of them the next morning.

"We were aroused at 3 A.M. by the intelligence that the pilgrims were coming. Rising in haste we beheld thousands of torch lights with a dark mass beneath, moving rapidly over the hills. Striking our tents with precipitation we hurriedly removed them and all our effects a short distance to the left. We had scarce finished when they were upon us;—men, women, and children, mounted on camels, horses, mules, and donkeys, rushed impetuously by towards the bank. They presented the appearance of fugitives of a routed army. Our Bedawin friends, sticking their tufted spears before our tents, mounted their steeds, and formed a military cordon around us. But for them we should have been run down, and our effects trampled upon and lost.

"The party that had disturbed us was the advanced guard of the great body of the pilgrims. At the dawn of day the last made its appearance, coming over the crest of a high ridge in one tumultuous and eager throng. In all the wild haste of a disorderly rout, Copts and Russians, Poles, Armenians, Greeks, and Syrians, from all parts of Asia, from Europe, from Africa, and from far distant America, on they came;—men, women, and children, of every age and hue, and in every variety of costume, talking, screaming, shouting, in almost every known language under the sun. Mounted as variously as those who had preceded them, many of the women and children were suspended in baskets, or confined in cages, and with their eyes strained towards the river, heedless of all intervening obstacles, they hurried eagerly

forward, and dismounting in haste, and disrobing with precipitation, rushed down the bank, and threw themselves into the stream.

"They seemed absorbed in one impulsive feeling, and perfectly regardless of the observation of others. Each one plunged himself, or was dipped by another, three times below the surface, in honor of the Trinity; and then filled a bottle or some other utensil from the river. The bathing dress of many of the pilgrims was a white gown with a black cross upon it. Most of them as soon as they were dressed cut branches of the *agnus-castus*, or willow, and dipping them in the consecrated stream, bore them away as memorials of their visit.

"In an hour they began to disappear, and in less than three hours not a human shadow was cast on the lately crowded bank. The pageant disappeared as rapidly as it had approached, and left to us once more the silence and solitude of the wilderness."—Pp. 261, 262.

They soon embarked and entered the Dead Sea. The river is at its mouth 180 yards wide and three feet deep. They were exposed to some hazard as they passed on to the sea.

"A fresh north-west wind was blowing as we rounded the point. We endeavored to steer a little to the north of west to make a true west course, and threw the patent log overboard to measure the distance; but the wind rose so rapidly that the boats could not keep head to the wind, and we were obliged to haul the log in. The sea continued to rise with the increasing wind, which gradually freshened to a gale, and presented an agitated surface of foaming brine; the spray, evaporating as it fell, left incrustations of salt upon our clothes, our hands and faces; and while it caused a prickly sensation wherever it touched the skin, was above all exceedingly painful to the eyes. The boats, heavily laden, struggled sluggishly at first; but when the wind freshened in its fierceness, from the density of the water, it seemed as if their bows were encountering the sledge hammers of the Titans, instead of the opposing waves of an angry sea. . . .

"The wind soon abated, and with it the sea as rapidly fell; the water, from its ponderous quality, settling as soon as the agitating cause had ceased to act. Within twenty minutes from the time that we bore away from a sea that threatened to engulf us, we were pulling away, at a rapid rate, over a placid sheet of water that scarcely rippled beneath us; and a rain-cloud that had enveloped the sterile mountains of the Arabian shore, lifted up, and left their rugged outlines basking in the light of the setting sun. A light wind sprung up and huge clouds

drifted over, their western edges gorgeous with light, while the great masses were dark and threatening. The sun went down leaving beautiful islands of rose-colored clouds over the coast of Judea; but above the yet more sterile mountains of Moab, all was gloomy and obscure." Pp. 268-270.

They soon established their camp at Ain-Jidy, the ancient Engedi, situated on the western side, midway from the northern to the southern end of the sea, and proceeded to explore its waters and shores. They found, on sounding, that a deep channel runs along the centre from near the mouth of the Jordan, through two-thirds of its length. Its greatest depth is two hundred and eighteen fathoms. Its sides are very abrupt. A narrow terrace, on which the water is but twenty-five to thirty fathoms deep, intervenes between it and the eastern shore. On the western side, the bottom gradually declines outward for a mile or more to a depth of sixty or seventy fathoms, when it falls to one hundred and twenty or one hundred and thirty. The sea, at the south of this interior gulf, is generally quite shallow. Its breadth at the widest part is about nine, and its length forty miles. The mountains on the western side approach near the sea, and terminate in precipitous bluffs several hundred feet high. Near the southern extremity is the pillar of salt to which Josephus and some of the early fathers refer.

"We saw, on the eastern side of Usdum, one third the distance from its north extreme, a lofty round pillar, standing apparently detached from the general mass, at the head of a deep, narrow, and abrupt chasm. We immediately pulled in for the shore, and Dr. Anderson and I went up and examined it. The beach is a soft, slimy mud, encrusted with salt, and, a short distance from the water, covered with saline fragments and flakes of bitumen. We found the pillar to be of solid salt, capped with carbonate of lime, cylindrical in front and pyramidal behind. The upper or rounded part is about forty feet high, resting on a kind of oval pedestal, from forty to sixty feet above the level of the sea. It slightly decreases in size upwards, crumbles at the top, and is one entire mass of crystallization. A prop, or buttress, connects it with the mountain behind, and the whole is covered with debris of a light stone color. Its peculiar shape is doubtless attributable to the action of the winter rains."—P. 307.

The scene at the southern extremity of the sea is represented as extremely dreary and desolate. On the west side is the salt mountain of Usdum, rising to a great height, rugged and worn, with its conspicuous pillar. On the east are the lofty and barren cliffs of Moab, in one of the caves of which Lot found shelter. To the south is an extensive flat intersected by numerous drains, with the high hills of Edom in the distance; and at the north the calm and motionless sea, curtained with a purple mist, and holding in its depths, the ruins of Sodom and Gomorrah. The glare of light in the day is blinding, the air difficult of respiration, from the exhalations with which it is charged, and the heat insupportable. While exploring that part of the sea they were overtaken by a sirocco.

"A hot, blistering hurricane struck us from the south-east, and for some moments we feared being driven out to sea. The thermometer rose immediately to 102°. The men, closing their eyes to shield them from the fiery blast, were obliged to pull with all their might to stem the rising waves, and after an hour, physically exhausted, we gained the eastern shore. My eyelids were blistered by the hot wind, being unable to protect them, from the necessity of steering the boat.

"We landed on the south side of the peninsula near Wady Humeir, the most desolate spot upon which we had yet encamped. Some went up the ravine to escape the stifling wind; others, driven back by the glare, returned to the boats and crouched under the awnings. One mounted spectacles to protect his eyes, but the metal became so heated that he was obliged to remove them. Our arms and the buttons on our coats became almost burning to the touch; and the inner folds of our garments were cooler than those exposed to the immediate contact of the wind. We bivouacked without tents on a dry marsh, a few dead bushes around us, and some of the thorny nūbk, and a tree bearing a red berry a short distance inland, with low canes on the margin of the sea.

"Finding the heat intolerable, we walked up the dry torrent bed in search of water. Found two pools, not stagnant, the water flowing from the upper to the lower one. Washed and bathed in one of them, but the relief was only momentary. In one instant after leaving the water, the moisture on the surface evaporated and left the skin parched and stiff.

"Coming out from the ravine the sight was a singular one. The

wind had increased to a tempest; the two extremities and the western shore of the sea were curtained by a mist, on this side of a purple hue, on the other a yellow tinge; and the red and rayless sun, in the bronzed clouds, had the appearance it presents when looked at through smoked glass. . . .

"The heat rather increased than lessened after the sun went down. At 8 p. m. the thermometer was 106° five feet from the ground; and at one foot, 104°. The wind was more like the blast of a furnace than living air."—Pp. 312–314.

The heat of the valley, and perhaps the exhalations with which the air is impregnated, produced extreme drowsiness. He says that in crossing the sea on their return to Ain-Jidy, their disposition to sleep was almost irresistible. The men pulled mechanically with half closed lids, and except those at the oar, and himself, every one in the boat was asleep. The necessity of steering and directing alone kept him awake. The drowsy sensation, amounting almost to stupor, was greatest in the heat of the day, but did not disappear at night. The sea assumes at times a peculiarly sombre aspect. Unstirred by the wind, it lies smooth and gleamy like a mirror. The great evaporation envelopes it in a thin transparent vapor, of a purple tinge, that contrasts strangely with the singular color of the water beneath; and when they blend at a distance, gives it the appearance of smoke from burning sulphur. It seems a vast caldron of metal fused, but motionless. Its density is such that a muscular man erect, floats with shoulders out without exertion.

Mr. Dale, Dr. Anderson, and Mr. Bedlow, visited Sebbeh, supposed to be the ancient Masada of Herod, near the beach, several miles south of Ain-Jidy, where, on the top of the mountain, having a precipitous front of twelve hundred feet, there are vast excavations in the rocks, of cisterns, chambers, and galleries; and above, remains of massy walls and towers extending upwards of a mile. The whole party visited Kerak, the capital of Moab, where, in vassalage to the Mahometans, there is a small body of Arabs who bear the Christian name. They found there massy structures that were erected at the period of the crusades. Kerak is situated on a height three thousand feet above the sea.

"The castle, partly cut out of, and partly built upon the mountain top, presents the remains of a magnificent structure; its citadel, cut off from the tower by a ditch-ravine. It seems to be Saracenic, although in various parts it has both the pointed Gothic and the rounded Roman arch. A steep glacis-wall skirts the whole. The walls now partly standing, are composed of heavy, well-cut stones, and there were seven arched store-houses, one above the other, with narrow slits for defence. The part used as the chapel was evidently built in the times of the crusades, and the east end, where the altar stood, was least demolished; for these buildings have been devastated by the hand of man. . . . Against the walls are pilasters and parts of columns, with sculptured ornaments, and upon the ceiling are traces of fresco paintings. The vast extent of this magnificent castle filled us with astonishment. It has five gates, and seven wells and cisterns, and the whole summit is perforated by subterranean passages. From the narrow embrasures of the vaulted chambers, we looked down into the ravine, green with fields of grain, and the shrubbery of oleanders, and upon a part of the sea in the distance."—P. 358.

On their return from Kerak, they proceeded to explore the eastern shore of the sea. The Arnon, which enters it nearly opposite Ain-Jidy, traverses the rocky ridge that runs along the shore in a channel of great depth. The chasm, which at the termination is about one hundred feet wide, is formed by high perpendicular cliffs of red, brown, and yellow sandstone, worn by the rains into fantastic forms, and seems the work of art. It runs into the mountain a short distance in a direct line, and then pursues a winding course like a stream running over a level surface. The Zerka, which enters the sea ten miles further north, passes through the mountain in a similar channel.

They completed their explorations on the fifth of May, having determined the geographical position of the sea, ascertained its depth, examined the topography of its shores, noted the temperature, width, depth, and velocity of its tributaries, observed the winds, currents, changes of the weather, and other atmospheric phenomena, and collected specimens of the plants, minerals, and animals, found on its shores. The facts developed by the examination are confirmatory of the sacred history, that the valley was once a plain, and was sunk by an extraordinary catastrophe.

"The bottom of the sea consists of *two* submerged plains, an elevated and a depressed one; the first *averaging thirteen*, the last *thirteen hundred* feet below the surface. Through the northern and largest and deepest one, in a line corresponding with the bed of the Jordan, is a ravine, which corresponds with the elevated ravine, in a ravine at the south end of the sea."—P. 378.

It had become desirable to quit the scene, as the health of the whole party had become impaired. Every one "had assumed a dropsical appearance; the lean had become stout, the stout almost corpulent; the pale faces had become florid, and those which were florid ruddy;" and the skin wherever injured became inflamed.

Having taken their boats apart and placed them on camels, they left the sea on the 10th of May for Jerusalem; and after a short stay there, proceeded to the Mediterranean, levelling as they advanced, to determine the relative elevation of the two seas. They struck the Mediterranean near Jaffa. He says:

"We had carried a line of levels from the chasm of the Dead Sea through the Desert of Judea, over precipices and mountain-ridges, and down and across yawning ravines, and for much of the time beneath a scorching sun. . . . We found the depression of the surface of the Dead Sea below that of the Mediterranean, to be a little over thirteen hundred feet. The height of Jerusalem above the former sea is very nearly three times that of this difference of level."—Pp. 439, 440.

They soon proceeded from Jaffa to St. Jean d'Acre, and thence to Nazareth, up the Jordan to its source, and to Baalbeck. On returning to Beirût, Mr. Dale, the second in command, and a most efficient officer, died in consequence of the debility contracted at the Dead Sea, and by the exposure and fatigue of the subsequent surveys and journeys. After some delay at Beirût, they proceeded in a French brig to Malta, where they embarked on board their own vessel, and in December arrived in the United States.

Lieutenant Lynch is excellently fitted for such an undertaking by enthusiasm, resolution, coolness, and tact in managing the rude and lawless beings whom he encountered in his voyages and journeys; and he has presented a narrative of

the expedition that is highly instructive and entertaining. No other volume which we have read, has given us so clear and vivid a conception of the principal scenes which he has described.

Palestine presents in its desolation and ruin an impressive verification of the prophecies. Its condition is precisely that which was foreshown by Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the other prophets, and threatened by Jehovah at the institution of the law, as the punishment of apostasy. What a contrast its naked hills, its verdureless plains, and its deserted towns form to their fertility, beauty, and populousness in the prosperous periods of the Hebrew commonwealth! It was then adorned with fruit-trees, groves, and forests. The hills were cultivated to the summit. The valleys waved with flowers, vines, and harvests, and sustained immense herds and flocks. The population was probably many times greater than, smitten as it is with a curse, could now subsist in it. It is in its present condition as signal a monument of God's avenging justice, as the vale of Sodom. And it is in that relation that it is to be contemplated, in order to derive from it the moral impression it should make. To gaze at it in a mere geographical relation, without any reference to the cause of its depopulation and barrenness, were like looking at a corpse without any consideration that it was once a living form, and that it is sin that has struck it with ghastliness, and consigned it to dissolution.

But contemplated as the land of God's ancient people, which has been for ages converted into a waste because of their rebellion, which drove them into exile, by its refusal to yield them sustenance, and was swept of them by a long succession of conquerors, who transported those of them who escaped the sword, into distant regions, or sold them into captivity, what a spectacle it presents! What a conspicuous and terrible demonstration to the eye of the whole civilized world, that God reigns and verifies his word; that he has the attributes and purposes which he represents in his law; and that he conducts his providence in such a manner as to manifest his dominion, maintain his rights, and confute his enemies!

And what a display will he make of his power and faith-

fulness, when he repeals its curse, converts its wastes into fruitfulness, and causes its solitudes again to be thronged by his ransomed people! The purpose of recalling them from dispersion, freeing their land from the blight with which it is smitten, and causing them to dwell there for ever in obedience and blessedness, is worthy of his attributes. What a vindication of his perfections it will form! What a confutation of his enemies! What a proof that he is such a being as he represents in his word;—that his schemes of wisdom and love extend through eternal ages, have the worth which he ascribes to them, and cannot be thwarted by men! Were he not to restore them, his covenant with Abraham would be broken. Were he not to reinstate them in their ancient relation, the object of his adopting them as a peculiar people, would be in a degree abandoned. Their serving him in that station is an element in the scheme of his everlasting sway over the world. But in place of defeat, he is to triumph, intercept the plots of the great prince of evil, and make the rebellion of Israelites and Gentiles subserve the final redemption of the race through the round of endless ages.

The future destiny of Palestine is immeasurably grand. The events of which it is to be the theatre, are to be greater and more wonderful even, than, with the exception of Christ's birth and death, were those of the past. Christ is there to appear again in glory, redeem his people, and destroy his enemies. He is there to continue to display himself visibly and receive the homage of men through everlasting years. It is to be the metropolis of the ransomed world, the scene to which all nations are to go to offer worship, and receive communications from God. Its mountains and plains and vales, are to become a paradise, and millions of beings spring to existence and dwell there from age to age who are to serve him with a beauty befitting a ransomed race, and enjoy him with a perfection, worthy the grandeur of his benignity.

ART. V.—THE PRINCIPAL PREDICTED EVENTS THAT ARE TO
PRECEDE CHRIST'S COMING.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE conviction is now very generally felt that great and favorable changes are soon to take place in the civil and ecclesiastical affairs of the European kingdoms; that the governments which tyrannize over their subjects are to be divested of their mischievous powers; that the papal and other apostate churches are to be overthrown; and an era begin of a purer religion, and greater peace and prosperity. In respect, however, to the events that are to lead to that result, the causes from which they are to spring, or the condition to which they are to introduce the church and world, different views are held. The predictions which are supposed to relate to them are differently construed, and diverse and conflicting opinions entertained of the agencies to be exerted by the church, that are to affect them; the trials to which it is to be subjected; and the catastrophe that is to overwhelm its foes.

One of the most important subjects in debate, is the import of the sixth vial. Who are represented by the great river Euphrates? What is signified by its being dried? Who are symbolized by the kings of the east; and what is meant by the way that is to be prepared for them by the drying of the river? The Euphrates is commonly supposed to symbolize the Turkish empire, and its exhaustion to denote the decay and overthrow of that power. There is no construction perhaps of any other part of the Apocalypse in which commentators so generally unite. It is, we believe, however, wholly mistaken. It has no ground in analogy. There is no resemblance between a great river, and an empire, considered

- either as a territory or an organized government. Waters denote people, the subjects of rulers; not rulers themselves. or the territory over which they exercise jurisdiction. That construction also wholly disregards the relation of the Euphrates to Babylon, which was captured by the diversion of its waters from its channel. The drying of the river

which was used as the symbol, was like that undoubtedly which was wrought by Cyrus ; and the preparation of the way thereby for the kings of the east, like that which he made by the drying of the river for the entrance of the Persian and Median armies beneath its walls into Babylon. That preparation of a way, accordingly, is in order to a conquest of some power by the agents who are denoted by the kings from the sunrising. That power must of course be the mystical Babylon of the prophecy ; and that Babylon, consequently, must bear a relation to those whom the river represents, like that which the ancient city bore to the stream that ran beneath its walls, and contributed to its support and protection. But this relation of the river to the city, and of the drying of the waters to its conquest, is wholly overlooked by the interpreters who refer it to the Turkish empire. They treat the exhaustion of that which is denoted by the river, as without any reference to the overthrow of that which is represented by the Babylon of the prophecy ; and thence divest the symbol of its chief significance. They have nothing to which the river stands related, as a support and barrier. They have nothing which its drying can expose to an overthrow. They have no kings of the east, who, by its exhaustion, prepare a way for themselves for a conquest. They are as manifestly in error, therefore, as they would be were they to deny its whole import, or assign it any other false meaning ; and their error leads to a misconception of many important events that are now taking place, and a misjudgment in respect to those which are approaching. They are looking to Asia for a great occurrence of which the European kingdoms are to be the scene ; and to the Mahometan empire for a change of which the nationalized churches are to be the subject. A correction of their misconception, therefore, would work a greater change than almost any other in their views of the events that are to precede Christ's coming, and the redemption of the world.

Another important subject in respect to which differing and mistaken opinions prevail, is the import of great Babylon itself ;—some regarding her as the symbol of Rome as a material city ; and others of the papal church. She is, in fact, however, the representative, we believe, of the nationalized

hierarchies of the ten European kingdoms, whether Papal or Protestant. Their constructions, accordingly, lead to the most mistaken views of the import of her fall; those who regard her as the symbol of Rome as the capital of the Papal states, looking for her being engulfed by an earthquake, or overwhelmed by a volcano: and those who treat her as the symbol of the Papal church, for the dissolution of that communion, as the event denoted by her overthrow;—catastrophes affecting different bodies, and wholly unlike that which is to befall her.

Other symbols that are very diversely construed, are the sealing of the servants of God, the slaying and resurrection of the witnesses, and the proclamation of the gospel to the nations. The defective and mistaken constructions of these and other symbols, lead to corresponding misconceptions of the events that are occurring, and false views of the future. So great is the misunderstanding of them by some of the influential writers in Great Britain, that they regard all the important events that are to precede the advent of Christ as having taken place, and are looking for his speedy appearance. It is highly desirable that these misapprehensions should be corrected, and just views formed of the occurrences that are to fill up the period which is yet to elapse before the Redeemer's coming. The chief predictions respecting them, it is clearly indicated in the prophecies, are to be understood by the true worshippers, at the time of their fulfilment, and are to exert an important influence in guiding and sustaining them in their labors and trials. We propose, therefore, to point out the principal predictions that seem to be now fulfilling, and are to be accomplished anterior to the advent of the Redeemer.

What is the point, then, to which the accomplishment of the predictions of the Apocalypse has advanced? The first four vials were poured, we suppose, at the period of the French revolution, and the wars that followed to the last great battle in 1815. Those who felt the effects of the first vial, were the men who had the mark of the wild beast, and worshipped its image, which are the characteristics of the population generally of France, Spain, Portugal, and the other Catholic kingdoms that lie within the limits of the western Roman empire. The sores with which the bodies of

the men seen by the prophet, were smitten, are symbols of the sense of misery, the restless desires, the rancorous passions with which the *minds* of those whom they represent, were inflamed by the deprivation of their rights, and the harassing oppressions which they suffered from their civil and ecclesiastical rulers. The second vial had its fulfilment in the promiscuous slaughter of rulers and people in the French revolution; the sea which was converted to blood, denoting the people in their relation as subjects, and the fish which lived in it, the superior ranks who drew their official life from those over whom they exercised authority. The spectacle which that people presented when they had stained themselves with the blood of a million of their number, and put to death their king, queen, and princes, and a crowd of inferior officials, was such as a sea would exhibit, which was crimsoned with gore, and strewn with the carcasses of its fish that had died from its unhealthiness. The other nations of Europe denoted by the streams and fountains were the subject of the third vial, and the blood with which they were stained symbolized that which was shed in the wars that followed the French revolution; and they extended to all who had persecuted the people of God;—the population of France, Switzerland, Italy, all the kingdoms and principalities of Germany, England, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden; none that had shed the blood of saints and prophets, whether Catholic or Protestant, were exempted. The heat with which men were scorched under the fourth vial, denotes the torturing oppressions with which the civil rulers, symbolized by the sun, devoured their subjects at that period, and still torture and devour them. The sense of misery with which the minds of the European population have been filled by the tyranny of their rulers for the last fifty years, has been like that which they would have felt, had the heat of the sun's rays been heightened to such a degree as to scorch their bodies. What more striking symbol can be imagined of the restless inquietude, the torturing feeling of deprivation and injury by their rulers with which they are now universally filled! All these predictions have thus met, or are still meeting with the most exact and conspicuous verification. Every stroke in the delineation has a counterpart in the occurrences which

we have alleged as their fulfilment. The annals of Europe present no other combination of events that bear such a correspondence to the symbols.

The fifth vial poured on the throne of the wild beast, probably had its accomplishment partially in the fall of Bonaparte, Louis XVIII., and Charles X.; but met a far higher fulfilment in the revolutions of the last and present year, and is, perhaps, to receive a further verification in the overthrow of other dynasties, and the modification of other governments. The vial was poured on the throne of the wild-beast. The consequences designated by the prophecy, were that its kingdom was filled with darkness, and that its subjects gnawed their tongues for pain, and blasphemed the God of heaven because of their pains and their sores, and altered not from their deeds. The wild beast is the symbol of the civil rulers of the ten kingdoms that rose out of the ruins of the western Roman empire. This is clear from the express interpretation of the horns as the representatives of kings: and of the whole beast as the representative of civil rulers. "Power was given it over all kindreds and tongues and nations." As its horns, then, denote the monarchs of the ten kingdoms, its trunk and limbs must symbolize the persons that hold subordinate civil offices in their empires. The beast is, accordingly, expressly distinguished from its subjects, who receive its mark, and who wonder after and worship it. The ascription to it of a throne also, indicates that it is the representative of civil rulers, and rulers that exercise a monarchical government. What the effect was which the vial wrought on the throne, is not stated; and the reason perhaps is, that the influence of that which it symbolizes on the several dynasties is not the same. One is absolutely, at least for a period, overthrown. Others are for a season suspended by the flight of the monarchs; and others still are weakened and subjected to important limitations by forced concessions to their subjects. The only effect that is mentioned of the effusion of the vial was, that the beast's kingdom was filled with darkness. Let us conceive that as the revolutionary agitation of 1848 spread from Paris over France and the whole of the ten kingdoms, a cloud of pitchy darkness had descended and enveloped that territory. The condition of

the rulers and people as physical beings, in such a night of gloom, would be such as their condition was and is in a political relation under the changes wrought by those assaults on the monarchies. As, were their territory wrapped in impenetrable darkness, they would be isolated from each other, incapable of acting in concert, uncertain of each other's condition and purposes, and filled with fears and alarms ;—so the population of France, Italy, and Germany, especially, were and still are, in a political respect, in a great degree disorganized, uncertain of each other, unable to act in harmony, and agitated with apprehension and alarm. The parties into which they are divided have groped, and still grope, as though blindfolded. They have achieved nothing as they expected, but like men who have lost their way, have gone universally in a cross direction. Their greatest, and apparently best defined movements, have issued in events that are the opposites of those at which they aimed. The French revolution, instead of yielding occupation and abundance to the laborers of Paris, deprived them of employment and reduced them to beggary and starvation. The new government, in place of securing to the people the liberty which they anticipated, is, in many respects, more tyrannical than the monarchy which they overthrew. Many of the men who were chiefly instrumental in establishing the republic, instead of obtaining the political stations, and enjoying the influence which they expected, have sunk into neglect, or been driven into exile. The new administration, in place of favoring the liberty of other nations, has overturned the republic instituted at Rome, and attempted to reinvest the pope with the worst species of despotic power. The king of Belgium, who was ready to abdicate, had his people desired it, seems to have held his sceptre with a surer grasp than any other monarch of Germany. The Austrian government, which appeared less likely to feel the shock of revolution, has been in greater danger than any other of subversion. Metternich, who was thought to be more thoroughly master of the art of despotic rule, and more likely than any other minister to maintain his position, was the most easily baffled, and the most thoroughly divested of his power. The pope, who from his pretensions to the vicegerency of God and

infallibility, it might have been expected, would be the most reluctant to quit his station, and if overwhelmed, fall with a degree of stateliness, was more easily induced than any other prince to abandon his throne, and in a form the most undignified and abject. The population of Rome, which seemed less capable than any other of self-government, and less likely to offer a brave and effective resistance to a foreign foe, has conducted itself in a more orderly manner, displayed a nobler patriotism, and made a bolder and more strenuous struggle for the defence of its liberties, than the people of any other capital that has been the scene of revolution. The Austrian monarchy, which has ever been fearful and jealous of Russia, has, by inviting the Czar to assist in the conquest of Hungary, assumed the relation of a dependent on him, and probably placed it in his power hereafter, without regard to the wishes of Austria, to pursue what policy he pleases in respect to the principalities on the lower Danube and the Turkish empire. The course of rulers and subjects has thus in every respect been the converse of that which it was natural to expect. The people, especially, have missed their object in every effort they have made. There is no symbol that could more fitly represent the perplexities in which they have been involved, and the manner in which they have been baffled, than that of the prophecy. They have moved and striven like men who rush to and fro in the dark, without knowing in what direction it is they are going, or whether the measures they are pursuing will contribute to their safety or add to their dangers. This extraordinary correspondence of their condition with the prediction is, together with the verification of the vials that preceded it, an ample demonstration of the legitimacy of this application.

What then is to be the issue of this strife? It is still to be characterized by the disappointment of the people. Though they may succeed in a degree in some of their aims, they are not to gain the great objects of their desire. The men beheld by the prophet in the vision, "gnawed their tongues for pain, and blasphemed the God of heaven because of their pains and their sores, and changed not from their deeds." The multitude whom they represent are to be chagrined, tortured, and maddened by the failures and disasters with which they are

to be obstructed and baffled. They are to accuse God of injustice in leaving them still to suffer the deprivations and tyrannies which are the causes of the torturing passions denoted by the sores, and of the oppressions signified by the scorching heat; and they are to go on unreformed. Defeats and disappointments have thus far been most conspicuously the result of their endeavors. In what sudden, unexpected, and surprising disasters, miseries, and despair, the struggles of the people of Paris issued! How completely have the inhabitants of Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Genoa, Milan, Florence, Naples, and other cities, been thwarted in their efforts for liberty! In what a terrible catastrophe the revolt of the Sicilians terminated! How humiliating was the defeat of the Irish conspirators? How have the Germans been balked in their endeavors to establish a common representative government! How has Hungary fallen! And with what exasperating reverses and defeats have many of the leaders of the revolutions been overwhelmed! What an indubitable and conspicuous correspondence these events present to the symbol? Its other representations are doubtless meeting a similar fulfilment. The people of France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Portugal, certainly exhibit no signs of a reformation from the evil deeds to which they have been accustomed; and it is in accordance with their false views that they should impeach God of injustice in leaving them to experience such defeats and suffer such miseries. And this will doubtless still be their course as long as the present struggle continues.

We have then in these great and wonderful events extending through upwards of fifty years, affecting the whole population of the ten kingdoms, embracing a vast crowd of extraordinary agents, and forming together a combination of occurrences unlike any other of which the world was ever the theatre, the most convincing indications of the point to which the predictions of the Apocalypse have been fulfilled; and looking from this position, may discern with a good degree of certainty what the chief great events are that are still to take place, anterior to the final overthrow of the apostate powers, and establishment of the millennial kingdom.

One of the most important and probably the nearest of these is the alienation of their subjects from the nationalized

hierarchies, denoted by the drying of the river Euphrates. That this is the true import of the prediction there is, we believe, no rational ground to doubt. The symbol is unquestionably taken from the diversion of that river from its channel, by Cyrus, in order to the conquest of Babylon. That which the symbolic Euphrates denotes must, therefore, bear a relation to that for which the Babylon of the prophecy stands, like that which the literal river bore to the material city beneath whose walls it ran; and the drying of that which the river denotes must be in order to the conquest of that which the city represents, as the exhaustion of the river by Cyrus was to the conquest of the city itself. But the Babylon of the prophecy is the representative of the nationalized hierarchies of the ten kingdoms. She represents the same body as the woman seated on the wild beast and bearing on her brow the denominative, "Mystery, great Babylon, the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth." This is clear from the identity of the names, and the express representation that the woman is the great city which holds empire over the kings of the earth. She is not the symbol of civil rulers, as she is distinguished from the wild beast to which *the whole civil power* over the kindreds, and peoples, and nations, is given; and from the kings, with whom she is exhibited as committing fornication. She is not the representative of the apostate churches at large, including their unofficial members, as well as their ecclesiastics, for she is discriminated from the inhabitants of the earth, whom she has made drunk with her wine. She must, therefore, be the representative of the ministers of the church, or the nationalized hierarchies, as besides the unofficial members of the churches or people and the civil rulers, there is no other class in the ten kingdoms that can be represented by her. That the nationalized hierarchies are the body whom she symbolizes, is seen also from the station of the woman on the wild beast. As she was supported by that symbol of the civil rulers; so the hierarchies are legalized, furnished with their revenues, and sustained in the exercise of their power by their several civil governments; and they are the only part of the church which receives from them those offices. In like manner all the other marks that distinguish her have an exact counterpart in the

nationalized hierarchies ; while they are neither found in any other body, nor is there any other contemporaneous body from which she is not expressly discriminated that can possibly be the subject of them. There is the most absolute certainty, therefore, that they are the organizations which she represents.

Such, then, being the part of the church which great Babylon denotes, the river must be the symbol of a body that bears a relation to the nationalized hierarchies like that which the Euphrates bore to the material Babylon ; and the dissipation of that which the Euphrates represents, must be in order to an overthrow of those hierarchies, in like manner as the diversion of the river from its channel was in order to the conquest of the city that was made accessible by it. We are accordingly expressly told that the river was dried by the vial, *that the way might be prepared for the kings from the sunrising*, who are, therefore, to assail and conquer it, as Cyrus and Darius, the monarchs of Media and Persia, by their armies entered by the channel which the diversion of the river prepared for them, and conquered the literal Babylon. What body, then, is there that sustains a relation to the nationalized hierarchies, like that of the Euphrates to Babylon, so that its dissipation, diversion to another channel, or transference from their jurisdiction, would expose them to an overthrow ? Undoubtedly the members of their churches, or the people over whom they have authority. They live under the sway of those hierarchies, as the Euphrates passed under the walls, and through the midst of Babylon. They are the source of their support, and means of their strength and security, as the Euphrates was to Babylon ; and their alienation, or withdrawal would weaken the hierarchies and expose them to an overthrow, as Babylon was made accessible by the diversion of the river from its channel. And finally, that they are the body denoted by the symbol is made certain by the fact that waters are interpreted in the prophecy as the representatives of peoples ; and that there are no other persons who stand in such a relation to the hierarchies as answers to the symbol.

What change then in the relations of the unofficial members of the churches to their hierarchies is denoted by the

drying of the river? Their alienation and withdrawal from the nationalized churches undoubtedly. To leave them and enter other communions, form new combinations, or wholly disconnect themselves with the church, will be to the hierarchies what the diversion of the Euphrates was to Babylon. It will weaken them and expose them to an overthrow; inasmuch as the power and disposition of the civil rulers to sustain them must diminish, in proportion as it is unacceptable to their subjects; and when their unpopularity reaches such a height that the governments can no longer safely uphold them, they must be repudiated, or divested of their nationalization.

This great movement has already begun. The attention of the people of Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, has been drawn, for twenty-five years especially, in a greater measure than ever before, to the enormous burthens to which they are subjected for the support of the hierarchies, and the civil disabilities that are annexed to dissent, and as the spirit of liberty has spread, a desire has been generated to be released from their tyranny, and obtain a religious freedom like that which is enjoyed in this country. A large secession has already taken place from the church of Scotland. An active and efficient society has been formed in England for the purpose of procuring the denationalization of the establishment. The subject is discussed by lecturers and in periodicals, and has become a theme of great interest. Much doubt is felt by many of the clergy of the propriety of a part of the canons and some of the services of the church. A deep dissatisfaction pervades the people with the mode in which its revenues are raised and its offices administered; and a great combination of causes is influencing them, which seems likely, at no distant period, to beget a general wish that the connexion of the church with the state should be terminated. Still more powerful causes,—the profligacy, superstition, and tyranny of the clergy, indifference, a desire of freedom, infidelity, are producing similar results on the continent. The clergy of all denominations have lost much of their influence; a vast proportion of the people have become alienated from the establishments; many of the Catholics of Germany, and a part of the Protestants of Switzerland, have

formally withdrawn from them. Could the disposition of the people generally be fully made known, we doubt not their alienation would be found to have advanced much further than is apparent ; and the right of toleration which was granted in the constitutions of last year, and the passionate desire for liberty which has seized the people generally, are likely greatly to augment it. The change of the policy of the pope, his hostility to the republic which was instituted on his flight from Rome, and his restoration by a foreign power, and re-commencement of a despotic sway, will probably contribute important influences to promote it, by arraying the friends of liberty throughout the Catholic kingdoms in a political antagonism to him and the nationalized hierarchies that yield him allegiance and support his measures. This has indeed already taken place in a degree. An address to the people of Rome by a popular club of that city was published soon after the fall of the free government, urging them to abandon the church of the popes and adopt that of the primitive age, as the most efficient means left them of overturning the civil power of the ecclesiastics ; and obtained, it is said, a great circulation and met an almost universal assent. But whether or not any new agencies are immediately to be exerted to accomplish it, as the causes that are now acting seem certain to lead the people to a fuller knowledge of their rights, to impress them with a deeper feeling of the religious thralldom in which they are held, and to inspire them with the wish, the hope, and the determination to free themselves from the cruel burthens with which they are oppressed, their sense of the evils of the national establishments must necessarily grow, and a disposition to withdraw from their communion spread and become contagious, and give rise at length to powerful organizations and strenuous efforts to procure their separation from the civil governments.

We recommend to our readers to observe attentively these tendencies and movements of the European nations. Should they desert the communion of the nationalized churches on a greater scale ; should they come in large bodies to regard them with aversion, and wish for their overthrow ; should the friends of religious and political liberty generally assume an attitude of direct hostility to them, and organize for their denational-

lization, it will give important confirmation both to the construction which we have put on the symbol, and to the principles of interpretation on which we proceed ; and serve to determine with much clearness the point to which the accomplishment of the Apocalypse has advanced.

Another important event symbolized in the prophecy that is yet to take place, and that seems to have an intimate connexion with the withdrawment of the people from the established hierarchies, is that which is represented by the sealing of the servants of God.

“ And after these, I saw four angels stationed at the four corners of the earth, having power over the four winds of the earth, that wind should neither blow on the earth, nor on the sea, nor on any tree. And I saw another angel ascending from the sunrising having the seal of the living God. And he cried with a loud voice to the four angels to whom it was given to injure the earth and the sea, saying, Ye may not injure the earth, nor the sea, nor the trees, until we can seal the servants of God in their foreheads. And I heard the number of the sealed, a hundred forty-four thousand.”

As the sealing of the servants of God is to be an impress of his name on their foreheads, its design and effect are to make it cognisable and conspicuous to others that they are his servants. They are not constituted such by the seal, but being already his servants, its office is to make it visible and notorious to spectators that they are his. By what analogous mark then is it that it is to become manifest and conspicuous to spectators that those whom the sealed represent are the servants of God ? We are shown in a subsequent vision, in which the hundred and forty-four thousand are seen standing with the Lamb on Mount Zion, having his and his Father's name written on their foreheads ; and they are described as they who have not been defiled with women, for they are pure ; and as having no falsehood found in their mouth, for they are spotless. The women of the prophecy with whom men are defiled are adulteresses ; and the great adulteress, who causes men to drink of her cup, is the woman seated on the wild beast, having on her forehead the name, great Babylon the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth ; and that woman is the symbol of the nationalized hierarchies. Not to

have been defiled with women, therefore, is, according to the prophecy, not to have been guilty of communion with the nationalized hierarchies, by submission to their usurped authority, union in their worship, and participation in their rites. The way then in which it is to become manifest to the eyes of men, that those who are represented by the sealed are the servants of God, is by their not communing with, nor in any form sanctioning the nationalized churches; and this implies, that to enter a church that is legalized by the state, assent to its claims, and unite in its service, involves a fall from fidelity to God to the homage of creatures, like the fall from purity of which a man is guilty who unites himself with an adulteress. The symbol indicates, accordingly, that the question is to be publicly and zealously discussed, whether the civil establishment of a church, which involves a usurpation of authority over God's laws and rights, is not unlawful, and an arrogation of power to dictate what the religion of his subjects shall be; and whether, therefore, to approve a nationalized hierarchy and sanction it by subjection to its authority and union in its worship, is not in effect yielding it supreme homage and falling from fidelity to God; and that his servants are to give the most conspicuous and decisive proofs of their allegiance by denouncing and avoiding nationalized churches, as apostate, and giving to God the honors that belong to him as the sole lawgiver of his worshippers. The angel from the sun-rising symbolizes the persons who are to lead the servants of God to give that manifestation of their allegiance. The earth, the sea, and the trees, represent the nations in their relations as subjects of the civil rulers. The four angels whose office it is to injure the earth and the sea, symbolize persons who inflict destructive calamities on nations; and are armed revolutionary leaders, therefore, probably. The address of the angel holding the seal of God, to the angels having power over the winds, implies that they whom the sealing angel represents are to propose to the revolutionary leaders that they should postpone their destructive work until the former can cause the servants of God to give proof of their disapprobation of nationalized churches, and resolution not to join or sanction them; and the assent of the four angels to that proposal, indicates that their object is one

which the open and efficient testimony of the servants of God against the nationalized hierarchies will subserve. It may be to revolutionize the governments which support the hierarchies. Immediately after the sealing, therefore, the ten kingdoms are to be agitated and ravaged by revolutionary strifes, like the earth and sea when swept by resistless winds.

This event is still future, and at a considerable distance, as those who are to be sealed are persons who have never been connected with the nationalized churches. They are they who have not been defiled with the great adulteress; for they are pure. They have not falsified their profession of supreme and exclusive homage of God by ascribing his prerogatives and honors to creatures; for they are without guile. They are to be of a generation, therefore, that is yet to arise. There are indications, however, of a preparation for the formation of such a body. The expediency of establishments has long been strenuously questioned in Great Britain, and on the Continent. Many of the arrogations of the civil governments, and the hierarchies, are regarded as inconsistent with the rights of conscience; and there are now beginning to be signals of a tendency to contemplate legislation over religion by men, in its higher relations to God, and treat it as an infringement of his rights, and assumption of his prerogatives. It will be discerned at length, doubtless, that that is by far the most efficient objection to nationalized hierarchies; the principles on which they are established will be thoroughly discussed; it will be seen that the brand of divine reprobation is fixed on them in this prophecy; and a body will be raised who will refuse to connect themselves with them, and will denounce them as in effect usurping the throne of God, and making themselves the objects of a religious homage.

The ascent of the angel from the sunrising indicates that this great movement is to be public, attract all eyes, and introduce a new era. Those who are denoted by the sealing angel are to be as conspicuous as a being of that order would be in ascending the eastern atmosphere and flying through mid heaven; and the organization of such a body as the sealed denote, to exemplify and maintain a pure allegiance to God, and testify against the arrogation of his rights by ecclesiastical and civil rulers, will form a momentous epoch in the career of

the church. No greater change, perhaps, has ever been wrought in the views of those who truly love and fear God, though in great imperfection, than will take place when the pious members of the nationalized churches who now regard them as enjoying the express sanction of heaven, shall discern their true character as usurping and apostate, quit and denounce them as great Babylon, and exert themselves to train their families, and others over whom they have influence, in a pure allegiance to the Almighty. The question is adapted beyond almost any other to rouse the sensibilities and affect the consciences of men ; and it is one of the clearest that was ever debated. When civil rulers assume jurisdiction over religion, and dictate the faith and worship of their subjects, they certainly, in effect, arrogate a superiority to God, and assert a right to determine whether he shall be worshipped by their subjects, and in what form. A hierarchy that allows itself to be legalized in that manner by civil rulers, derives its authority from them, and thereby sanctions their usurpation of God's place, is guilty of infidelity to him, and the ascription of his rights and honors to creatures ; and thence, worshippers also who submit to such a hierarchy, and sanction its connexion with the state, yield their countenance to that arrogation of the throne and honors of God. What theme more intimately touches the true allegiance of his people to him, or is adapted in a higher measure to awaken their profound interest ? On what subject would they more naturally feel it to be an imperative duty to make known a change of their views ; or what could inspire them with greater fidelity, zeal, and boldness, than the discovery that their fellow believers have involved themselves in the thralldom of great Babylon, and are dishonoring the Redeemer by yielding to that detested sorceress the homage that is due to him ? The subject presents the most ample means for a discussion and excitement that shall agitate the whole civilized world, and give to those who proclaim and maintain the truth, a conspicuity and grandeur like that of an angel of light soaring up the arch of heaven.

Another event of still greater moment, and that is probably to be consequential on the sealing of the servants of God, is the slaying and resurrection of the witnesses. Their slaughter

and restoration to life are supposed by many to have already taken place. They are most certainly, however, mistaken in that persuasion, and in their general views of the symbol. None of their errors, perhaps, are greater or more singular than those into which commentators have fallen on this subject, as we shall show, in a degree, in the conclusion of the notice of Mr. Faber's system of interpretation. That which their slaughter denotes, instead of being, as is generally represented, a mere compulsory silence, political disfranchisement, or obstruction in the utterance of their testimony, is to be a literal slaughter, and thence that which is represented by the refusal to them of a burial, and their resurrection, are also to be such a literal refusal and resurrection. There are no analogous events which they can be supposed to represent. If the symbolic death which was corporeal, denoted a death of a different and analogous species, it would be a death of the spirit, or a spiritual death; but that is impossible, as it is in contradiction to the character of the witnesses, who maintain their allegiance to God. It implies also that by slaughter they pass into the same state as that of the civil rulers who are to slay them, and of the people and nations who are to gaze on their dead bodies—as they also are spiritually dead. But that, too, is in contradiction to the prophecy, which exhibits their slayers, and the multitude who gaze on them, as living and acting in their accustomed manner; not as corporeally dead. Their death, then, cannot be spiritual, and therefore must be literal, as there is no other species. Their resurrection must consequently be literal also, as it must be to a life that is the opposite of their death. And finally, this is confirmed by the consideration that there is no event but such as itself is, which the refusal to bury their dead bodies can symbolize. What conceivable act is there, towards men who are spiritually dead, that can be to them what the refusal of burial is to the bodies of slain witnesses? An exposure of their souls as dead, to the public gaze! But what could that be? Or whatever it might be, would it not be simply to show that the spiritual condition of the witnesses had become precisely like their own? But that is inconsistent with the prophecy, and absurd. The death, exposure, and resurrection, then, that are foreshown, are to be literal. This is further confirmed by the

consideration that there are no events of a different species that could serve as symbols of a literal slaughter, exposure unburied, and resurrection; and that, therefore, if those events were to be foreshown, they must necessarily be employed as their own representatives. There is no event of a different nature that would serve as a symbol of the death of the body by slaughter; there is none that could appropriately represent the preservation of bodies unburied, and exposure to the gaze of multitudes; there is none that could symbolize the resurrection of such bodies to a glorious and immortal life, and assumption to the cloud of the Divine presence. If those whom the witnesses denote, then, are to be really slain, denied a burial, raised to immortal life, and caught up to the cloud of God's presence, it is of necessity, and in accordance with the laws of symbolization, that they are used as their own representatives. Who, then, are they whom the witnesses denote? The witnesses themselves are said in the prophecy to be the two olive trees, and two candlesticks that stand before the God of the earth; and the olive trees are interpreted in Zechariah as symbols of the ministers or teachers appointed by God; and the candlesticks are explained in the Apocalypse as representatives of churches. They are the symbols, therefore, of ministers and churches; and they are ministers of churches, accordingly, and unofficial believers, who are to be slain, denied a burial; raised in glory, and taken up in a cloud to heaven.

What, then, is the peculiar testimony which they are to utter, and for which the wild beast is to make war on them and put them to death? It is to be like their testimony in past ages, doubtless,—a faithful teaching and profession of the true gospel, a rejection and denunciation of the false doctrines and superstitious worship of the apostate church, and a bold and uncompromising assertion and vindication of the rights of God as the lawgiver of his people, and condemnation and rebuke of the usurpation of his throne and power by the civil rulers and ecclesiastics, in legislation over his word and worshippers, by nationalizing the church and dictating to it its faith, its homage, and its discipline. And among these, the last is not improbably to hold a very conspicuous place, and be the occasion of the war on them by the wild beast. The

civil rulers may find that the doctrines and denunciations uttered by the witnesses discredit them, and, perhaps, endanger their authority, and persuade themselves that it will be politic to relieve themselves from the annoyance by their extermination. That their testimony is to have a reference to the usurpation of God's prerogatives, by the rulers, in the dictation to their subjects of the faith they are to profess and the worship they are to offer, is apparent from the fall of one of the nationalized hierarchies in the political revolution symbolized by an earthquake, that is to be caused by the resurrection and assumption of the witnesses. The revolution and overthrow of the hierarchy because of their justification in that extraordinary manner, indicate that the testimony for which they are to be slain is to be in contradiction to the pretensions of that hierarchy, in its relations to the state by which it is established. This great tragedy is undoubtedly, therefore, to be consequent on the discussions and organizations against the usurping rulers and hierarchies foreshown by the sealing of the servants of God.

But what churches are they whose ministers and members are to fill that great office and meet that august vindication? Are all in the circuit of the ten kingdoms that are evangelical, to share in it; or only those of Piedmont and France that have subsisted through the whole period from the commencement of the twelve hundred and sixty years? The latter only, it is thought by many, and perhaps with greater probability than the other; and on that supposition, the representation that before the wild beast again makes war on them, they are to be disposed to cease from their testimony, or discontinue their protest against its usurpations, may be considered as having had its fulfilment in part, at least, in the consent of the Waldenses and French Protestants to nationalization by Bonaparte. The connexion of the Waldenses with the state terminated at the dissolution of the French empire in 1814. The nationalization of most of the Protestants of France still continues. A portion of them, however, decline to receive support from the public treasury, and many of the evangelical are beginning to disapprove of it, and are inclined, like the Dissenters of England, the Free church of Scotland, and the seceders from the

nationalized church of the Canton de Vaud, to become independent. When that great crisis arrives, its nature, there are indications in the prophecy, will be fully understood by the witnesses; and their views of it known by the civil rulers and people. One reason, doubtless, that they are to be put to death, is to be, that they are to entertain and express the expectation of a resurrection; and the design of the multitude in not suffering them to be buried, will be to confute that expectation, by preserving them where their continuance under the power of death can be fully demonstrated. Their hope is doubtless to be, that they shall thereby disprove their claim to a divine sanction for their testimony, convince their followers that they are imposters, and put an end to their influence. It will attract the eyes of the whole civilized world, therefore, and their resurrection and visible ascent to heaven are to make an overwhelming impression on the spectators and the nations. A great revolution is immediately to take place, one of the hierarchies fall from its nationalization, and a vast number of those who had held important positions in the state consigned to slaughter.

It is not until this epoch, that the second woe, or the domination of the Turks over the churches of the eastern Roman empire, is to reach its end. After the earthquake and fall of the tenth of the city, the prophet announced, "The second woe is past, behold the third woe comes quickly." How, then, is the Turkish power to be overthrown? There is no direct prediction of the mode in which it is to be swept from the scene. There is reason, however, to presume that it is to be by a conquest by the Russians. Immediately after the sixth vial, the dragon,—which had not before been beheld by the prophet from the period of the wild beast's rise out of the sea and reception from it of its power and authority,—again appears on the scene, as the associate and ally of the wild beast and false prophet, in exciting the kings of the earth and their armies to unite in a war against the Almighty. That monster is the symbol, under its last head, of the Constantinopolitan dynasty of the Roman empire, and continued to represent the line of monarchs, doubtless, who ruled the eastern empire down to its subversion by the Turks, nearly a thousand years after the conquest of the western by the

Goths, and rise of the ten kingdoms in its place. They were the civil head of the Greek church. The Russian emperor is in like manner the civil head of the Greek church in his dominions and in the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bulgaria; and should he conquer Constantinople, and the Turkish territories in Asia Minor and the Mediterranean islands, will naturally become the head of the whole Greek church. It is probably he, therefore, whom the dragon symbolizes in that vision. That the princes of Russia contemplate the acquisition of Constantinople and the adjacent dominions now under the sway of the Sultan, and have made great preparations for it, is notorious. They have long had a powerful fleet in the Black Sea, immense military dépôts in the ports, and a large army in the vicinity. They are in joint possession with the Turks of Moldavia and Wallachia, have strong affinities with the races that occupy the lower basin of the Danube, and may not improbably extend their empire over the whole of them, and gain a position thereby within the limits of the western Roman empire.

Another predicted agency of great moment that is to be exerted far more conspicuously than hitherto, is the communication of the gospel to the nations, and warning that the hour of God's judgment has come. The message of the angel flying through mid-heaven having the everlasting gospel to preach to them that dwell on the earth and to every nation and kindred and tongue and people, was, "Fear God, and give glory to him; *for the hour of his judgment is come*: and Worship him that made heaven and earth and the sea, and the fountains of waters." That warning has been but very slightly uttered as yet. Those who have gone to communicate the gospel to apostate Christians, Mahomedans, and the heathen, with few exceptions, do not even believe that the hour of God's judgment is at hand; but hold that it is to follow, instead of preceding, the conversion of the world. Nor have they adequately uttered the command to fear God and worship him alone who is the creator of the heavens and earth and sea and fountains, the symbols of rulers and subjects, peoples and tribes. It is a command to ascribe the rights and honors of God to him alone in distinction from creatures. Yet many of them are still addicted to

that imputation of prerogatives to civil rulers and ecclesiastics which the prophecy exhibits as a worship of them. The gospel is not only to be preached, therefore, to all nations that are yet ignorant of its glad tidings, but in a manner very different from that in which it has hitherto been presented to them. A great change is to take place in the views of those who preach it. They are to become aware, by understanding the prophecies, that the period of Christ's coming to judge the usurping monarchs, the unfaithful and apostate churches, and the idolatrous nations, is at hand, and are to announce it to the inhabitants of the ten kingdoms, and every people and tribe and tongue; and exhort them to fear God and pay their homage to him instead of creatures. The change which we desire, and are endeavoring to introduce in the views and teachings of the missionaries from our churches, and those who conduct and support the societies by which they are sustained, is indisputably, therefore, at length to take place. And instead of diminishing their zeal or lessening their influence, as some of their friends now strangely imagine it must, they are under its impulse to rise from their present inadequacy to a power and conspicuousness like that of a mighty angel flying visibly through the vault of heaven. What a vast and momentous revolution in the faith, expectations, and labors of believers, will this involve! What a change in the principles on which the Scriptures are interpreted! What a repudiation of the absurd and false metaphysics drawn from the Germans, which are now betraying ministers of the gospel into apostasy, and spreading infidelity through the churches! What an advancement in understanding the great aims of the divine administration, and the duties to which the people of God are called! This symbol, very probably, will not receive its full verification till the period of the persecution of the witnesses, perhaps not till after their martyrdom and resurrection; which will doubtless produce a profound impression on the church, rouse the indifferent, convince the unbelieving, show the true worshippers what the office is to which they are called, and confirm their fidelity and quicken their zeal.

Another momentous event that is to take place after this,

as is seen from the order of symbolization, is the fall of great Babylon. And another angel followed, saying,

“She has fall’n, has fall’n, great Babylon, and become
A demon habitation, and the chief
Station of all abominable shapes
Winged, and polluted spirits, and because
She made the nations drink the maddening wine
Of her adulteries, and enriched the great
Men of the earth with her large merchandise.”

The fall of Babylon cannot denote the dissolution of the hierarchies, inasmuch as they are still to subsist after they have fallen, as is seen by the representation that Babylon became by her overthrow a habitation of demons; and by the summons of the people of God, after her fall, to come out of her. It must symbolize, therefore, their denationalization or dejection from their station as civil establishments, and deprivation of the peculiar privileges which they derive from the state. The employment of an angel descending from heaven and lighting the earth with his glory, as the symbol of those who are to announce her fall, indicates that it is to be publicly proclaimed and celebrated by a vast body of the conspicuous and influential; and that loud and exulting celebration implies that it is to be regarded as an occurrence of the greatest interest to the church and world. And what an epoch it will be when the hierarchies are deprived of the power with which they are now armed by the civil governments, to dictate their faith and worship to those who are under their jurisdiction, to extort revenues from the people against their will, enforce their discipline by civil penalties, and persecute dissentients; and are forced to rely on their voluntary adherents for their support! What a crisis when the rulers shall be compelled, or induced by the popular voice, to relinquish their usurped authority over religion, and leave their subjects to hold the faith and offer the homage which God appoints!

Yet, after their fall, a party of their subjects are still to ascribe to the civil rulers and papal hierarchy the power over religion which they now arrogate; and another great act of

the faithful servants of God, which is foreshown, is a warning against that imputation to them of the prerogatives of God. "And a third angel followed them, saying with a loud voice, if any man worship the beast and its image, and receive its mark on his forehead, or in his hand, the same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation, and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb. And the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever; and they have no rest day nor night who worship the beast and his image, and whosoever receiveth the mark of his name." The image is the symbol of the combination of the Catholic hierarchies that have the pope as their head, and is modelled after the pattern of the imperial government under Constantine and his successors. To worship the beast and the image is to impute to them the supreme authority which they arrogate in religion, and to receive the mark of the beast is to submit to its usurped power, and enter the communion and profess the faith which it enjoins. The terrible punishment which is to be inflicted on those who continue that allegiance, shows that the principles which it involves are then to be so well understood, that it will necessarily be an act of apostasy, and a just ground for their condemnation as hopelessly incorrigible.

Contemporaneously, probably, with this warning, another is to be addressed to the people of God who still continue in union with the fallen hierarchies—a summons to come out of Babylon, and unite with those who are about to retribute her for her sins. "And I heard another voice from heaven, saying, Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues,—reward her as she rewarded you."

The whole of these symbolizations indicate that the great question that is to be tried in these severe struggles anterior to Christ's coming, and by which the allegiance of his true people, and the apostasy of those who falsely bear his name, are to be made apparent, is to respect the rights of God as the lawgiver of his creatures, in contradistinction to the arrogations of authority over them by civil rulers and ecclesiastics. **Who** has supreme power over men in reference to religion? **Who**

are they bound to regard as having the right to determine whom they shall adore, what worship they shall offer, and what doctrines they shall believe and profess? The Almighty who has prohibited the ascription of divine honors to any being besides himself, revealed the method of salvation which he has appointed, and designated the homage which men are to pay to him,—or civil rulers and ecclesiastics, who claim that he has constituted them his vicegerents, and authorized them to legislate over his institutions and rights, and appoint the religion of their subjects? * It is in reference to this that the sealing of the servants of God is to take place; that the witnesses are to be slain; that a political and ecclesiastical revolution, denoted by an earthquake and the fall of the tenth of the city, is to follow their resurrection and assumption to heaven; that the heralds of the gospel are to summon men to worship God only; that great Babylon is to fall, and her fall be celebrated with exultation by the true worshippers; that punishments are to be denounced on all who thereafter worship the beast or its image; and that the people of God are to be warned to come out of the fallen hierarchies, that they may not partake of their sins, nor share in their punishment; and the strife is to be carried to such a height, and become so exasperating to the apostate powers, that they are again to persecute and slaughter those who maintain their allegiance to God. We are told, at their denunciation of the death which God threatens on those who worship the beast and its image,—“Here is the patience of the saints; here are they that keep the commandments of God, and the faith of Jesus. And I heard a voice from heaven saying unto me, Write, Blessed are the dead who hereafter die in the Lord. Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their toils, and their works follow

* This is the question at issue in the English establishment in the suit between the Bishop of Exeter and the Rev. Mr. Gorham, lately decided in favor of the Bishop. The inquiry is not, What has God revealed—what do the Scriptures teach respecting baptism and regeneration? but what is the doctrine in reference to them imposed by the national legislature, and assented to by the clergy? The doctrine of regeneration by baptism, is the judgment rendered by the court, and the rejection of that doctrine is accordingly a legal disqualification for office in the national church, and may be made the means of ejecting from their livings the whole body of the evangelical clergy now in the establishment.

with them." They are to give the most decisive demonstrations that they are the true servants of God, by enduring the greatest evils and surrendering their lives, rather than turn from their allegiance and yield his honors to usurping creatures; and those usurpers are to present the most resistless proofs of their character, by slaughtering his witnesses who refuse to apostatize, and denounce their arrogations of his rights. How little is it realized that such a crisis is approaching! How little is it felt that such an importance attaches to the exhibition by believers of indubitable proofs that they are reconciled to him; that they have a spirit of indomitable fidelity; and that he is justified, therefore, in treating them as truly his children, and exalting them to rewards that contemplate their everlasting allegiance! How alien from the spirit of these witnesses and martyrs are those who now, instead of such a persecution, anticipate a conquest by their arms of the wild beast, the papacy, and the world; and denounce the exposition and promulgation of the revelation God has made, as a perversion of his truth, and an assault on his cause! Is there any room for doubt which party their principles and passions would be likely to favor, were they to share in this strife?

It is in preparation for this contest, perhaps, or possibly contemporaneously with it, that the antichristian powers are to adopt another measure to strengthen their party, and overwhelm those who are looking for the advent of the Redeemer. After the descent of the sixth vial on the Euphrates, the prophet says: "I saw three unclean spirits like frogs go out of the mouth of the dragon, and out of the mouth of the wild-beast, and out of the mouth of the false prophet. For they are the spirits of devils, working miracles that go forth unto the kings of the earth and of the whole world to gather them to the battle of that great day of God Almighty." If, as we have suggested, the dragon denotes the monarch of Russia, the head of the Greek church reigning within the limits of the eastern Roman empire; and if the second woe, or Turkish domination over that and the other Asiatic churches, is to be terminated by a conquest by that monarch; then this conspiracy of the antichristian powers is probably to take place after the second woe and the fall of the nationalized churches,

and immediately before the effusion of the seventh vial. That it is to be after the overthrow of the hierarchies, seems to be implied in the appearance of the head of the papacy as the false prophet—a mere ecclesiastic, in place of the two horned wild-beast, which is the symbol of the two classes of rulers—civil and ecclesiastical—who now exercise the government of the papal states. The power of the pope as a prince will have ceased, doubtless, before that period, or he would have been represented in his double character by that symbol. The unclean spirits denote emissaries that are to be sent forth by the dragon, wild-beast, and false prophet, and are, it would seem by their working miracles, to profess to be prophets, or the ministers of God, and represent that it is by his command that they summon the kings and their armies to assemble at the great battle of the Almighty. That they are to attempt to gather the kings of the whole world, implies that it is to be after the heralds of the gospel have proclaimed its tidings to all the nations, and summoned them to pay their homage to God, the creator. That they are to assemble them to the great battle of God, indicates that the antichristian powers are to be aware that the true worshippers expect the interposition of the Almighty, at that crisis, to protect his people, defeat his enemies, and establish his kingdom; and their gathering them together at Armageddon, that it is expected that Palestine is to be the scene of that interposition. It is foreshown in the ancient prophecies that a body of the Israelites are to return to Judea and endeavor to re-establish themselves there, anterior to the final judgment of the Gentile nations; that these nations are to attempt to intercept them from their undertaking, and carry them again into captivity; and that the Redeemer is then to descend visibly on Mount Olivet, and deliver his people, and destroy their assailants. It is probable, therefore, that the antichristian powers are to understand what the constructions are that are put on these predictions; that both will consider that the question between them will be determined by the defeat or success of the Israelites in their attempt to re-establish themselves in their ancient land; and that the dragon, wild-beast, false prophet, and kings of other parts of the world and their armies, will go there in the confidence that they shall easily conquer them,

reduce them again to bondage, and thereby effectually confute them and confirm themselves in their usurped power.

Anterior to this great movement, however, and perhaps at some distance, the seventh vial is to be poured into the air, and the seventh trumpet blown, which are to introduce the last woe, or destruction of the armed enemies of the Redeemer and judgment of the nations. The opening of the temple in heaven in the vision, and exhibition to the prophet of the ark of the covenant, have a reference, not improbably, to the recognition and readoption of the Israelites that is then to take place. Commotions and revolutions are to follow that are to overturn all the governments instituted by men, and inflictions fall on the nations like great hail from the skies.

Such are the great events, affecting the church and world, that are to take place prior to the coming of the Redeemer ;—an exasperating disappointment of the nations in their present struggle for a higher degree of civil liberty, and the improvement of their physical condition ; an alienation and withdrawal of their subjects from the communion and support of the nationalized hierarchies ; the rise of a body of worshippers who shall denounce them as usurping God's rights, and refuse, on that ground, to communicate with them ; a persecution and slaughter of the witnesses because of their testimony for God, as the sole lawgiver of his people ; their resurrection and assumption to heaven in demonstration of their innocence and acceptableness to him ; in consequence of that vindication of the witnesses, a great political revolution and fall of one of the nationalized churches ; a proclamation of the gospel to all nations, and warning that the hour of his judgment has come ; the fall of the other hierarchies from their connexion with the state, and deprivation of the powers which they derive from their nationalization ; an exulting celebration of their fall by the true worshippers ; a denunciation by them of everlasting destruction to those who thereafter ascribe the rights of God to the civil rulers of the ten kingdoms, or the usurping ecclesiastics of the papal hierarchies ; a renewed persecution of the saints, because of that testimony ; a summons of the people of God to come out from the communion of the usurping church ; a return of a portion of the Israelites, and re-organization as a people in

their ancient land; and finally, an endeavor by the apostate monarchs and the pope to re-conquer and disperse them in order to confute the expectation of the true worshippers of the advent of Christ to establish his millennial kingdom, and confirm themselves in their usurped power. How unlike the views of the future that are generally entertained! Here are no indications that, appropriate as it is, the most magnificent proof that the children of God can give of their devotion to him, is to yield a slight portion of their superfluous wealth to send a small number of missionaries to evangelize the heathen. Instead, they are to verify their allegiance by withdrawing from the splendid and powerful establishments to which the worldly and great belong, denounce the civil and ecclesiastical rulers as usurpers and apostates whom the multitude honor by the ascription to them of divine prerogatives, and endure persecution, and surrender their lives rather than swerve from their fidelity to him. Here are no intimations that the world is to be recovered from its apostasy and converted into a paradise of virtue and bliss by the instrumentalities that are now employed by the church for its Christianization. Instead, the true worshippers are still to be few in number compared to their antagonists; and the antichristian powers are to continue their war on them, and would conquer and exterminate them, were not the Redeemer to interpose for their deliverance. The great question that is to be tried, and in reference to which the true and false worshippers are to show their respective characters, is not whether the church will convert the world by its endeavors for that end; but who is the proper object of homage; who is the lawgiver of the church; whose appointment of a method of salvation and injunction of a religious faith and worship is to be received as authoritative, and made the ground of reliance for pardon and life? It is apparent, then, that the views that are entertained by the churches generally of Europe and this country, respecting the events that are approaching and the aims of the divine administration, are essentially erroneous. The Protestants are scarcely less mistaken in respect to them than the Catholics.

It is obvious from these prophecies, that it is not, as some represent, of little significance whether the people of God

understand or not what he has revealed in them. A knowledge of their teachings is essential to a comprehension of the duties to which they are to be called. How can they meet the great crises that await them, if they misconceive the questions that are then to be at issue? How can they yield such an allegiance as shall show that they are indubitably his children, if they mistake the being to whom it is to be rendered,—worshipping creatures instead of the creator, and ascribing the honors that are due to the Redeemer to his rivals? They must know what God's testimony is, in order that they may utter it. They must understand what the crimes of the powers denoted by the wild beast are, in order that they may witness against them. They must know who it is that great Babylon symbolizes, what her sins are, and what is meant by her fall, that they may intelligently exult at her overthrow. How can they announce to the nations that the hour of God's judgment is come, if they do not understand the predictions of that judgment? How are they to manifest their faith and patience, and keep the commandments of God and the testimony of Jesus, if they do not know what those commands and that testimony are? Nothing can be plainer than that the whole of the peculiar agencies they are to exert, and the deliverances and rewards they are to receive, turn on their understanding the predictions they are to fulfil. To suppose them mistaken in respect to them, is to suppose that they are to act in error, and receive the sublimest proofs of God's approbation, for a faith, submission, and martyrdom, that are the offspring of delusion. That they are to found their acts on their views of these prophecies, is apparent also from the conduct of their enemies. Why should the wild beast and his subjects refuse a burial to the slain witnesses, unless the witnesses are to die in the expectation of a resurrection at the end of three years and a half, and yield their lives, therefore, under a persuasion that they are the persons denoted by the prophecy? Why should the people and tribes and nations and tongues, go to gaze on them, unless it be that they are with a reference to that persuasion, to be preserved in a condition in which they can be identified, and their non-resurrection, if they should not rise, be open to public observation, and demonstrable? Why

should they assemble at the scene of their exposure, at the expiration of the three years and a half, and be spectators of their resurrection, unless it be that they are to be aware that that is the crisis at which the prophecy is either to be verified or confuted? Why should the dragon, wild beast, and false prophet send out emissaries, and induce the kings of the world to assemble their armies, to oppose the establishment of the Israelites in Palestine, unless they are to know that the Almighty is expected to interpose and give success to his worshippers, and that to confute that expectation by defeating them in the conditions that are designated by the prophecy, will be effectually to confound their accusers and vindicate themselves? The servants of God are manifestly, then, to proceed in all their great acts on the belief that the civil and ecclesiastical powers against whom they testify, are guilty of the usurpations which these prophecies ascribe to them, and that the Son of God is soon to interpose to destroy them: and those powers are to be prompted in their measures against his people, by the fact that they entertain such views of the import of these predictions, and expect such interpositions of the Almighty for their deliverance.

This consideration should encourage those who are attempting to unfold the prophecies, to continue their endeavors to rouse the people of God from indifference to them, correct their misapprehensions of the laws by which they are to be interpreted, and induce them to receive their great teachings. Instead of being unworthy of study, or necessarily distasteful, they most intimately respect the divine administration, and the duties of God's people, and have the utmost adaptation to interest and impress them; and they are not always to be neglected. The feeling is now more common, probably, than is generally supposed, that a better understanding of the laws by which they are to be explained, and of the great events which they foreshow, is very desirable. There are thousands of the humble, devout, and active in Christ's service, there is reason to believe, who feel their want of better views, and are prepared to welcome the means of obtaining them. The subject needs but to be treated in a proper manner, to overcome their distaste, satisfy them of its intelligibility, and rouse them to proper endeavors to make themselves familiar

with it. And God will own his truth, lead his true people to receive it, and prepare them thereby to bear the peculiar conflicts, and fulfil the lofty duties to which they are to be called in preparation for his coming. "The wise," we are expressly foretold, "shall understand." It is the apostate powers only, and those whom they hold in thralldom;—the wicked who are to do wickedly, and none of whom are to understand,—that are to continue in delusion, and disbelieve and oppose his designs. Let Christ's disciples, then, not remit their endeavors, though their labors may still be neglected by many, and by some even repelled with scorn. The certainty is full at once of grandeur and awfulness, that the period of their indifference and aversion is to be short:—that the listless are soon to be roused from their inconsideration, the sceptical driven from their unbelief, and the hostile, who would, were they able, intercept inquiry, and perpetuate the ignorance and misapprehension of the church, startled, after a momentary infatuation, to a sense of their error, and carry thereafter, through the eternal ages of their being, a resistless realization of the truths which they now despise and deny.

ART. VI.—NARRATIVE OF EVENTS IN BORNEO AND CELEBES, down to the Occupation of Labuan, from the Journals of James Brooke, Esq., Rajah of Sarāwak, and Governor of Labuan, together with a Narrative of the Operations of H. M. S. Iris, by Capt. Rodney Mundy, R. N. With Plates, Maps, and Woodcuts: in two vols. London: John Murray. 1848.

THESE volumes present a narrative of one of the most extraordinary undertakings of the age, from its philanthropy, the success which has attended it, and the great results to which it is likely to give birth. Borneo, which lies under the equator, and extends through ten degrees both of latitude and longitude, is occupied by a large population, partly Malay, from the neighboring continent, who reside chiefly on the

coasts, and partly Dyaks and other aboriginal tribes, who dwell in the interior. They are divided universally into small clans or communities, under the government of chiefs, some of whom bear the title of pangeran, and others of rajah; and those of Borneo proper, or the northern shore, are united in an empire, under the dominion of a sultan. They generally exercise a fierce and relentless tyranny over their subjects, and carry on perpetually a predatory war with one another, invading each other's territories, slaughtering or making captives of those who fall into their power, and plundering and wasting every species of property. Those on the coast exercise the trade of slaving, robbery, and murder also on the sea, and sometimes with powerful fleets, sail round the whole island, capture the merchant vessels with which they meet, enter harbors, ascend rivers, burn villages and cities, seize or kill the helpless, and after months of outrage and blood, return laden with captives and spoil. Captain Brooke conceived the project of mitigating at least, and if practicable, of curing these enormous evils, reclaiming the population from their ferocious habits, inducing them to engage in agriculture and trade, and become prosperous themselves, and of commercial advantage to Great Britain; first, by counsel and persuasion, and at length by the institution and exercise of a just, liberal, and peaceful government in one of their rajahships, and inducement of the others to follow the example, by the manifestation of its beneficial effects, and by force, when needful and justifiable by the laws of nations; and his exertions, which have been conducted with a largeness of views, disinterestedness, skill, and energy, that entitle him to be considered one of the noblest men of the age, have been attended with extraordinary success.

He sailed from England in his own yacht in November, 1838, and after visiting Singapore, in August, 1839, reached Sarawak, the capital of a district on the river of that name which enters the sea near the northwest point of Borneo, and commenced the task of cultivating the friendship of the rulers and people, and exploring the country. He met a friendly reception, and after spending a month in that and the neighboring rivers, returned to Singapore, and proceeded to Celebes, where he occupied nearly half a year in exploring the coasts,

visiting the principal towns of the interior, making himself acquainted with the chiefs and people, and counselling them to abandon their wars on one another, and cultivate the arts of peace.

On returning to Sarāwak at the close of the summer of 1840, he found the rajah embarrassed by the rebellion of a part of the population against the sultan, to whom he was subject, and in such difficulty, that to induce Mr. Brooke to interpose and exert himself to reconcile the belligerents, he offered to invest him with the government of Sarāwak, and its revenues and trade. Mr. Brooke proceeded to the scene of the war with the crew of his yacht, and in an engagement charged the revolting army with his English party of eleven and a single native, and routing them, gained a complete victory; in consequence of which the rebellion was in a few days terminated by a treaty of peace. After many difficulties and delays, the negotiation for the transference of the jurisdiction to him was completed, and on the 24th of September, 1841, he was declared rajah and governor of Sarāwak.

He immediately began to exert himself to introduce order, security, and industry in the province; liberated those who were held captives, gave protection to the lives and property of the weak, established a court for the trial of offenders, and, the better to accomplish these ends, issued, in 1842, a decree in the Malayan language, in which he ordained—

“ 1. That murder, robbery, and other heinous crimes should be punished according to the written law of Borneo; and no person committing such offences escape, if, after fair inquiry, he were proved guilty.

“ 2. That in order to ensure the good of the country, all persons, whether Malays, Chinese, or Dyaks, should be permitted to trade or labor according to their pleasure, and enjoy their gains.

“ 3. That all roads should be open, that the inhabitants at large might seek profit both by sea and land; and all boats coming from other parts, be free to enter the river and depart, without hindrance.

“ 4. That trade in all its branches should be free, with the exception of antimony ore, which the governor held in his own hands, but which no person should be forced to dig, nor when obtained, surrender with-

out a proper compensation, that the people might be encouraged to labor and trade, and enjoy the profits which they made by fair and honest dealings.

" 5. That no persons going among the Dyaks should disturb them, or take their goods, under the false pretence that they were agents of the government.

" 6. That the revenue should be fixed by the governor, at a proper rate, so that every one might know how much he must contribute yearly to the support of the government.

" 7. That the weights, measures, and money current in the country, should also be settled by law."

He notified them that he would enforce obedience to these enactments, and whilst he gave protection and assistance to all who should act rightly, would not fail to punish those who should seek to disturb the public peace or commit crimes ; and he warned all such to seek their safety by leaving his dominions.—Vol. i. pp. 277–279.

These novel privileges and assurances of protection from slaughter and robbery, commanded the confidence of the people, and immediately gave an impulse to their industry and enterprise. They began to erect houses, cultivate their fields, prepare articles for export, and engage in commerce with Singapore. The population of the capital and other parts of the province was rapidly increased by immigrants from other districts of the island, for the sake of the personal security and freedom of trade that were afforded them, and Mr. Brooke soon found himself able to assume an attitude of strength and authority towards the neighboring rajahs and chiefs, some of whom were jealous of his designs, and others resentful of his endeavors to check their wars and piracies. In 1842 a marauding party entered the river Sarāwak with the design of attacking him, and placed him under the necessity, in self-defence, to pursue and assail them in their own haunts, where their chiefs were captured and put to death. Such was the respect which his course inspired, that another powerful body of pirates, occupying the neighboring rivers, were withheld from an attempt to conquer him, by a letter, apprising them that he was now the legal rajah of Sarāwak, warning them not to enter his territory, and threatening them with summary punishment should they venture to assail him. In

the course of 1842, Mr. Brooke visited Brunè, the chief city of Borneo proper, on the northern coast of the island, and the capital of the sultan who has jurisdiction over Sarāwak, and obtained from him a formal appointment as rajah, by which his power was confirmed, he became invested with a more absolute authority over the affairs of the province, and was freed from annoyance by pangerans and other officers appointed by the sultan, who had, till that time, continued at Sarāwak, and sometimes obstructed his administration.

After his return to Sarāwak, several tribes of Dyaks sent to solicit him to take them under his protection. Their ambassadors, on being admitted to his presence, said, "We have heard—the whole world has heard—that a son of Europe is the friend of the Dyaks." He soon after made an excursion into the interior, and conquered one of the chiefs in his territory, who was in revolt, and exercised a cruel tyranny over those under his government. He represents the country into which he penetrated, lying west of Sarāwak, as beautiful and rich, adapted to the culture of rice, coffee, nutmegs, and cotton; made accessible by a fine river; bounded at the south by a range of mountains, affording a cool temperature; of a healthy climate, and abounding in minerals and valuable forests; yet as having, as a field for philanthropic labors, still greater attractions. He says,

"Never were poor people more oppressed, or more wretched, than in these countries. From the great weakness, however, of the native government, there has gradually been a spirit of resistance awakened amongst them, and a hope for better things, which will induce them to take protection, and bless the hand that gives it. By a just and liberal administration, their condition may be greatly ameliorated, and the unhappy Dyaks, an interesting and industrious race, released from their wretched bondage and oppression. Christianity may easily be introduced among them, civilization advanced,* commerce greatly extended, and this vast island laid open to the enterprise of the active and enlightened of Europe."—Vol. i. p. 325.

Their ideas of God and a future existence are very faint and vague. One of the most horrid of their customs is the slaughter of a fellow being and presentation of the head to the woman when a proposal of marriage is made. The possession

of one such head is regarded as an indispensable condition of matrimony. When one who desires to be married cannot procure an enemy's head, he proceeds with a party to a distance, and attacks and kills whoever falls in his way. The heads are preserved and suspended in their houses. The marriage ceremony differs in different tribes. In one it consists in the bridegroom and bride's smearing the forehead, hands, and chest, with a bloody paste, and then seven times passing a live fowl across the breast. In another, a tray is borne on the head, both by the bridegroom and the bride, supporting four cups,—one of swine's blood, one of the blood of a fowl, one of rice, and one of gold dust. Among the inhabitants of Celebes, the man and the woman each take a fowl by the legs, and swing it seven times round the head. Some of the tribes bury their dead ; others burn them.

Captain Brooke began soon after his establishment at Sarāwak to solicit the co-operation of the authorities at Singapore, and the British government, in his undertaking, urge them to yield him the aid which he needed to suppress the piracies of which the sea and rivers were continually the scene, and British vessels often the victims, and take measures by the purchase of territory and conciliation of the people, to secure the trade of the island ; and in the beginning of 1843 visited Singapore to communicate in reference to it with the merchants and officers of that port. While there, information being received that a large piratical fleet was on the coast of Borneo, Captain Keppel offered to proceed there in his frigate and endeavor to capture them. He fell in with several marauding vessels on the way, and after preparing a squadron of boats at Sarāwak, sailed up the river Sarēbas, burned several towns occupied by the freebooters, and reduced the chiefs to submission. Towards the close of the year, Mr. Brooke sailed to Brunē in a British fleet, and obtained a cession of Sarāwak in perpetuity. In 1844, Captain Keppel again visited the island, and destroyed Patusan, the capital of a powerful band of pirates, on the river Batang, east of Sarāwak. The depredations of those freebooters on the whole of the northern coast continuing, in 1845, Mr. Brooke, who had now secured the confidence of the British government in such a degree, that he was appointed confidential agent to visit

Brunè and communicate with the sultan in regard to the suppression of piracy, induced Admiral Sir Thomas Cochrane to sail to the coast with his fleet, for the purpose of subduing the pirates and compelling the sultan to give protection to British subjects, who, after soliciting the aid of the British in repressing the pirates, now encouraged them; and again, in 1846, when he visited Kanōwit, a large piratical town on the Rejang, and terrified the chief into a promise to abstain from freebooting, and conquered Brunè, the capital of the sultan,—who had now openly violated his engagements with the British government and put to death those of his own family who were favorable to Mr. Brooke,—and subsequently attacked and captured the other principal towns of the freebooters along the northern coast. The narrative of these expeditions, which Mr. Brooke accompanied, is given by Captain Mundy, and is highly interesting. They ascended the Rejang in a steamer, and their approach was not noticed by the people of Kanōwit till passing round a point they shot almost into a group of women who were sporting in the water.

“It would be difficult to describe the consternation of these wild Dyaks, as the anchor of the Phlegethon dropped from her bows into the centre of the little bay selected for their bathing ground. The first impression seemed to stupify both old and young, as they remained motionless with astonishment. When conscious, however, of the terrible apparition before them, they set up a loud and simultaneous shriek, and fleeing rapidly from the water, dragged the children of all ages and sizes after them, and rushed up their lofty ladders for refuge. Then we heard the tom-tom beat to arms, and in every direction the warriors were observed putting on their wooden and woollen armor, and seeking their spears and sumpitans. Meantime, the steamer swinging her stern gradually within a few yards of the landing-place, brought into view the whole of the under part of the floor of the immense building, into which they had entered, erected at the very brink of the stream—for the piles on which it was supported were *forty* feet in height—and though at this short distance, had they chosen to attack us, a few of their spears and poisoned arrows might have reached our decks, it was evident that their own nest thus raised in the air, and containing three hundred desperate men, was entirely at our mercy.

“Our guides and pilots had hailed them from the moment of our arrival, counselling them to desist from any aggressive act, telling them

that the strangers were white men from the west, were friendly, and that the Great Sea Lord wished to receive a visit from the chief of the tribe, who might trust himself on board in safety: but the fears of the people were too strong, and the chief not venturing to come forward, the admiral directed a white flag to be hoisted. After some little stir it was discovered that no flag of this color is in the Indian code, and as no white bunting could be found on board, I had recourse to one of my linen sheets, which was quickly triced up at the fore, and its effect seemed instantaneous. In a moment from the large verandah, and from every window, strips of white cloth were hung out, and amidst loud shouts of joy, the men rushed down the ladders, some bringing the flags with them, and others launching their canoes, pulled directly to the steamer without apprehension.

"The chief, who was a very old man, with about thirty followers, then came on board. He was profusely tattooed over his whole body, and like the rest of his savage crew, was a hideous object. The lobes of his ears hung nearly to his shoulders, from the weight of the immense rings that were fixed in them. Round his waist he wore a girdle of rough bark, which fell below his knees, and on his ancles large rings of various metals. With the exception of his waist-cloth, he was naked. We knew that this old wretch and the whole tribe were down-right and hereditary pirates, and that joined with the Siriki people, they had only a few months ago committed dreadful outrages on the coast, their most recent amusement having been a descent on the village of Palo, which, after a brave defence by the inhabitants, they totally destroyed. It was a collection of houses built on the summit of immense piles, forty feet from the ground. The invading force was, however, too numerous to be long withstood, and the piles being at length hacked to pieces or burnt down, the lofty building fell with a crash to the ground, when, with the exception of a few able-bodied men, the whole tribe was made captive, and carried away in triumph to Kanöwit. The young and handsome women were, of course, the greatest prizes, and as several appear to have been taken on this occasion, and the law of having only one wife seems to be in force in this quarter, we must suppose that many of the youthful Kanöwittians were then provided with a foreign bride.

"It is not surprising, therefore, that this horde of desperadoes was much alarmed at our presence, and believed that their doom was sealed. The fame of Mr. Brooke had reached even this remote spot, 120 miles in the interior, and the atrocities committed at Brunè by the sultan were known, proving that a communication exists throughout a greater part of Borneo proper. The admiral gave the same advice to this man

as he had done to the chief of Siriki, and the same promises were made in return, of abstaining from piracy for the future. This chief was suffering from ophthalmia, and after the termination of the audience, he was handed over to the surgeon, who quickly relieved him, and the octogenarian savage returned to his house in an ecstasy of delight.

"Having dismissed our visitors, we all landed, and some of us mounting the ladders of these extraordinary houses, presented ourselves as objects of curiosity to the women and children. I was surprised to find the former as well clothed as the Chinese, and rather good-looking. Their skins are a dark-brown, like the American Indians. The rooms were literally crowded with children, who, after receiving a few presents, soon got accustomed to us, and danced round and laughed heartily.

"I could just stand upright in the room, and looking down on the scene below, might have fancied myself seated on the topmast cross-trees. Having traversed every part of the long gallery, thus level with the summits of the trees, and distributed the few gifts we had to the women and children, we turned our backs on the pendent human skulls, and retracing our steps, proceeded to the Phlegethon, where we found perfect confidence established between the crew and the natives, and an active exchange in goods going on. After a two hours' visit, we commenced the descent of the river."—Vol. ii. pp. 121–126.

They proceeded in the expedition against Brunè, situated on the river Borneo, twenty miles from the sea, in steamers, small armed vessels, and gunboats, and were threatened with a formidable resistance,—the place being fortified by five strong batteries with near fifty pieces of artillery. They were soon silenced, however, by the rockets and shot from the fleet; the sultan, with his troops, fled into the country, and the inhabitants retreated into the jungle. Capt. Mundy pursued the sultan the next day through almost impassable forests and swamps, and burned one of his villages, with a vast building supported on piles in which was a large quantity of arms and ammunition. The people finding that the war was waged against the sultan, not against them, and that if peaceable their persons and property were not to be molested, soon returned to the city, and a proclamation was issued by the admiral, in which he notified the sultan and his subjects that if he returned and governed his people justly, abstained from piracy, and kept his agreement with the British, hostili-

ties would cease ; but that should he again be guilty of treachery towards them, and violence, the admiral would return and destroy their city.

After the departure of the admiral, Capt. Mundy was left in command on the coast, and continued the war on the pirates. In an expedition against a tribe up the river Mambakut, he destroyed upwards of twenty of their large buildings which were used as forts and depositories of arms. Of one of them, he gives the following description :

“The main verandah had a frontage of 300 feet, and the piles on which it stood were four feet in diameter. The building was close upon the river's bank, and partially concealed by cocoanut trees. One of these had been cut down in order to form a kind of abattis, from behind which, as the Phlegethon's boats approached, a few small guns opened, but were quickly silenced as the reinforcements came up. A party was at the same time landed for the purpose of cutting off the enemy in their retreat, but they were not to be caught, and retiring rapidly into the jungle, carried with them their killed and wounded. This first-class mansion had been tenanted by Hajjè Saman himself, the pirate chief. In two minutes it was in flames, and amongst the furniture soon enveloped in the blaze, were fifty skulls, and as many packages of human bones—several of them evidently the latest gifts of the Dyak gentlemen to their lady-loves ; for no aristocratic youth ventures to pay his addresses to a Dyak damoiselle, unless he throws at the maiden's feet a net full of skulls, at the same time that he offers his hand and heart.”—Vol. ii. pp. 221, 222.

To maintain the salutary impression which these decisive measures had made on the pirates, Captain Mundy continued to cruise on the coast, and in September, by command of the British government, obtained the cession from the sultan of the island of Labuan,—at the mouth of the river Borneo,—as a naval station and commercial port, for which it is well fitted. It is about eleven miles in length, has a fine harbor, is fertile, has good water, an extensive bed of coal suitable for steamers, and much valuable timber, and is favorably situated for trade with Borneo.

These general measures, which were adopted by the recommendation of Captain Brooke, and in most of which he took an active part, served greatly to strengthen his authority at

Sarāwak, and extend and confirm his influence over the tribes of the whole western and northern coast. The population, culture, and wealth of his province rapidly advanced. Sarāwak, from a village of fifteen hundred, became a city of 12,000 inhabitants. Immigrants almost continually flocked from the neighboring provinces for the sake of the security, freedom, and opportunity for wealth which are there enjoyed, and the order and prosperity of the province became so well established, that in 1847 he visited England, was treated with much distinction, and received the appointment of governor of Labuan ; by which he becomes by far the most powerful ruler of Borneo. He thus seems likely to accomplish the great objects at which he aims ; the repression of the tyranny, violence, and bloodshed, with which the people have been debased and devoured ; the introduction of order, the arts, and religion ; the opening a new empire to the commerce of Great Britain ;—the elevation in short, of millions from the lowest barbarism and wretchedness to civilization, abundance, and happiness ;—the benefits of social refinement ; the blessings of christianization ; and it will be one of the greatest and most philanthropic achievements of the age.

The results of his labors thus far, are well stated by Captain Mundy :

“It will not be out of place, if I here state the positive benefits conferred on the civilized world by the extraordinary career of Mr. Brooke, for I believe that the European public at large have hitherto been totally ignorant of the *practical* effects which have arisen from the energetic policy of this great man ; and though his own countrymen have long known that the shores of Borneo have for ages past been infested by pirates, and the sea-board of that vast island peopled by a race whose hand was against every man ; yet I feel assured that whilst very few have been acquainted with the immense numbers and power of the piratical tribes, and with their astonishing organization, exceeding anything that was known in the days of the buccaneers and freebooters of the western hemisphere ; they have also been equally unaware of the lengthened captivity and cruel treatment which the crews of shipwrecked and captured vessels met with from the hands of their barbarous masters, who, inhabiting a coast of 700 miles in extent, were in league with the great Illanun and Balanini communities, and

all who fell within the grasp of either party met either death or the miseries of perpetual slavery. . . .

"Laying aside all supposititious or prophetic views of the extent of civilization which may hereafter arise from the moral influence and humane conduct of Mr. Brooke in his own province of Sarāwak, I will shortly narrate the positive good which has already risen from his patient labors.

"Each reader will form his own opinion, but to my mind the astonishing fact, that the inhabitants of the whole north-west coast of Borneo, extending from Cape Datu to Malladu Bay, are now so far weaned from their savage habits as to insure the personal safety of any European who may be thrown by shipwreck, or otherwise, upon their shores, is the triumph which should ever stand the first amongst the many which Mr. Brooke has achieved in that violent land.

"Another great benefit conferred on the commercial world by Mr. Brooke, is the suppression in a large degree, by his resolute efforts, of piracy. No one can be surprised when he reads that pirates infest the Eastern Archipelago, as scanty as our knowledge has been of that region,—still the early circumnavigators have frequently alluded to these rovers of the sea ;—but when we are informed that Dyak fleets of two hundred vessels, manned with four or five thousand men, were frequently cruising off the province of Sarāwak, carrying desolation and destruction in every direction ; and at the same time learnt that Illanun and Balanini fleets, even better organized, and equally great as to numbers, were also ravaging the shores of every peaceful tribe, and rendering the navigation of the seas so perilous, that no merchant vessel dare approach within the limit of their cruising ground,—we could scarcely credit the startling announcement. Yet it was so. . . . The rendering the north-west coast of Borneo a refuge for the shipwrecked of all nations, and the suppression of piracy in the eastern seas, are what I consider the most prominent of the benefits conferred on the civilized world by Mr. Brooke.

"The opening of the vast coal fields—at Labuan and the vicinity—and the gradual development of a rich island for the mutual benefit of his own country and of Borneo, together with his patient endeavors to ameliorate the condition of the aboriginal inhabitants, are well known to the British public, who, since his return to his native land, have everywhere received him with most marked distinction, and expressed their high admiration of his character."—Vol. ii. pp. 369–372.

These are indeed vast results,—far surpassing anything that has been achieved by any other individual in the same period,

and transcending what the most powerful nations are usually able to accomplish, either by diplomacy or arms. What a contrast they present to the ill-success of the British in their efforts to suppress the slave trade on the coast of Africa, in which they have sacrificed so many lives, and lavished so much treasure! But we hope that still greater benefits may yet be conferred by Mr. Brooke on Borneo, by the introduction of knowledge, good government, the arts, commerce, and religion. It presents a splendid theatre for his philanthropic exertions. With the exception of Australia, it is the largest island known, measuring at its extreme length nine hundred miles, at its greatest breadth seven hundred, and six thousand in circumference. It occupies a central situation in the Eastern Archipelago, in the direct track of an extensive and valuable commerce. It has on every side a large number of good harbors and navigable rivers. Its climate, though hot, is tempered by sea breezes, and is healthy, and its soil is one of the richest on the globe, and suited to the most valuable crops,—rice, cotton, sugar, coffee, sago, and pepper. Its forests are magnificent, and yield, besides the finest timber, camphor, gutta percha, and other commercial articles. The population is numerous, and, worn out with violence and misery, feels the need of amelioration, and sees, from the experiment at Sarāwak, what it should be and its practicability, and is prepared, doubtless, to welcome with just laws, personal safety, and useful arts, the blessings also of Christianity, for the introduction of which a mission has already been established. What great effects may not Mr. Brooke yet achieve! May a benignant providence long preserve him to pursue his noble designs; and continue to attend them with success!

ARTICLE VII.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, by J. D. Morell, M.A. New York: D. Appleton and Co. Philadelphia: G. S. Appleton, 1849.

THIS work owes its chief interest to the exhibition which it presents

of the views to which modern idealism has led philosophers and theologians abroad, respecting some of the most important questions of theology. The theories which Mr. Morell advances are professedly drawn in a large degree from Schleiermacher and his disciples, and are substantially such as are held by German rationalists generally, and their followers, doubtless, in Great Britain and this country. It is to be read, accordingly, for the purpose of learning their theories; not with the expectation of accurate views of the subjects which it professes to expound; as a statement of the speculations of those who treat Christianity as, like other systems of belief, a mere phenomenon of the mind, rather than as a divine institution. Such is of necessity its character, from the views of our nature on which it is founded. Mr. Morell, after the example of the German theologians whom he takes as his guides, holds the theory advanced by Kant, that all our sense-perceptions are the mere product of the mind itself, not caused by the action on our organs of the objects perceived by us; and thence that they form no evidence of the existence of a material universe, fellow-beings, or God. On that supposition the author of Christianity and Christianity itself also, are necessarily merely ideal, and to be contemplated only as phenomena of the mind that conceives them. His philosophy of religion is, accordingly, an explication of the origin, facts, and doctrines of Christianity on the ground of that theory. Thus, he defines Christianity first in a subjective relation, without any reference to outward facts, "as that form of religion in which we are conscious of absolute dependence and perfect moral freedom being harmonized by love to God;"—and in an objective respect, "as that religion which rests upon the consciousness of the redemption of the world through Jesus Christ." Here the objective is as truly as the subjective exhibited as a mere fact or phenomenon of consciousness. There is no more objectivity in the *idea* of a redemption and a Redeemer, than there is in the *idea* of a God, which is contained in his definition of Christianity subjectively. These definitions, however, are not in accordance with the theory to which he designed to adapt them. If his view of our perceptive nature be true, then Christianity should be defined simply as views and emotions in respect to Christ and the method of redemption that bears his name, without any consideration whether they are believed to be real, or are rejected as a falsehood, or fancy. Nothing would be necessary to entitle an idea or feeling to be denominated Christianity, except that it respected Christ and his work as Redeemer. The unbelief and blasphemy of a Voltaire would come as perfectly within his definition, as the faith and love of a Paul, a Luther, or an Edwards. But taking Christianity as involving, according to his definition, a con-

viction of the reality of Christ's life and work, it still exhibits any one of the numerous classes of views and affections, with which they are regarded as entitled as truly to the name, as any other. A false faith, a false worship, and a false hope, are as much Christianity, according to it, as the faith and love that harmonize with the teachings and requirements of the gospel.

The principal subjects of which he treats are, the faculties of the mind, the distinction between the logical and the intuitional consciousness, the peculiar essence of religion and of Christianity, revelation, inspiration, Christian and popular theology, fellowship, certitude, the significance of the past, and the relations between philosophy and theology. Mr. Morell has fine powers, treats these subjects with much perspicuity and ease, and furnishes the reader who is aware of the theory on which he proceeds, very adequate means of discerning what some of the most important of the speculative views are that are entertained by the theologians of Germany, and how irreconcilable they are with the great truths of revelation.

2. *LOYOLA, AND JESUITISM IN ITS RUDIMENTS*, by Isaac Taylor. New York: R. Carter and Brothers, 1849.

LOYOLA is one of the small number who, by the promulgation of a doctrine, the institution of a society, or both, have exerted vast influences, and changed the history of the world. The most extraordinary of these was Mahomet, who not only taught a new doctrine, and organized a new sect, but instituted a government, and erected an empire. Plato exerted his great power by his philosophy; Aristotle by his logic; Luther, Calvin, and Wesley by a doctrine and society to profess and maintain it; but Loyola simply by an organization for the purpose of influencing the Catholics in respect to religion, learning, and politics, and exercising an absolute empire over their minds; and his success was almost as extraordinary as his project.

Mr. Taylor presents a history of his life, his institution of the society of Jesuits, its discipline, its objects, and its success. He forms, we think, too favorable a judgment of Loyola's religious character. We see no indications in his principles or conduct of anything higher than gross superstition, an eager and intolerant spirit of sectarianism, boundless ambition of power, and remorseless barbarity in crushing all whom he wished to make his instruments into a subserviency to his will. One of the most surprising facts narrated of him, was his ignorance of Christianity, at the commencement of his efforts as a teacher. Mr. Taylor regards him as having drawn his ideas respecting it from the

Mosaic pavements and painted windows of the churches; and, perhaps, a pictorial life of Christ; and deems it not probable that he had ever read the New Testament. It is a confirmation of this that what is entitled his religious exercises, or meditations, were not contemplations of God and his will, but instead, mere endeavors at vivid imaginations of the events of Christ's life and death and the scenes of the invisible world—a strong conception of the persons and facts described in the gospels that were usually selected for delineation in the churches. God most emphatically was not the object of his homage, nor the Scriptures the source from which he drew his ideas of religion. The vow of obedience which those who entered the society were required to take, necessarily made them apostate and unprincipled; as it invested Loyola with absolute dominion over their consciences, and made his will their rule. He was their religious lawgiver, and the pope was his. God had no direct share in the determination of their faith or duty. The constitutions expressly gave the superior authority to command any of the members whom he pleased to perpetrate any sin, which he thought might be conducive to their good or the interests of the institution. He had only to reverse God's commands, and revolt was converted into obedience, and evil became good. To this arrogation of authority over the laws of the Most High, was added the blasphemy of a pretence that it had his sanction!

The principles and history of Jesuitism deserve to be studied for the exemplification which they furnish of the facility with which artful and ambitious errorists may mould men to their will, and make them by a process that involves a direct contradiction and violation of their nature, the propagandists of the most profligate falsehoods, and perpetrators of the most outrageous crimes.

Mr. Taylor's speculations in regard to the form which the perversion of Christianity is likely next to assume, deserve attention. His chapter on Pascal's Provincial Letters is the most interesting in the volume, and best adapted to sustain his reputation as an author.

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ART. I.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By J. D. MORELL, A.M., author of the History of Modern Philosophy. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton & Co. 1849.

THE most artful and showy method that has ever been devised for the subversion of Christianity, is that of the modern German rationalists, who, adopting Kant's theory respecting the senses, represent all the objects of perception and thought as existing only in the mind that conceives them, and thereby deny the fact and possibility of religion, by denying that God, right, and law, have an objective reality, and making each one to himself the only conscious being, and his mental phenomena the only universe. It is on that theory, unhappily, that Mr. Morell has written his Philosophy of Religion. His aim is to resolve Christianity into mere consciousness, and exhibit it as of so vague and variable a nature, from the diversity of views and emotions with which it may be regarded, that the Scriptures cannot be taken as an authentic exposition of it, any more than the biography of an individual, or of the men of one age, can be taken as the biography of the race through the whole period of its being.

Many of his views, indeed, are inconsistent with this scheme, and many of his discussions learned and acute ; but this theory lies at the basis of his system, and a knowledge of it is necessary in order to discern the ground and import of his speculations. It is, in our judgment, a fatal error, and should be pointed out, that his work, which will naturally obtain a wide circulation, may be intercepted from the mischievous influence it is adapted to exert.

He first treats of the faculties of the mind, and defines "the sensational"—which he regards as "the lowest stage of consciousness,"—as "that in which the mind is impressed from outward and material causes, *yet is occupied solely with its own inward or subjective impressions*." As we are now constituted," he says, "we possess a material organism which has a direct and mysterious connexion with the sensitive mind. The affections of this organism produce mental *feelings* ; and it is the attention of the mind directed to these feelings, simply *as feelings*, that we denominate a sensation."—P. 39. This definition is erroneous in two relations ; and is thus framed, doubtless, that it may harmonize with the idealism of which it is designed as a basis. The representation that sensation involves a *feeling*, excludes all impressions on the eye, except such as, from the intensity of light or other causes, are injurious to the organ. There is no *feeling* in simple sight, like that which we experience in touch, taste, and smell. The mind has no consciousness of the effect that takes place in the body, and is the medium of its perception of the objects of vision. Not one person, probably, in hundreds, knows that an image is formed on the retina, that is the means through which the object that produces it is seen. And next : as attention is voluntary, not passive, or of physical necessity—in defining sensation as "*the attention* of the mind, *directed* to the feelings" that arise in the organs of sense, "*simply as feelings*," he changes it from an effect in respect to which the mind is passive, into a voluntary act, which is both mistaken and absurd. The impressions or effects produced by outward things, would, on that theory, take place antecedently to their being perceived, and, therefore, independently of consciousness. But there is no such antecedence of sensations to the mind's consciousness of them. The supposition is self-con-

tradictory. Its consciousness of its sensations is its perception and its only perception of them; and its perception of the external objects that cause them, if they are objects of sight, touch, or taste, is contemporaneous with and involved in the effects they produce, not the consequence of subsequent volition. It cannot have a sensation or feeling of which it is not aware. If Mr. M.'s definition were true, it would not be the application of a hot iron to the body that gave pain, but the mind's attention to the effect produced by that application, which is preposterous. Instead of the perception of sensations being the consequence of voluntary attention, it is only after they are perceived that they can be voluntarily made the objects of notice. By defining perception, however, as a voluntary act, and thence making the mind its cause, he prepares the way for its being treated, when he comes to the description of the things perceived through the senses, as merely ideal.

He next proceeds from "the sensational to the perceptive consciousness." He says :

"Perception indicates the state of consciousness in which the mind, getting beyond itself, attributes the impressions it experiences to the existence of external things." . . . "The nature of the sensational and of the perceptive consciousness can best be appreciated together. The organism with which we are endowed is in some way affected from without. *The attention of the mind as an active and intelligent principle is drawn towards this affection, and a certain state of consciousness succeeds.* If, on the one hand, we regard the organism as belonging to self—as being as it were included *in it*, and contemplate the affection it undergoes, as an affection of the subject, *the result is a sensation.* If, on the other hand, we regard the organism as a material structure, out of or beyond the subject, having the varied qualities of form, extension, &c.,—qualities entirely distinct from Mind, or the Me, then *perception is the result.*"—P. 42.

This definition, also, is singularly inaccurate. It represents sensation as "the result," not only of a voluntary act subsequent to the impression on the organs, but of a consideration of the relation of the organs to the mind. The mind, however, enters into no such consideration, in sensation, of the relation and office of the organs. It is not the consequence

of analysis that it distinguishes sensation from the objects that produce it. It never confounds them. In like manner, the perception of the objects that occasion sensation, and apprehension of them as exterior and real, is immediate and unavoidable. Instead of being the result of speculation, or analysis, no one can withhold himself from regarding them as distinct from himself, and having an independent existence. It were as impossible and solecistical, as it were to convince one's self that sensation and perception themselves are not subjective, nor real. His definition would absolutely exclude all the perceptions that take place through the eye; as there is no organic sensation in vision, like that which we feel in taste, smell, and touch, to suggest the inquiry, whether the body is exterior or not to the mind. By this theory, also, he converts all that is passive in perception by the senses, into a voluntary act, and prepares the way thereby to exhibit the whole process as purely ideal, and the work of the mind's own powers, instead of being produced by the action on it of exterior causes. This he indeed disclaims, and denounces as leading inevitably to scepticism. It is nevertheless, we think, indisputably his own theory. He says :

"Were we obliged to *infer* the existence of an objective reality from our own mental affections; were our belief in such reality a notion, idea, or conclusion, which we arrive at by means of our logical understanding, then, indeed, we could never escape the subtle arguments of the sceptic. All our knowledge of the outward world being, on that principle, supposed to come through subjective and logical processes, we could never find a valid passage from these abstractions into the concrete reality, and must at once renounce all pretensions to philosophize on the question. But in perception *the qualities* of matter are seen by us directly and intuitively. The connexion between the organism and the mind is of such a nature, that *quality, quantity, and their developments, such as space, time, figure, degree*—in a word, *all the primary qualities* of matter are perceived by us, not as *inferences* from certain subjective states, but as the real determinations of objects altogether apart from ourselves, and comprehended by a direct intuition."—Pp. 43, 44.*

* Mr. M. uses the word "logical," not in the usual sense of argumentative, or according to the rules of reasoning, but synonymously with categorical or relational. By "the logical understanding," accordingly, he means a faculty that perceives and contemplates things that are referable, as he here explains himself, to the cate-

The question then is, whether, on his theory, these qualities of matter really belong to the objects which excite our perception of them, and are truly predicable of them: or whether they are the mere product of the perceptive powers, and exist only in the mind that perceives them, just as objects conceived in dreams and delirium often have only an ideal existence. If the latter be his theory, then as objects are never perceived except as having forms, qualities, and relations, his attempted discrimination between the perception of them as mere external existences, and as having forms, dimensions, colors, qualities, and relations, in place of being a legitimate element of his system, is in contravention of it. And this is indisputably his theory, as he immediately shows in his definition of the understanding.

"We come next to the third step in the development of the human mind, and that is the logical consciousness, usually comprehended under the term *understanding*. Perception, as we saw, designates the direct and immediate cognisance of an objective reality—of a *thing*. As such, it of course implies that we possess some kind of comprehension of the primary qualities of bodies—that we grasp intuitively the main attributes of the material world. . . . Yet this logical consciousness, although it is the great instrument of practical life, is *entirely subjective and formal*. The material with which it has to do is wholly given in sensation and perception; all that it furnishes in addition to this, are *forms of thought, general notions, categories, and internal processes*, which have an abstract or logical value, but which, when viewed alone, are *absolutely void of all 'content.'*"—Pp. 45–47.

The understanding gives then, in addition to that which, according to his theory, is obtained in sensation and perception, *everything that is involved in the apprehension of external objects*: such as figure, dimensions, color, qualities, relations, and whatever is capable of definition and classification; and gives them, therefore, their *objectivity* also, which is involved in those qualities, and is conceived only under their forms. Sensation and perception, then, do not reveal the outwardness

gories; such as form, color, size, weight, solidity, quantity, quality, roughness, smoothness, heat, motion, and whatever else is conceived as having relations to other existences.

of that which they respect, but contemplate it merely as subjective. He presents a fuller statement of this theory on a subsequent page.

"It is frequently supposed that the *notions* we possess of external objects around us, are simply sensuous impressions; that *the logical form* of those objects is conveyed by the senses to the brain, and then so enstamped on the mind as to leave upon it an *idea*, which can be afterwards recalled by the aid of memory, and otherwise made the ground of human experience. Now, this popular view of perception is the result of a miserably defective analysis of the whole process. Perception, viewed alone, indicates simply *the momentary consciousness* of an external reality, standing before us face to face; but it gives us *no notion which we can define and express by a term.*"—P. 68.

It gives no figure, then, size, color, quality, or relation;—nothing which we can predicate of it, and that enters into our conception of it as an external existence, and cause or occasion of our sensation and perception; nothing, then, if it is an object of taste or smell, that is sweet or bitter, agreeable or disagreeable; nothing, if it is an object of touch, that is rough or smooth, wet or dry, hot or cold, hard or soft, round or angular; nothing, if it is an object of sight, that has shape, hue, dimensions, or relations. Sensation and perception, then, involve nothing but a bare consciousness that an impression is made on the organs. They give us no knowledge whatever of the nature of that impression, or the object that occasions it. All our conceptions of that are, consequently, the mere work of the understanding, and are therefore purely ideal. To the statement that "perception gives us no notion which we can define and express by a term," he adds:

"To do this is the office of *the understanding*—the logical or constructive faculty, which seizes upon the concrete material that is given immediately on perception, moulds it into an idea, expresses this idea by a word or a sign, and then lays it up in the memory, as it were a hewn stone, all shaped and prepared for use, whenever it may be required, either for ordinary life, or for constructing a scientific system. Thus, *every notion we have of an external object*—as a house, a tree, or a flower,—is composed of two elements—a material and a formal. The matter is furnished by the direct sensational intuition of a concrete

reality, and this is perception; *the form is furnished by the logical faculty*, which, separating the attributes of the object, as given in perception, from the essence, *constructs a notion or idea*, which can be clearly defined, and employed as a fixed term in the region of our reflective knowledge. This perception, indeed, is the *basis* of our experience, for without it, no objective material could be presented to us; but the understanding is the faculty which gives to our perceptions *a definite form*, and enables us to build up our knowledge into a complete body of experimental truth."—Pp. 68, 69.

But if the understanding thus gives to objects all that enters into our conceptions of them, as real external existences, then the matter of these conceptions cannot be furnished by a sensational intuition of it as "a concrete reality." There can be no intuition of an external reality in a sensational feeling, if that feeling is nothing but a bare consciousness of an impression made on the organs. How, if limited to that mere subjective consciousness, can it involve the notion of an objective reality as its cause? It plainly cannot give birth to such a notion, unless it be by inference, which he represents has no place whatever in the process.

His theory of the understanding is thus identically that of Kant, who, while he admitted that the impressions on the senses are the work of some external enginery, yet held that the reason that we have such perceptions as we have of external things, lies wholly in the mind itself; that they cannot be the medium, therefore, of any knowledge of the nature of that external enginery, nor of an inference respecting it; and, accordingly, made the universe, that is real to us, purely ideal, without any demonstrable ground, or counterpart in anything without us. His admission that there is an exterior cause that produces the impression on our senses, is thence wholly nugatory; as, in affirming that our nature deceives us in respect to the reality of the objects of our perceptions, he makes it impossible, on his principles, to prove, or render it probable, that it does not also in the feeling that the impressions on the senses are produced by exterior causes. Mr. Morell's view of our faculties is thus far, then, a mere theory of idealism. It makes the mind the cause of all its phenomena. It gives us no external world, no real fellow-beings, no infinite

intelligence, as the cause of an external universe, nor any ground for an inference of his existence. God, therefore, a moral government, a revelation, religion, and Christianity, must also, on his system, if he be consistent with himself, be merely ideal. He next proceeds to a definition of reason.

“A little consideration soon begins to reveal to us the working of another state of consciousness higher than those we have yet mentioned—one which takes a broader sweep, and seeks to unravel vaster problems. This higher state of consciousness constitutes a kind of *intellectual sensibility*,—an immediate intuition of certain objects, which are in no respect cognisable simply by the senses and the understanding. The faculty of which we now speak, and which may be termed *pure reason*, or *intuition*, holds, in fact, a similar relation to the understanding, that perception holds to sensation. As sensation reveals only *subjective* facts, while perception involves a direct intuition of the *objective* world around us; so, with regard to higher truths and laws, the understanding furnishes *merely* the subjective forms in which it may be logically stated, while intuition brings us face to face with the actual matter, or reality of truth itself.”—Pp. 48, 49.

If this comparison be just, then the objects which it is the function of reason to perceive, must, like those of the understanding, be merely conceptional, and have no existence except in the mind that perceives them. If, indeed, as he represents, reason has the same relation to the understanding that perception has to sensation; then, as perception, according to his definition, is nothing but the mind's regard of the object of sensational feeling, as exterior to itself, consequent on attention; so reason can be nothing more than its regard of the conceptions, or phenomena of the understanding, as having a real external existence; and in place, therefore, of being an immediate intuition of objects that are not cognisable by the understanding, would only be an intuition of the identical objects of which the understanding has cognisance. He presents quite an opposite view, however, in the following exemplification which he gives of the action of this faculty.

“The mind, after it has gazed for awhile upon the phenomena of the world around, begins to ponder within itself such thoughts as these: What is this changing scene, which men call nature? What,

then, is nature? Of what primary elements do all things consist? What is the power and the wisdom through which their infinite forms of beauty spring forth, live, decay, and then become instinct with a new vitality? In these questions we again discern the activity of a higher state of consciousness than the understanding alone presents. The understanding, looking at the objects presented to us, through the agency of perception, abstracts their properties, and classifies them; in a word, it separates things into their genera and species, and there leaves them. But the pure reason, instead of separating the objects of nature, and classifying them into various species, seeks rather to *unite* them, to view them all together, to find the one fundamental essence by which they are upheld; to discern the great presiding principle by which they are maintained in unbroken harmony. The understanding has simply to do with separate objects, viewed in their specific or generic character; the higher reason has to do with them as forming parts of one vast totality, of which it seeks the basis, the origin, and the end. With the phenomena of the human mind it is the same. *The understanding only classifies them*; the pure reason inquires into the nature of the principle from which they spring, and views the human mind as a totality, expressing the will and the purpose of the great Archetype." —Pp. 49, 50.

He has here forgotten his own definition, it seems, and fallen back into the "consciousness," that the external universe is real instead of ideal, and corresponds to our perceptions of it through the senses. The understanding, instead of creating all the qualities of external objects, and its operations in respect to them, *now merely classifies them*. He proceeds:

"These two efforts of the reason to seek the nature and origin both of the universe and the soul, lead naturally and inevitably to the conception of some common ground from which they are both derived. The soul is not self-created, but is consciously dependent upon some higher power. There must be a type after which it was formed; a self-existent essence, from which my mind proceeded; a supreme *mind*, which planned and created my mind. So also with regard to nature. *If the universe as a whole shows the most perfect harmony, all the parts thereof symmetrically adapted to each other, all proceeding onwards like a machine infinitely complicated, yet never clashing* in its minutest wheels and movements, there must be some mind vaster than the universe, one which can take it all in at a single glance, one which has planned its harmony, and keeps the whole system from perturbation.

In short, if there be *dependent* existence, there must be *absolute* existence; if there be temporal and finite beings, there must be an Eternal and an Infinite one. Thus the power of intuition, that highest elevation of the human consciousness, leads us at length into the world of eternal realities."—Pp. 50, 51.

Here he again quits his own system, and treats the universe as an absolute reality without us, the object of our apprehension, and corresponding in nature and the variety of the individual things of which it consists to our perceptions of it through the senses. His argument is founded wholly on that assumption, and dependent on it for its truth. If there be no real universe that has symmetrical parts; if there be no complicated machine, that has been planned, and is moved with harmony, then there is no ground for the inference from such a machine, of the existence of an infinite mind as its cause. If the mind itself be, as his theory of the understanding represents, the sole and independent cause of all the objects which its thoughts, feelings, and volitions respect, then there is no basis in these phenomena for the inference of another and higher cause of them, nor cause of the mind itself. If there be in that theory any possible ground for the inference or intuition, as he denominates it, of a superior cause of the mind, it must lie exclusively in the mind itself; not in the effects to which it gives birth by its own powers.

The views which he next presents of the distinction between the intuitional consciousness, or the perception of objects by reason, and the logical consciousness, or perception of things by the understanding, are of still higher importance, and marked by an equal intermixture of error. He exhibits the perception of objects by reason as a direct beholding them, in a manner analogous to the perception of objects by the senses, or through what he denominates the understanding.

"There is one state of our intellectual consciousness by virtue of which we define terms, form propositions, construct reasonings, and perform the whole office that we usually attribute to a mind that acts *logically*; but there is also another state of our intellectual consciousness, in which the material of truth comes to us as though by a *rational instinct*,—a mental sensibility,—an intuitive power—a '*communis sensus*,' traceable over the whole surface of civilized humanity. These two

classes of phenomena, therefore, which we find to be almost universally acknowledged by past thinkers, we have denominated the logical and the intuitional consciousness, and it is the object of the present chapter to develop as clearly as possible the real distinction between them."—P. 60.

That accordingly which he attempts to establish is, that by reason we perceive supersensuous and spiritual realities and truths by a direct vision of them, *independently of means*, precisely as by our visual organs we perceive the external world without the intervention of any intermediate instrument. As this theory lies at the basis of much of his subsequent speculation, and is the ground of his misrepresentation and reproach of logic, and depreciation of the Scriptures, theology, and language, we shall present his view of it at large, and point out its erroneousness, and the consequences to which it leads. Thus he says, in attempting to prove it:—

"The knowledge we obtain by the logical consciousness is *representative* and *indirect*; while that which we obtain by the intuitional consciousness is *presentative* and *immediate*."—P. 60.

And he proceeds in an endeavor to show, that unless our perception of supersensuous things is *immediate*, or gained by a direct vision independently of means, they are not, in fact, the objects of our knowledge, precisely as the external world is not in reality the object of our knowledge, unless it is actually that which we perceive by our organs of sense.

"The main points in the question of the mediacy and immediacy of our knowledge have been gradually brought out with the utmost distinctness in the controversy, which has existed, on the nature of *perception*. It was long taken for granted that our knowledge of the external world was obtained through the medium of inward conceptions or representative ideas."—P. 60.

He then points out the manner in which Hume endeavored, on the ground of that theory, to prove that we have no certain knowledge of the external world, but must regard a conceptional as the real and only universe; next, the expedient by which Kant attempted to confute that theory, but by which

he, in fact, only reproduced it in another form, and gave it a more scientific aspect; and finally, the mode in which Fichte pushed it to its legitimate results, and founded on it his scheme of absolute idealism.

“Fichte, however, neglecting what was true, and exposing what was weak in the Kantian philosophy, completed the subjective theory. Admit that our knowledge of all things around us consists in *ideas*, and we can never, he argued, get out of the subjective circle which our theory draws around us. The soul here becomes as it were an intellectual eye placed in the centre of the consciousness, and occupies itself solely with the phenomena which pass across it. Whether these phenomena be significant of any external reality, or not, we cannot tell; for, whatever faculty we may suppose capable of assuring us of it, still this very faculty merely indicates a subjective process, which can no better take us out of ourselves, than could the previous conceptions.”—P. 61.

As Mr. Morell himself, then, holds Kant's theory,—which is essentially the same as that on which Hume proceeded, except that, instead of ideas, he denominates the objects of perception “forms of thought,” or “the forms of the understanding,”—he makes those forms of thought which, according to him, are the mere products of the understanding, the only universe of which we have any knowledge, and cuts off the possibility of a perception or inference of an exterior world that answers to the objects of our perceptions. If he had reasoned consistently, therefore, he would have made the supersensuous world, which he holds is seen by reason, purely ideal, in the same manner as he represents that that which is the object of the senses is merely conceptional, and exists only in the mind that creates and perceives it. He, however, argues on precisely the opposite assumption, that there is an actual exterior universe, that is the real object of our sense-perceptions.

“The only scientific solution of these difficulties is substantially that which was first proposed by Reid, and has since been more fully developed by Sir W. Hamilton. It begins by denying the primary position of the ideal system (a position to which almost universal assent had been given from the age of Aristotle)—namely, that we have within us, separately and distinctly, any such things as the ideas, conceptions, or representations of external objects at all. In opposition to this, it affirms

that our knowledge of the external world is *direct, presentative*, and, in the lower use of the word, intuitional; that the subjective stands face to face with the object; that the objective reality, therefore, is not mirrored to us through any kind of internal representative process, but is apprehended *at once* by the direct intercourse which the mind enjoys with surrounding nature by the aid of its material organism. Thus, the *scientific basis* of our knowledge, even of the external world itself, has demanded an adequate appreciation of the difference between that which comes to our minds by direct intuition, or presentation, and that which comes only mediately by an intervening conception or idea.

"I have been somewhat more explicit than might appear needful upon this point, because the perception of the external world, through the senses, is perfectly analogous to that higher intuition, by which we are brought into contact with what we may term supersensual truth: and not only this, but the scepticism which results from denying the immediacy of our perceptive knowledge, in regard to the outward world, applies with exactly the same force against all spiritual truth, when the higher intuitional consciousness is lost sight of, or rejected."—Pp. 61, 62.

The theory of Reid and Hamilton, of our perception of the external world, is no doubt correct. We have, through our organs, an immediate sight and sense of its objects; and as absolute a knowledge of their presence and qualities, or that they are realities, and have the properties and sustain the relations which we ascribe to them, as we have of our consciousness in respect to them. That conviction is natural, universal, and unavoidable. It is the law of our constitution. We spontaneously and necessarily proceed on it in all our agency. No one can act on the opposite theory. To dispute its truth, and speculate on the assumption that it is false, is to charge our nature with the grossest deception, and divest ourselves of all ground for reliance on our faculties. Mr. Morell, therefore, in admitting the truth of this view of our sense-perceptions, and its necessity in order to a belief in the existence of the external universe, and of God, renounces his own scheme, and brands it with the charge of overturning the whole fabric of the material and spiritual world. By his admission of it, however, and the argument he founds on it respecting the mode in which we gain our knowledge of supersensuous things, he shows that he regards these as per-

ceived directly by reason, independently of means. He says :

"Of mere phenomena we can gain a very good knowledge by an intermediate logical process. We can have their different attributes presented to us as *abstract ideas* ; we can put those attributes together, one by one, and thus form a conception of the whole thing as a *phenomenon* ; but this cannot be done in regard to any elementary and essential existence. Of *substance*, for example, we gain no conception by a logical definition ; the attempt to do so has always ended in a denial of substance altogether, considered as an objective reality. *The only refuge against this logical scepticism, which has uniformly attached itself to sensational philosophy, is in the immediacy of our higher knowledge : in the fact*"—although it is in direct contravention of his own philosophy of our sense perceptions—"that we see and feel the existence of a substantive reality around us, *without the aid of any logical idea or definition, by which it can be represented, or conveyed. . . . Unless we ourselves have the intuition presented to us immediately, we can never comprehend it ; for it can never be made representative, never be known through a logical definition.*

"*The case is precisely the same with regard to the existence of an absolute Being—of a God.* If any one imagine that he can ever attain the full conception of the Deity by a process of logical definition or reasoning, he will be entirely disappointed of his hope. The primary conception of the infinite, the absolute, the self-existent, is altogether *undefinable*,—and consequently those minds which have proceeded logically, have always concluded that we have no such conception at all ; —that the infinite is a purely negative idea ; that it results simply from the addition of an indefinite number of finites. And yet to the intuitional consciousness there is no idea more positive, more sure, more *necessary* than this. Reason up to a God, and the best you can do is *to hypostatize and deify the final product of your own faculties* ; but admit the reality of an intellectual intuition, as the mass of mankind virtually do, and the absolute stands before us in all its living reality." —Pp. 63, 64.

He thus represents that God is seen directly by the eye of reason without the intervention of any means, just as objects of sight are beheld directly and absolutely through the eye, without the intervention of any logical media ; and makes it the ground of his depreciation of what he calls the logical process, of which he holds that representative conceptions are

the instruments. What mistake, however, more singular, more palpable, or more portentous, was ever made by a philosopher? The error does not lie in the representation that these intellectual and spiritual objects are not directly cognisable by the senses; nor that it is the peculiar office of reason to perceive them, and that they are apprehended by that power with as absolute clearness and certainty as the objects of sight are through the eye; but it lies in the representation that they are beheld by reason *independently of means*, by a direct gaze—an intuition that is the work absolutely of its own powers: for we have no such faculty of perception. No theory could be more inconsistent with our nature. All our perceptions of existence without us are mediate, or the consequence in some form of an agency on us; or effects that have been produced in us. It is the prerogative of God to see agents, objects, and actions independently of an agency from them. To suppose that we have such a *power of seeing spiritual entities directly*, is to suppose that we are capable of seeing all supersensuous agents and agencies that there are in the universe;—God, angels, separate spirits, bodied intelligences, however various their natures may be, or however remote may be their abodes. If we can in that way, without any influence proceeding from them, and independently of any extraneous media, see any one of them, why cannot we see all? And if we have such an extraordinary faculty, why is it that we are not conscious of a direct perception of them, and are not masters of all that belongs to a full knowledge of them? Why are we not aware of their orders, powers, numbers, residences, occupations, and blessedness or misery? Why is it that we have not ascertained what their views are of our powers, and learned whether they coincide or not with ours? Why have not Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Coleridge, or some of the speculatists who have pretended to this power of directly beholding supersensuous objects, favored the world with some account of their discoveries? Why, in place of adding to our knowledge of God, and his moral empire, have they only darkened counsel by words of falsehood and folly? Let them verify their lofty pretensions, ere they ask our faith in their testimony. Were higher proofs ever given by a class

of philosophers, that they had neither any just understanding of our nature nor of the import of their theories?

But our reason has no such power of intuition as that which he thus ascribes to it. That faculty has no more the prerogative of perceiving spiritual existences and truths without means, than the mind has of seeing material objects without eyes and without light. And this fact overturns the whole fabric of Mr. Morell's philosophy of our nature and of religion, and confutes his declamation and reasoning against logic, the Scriptures, dogmatic theology, creeds, and confessions.

It is through media only that reason discerns the great spiritual realities that are the objects of its perception, and means that are suited both to its own peculiar nature, and theirs. God has given existence to a vast system of things that they might be the means to us of this knowledge. Such is the material universe. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handywork; day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard." And it is fitted to be the instrument to us, we are assured by the apostle, of a knowledge of all his great attributes as a Spirit, divinity, self-existence, eternity, and omnipotence. "For that which may be known of God, is manifest among them; for God hath showed it to them. For by the creation of the world, the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and Godhead,—are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, so that they are without excuse."

The revelation which God has made of his will is also such a means. What a solecism to hold that his acts as moral governor, as they are embodied in the Scriptures, give us no information whatever of his rights, prerogatives, the principles on which he conducts his administration, or the agency he requires of us, but that all the knowledge we possess of those subjects, is gained by direct intuition independently of any communication from him! Why is the gospel to be proclaimed to every people and nation, and tribe and tongue, if it gives no information respecting the work of redemption? How on this scheme is it, that "faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God?" Why is it, if reason is thus the sole source of our knowledge, that "God

at sundry times and in diverse manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets," and "hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son?" And why is it that we are forewarned that we cannot "escape if we neglect the great salvation which began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed by them that heard him, God also bearing witness both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his holy will?" What an admirable familiarity these theologians and philosophers display with this great subject, which they thus affect to treat with a scientific accuracy that was wholly unknown until they rose to apprise mankind of the true principles of knowledge!

His providence is likewise such a means. His administration of the physical world is conducted in such a manner as to remind us of our subordination to him, lead us to recognise him as our upholder, benefactor, and rewarder; and the judgments especially and deliverances, with which he visits us, are expressly designed, we are told, to cause us to acknowledge him as the self-existent. No theory then could be more wholly inconsistent with our powers, and in contravention both of our experience and the measures which God employs to lead us to a knowledge of himself and his will.

Having thus stated this theory of the powers and office of reason, Mr. Morell endeavors to exemplify it, and distinguish it from the understanding by a variety of representations, in which he again treats "the logical consciousness," not in consistence with his definition, as the power which generates the forms of thought, or conceptions of external objects, but as a power that merely classifies them, and reasons respecting them, after they are generated; and represents that in those processes, the objects of perception are not the real objects of our thoughts and reasoning, but instead the mere words which we employ to designate them.

"The knowledge we obtain by the logical consciousness is *reflective*; that which we obtain by the intuitional consciousness is *spontaneous*. . . . We term knowledge spontaneous when we acquire it by the natural activity of our faculties, without taking any account, or being at all conscious what that activity *really* is. . . . Reflection is the *bending back*

of the mind upon itself; so that we may *render account* of the knowledge we have been acquiring spontaneously, and gain a clear idea of its development and validity.

"The knowledge that comes to us intuitionally or presentatively, must necessarily be *spontaneous*. Just as our perception of the external world is a spontaneous process, whenever the object without comes into direct contact with the subject within; in like manner, also, does our intuitional consciousness bring us *spontaneously* into sympathy with the elements of higher and spiritual truth. On this ground it is that there has so frequently been a tendency to describe the intuitional faculty by the name of an intellectual, a moral, or a religious *sensibility*; conveying, in every case the notion that there is an *immediate* contact effected between the elemental truth in question and the intellectual organ, similar to the contact which takes place between the sensitive apparatus and the outward object in the process of perception. On the other hand, the knowledge which comes to us logically, or representatively, must evidently be *reflective*, *i. e.* acquired by the conscious spirit of truth upon *scientific principles*.

"Moreover, the reflective knowledge resulting from this is clearly *representative*; for, instead of the concrete truth being presented at once to the mind's eye, it is represented to us by merely *verbal definitions and statements*. We gaze, in fact, upon *the mediating conceptions or ideas*, not upon *the original or essential reality*."—Pp. 65–68.

We give this long quotation, not in order to controvert the distinction which he asserts between direct and reflective views of the objects of knowledge, but for the purpose of showing the manner in which, after having admitted that in "our perception of the external world, the object without comes in direct contact with the subject within," he slides from that theory, and represents that when we come to give names to the external objects which we perceive, and reason respecting them, they are not the real objects of our thought and logic, but a mere set of conceptions which we have formed of them, and the terms which we use as their denominatives! This he asserts still more explicitly in passages that follow:

"The knowledge we obtain by the intuitional consciousness is *material*; that which we gain by the logical consciousness is *formal*. . . .

It is frequently supposed that the *notions* we possess of external objects around us are simple sensuous impressions—that the logical form of those objects is conveyed by the senses to the brain, and then so enstamped on the mind as to leave upon it an *idea* . . . which can be made the ground of experience. This popular view of perception is the result of a miserably defective view of the process. . . . It gives us *no notion* which we can *define and express by a term*. To do this is the office of the understanding—the logical or constructive faculty, which seizes upon the concrete material that is given immediately in perception, and moulds it into an *idea*, expresses this idea by a word or a sign, and lays it up in the memory, as it were a hewn stone, all shaped and prepared for use. . . . The form is furnished by the logical faculty, which, separating the attributes of the object from the essence, conducts a notion or idea, which can be clearly defined, and employed as a fixed term in the region of our reflective knowledge. . . .

"The bare intuition of the elements of our knowledge does not by any means constitute *science*. To do this, we must shape our direct intuitions into *notions*, which represent them *definitively*; these notions must be expressed by *signs*; the facts connected with them by propositions; and thus we must embody the whole subject in a united chain of logical deductions.

"The point, however, to which we would here draw especial attention, is this,—that the logical statement of truth places that truth before us not really, but representatively. When we study the science of astronomy, by means of our mathematical definitions and diagrams, we are not gazing upon the actual concrete truth, but are viewing it formally as represented by words and symbols. When we construct a regular system of ethics, we are not viewing moral relations directly, since they can only be viewed directly in actual life; but we are producing a logical representation of them. When we develop the laws of harmony we are not then directly conscious of that harmony, as we are when it is actually produced; but we are describing it indirectly, and gazing upon the representation which our logical definitions place before us. This then we may term the form into which the understanding throws the material, which intuition alone can originally impart to us."—Pp. 68–71.

He thus represents that in the logical or scientific treatment of things as having properties and relations, in the appropriation to them of names, and in reasoning respecting them, they are never the real objects of our thoughts and argumentation, but only a set of representative notions or conceptual

forms which the understanding substitutes in their place, and the terms by which we designate them!—a mere array of shadows that have no correspondence to their nature; and it is on that ground that he and the speculatists whom he follows, hold that no knowledge of things is acquired by the understanding, decry logic as an empty farce, and pronounce the definition and statement of doctrines in language to be wholly useless as a means of intelligence. No greater or more absurd error, however, was ever uttered. It is equivalent to a denial that a real universe, either material or spiritual, in distinction from a conceptional or denominational one, is ever the subject of our discussion or thought; inasmuch as we never think of one except in words; and as having attributes, qualities, and relations. But if none but a conceptional or ideal universe is the object of our thoughts and reasonings, what ground is there for the distinction which he has endeavored to demonstrate between a logical and an intuitional consciousness? Unless there is a real material and spiritual universe to be the subject of an intuitional consciousness, as well as an ideal one to be the subject of a logical consciousness, his whole argument falls. But there can be no real external universe to us that we cannot make the object of thought and discussion, designate by a name, and make the subject of affirmation. The supposition is in the grossest contradiction to our nature. We certainly have no knowledge of a universe that we cannot conceive as having qualities, distinguish by a name, and make the absolute object of thought and discussion. We have no knowledge of any material universe except that which is the object of our perceptions, and which we employ our language to designate and describe. We know of no Jehovah but him to whom we appropriate that name, and whom we regard as the self-existent, and the creator and ruler of the universe of worlds and creatures. Into what a gulf of contradiction and error Mr. Morell plunges by this theory! It is a denial that the Jehovah of the Scriptures, of theology, and of our homage, is the Jehovah of our intuitional reason, or consciousness. But that we know from consciousness to be false. We appeal to the reader whether the Jehovah of the Scriptures, of theology, of his prayers, adoration, and faith, is not identically the Jehovah of his rea-

son; the Being whose existence, and eternal power and Godhead, though invisible, he sees with absolute certainty from the creation of the worlds, and understands from the things that are made. Can a proposition be conceived that offers a more palpable and monstrous contradiction to our consciousness than the asseveration that he is not! The supposition that it is otherwise, makes the pretence of theology, of religion, and of knowledge, a farce. And what is thus true of God, is true of all the other objects of which we have a knowledge, either by our senses or reason. This fancy that the material and spiritual universe that is the object of our logical consideration, is a different one from that which we discern by our reason, is thus a sheer fallacy, devised by Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and that class of speculatists, to banish God from our knowledge, and reduce us scientifically to a necessity of universal scepticism. It has not a shadow of proof or plausible pretence to support it. Those who are not familiar with the intricacies of metaphysics have only to try it by their consciousness to discern its total falsehood. Let them make the experiment. When they speak, for example, and reason respecting an edifice, its form, dimensions, color, architecture, expensiveness, ownership, beauty, use, and express opinions, and make affirmations respecting it, is not the edifice that is the subject of their thoughts, discourse, and affirmations, identically the same as that which is the subject of their perception when they view it with their eyes, and enter, and examine it with their hands? Is not the house which a man purchases and occupies, identically the same as that of which he takes a title-deed in language, and which he conveys by a language title to a purchaser, or bequeathes to his heirs? To what portentous results would this doctrine lead, were it universally adopted, and made the basis of agencies? According to Mr. Morell, there is not a legal language instrument in the world that conveys to its owner a title to any material property. Such instruments treat of nothing but *notions*, that exist only in the understanding! The distinction between a rich and a poor man is only ideal;—the difference being simply that the rich man has a greater number of notions than a beggar, and notions of a different species. We are not surprised that the charlatans in this country who adopt

the vocabulary of Kant and Coleridge, and declaim against logic, should fall into this preposterous blunder, as they are the mere dupes of names and words; but that Mr. Morell, who has indisputably a fine intellect, has studied these subjects with great attention, and displays an admirable tact in stating and criticising the systems of others, should have been betrayed by the specious theories of his German guides into so stupendous and palpable a mistake, and notwithstanding the variety of the aspects in which he surveyed it, failed to detect the marks of falsehood which it bears on its brow, strikes us with wonder. "When we study the science of astronomy by means of our mathematical definitions and diagrams," it does not follow, as he supposes,—because "we are not gazing upon *the actual concrete truth*,"—the heavenly bodies themselves—"but are viewing it formally, as represented by words and symbols," that these bodies are not the actual and sole subjects of our thoughts and affirmations. What a supposition! Are not the sun, moon, planets, and stars of the firmament, the real subjects of our scientific astronomy? Is it not our earth which, according to that science, revolves on its axis once in twenty-four hours, and annually wheels round the sun? Is it not the real sun which astronomers represent as investing our world with light, cheering it with warmth, and exerting the power that keeps it in its orbit, and determining the succession of our seasons by the angle at which its rays enter our atmosphere? Is it not the real moon which they exhibit as accompanying our orb in its circuit round the sun, illuminating our evenings with its reflected light, and occasioning the tides of the sea? Is not the force of gravitation, of which Sir Isaac Newton treats in his *Principia*, the power that really acts in our world, and produces the effects which he ascribes to it, and not a mere idea, or name? Are all our professional teachers, mathematicians, geographers, and navigators, mistaken in the supposition that his astronomy is the astronomy of our solar system? How much to be regretted is it, that those who attempt to free metaphysics and theology from their intricacy, and unfold to us their true principles, do not pause to compare their theories with the facts with which we are familiar, and consider what the results are to which they lead! Because in studying

astronomy by books and diagrams we are not actually gazing at the heavenly orbs, Mr. Morell imagines that those orbs are not the real objects of our consideration, and that the knowledge we acquire is not a knowledge of them; and because "when we develop the laws of harmony, we are not then directly conscious of that harmony, as we are when it is actually produced," he holds, that it is not the subject of our thoughts and demonstrations! His assumption accordingly implies, that agents, objects, truths, and the facts of our own consciousness, are never treated by us in books or conversation, or the subjects of thought, except when they are actually present to us, and the objects of our direct perception or consciousness! What then is the office of memory? Are not the objects which that faculty recalls and represents to us, identically those which had before been known by us? Are they a tribe that had never antecedently come within our notice? To what formidable results this scheme leads! The actors, acts, and events presented in history, it seems, are never those that have had a real existence! The Roman, Corinthian, Galatian, Ephesian, and other believers, are not the persons whom Paul addresses in his epistles inscribed to the churches of their name, because they are not the objects of our visual perception when we read his letters! The Jehovah of whom the Scriptures treat, is not the real Jehovah, because he is not visible to us when we read the record they present of his acts, his laws, his dispensations, and his purposes!

But the error of this theory is sufficiently apparent, and its adaptation to the object for which it was contrived by its authors,—the exclusion of God from his empire, the rejection of the Scriptures as a revelation of his will, and the elevation of fancy and philosophy to their place. It is, however, one of the most groundless and preposterous schemes that has ever been devised for the subversion of Christianity, and the most easily confuted. The material objects and spiritual entities which we designate by names and treat in analysis, classification, and reasoning, in conversation, biography, history, memory, and meditation, are identically those which we behold with our eyes, handle with our hands, and discern with our reason, and that, according to their several natures, affect

our corporeal and mental sensibilities. The words and conceptions which we employ in thinking, discoursing, and writing of them, are not substitutes for them, but the mere images and denominations by which we identify, distinguish, and describe them, and express the knowledge we have acquired, or views we entertain respecting them. Were not that the fact, memory would be a delusion, and words cease to be the names of things, or means of expressing our thoughts.

Such then, notwithstanding the unsteadiness with which he adheres to it, is Mr. Morell's view of our faculties. He holds that all the material objects which we suppose ourselves to perceive through the senses, are mere spectra generated by the mind and existing nowhere but in itself. All supersensuous objects, such as God, spirits, truth, virtue, beauty, are discerned, he represents, directly by reason, independently of means; and are likewise, therefore, purely ideal. When, however, we attempt to analyse, distinguish, and classify them, designate them by names, and reason respecting them, they no longer continue to be the real objects of our thoughts and discussion, but instead the mere terms which we employ in designating and describing them, are substituted in their place! As the world, its inhabitants, and its creator are thus purely ideal, there is no universe to any one except that which exists in his own thoughts. There is no religion, no theology, no virtue, no immortality, no science, no art, but that which exists in one's own views and experience! There is no objective Christianity, therefore, nor standard of any description without us, by which the truth or error of our speculative views can be tested. Each one's conception of it are to him the real and only Christianity. His own spirit is his only source of knowledge; and whatever he finds there is to be taken as the pure and absolute truth! It is on this monstrous theory, accordingly, that he constructs his philosophy of religion, as we shall now proceed to show; and it is by discerning the ground on which he thus proceeds, veiled as it is by a crowd of specious words, and deserted not infrequently by inadvertent concessions, that the error of his speculations, and the mode in which they subvert the whole fabric of theology and religion, are seen.

Thus he defines "the essence of religion" as a "feeling of dependence :"

"The essential germ of the religious life is concentrated in the absolute feeling of dependence—a feeling which implies nothing abject, but, on the contrary, a high and hallowed sense of our being inseparably related to Deity—of our being *parts* of his great plan—of our being held up in his vast embrace—of our being formed for some specific destiny, which even amidst the subordinate and finite pursuits of life, must ever be kept in mind as the goal of our whole being."—Pp. 93, 94.

But in the first place, this, on his theory, exhibits religion as a sheer delusion,—as if, as he represents, God, right, obligation, and law, are merely ideal, and exist only in the mind that conceives them, then there is no ground for a feeling of such a relationship to the Deity, and sense of dependence on him. So far from it, it is he who is dependent on the mind that conceives him for his existence, attributes, and relations; not the conceiving mind that is indebted to him for its being and relationship to the agency he is imagined to exert!

Next: A sense of dependence does not necessarily involve a religious feeling. Satan has doubtless a clear apprehension of his relation to God, and dependence on him for existence; yet there is no religion in that realization. A perception of our relationship to God as creatures, is, like a knowledge of his being, requisite undoubtedly to the exercise of religious affections towards him. It is not a part, however, of religion itself, as that is a recognition of him as being what he is, and the exercise and expression of affection towards him as such. It is awe, adoration, love, submission, trust, on the ground of his being what he is in himself, and what he is to us. A sense of subjection to him is often most unwelcome, and excites aversion and rebellion instead of adoration and love.

Thirdly: As God, by Mr. M.'s theory, is but a mere idea, a feeling of dependence on one deity must be as legitimate as on another, and may as appropriately be denominated "the essence of religion." He treats it accordingly as a mere feeling of a certain species, without any consideration who or what the object of it is. A sense of dependence on Jupiter

is as much religion, according to his theory, as the feeling of our subordination to Jehovah; and a reptile, a stock, or a non-existence, as legitimately its object, as the self-existent who creates and upholds us! Such a philosophy may suit an idealist who has no faith in a real deity; but cannot be satisfactory to a Christian, who believes in the self-existent, and knows that he is the only proper object of religious regard.

But finally: As in "the absolute feeling of dependence;—of our being parts of his great plan,—of our being held up in his vast embrace;—of our being formed for some specific destiny, which even amidst the subordinate and finite pursuits of life, must ever be kept in view, as the goal of our whole being,"—p. 94, we regard him in his *relations* to us as our author, upholder, and ruler, he is not then, according to Mr. M., the subject of our "intuitional," but merely of our "logical consciousness," and consequently is not the real object of our thoughts, and therefore is not the object of the religious feeling, if there be any, that is involved in our sense of dependence! Mr. Morell's theories thus make it absolutely impossible that God should be the object of a religious sentiment of any species. If religion be a feeling excited by a sense of a certain relationship, yet by his philosophy of the "logical consciousness," when we attempt to regard him in that relationship, he instantly retreats from our vision, and is supplanted by a spectre of the understanding that neither bears any resemblance to his nature, nor presents any ground for an inference of his being. Such is the brilliant result of his philosophy, which is to emancipate us from the false system of the Scriptures, and teach us how to be religious on the principles of the modern metaphysics!

He contemplates Christianity, in like manner, not as an objective reality, but as a mere feeling or conception, and debars it by his theory of the logical consciousness from the possibility of being the subject of thought and discussion in language.

"Religion itself, as we have seen, under whatever form, supposes the conscious existence of an absolute feeling of dependence: when this emotion takes extensively any peculiar type, it always indicates some deep and general awakening of the religious nature amongst those who

possess it—a development of some *particular* CONCEPTION of *man's relation* to and dependence upon the Infinite Being—a state of self-consciousness, in respect to the Divinity, which has powerfully worked from mind to mind, until it assumes a definite expression, *it may be in LANGUAGE*, or in certain peculiar modes of worship. To fix, therefore, the essential characteristic of any historical form of religion, we must look attentively at the outward phenomena it originates, as being an index to the precise state of self-consciousness which it more tacitly involves. The rites and ceremonies, the forms of worship, the expressions of adoration, of propitiation, of prayer, or of praise, the actions performed under these impulses, all will be certain indications of some particular state of the inward religious emotions, and it is only when we have examined all these phenomena carefully, and compared one with the other, that we begin to see their internal consistency, and grasp the general idea that lies at the basis of the whole.”—Pp. 109, 110.

Here, in forgetfulness of his own system, he is exhibiting religion as it is contemplated, according to his analysis of our faculties, by “the logical consciousness,” as a “particular CONCEPTION” formed by the understanding, “of man’s relation to, and dependence upon, the Infinite Being—a state of self-consciousness in respect to the Divinity, that has assumed a *definite expression in LANGUAGE*.” But as, according to that theory, the logical contemplation and statement of truth “place that truth before us not *really*, but *representatively*” only, religion is not in fact the object of this consideration, but only a conception which the mind substitutes in its place. He is here, therefore, on his own principles completely out of the circle of Christianity, and treating of a spectre instead of a reality. He goes on :

“Now Christianity is a religion, and, as such, must consist essentially, like all other religions, in a certain attitude of man’s whole spiritual nature in relation to God. We wish it distinctly to be understood, that we are regarding the whole matter just now *purely in its subjective point of view*. It is not at all a question with us at present what are the outward provisions which Christianity involves, or what means have been employed to bring the human soul into a certain attitude of dependence upon God. The simple problem is, to discover what that attitude really proves itself to be.”
 “It were very easy, in discussing the essence of Christianity, to adduce

the prominent facts connected with its establishment in the world, and equally easy to give a sketch of what are esteemed to be its main doctrines; but it is evident that neither of them would offer a solution of the question before us. These facts, on the one hand, only indicate the outward means by which the Christian consciousness has been awakened in human nature at large; *while the doctrines, on the other hand, are simply a formal or logical expression of the elements of truth, which that consciousness, when awakened, involves.* Neither the facts nor the doctrines are capable of showing the *essential features* of the Christian life; they are not strictly commensurable with our inward experience. They cannot be the indices by which we compare Christianity as an attitude of man's spiritual nature towards God, with other forms or phases of religion in the world. What we require to do now is to see how the Christian consciousness, with all its *distinctive attributes*, has developed itself through divine agencies, out of the broader religious feelings of humanity; to point out what these distinctive attributes really are; and thus to discover the essential points in which Christianity, as a form of our religious nature, differs from every other determination which that nature has successively assumed."—Pp. 110, 111.

Here he exhibits Christianity again as a mere interior feeling, wholly different, on the one hand, from the means by which that consciousness is awakened; and, on the other, from the doctrines which "are simply a formal or logical expression of the elements of truth which that consciousness involves." Yet, in direct contravention of his own system, he treats of this consciousness, or subjective Christianity, as it is contemplated by "the logical consciousness," as having "distinctive attributes," presenting likenesses or dissimilarities to other kinds of religion. It is not, therefore, on his theory the real subject of his discussion. Instead, he is but treating of a conception which the understanding has thrust into its place! He adds, on a later page:

"Even if Christ had spoken his whole mind and will to the apostles, that would not have constituted a *religion* in the living experience of mankind; that would not have *been* Christianity itself, however adapted to awaken it. Christianity, like every other religion, consists essentially in a state of man's inner consciousness, which develops itself into a system of thought and activity only in a community of awakened minds,

and it was inevitable, therefore, that such a state of consciousness should require time, and intercourse, and mutual sympathy, *before it could become moulded into a decided and distinctive form.*"—P. 113.

And when, according to him, it had received that form, it ceased to be Christianity, and became a mere cavalcade of logical conceptions, definitions, and words, as unlike that Christianity which is the object of the intuitional consciousness, as the name graven on a monument is to the living spirit that once animated the dust which sleeps beneath. He now proceeds to give a specific definition of Christianity—of which, however, by his theory of the logical consciousness, the Christian religion cannot be the subject, but only a conception or spectre of it, generated by the understanding.

"Taking then, first, the subjective point of view, and waiving for the present all reference to any outward facts or phenomena, we may define Christianity as *that form of religion in which we are conscious of absolute dependence and perfect moral freedom, being harmonized by love to God.*"—P. 116.

What definition, however, could be given that would more wholly exclude everything that is distinctive of Christianity? It involves no affection towards Christ, nor any recognition of his work or him; but is a feeling which a Jew, a Mahometan, or a Hindoo, may have as readily as a Christian, as it includes nothing but, first, a sense of dependence—which he regards as an essential element in all religions, false as well as true. Next, a conscious moral freedom which is equally common to all classes of worshippers; for there are none who regard themselves as involuntary in their moral acts. And, finally, the hope and expectation of God's favor, which there are no worshippers who do not cherish. Is there any class of Pagans, Mahometans, Jews, or apostate Christians, who do not regard the being whom they adore as propitious to them—who offer their homage in despair? His definition is no more a definition, then, of subjective Christianity, than of subjective Hindooism, Mahometanism, or any other false religion which its devotees cherish with a hope of acceptance. He next proceeds to define Christianity objectively.

"We now turn to the objective side of the question. Here our definition, instead of pointing to the internal relationship of man to God, takes into account the *outward features* of the Divine purpose in the restoration of mankind. In this point of view we may define Christianity as that religion which rests upon the consciousness of the redemption of the world through Jesus Christ. Here we have two elements involved, both of which are necessary to complete the conception of Christianity objectively considered. The one is the idea of redemption, the other is that of a personal and historical Redeemer."—Pp. 123, 124.

It is thus apparent again, from this definition, that his subjective Christian religion has not the slightest element in it of Christianity; inasmuch as it has no reference whatever to Christ. It is only as an *objective* religion that he has any share in it! What an affront to God? What a contradiction to Christ's teachings? What a misrepresentation of the hearts of his disciples? The piety of his people, it seems, according to Mr. Morell, their faith, their love, their hope of sanctification, their trust for pardon and acceptance, have not the slightest relation to the Redeemer. Their religion consists of nothing but a sense of their dependence, a consciousness of their moral freedom, and a persuasion of God's love. It involves no consideration of the medium through which that love is to be exercised, or what the dispositions and acts are that are requisite to a participation in it.

Where now lies the reason of his giving a definition that thus contradicts the Scriptures, misrepresents the piety of God's people, and divests Christianity of all its distinguishing elements? In his idealism. As he holds with the German infidels from whom he drew his theory, that there is no universe external to us, no God, and no fellow beings; but that our seeming perceptions of them, and proofs of their existence, are mere conceptions that are generated by our own faculties, and have no counterpart without us, he necessarily contemplates the religion that bears the name of Christ as merely subjective, and nothing more than "a phase" of his feelings who exercises it. It cannot, on that hypothesis, be anything else. In like manner the objectivity of religion can on that supposition be nothing but a conceptional or imagined one: all its outwardness must be imparted to it by the understanding which

generates the forms under which it is conceived and described as external. Its conceptional objectivity is, accordingly, nothing but a peculiar "phase" of consciousness, and is as absolutely subjective, therefore, as its subjectivity itself. In conformity with this necessity of his theory, he, in fact, defines its "objective side," as resting "upon the *consciousness* of the redemption of the world through Jesus Christ," which, on his view of that consciousness, is nothing but a conception or spectre of the understanding. His Christianity is thus, in every relation, altogether ideal. It has no God, no Christ, no race of men to be the subjects of redemption, no historical facts as its ground; nothing but what exists in the mind of the individual who exercises it.

It is only on the supposition that that theory is correct that he can be excused for denominating a mere "feeling" Christianity. It is as total a departure from usage, and as unjustifiable to employ the term with such a meaning, as it were to appropriate the name of any other external thing to a mere feeling or mental act: to call algebra an affection; history, metaphysics, theology, the material universe, or God, a consciousness. This abuse of the term, by Mr. Morell, would be inexplicable, were it not that he is an idealist.

As his definition includes nothing that distinguishes Christian piety, it disregards all the peculiar affections and acts which the Scriptures exhibit as essential in order to salvation by Christ. According to Mr. Morell any one who hopes to be saved through Christ is as fully entitled as any other to be regarded as a genuine Christian, and a subject of the promise of pardon and acceptance. A Catholic worshipper of images, a Puseyite who relies on his reception of the sacraments for justification, a follower of Coleridge who rejects Christ's atonement, a material pantheist, like Spinoza or Swedenborg, who regards himself as a part of God, an ideal pantheist, like Hegel and others of that school, who deny that there is any Christ or any deity, are as truly men of Christian piety; and as much the subjects of redemption by Christ, as Paul, John, or any others who worship God in spirit and in truth, and keep the faith that was delivered to the saints. Voltaire, who received the sacrament in his last hours, and Paine, who intermixed his dying blasphemies with impassioned cries to Christ to save

him, were as truly Christian men, on Mr. Morell's scheme, as any others!

But finally, on his theory of "the logical consciousness," even this poor shadow of a subjective Christianity cannot be the real subject of his discussion in this inquiry, inasmuch as he treats of it *reflectively*, attempts to analyse it, distinguish and define its attributes, and expresses them in words. It is not actually, therefore, but only representatively the theme of his thoughts. The real subject of his consideration is nothing more than a conception, or form, that exists nowhere but in the mind that conceives it! What an effulgent light his philosophy of religion throws on its nature! That men, like Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Strauss, and other Germans, who have no belief whatever in God, should put forth views of this kind, is easily explicable. They were officials of nationalized churches, or held stations in universities that rendered it necessary that they should give their assent to the doctrines of the Scriptures, as they are expressed in the public creeds and formularies, and placed them under a strong inducement to devise some theory by which their total disbelief of Christianity, as a reality, might be reconciled with their professions of faith in it. And this was their design in this philosophic theory; by which the Christian religion is wholly divested of objectivity, and converted into a mere feeling, that either has no relation whatever to Christ, or none but the most vague and unmeaning. If this philosophy could be made to prevail, they saw, that though without any faith whatever, even in God, they yet could have as valid a title to be regarded as Christians, as those who receive Christianity as it is taught in the Scriptures, and look to Christ for redemption by a true faith! But that Mr. Morell and others, who are under no such motive to confound the truth, should be betrayed into a reception of their theories as absolutely correct, which, probably, never for a moment commanded their own assent, is surprising.

Mr. M. next proceeds to the philosophy of revelation. On the supposition that God, Christ, redemption, the material world, and all other external existences and facts, have no actual being, but are mere ideas that subsist only in the mind that conceives them, it results of necessity that a revelation

from God must also be altogether ideal, the mere work of the understanding in which it takes place, and must be explained in the same manner as the acquisition is of any other class of ideas. That is the view, accordingly, which Mr. Morell gives of the revelations which God has made to man. While he admits that "the idea of revelation always implies a process by which knowledge, in some form or other, is communicated to an intelligent being," he holds that it must be received by "intuition," or a direct beholding of the objects which it respects, independently of any other means.

"We have already seen that there are two modes of intelligence possible to man in his present state. These are the *intuitional* and the *logical*. In the former case we arrive at truth by a direct and immediate gazing upon it. The subject stands immediately in presence of the object and perceives it; hence we term the process, in some instances, *perception*, as when we come in contact with the external world through the senses; and sometimes *intuition*, as when we have a direct knowledge, through the interior eye of consciousness, of higher and more spiritual realities. In the logical mode of intelligence, on the contrary, we arrive at truth *mediately*, either by some calculation or inference of our own, or by some definition or explanation from the lips of another. Thus, all the different methods of analysis, of reasoning, of definition, of explication, belong to the province of logical consciousness, and imply simply the proper use of the fixed laws of thought, within the sphere of our present experience. . . ."—Pp. 128, 129.

"In considering, then, under which of the two great generic modes of intelligence we have to class the particular case involved in the idea of a revelation, we can have but little hesitation in referring it at once to the category of *intuition*. The idea of a revelation is universally considered to imply a case of intelligence in which something is presented *directly* to the mind of the subject; in which it is conveyed by the immediate agency of God himself; in which our own efforts would have been unavailing to attain the same conceptions; in which the truth communicated could not have been drawn by inference from any data previously known; and finally, in which the whole result is one lying beyond the reach of the logical understanding."—P. 130.

This representation, however, that a revelation can take place only by intuition, or a direct vision of the truth revealed, independently of means, is wholly mistaken. It excludes all the revelations which are recorded in the sacred volume,

that were made by the Almighty by his voice. The truths and purposes announced by him were not directly beheld by the prophets to whom he uttered them, any more than they now are by those who read his word. It excludes, also, all the revelations which were made by symbols, such as those of the Apocalypse, Zechariah, Daniel, and Ezekiel. The things revealed through them were not seen by the prophets directly, but only through their representatives. The symbolic agents, objects, and acts of one species exhibited to them in vision, were the media of foreshowing agents, acts, and events of another. It is a denial, also, that a revelation can be made through language. When Christ announced to the Jews, that "the hour is coming in which all that are in the grave shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and shall come forth: they that have done good, to the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil, to the resurrection of condemnation," no revelation was made, according to Mr. Morell, because the resurrection foretold was not directly beheld by those who heard the announcement. This preposterous representation he advances still more formally in a subsequent part of his argument. He exhibits it, moreover, as absolutely impossible that God should reveal anything that is future, inasmuch as he makes the direct vision of the truth, purpose, or event, revealed, necessary in contradistinction from a perception, or knowledge of it through media. It cannot be revealed, therefore, until it has actually come into existence, because it cannot till then be directly seen. To exhibit it by symbols, or any species of representative, would not be to make it an object of direct intuition, but only of knowledge by inference, or interpretation. Mr. Morell, accordingly, if consistent, must deny not only that the prophecies of the Scriptures are a revelation, but that we have any knowledge whatever from God of the future! Whether we are to exist and be conscious after death; whether we are to be raised from the grave, be judged according to our deeds, and live for ever in bliss or misery, is absolutely unknown, and of necessity, because nothing can be revealed, but by being made an object of direct perception, and, therefore, after it has come into existence! We cannot even have a knowledge from God that blessings will attend us in this life, if obedient,

and evils, if disobedient. We cannot have any promise in respect to his agency towards us, in which we can exercise our faith, and from which we can derive support; nor any threatening that can excite our fears. A moral government, therefore, enforced by sanctions, is physically impossible. The future, in respect to God's purposes, and the principles on which he is to exercise his administration, is an absolute blank.

What a splendid philosophy of religion! How admirably entitled to the reputation of scholars, metaphysicians, and theologians, are those of our religious teachers who take these miserable speculatists as their guides, who, it would seem, if they were sincere, cannot have had intellect sufficient to comprehend the simplest elements of their systems! Their design, however, by the theory, was to set aside the word of God, and make a revelation the work of our faculties, independently of any extraordinary communication from the Most High. And Mr. Morell has followed them in that representation. Thus he avers that every peculiarity that marks the reception of knowledge by revelation, is seen in an equal degree in ordinary intuition; and alleges, in exemplification of it, the perception of the external world by the organs of sense.

"Intuition, in like manner as revelation, implies that the object of intelligence is presented *directly* to our contemplation. So closely does intuition resemble our idea of a revelation *in this respect*, that we may see the strictest analogy between them, even in that lower kind of intuition which we term 'perception by the senses.' We may say, without doing any violence to the ordinary usage of the word, that our knowledge of the material universe is a *revelation*. Imagine that we had been present at the moment when light and order first broke in upon primeval chaos; imagine that from a state of darkness, we saw the universe spring forth into harmony and beauty; should we not have regarded the conceptions which streamed in upon our minds, as being, in the strictest sense, a Divine revelation? But what *was* a revelation to the minds which first witnessed it, must, as far as its real nature and mode of communication is concerned, be *always* a revelation."—P. 131.

This is, in the first place, a gross misuse of the term. The word revelation denotes a communication by God, through

miraculous means, of his will or purposes respecting men, that is a rule or an aid to them in their duties. But the ordinary perception of external objects by the senses has nothing of that character. If any moral or religious instruction is derived from it, it is by inference, which Mr. M. asserts is never the medium of a revelation. He, in the next place, contradicts in it his representation, that "revelation is a case of intelligence," "in which it is conveyed by the immediate agency of God himself—in which our own efforts would have been unavailing to attain the same conceptions; in which the truth communicated could not have been drawn by inference from any data previously known; and, finally, in which the whole result is one lying beyond the reach of the logical understanding,"—P. 130. Is it not surprising that he should in the next paragraph desert and contravene each of these representations? There is no immediate agency of God in our ordinary perceptions by the senses. They are the result of our own efforts. We certainly are voluntary in looking at the objects around us. The religious truths which we learn by such perceptions are acquired by reasoning, and do not, therefore, lie beyond the reach of what he calls the logical understanding. It is by reflection and inference that we see that the things that are made, manifest the invisible things of the creator, even his eternal power and Godhead.

Mr. Morell's definition, however, accomplishes his purpose by divesting the Scriptures of everything that distinguishes the mode in which the revelations which they record were made, and investing our senses with as high authority as the voice of God himself, and other miraculous means which he has employed to make known to us his will. He adds, in further proof that that which is acquired by perception or intuition by the senses, is a revelation :

"Intuition, in the same manner as revelation, implies that the knowledge involved in it is presented to us immediately *by God*. This is true respecting those ordinary conceptions which we are apt to separate altogether from the Divine operations. Are not the forms of beauty, and the high ideas embodied in *nature*, immediate manifestations of the thoughts of God to the human mind? Can we reject the inference, that the process by which we gaze admiringly upon the wou-

ders of nature, is a mode of intelligence that implies in its generic sense a direct revelation to us *from God* himself? The case is still plainer when we turn to the higher spheres of intuition; for what other can we say, in reference to the conceptions we enjoy of the true, the beautiful, and the good, than that they are placed before our mental vision by the direct agency of Him, who is the source and centre of all truth, and goodness, and beauty."—Pp. 131, 132.

But it is, in the first place, a contradiction to represent that conceptions that are presented to us through "*nature*" are "presented to us immediately by God." By the very terms, the objects of nature which act on our senses and excite those conceptions are the *means* by which they are "placed before us." And next, if, as he here asserts, conceptions that are excited by the action on us of "*nature*," are an immediate revelation from God, then all conceptions and ideas which we acquire, whatever the media may be, must also be an immediate revelation from him, and the pretence that it is only a particular species that is entitled to that denomination is groundless. If the fact that God is the author of the material world, proves that our perception of it and its qualities is an immediate revelation from him, then the fact that he is the author of our minds proves equally that every conception, idea, and fancy that rises in them, because our faculties are what they are, is also an immediate revelation from him. A dream, therefore, is as much a revelation, as a direct miraculous communication from the Almighty! The assertion of Satan to Eve, "Thou shalt not die," was as absolutely a revelation from God, and as authoritative as his own announcement, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die!" By this scheme its authors and disciples again thus reach the end for which they contrive, and maintain it:—the dispossession of the Scriptures of all title to be regarded as a peculiar revelation; and elevation of their ordinary thoughts, their wildest dreams and fancies, their infidel and atheistic theories, the lies and blasphemies of Satan himself, to as high an authority as the word of the Selfexistent! For if every fancy and conception is an immediate revelation from God, because he created the external world that occasions it, and the intellect that is the subject of it; and if an

immediate revelation from God is authoritative, are not the errors of the ignorant, the fancies of the bewildered and fanatical, the theories of the infidel, the falsehoods and calumnies of the great prince of evil, as authoritative as any others?

Having thus shown to his satisfaction that every conception that is obtained by the action on us of an external agent, and is thence an intuition, is an immediate revelation from God, he next turns, and in direct contravention of it, endeavors to demonstrate that no conception or knowledge that is acquired by the use of our powers, through means such as language, a living teacher, or logic, can be a revelation.

"Could not a revelation from God, it might be naturally argued, consist in an exposition of truth, made to us by the lips or from the pen of an inspired messenger, that exposition coming distinctly under the idea of a *logical explication of doctrines*, which it is for mankind to receive, as sent to us on Divine authority! . . . We have no doubt whatever but that there have been agents commissioned by God to bring mankind to a proper conception of Divine truth, and comprehension of the Divine will. But now let us look a little more closely into their real mission, and consider the means by which alone it was possible for them to fulfil it.

"These Divine messengers, we will suppose, address their fellow-men in *the words and phrases they are accustomed to hear*, and speak in this way to expound to them the truth of God. If we imagine ourselves, then, to be the listeners, it is needless to say that so long as they treat of ideas which lie *within* the range of our present experience, we should be well able at once to comprehend them, and to judge of the grounds on which they urge them upon our attention. But it is manifest that such a discourse as I describe could in no proper sense be termed a *revelation*. So long as the Divine teacher keeps within the range of our present intellectual experience, he might indeed throw things into a new light, he might point out more accurately their connexion, he might show us at once their importance and their logical consistency; but all this would not amount to a *revelation*; it would give us no *immediate* manifestation of truth from God; it would offer no conceptions lying beyond the range of our present data; it would quite fail in bringing us into contact with *new realities*, nor would it at all extend the sweep of our mental vision. . . .

"But now let us imagine him to *transcend* the present sphere of our mental vision;—it is evident from what I have just said, that in such a case we should be by no means in a condition to comprehend his mean-

ing ; on the supposition of course that he was to confine himself to *mere exposition*. The only way in which he could give us a revelation of truth hitherto unrealized, would be by becoming the agent of elevating our inward religious consciousness up to the same or a similar standard as his own ; which is the same thing as if we had said that all revelation, properly so called, can be made to us primarily, only in the form of religious *intuition*."—Pp. 136–138.

His representation, thus, is that no revelation can be made to us in respect to a subject of which we already have a degree of knowledge. So long as "the Divine messengers" "treat of ideas which lie *within* the range of our present experience," their "discourse could in no proper sense be termed a revelation ;" because "it would offer no conceptions lying beyond the range of our present data ;—it would fail in bringing us in contact with *new realities*." A subject must be absolutely new, then, in order that a revelation may be made in respect to it. It follows that after we have gained a knowledge of God's being, attributes, and relations, it is impossible that he should make a revelation to us ; and accordingly, that we have no revelation from him, unless it was exclusively employed in conveying to us our first knowledge of his existence, nature, and relations. It results, then, that the Scriptures, or the communications which they record, are not a revelation, as they are not the first means of our knowledge of God's existence ; and with equal certainty, also, that a large portion of the intuitions which Mr. Morell treats as revelations are not such ; inasmuch as they take place subsequently to our knowledge of God's being and work as creator and ruler.

But how palpable and egregious a mistake ! God can as well make revelations to us in respect to subjects of which we already have much knowledge, as in relation to any others. What obstacle can our knowing that he exists and is the rewarder of them that seek him, be to his revealing to us the nature of the administration he is to exercise over us ; or a series of the events of which the earth is to be the theatre at a future period ? What obstruction can the fact that we know that we are to exist for ever, be to his revealing to us the mode and scene of our endless life ; the relations we are to sustain to him, and the agencies we are to exert ? The sup-

position that a knowledge of one truth or class of truths respecting a subject, can be a hindrance to a revelation of others, is preposterous. It might as well be said that when we have once gained any knowledge of a subject, however slight the degree, we cannot thereafter rise to a higher understanding of it, by any means that we may use, "because it already lies *within* the range of our present experience." On that assumption the child that has learned the first lessons of his spelling book, has become as absolute a master of literature as he can ever be; the youth who has advanced through the axioms and definitions of geometry, has obtained all the familiarity with the science that could result from a life of the most diligent and successful study! Were Mr. Morell's theory just, there is not a truth announced in the Scriptures that could be said to have ever been revealed!

His whole theory, indeed, that a revelation can only be made through intuition and by a direct vision of the object which it respects, is altogether mistaken and absurd. It denies that a revelation can be made through language, or other media, such as symbols. But nothing can be more groundless. There is no more reason why a revelation may not be made in language, than there is that knowledge from any other source cannot be communicated in words. How is it that it is impossible to God to give us information through spoken or written words, any more than it is for men? Are his powers inferior to those of his creatures? Are words from his lips, or the lips of those whom he inspires, any less significant than those that are uttered by uninspired teachers? Cannot God give us information through speech of an event that is hereafter to take place, as well as a human historian can of one that has already happened? Cannot he announce to us his purposes, enact laws, inform us of their sanctions, and unveil to us the future, in any relation that he pleases, as easily and adequately as men can describe the past? What more preposterous fancy was ever entertained? Nothing is requisite to constitute a communication a revelation, but that it should come from God, and in a manner that demonstrates that it is he that imparts it. The medium through which it is communicated is of no significance. It may be by a voice, by messengers of an angelic order, by representa-

tive signs exhibited in vision, or other means. It was by spoken words that the angel Jehovah revealed to Abraham his purpose to destroy the cities of the plain. The patriarch's "intuition" by his "senses," of their destruction; was not a revelation to him of that design, but merely a sight of its execution. When Christ made the revelation to the high priest that he should "hereafter see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven," it was through words, not by an exhibition of that great scene to his senses. He is not to gaze on it immediately and know it by "intuition," till Christ actually comes in the clouds and "every eye sees him." And, in like manner, all the other revelations of laws, dispensations, purposes, and events that were future, that are recorded in the sacred volume, were made through media,—the voice, symbols, inspiration, or written language; and their use is as appropriate and necessary in the communication of knowledge to us by God, as in the expression of our thoughts to one another, or reception of knowledge from our fellow men. Is it not astounding that it should be supposed, and affirmed as little less than self-evident, that God cannot make these means the vehicle of expressing to us his will, and revealing to us his purposes?

Mr. Morell closes his argument on this subject by repeating, on the one hand, that all our primary ideas of truth come to us by immediate communication from God; and denying, on the other, that the Bible is a revelation.

"Universally, the primary data of all branches, even of scientific truth, come to us by a direct and intuitional power; that is, using the word in its broad and generic sense, *by an immediate revelation from God*. . . . Exactly in the same way does our religious knowledge come to us primarily, by a direct revelation addressed to the intuitional faculty."—Pp. 142, 143.

"The Bible cannot, in strict accuracy of language, be termed a revelation, since a revelation always implies an actual process of intelligence in a living mind; but it contains the records in which those minds who enjoyed the preliminary training, or the first brighter revelation of Christianity, have described the scenes which awakened their own religious nature to new life, and the high ideas and aspirations to which that new life gave origin."—P. 143.

He thus reaches the result that is held by the idealist, who regards the existence of fellow-beings and God as merely conceptional; that no revelation made to one being can be a revelation to another; and that each one is his own seer, and all his conceptions and fancies of absolute truth to him, and invested with absolute authority as a revelation. Those who can persuade themselves of this, doubtless can feel justified in rejecting the word of God. But through what an abyss of contradictions and solecisms they find it necessary to wade to reach that position? On the one hand it is denied that God has the power of communicating knowledge to his creatures, through the means or in the modes by which they communicate it to one another; yet, on the other, it is held that all the ideas which they acquire of his works and him by the use of their senses, are immediate revelations from him! Here it is asserted that after a being or truth has become an object of perception or knowledge, no revelation can be made in regard to it; yet there it is admitted that thousands and millions of revelations are made *through the senses*, in respect to "nature," after "nature" has become an object of perception; and that the Bible "contains the records" of a great number of revelations of God's will and designs, that were made after the prophets who received them had become aware of his being, attributes, and government! Now, it is averred that a communication from God cannot be a revelation to any one except him to whom it is immediately made; yet now, in direct contradiction to that, it is represented that every conception, thought, fancy, or dream, that is excited in one's own mind, though it is not a communication from God, is to be taken as an immediate revelation from him! Such are some of the portentous falsehoods and contradictions which it is found necessary to advance in order to reach the conviction that the word of God is not a revelation, but that each one's speculations, theories, conceptions, and imaginations, are a legitimate standard of truth and law to himself.

But Mr. Morell's theory of intuition cuts off still more effectually the possibility of a revelation of laws, promises, threatenings, a method of redemption, or any truth or fact that relates to God's purposes, or our duties to him and one another. He holds that the knowledge acquired by intuition, "in its origin,

lies beyond the region of the understanding," and thence involves none of "our forms of thought," but only "the elementary materials out of which our knowledge is primarily drawn." On the other hand, he represents that the logical consciousness or understanding furnishes the forms of all our notions or conceptions of things, as having shapes, colors, dimensions, qualities, and relations. In physical things, he says:—

"The matter is furnished by a direct sensational intuition of a concrete reality, and this is perception: the form is furnished by *the logical faculty*, which, *separating the attributes of the object*, as given in perception, *from the essence*, constructs a notion or idea, which can be clearly defined and employed as a fixed term in the region of our reflective knowledge."—P. 69.

"In realizing the distinction we have now portrayed between the two great modes of man's intellectual activity, we must caution our readers *not to confound the products of the intuitional consciousness with the fundamental forms of thought, such as are usually described in a table of the categories*. The product of intuition is never an abstract, formal, and empty notion; it is precisely the reverse—namely, *a direct perception of some actual concrete reality*. By means of the logical or analytical faculty, we never see things in their *organic unity*; we merely view their separate parts abstractedly considered, and seek to discover *the formal consistency* which runs through them. By intuition, on the other hand, we view truth *as a whole*, without taking any account of its parts—without noticing the forms or categories under which it can be represented to us—without asking after the logical consistency of the entire phenomena."—P. 78.

He thus avers that in intuition we behold objects as bare existences simply, without any consideration of their attributes, characteristics, or relations; and that it is only when we perceive them by the logical consciousness that we contemplate them as having forms, attributes, characteristics, prerogatives, conditions, and relations. From his theory, therefore, that revelation takes place by intuition solely, and not by the logical consciousness or understanding, it follows that it must contemplate God wholly irrespective of his attributes, characteristics, prerogatives, and acts; and man without reference to his faculties, relations, obligations, conditions, and necessities! For all these are embraced in the categories,

and are identically what the term logical is used by Mr. M. to denote—not simply that which is of the nature of reasoning, or in accordance with its rules; but that which is relational, which contemplates things as having properties, distributes them into their elements, assigns them to genera or species, or treats them as having a diversity of faculties or elements, and sustaining relations. A revelation, then, cannot exhibit God as self-existent, eternal, infinite, almighty, wise, good, holy, a creator, upholder, lawgiver, redeemer, avenger; for that were to exhibit him as possessing attributes, sustaining relationships, having prerogatives, and exerting acts! It can only contemplate him as a mere intelligence, without consideration of anything that distinguishes him from other existences! In like manner it cannot exhibit mankind as creatures of God, subjects, owing duties to him, sinners needing redemption, believers or unbelievers, nor in their relations to one another, as husbands, wives, parents, children, rulers, subjects; for all these are embraced in the categories. They belong to the what, the why, the how, the when, the whom, or some of the other relationships under which all things are contemplated logically. God cannot then by possibility make known to men a *law* by revelation, a method of redemption, nor a purpose of any nature that touches his rights, or their obligations to him and one another; for that were to make a revelation to their logical instead of their intuitional consciousness! The whole fabric of God's moral government is thus struck from existence at a blow, and the Scriptures in which its laws are recorded, exhibited as demonstrating their falsehood by a total contradiction to our faculties. For God reveals himself in them as we contemplate him by what Mr. Morell calls "the logical consciousness," as having attributes and rights, or sustaining relations, and exerting acts; and presents men also as we contemplate them, as having attributes and characteristics, sustaining relations, owing duties, exposed to dangers, and needing mercies. Into what a bottomless gulf have Mr. Morell's theories thus led him! Can he have looked down this hideous deep, and been aware of the plunge into it he was making? Can he suppose that a law can be imposed by God in any other way than by his revealing it? Can he imagine a moral government to be instituted by God, without exhibit-

ing him in his relations to mankind ; and mankind in their relations to him and one another ? Can he conceive a revelation of a method of redemption, that makes no reference to God as having rights, as a lawgiver, and as gracious ; nor to men as subjects of his government, as sinners, and as needing salvation ? How is he to escape from this abyss of self-confutation and absurdity ?

He next proceeds to discuss the philosophy of inspiration. On the idealistic theory that there is no real deity, no created intelligence, and no universe exterior to the mind, but that all seeming perceptions, and proofs of their being, are mere forms of the intellect that conceives them ; it is apparent that there can be no absolute communication of knowledge to the mind from without. If there be any unusual accession to its intelligence, it must be the work of its own powers ; and if it be an acquisition of knowledge that ordinarily lay beyond its reach, the attainment must be the consequence of some change in its faculties by which it is raised to a higher power of intuition. It must be a stimulation by which its eye is sharpened, its vision extended, and its grasp of that which is presented to it rendered more vigorous. Such, accordingly, is the view which Mr. Morell presents of inspiration. It is not in his judgment a miraculous communication of knowledge, but an enlargement of the power of acquiring it by intuition.

“ All revelation implies two conditions ; an intelligible *object* presented, and a *given power of reciprocity* in the subject ; and in popular language, when speaking of the manifestation of Christianity to the world, we confine the term *revelation* to the former of these conditions, and appropriate the word *inspiration* to designate the latter.

“ According to this convenient distinction, therefore, we may say that revelation, in the Christian sense, indicates that act of Divine power by which God presents *the realities of the spiritual world immediately to the human mind* ; while *inspiration* denotes that especial influence wrought upon the faculties of the subject, by virtue of which he is able to grasp these realities in their perfect fulness and integrity. . . .

“ Revelation and inspiration, then, indicate one united process, the result of which upon the human mind is, to produce a state of spiritual intuition, whose phenomena are so extraordinary, that we at once separate the agency by which they are produced from any of the ordinary principles of human development, and yet this agency is applied in

perfect consistency with the laws and natural operations of our spiritual nature. Inspiration does not imply anything generically new in the actual processes of the human mind; it does not involve any form of intelligence essentially different from what we already possess; it indicates rather the elevation of the religious consciousness, and with it, of course, the power of spiritual vision, to a degree of intensity peculiar to the individuals thus highly favored by God."—Pp. 147, 148.

But this is equivalent to a denial that we have or can have an inspired revelation, inasmuch as if it be true, such revelations as God has made, are impossible. No stimulation of the mind, or elevation of its faculties, could enable it to discern the thoughts of God, truths respecting his government, future events, or a thousand other realities, independently of means. By our nature we can perceive things that exist without us, only as we become subjects of an influence from them. It is through the medium of some effect produced on our organs of sense that we are apprised of their being and nature. It is the prerogative of God to see things out of himself independently of an influence from them: and he sees them and knows all that pertains to them, because they exist, and are what they are each moment, by his will. Could we discern exterior existences, or truths that relate to them, by virtue of our own powers, irrespective of any agency from without, we should have a power of omniscience. There would be no reason why we could not see one external agent or object as well as another, and one truth respecting their nature, acts, purposes, dispositions, and destiny, as well as another. But we have no such power, and no stimulation or enlargement of our faculties, therefore, would place us any nearer the perception of a large share of the great things which God has revealed. How could any enlargement of Abraham's perceptive powers have enabled him to discern, without any direct communication to him of the fact, that it was God's design to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah by a storm of fire and brimstone? Could he by searching any more find out that, than any of the other purposes of the Almighty? How could any sharpening or augmentation of Isaiah's faculties have made it possible to him, by their mere virtue, to foresee that in a distant age the Eternal Word would become in-

carnate, that Jehovah would lay on him our iniquities, that he would be wounded for our transgressions, and that by his stripes we should be healed? How could any augmentation of Paul's intellect have made it practicable to him to fore-know, that at a future epoch "the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ?" Or that when that great moment arrives, we shall not all sleep, but shall all be changed, in the twinkling of an eye, and the dead be raised incorruptible? The supposition is absurd. The *unexpressed* thoughts and purposes of God; the *unannounced* principles on which he is to conduct his administration of the world; the *unrevealed* events that are to mark his future sway, can no more be discerned by a creature raised to millions of times the energy of the greatest created intellect than by one of the feeblest powers. It is by our very nature by media alone that we can become aware of them; and it is that influence on the mind by which the prophet is put in possession of those media, that constitutes his inspiration. It is in being made to hear the language in which the revelation is uttered, to see the symbols by which it is represented, or being subjected to whatever other agency it may be, through which the thoughts are transfused into the mind, of which the revelation consists.

Mr. Morell's philosophy of inspiration is therefore indisputably false. He assumes that the agents, thoughts, truths, laws, purposes, and events which are made known to us by revelation, naturally lie within the reach of our faculties, independently of means, and that all that is requisite to our attaining a full knowledge of them is, that our powers should be quickened and raised to an extraordinary sharpness and energy. The great realities, however, which are made known to us by revelation are not naturally within the scope of our powers. We cannot know them immediately. As the gift to us of myriads of eyes would not enable us to see any but material existences, nor to see them without light; so the gift to us of the loftiest intellect with which a created being was ever endowed, would not enable us without appropriate means to discern God's thoughts and purposes, nor the acts or

conditions of his creatures who are invisible to us. We cannot possibly discern any of them by intuition. We cannot know, in that way, any of God's thoughts, designs, or requirements, inasmuch as he is not the object of our direct vision. We only know him through media. We cannot in that way know any of the thoughts, acts, or conditions of creatures that are future; inasmuch as nothing future is the object of our perception. Nor were the agents, some of whose acts and conditions have been made known to us by revelation, actually presented to our senses, could we thereby know by intuition that they are to exert those acts, and be placed in those conditions. We are not able, by the mere perception of a corporeal agent, to see absolutely what his thoughts are even at the moment of our observation. We can only know them by construction or inference from his countenance or gestures. But we can know nothing whatever from his mere form, what his thoughts, acts, and conditions are to be at a future period. An exhibition to Jeremiah, for example, of Judas Iscariot, would not have placed it in the power of the prophet to foresee the agency which that betrayer exerted towards Christ in delivering him to the priests; towards the priests in returning the thirty pieces of silver; nor towards himself in committing suicide. Such futurities can only be known through means as appropriate and adequate to their manifestation, as those which are required to impart a knowledge of similar acts or events that are already past. And those means must be either the announcement of them in language, the representation of them by symbols, or the transfusion into the mind—in some other miraculous manner that produces a consciousness that it is a revelation from God,—of the conceptions which, when expressed in language, form a prophetic description or narrative of the acts and events foreshown.

As he mistakes thus in his theory on this subject, he errs in a like degree also in his objection to what he denominates a mechanical inspiration, by which he means an absolute communication to the mind of the conceptions or thoughts of which the revelation consists, and the language in which it is expressed. Such an inspiration is not only not unnatural or unnecessary, but there is no other method by which the

thoughts, truths, and purposes which God has revealed, can be made known to us. There is demonstrably no way in which things that from their nature are beyond the scope of our faculties, can be communicated to us, except by means that bring them within our reach. And such are the unexpressed will, thoughts, and designs of God respecting our agency and the government of the world; and the commands, truths, and purposes which he has made known to us. There is no method in which they could be expressed to us, except by representatives of a different species, that are employed on a principle which we understand. We cannot directly know his preceptive will, or see his thoughts. There is no medium, for example, through which we could be apprised of the imposition on us of the law,—Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself,—except the expression to us of that law in spoken or written language or some equivalent signs; as there are no other media by which the law itself, or the fact that he has imposed it on us, can be indicated to us. This is apparent from the consideration that we cannot now express it to one another, nor the fact that he has enacted it, through any other means. Were the whole human family to spend ages in the effort, they could not succeed in the slightest degree. It is physically impossible. And so of all other commands and all promises and threatenings. As the will and thoughts of God are not directly perceptible by us, they must, if communicated to us, be made perceptible by means of a different species. But the only representatives of things that are not directly perceptible by us are arbitrary signs, and the only arbitrary signs of thoughts that form propositions such as his law and purposes, are spoken and written language. If there be any other, let Mr. Morell designate it. We have the most absolute demonstration, therefore, that the method of inspiration which he denominates “mechanical,” has been employed by the Most High, and thence that Mr. M.’s objections to it are false.

Mr. Morell’s method of treating the subject, though seemingly philosophical and displaying much acuteness, is yet more specious than thorough, and adapted to give an air of accuracy to the theory he advances, rather than to demonstrate the truth. His volume, it may be seen from the quotations

we have given, is employed in the *statement and advocacy of certain philosophical opinions*; not in the actual proof of them. Not a shadow of evidence does he present of the truth of his doctrines. He has written much as though his object were merely to present the theories of the German idealists on the several subjects of which he treats, and state their objections to other views that are held respecting them. The consequence is, in the first place, that his system is erected on assumptions that are not verified. There is no proof for example of the position on which his whole scheme rests, that the understanding generates all the forms of thought, or shapes, hues, dimensions, qualities, and relations, which belong to external things, as they are the objects of our perception—by which the universe is made to be merely conceptional—no reconciliation of that theory with our consciousness, and the numerous concessions and assumptions in which he abandons and confutes it; and no defence of it from the scepticism in which he admits that it naturally terminates. There is no proof that reason is a power of directly perceiving supersensuous entities and truths, in contradistinction from seeing them through means; nor any reconciliation of that theory with our consciousness, or our ignorance of innumerable subjects with which, were we possessed of such a faculty, we should naturally have a perfect acquaintance. And the result, in the next place, is, that several of the great questions on which the issue most intimately depends, are either not discussed at all, or are not presented in their true relations. When proposed directly, it is apparent that he must treat the subject anew, and in a wholly different form, in order to establish the system which he advocates. Thus, apart from his theory of the understanding which is the foundation of his whole scheme, and is indisputably false—1. It is a question of fundamental importance whether reason is a power of immediately perceiving supersensuous entities and truths, such as God, spirits, rights, thoughts, laws, obligations, and purposes, independently of media. If we can directly see God, discern his thoughts, perceive his will, and know his laws, appointments, and purposes, without any communication or action on us from him, and without any means whatever, why are we not conscious of it? What need have we of a revelation? Why is it that

we have not a perfect knowledge of him? Why are we not omniscient? This inquiry is clearly of the highest significance. It is, in fact, the question whether we are deities or creatures. Mr. Morell tacitly decides it in the affirmative, but totally overlooks the stupendous implications which it involves. We have, however, only to refer to our consciousness for the most absolute evidence that he is mistaken; and with this his whole theory of reason, revelation, and inspiration falls. 2. As we are conscious that we are not omniscient, that we cannot see God, nor other spiritual beings directly, and that we are not able to discern his thoughts, will, or purposes, independently of means; and as we know, if media are requisite to our perceiving his thoughts, they must differ from his thoughts themselves, and be a species of arbitrary signs, that are employed on a principle which we understand—it is a question of the utmost moment in this inquiry, whether, besides spoken and written words, there are any arbitrary representatives of thoughts, through which a revelation can be made, like that of the Scriptures, consisting, not of mere single things, as agents, objects, and acts, but of combinations of thoughts, expressed at large, such as laws, promises, threatenings, dispensations, ordinances, predictions. If there are, let Mr. Morell point them out. If he knows, for example, of any media but articulate sounds and written words, by which the combination of ideas, expressed in the introduction to the decalogue and the first commandment, could have been announced to the Israelites: "I am Jehovah, thy God, who have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before me," let him designate them, and show how that assemblage of ideas could be clearly expressed by them. Let him exemplify them, if he is aware of any such media through which a specific expression could have been made to them of the requirement of the second commandment: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them; for I, Jehovah, thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth gene-

ration of them that hate me ; and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments." Can he designate any other representatives than articulate voices, written words, or other signs used on the same principle, by which that combination of thoughts could have been expressed? This is a fundamental question. If he cannot show some other species by which that command could have been conveyed to the Israelites and to us, then he must either abandon his theory of revelation and inspiration, and admit that God may communicate his thoughts and will to us through language, and, therefore, by what he calls a mechanical inspiration ; or else deny that a revelation has been made to us of his will.

If he admits both that there are no other media than language through which such an expression of God's will can be made to us, and that such a revelation of it has actually been made through that medium, then he must retract his representation that no revelation of his will can be made through what he denominates the logical consciousness ; for, in the decalogue and in all other laws, both God and men are exhibited and contemplated relationally ; or in the forms of what he calls the understanding, or logical consciousness ; God as self-existent, as having attributes and characteristics, relations, rights, and purposes ; and men as creatures, possessing attributes, sustaining relations to him and one another, having rights and possessions, owing obligations, and capable of exerting acts that have a reference to those laws. Material objects, also, are contemplated as they are perceived, according to Mr. M.'s theory, by the understanding, as having forms, dimensions, properties, and relations. Things in heaven, in the earth, and in the water, of which images and likenesses can be formed, must be material ; have shapes, hues, and dimensions ; and be conceived, therefore,—to use the cant of these speculatists,—in time and space. If God, then, can make such an expression of his will in which he, those whom he addresses, and the objects of the material world, are exhibited relationally, according to their several natures and conditions, then he can make a revelation to what Mr. M. calls our logical consciousness, and Mr. M.'s speculations on that subject are overturned. If he would make an effective

inquisition, then, of the truth, he must discuss these questions in the relations we have suggested; and, if thorough and impartial, it will, of necessity, result in the rejection of the errors we have pointed out, and adoption of the views that are commonly entertained of inspiration, Christianity, and reason.

Such is Mr. M.'s philosophy of our nature, of religion, of Christianity, of revelation, and of the mode in which it is imparted to us. Though embarrassed by many inconsistencies and self-contradictions, it is the theory of the modern atheistic idealists, and is, in fact, a denial of revelation, religion, and God, as objective realities, and a deification of the mind itself, and ascription to it of all the powers and acts which it professes to refer to the deity. It is not probable that it was ever truly believed by its authors, but was invented that they might have, at least apparently, a God and a Christianity, in which they could consistently profess faith, while they rejected those of the Scriptures. As they were under the necessity of making such a profession in order to enjoy the lucrative positions in the churches and universities to which they had been exalted, or to which they aspired, and could not do it speciously while the Scriptures were taken as presenting a just view of their nature, they attempted to devise a philosophic divinity and Christianity that were in accordance with their infidelity; and this hideous system of falsehood and folly is the product to which they for that purpose gave birth. It very probably is not believed by many who advocate it in this country and Great Britain, as it is at once a convenient shield from the unpopularity of open atheism, and an effective instrument for the subversion of Christianity. Those who receive it are, without exception, so far as we are aware, either openly, or with very ineffectual attempts at concealment, rejectors of the great doctrines of the gospel; and the elements and spirit of infidelity and atheism have, we doubt not, gained a place in the general mind, just in proportion as the false metaphysics are received on which this system is founded.

After presenting this view of the nature of Christianity, and the means through which we acquire a knowledge of it, Mr. Morell proceeds to present his philosophy of the mode in

which we act in respect to it when it has become the subject of our thoughts; but we postpone the notice of that part of his volume to a future number.

ART. II.—A DESIGNATION OF THE FIGURES OF ISAIAH,
CHAP. V. AND VI.

BY THE EDITOR.

THIS chapter, though less tropical than the first, second, and third, has several figures of great force and beauty.

1. An allegory, consisting of three parts: the description of the vineyard, which is the representative: the prediction of its destruction: and the designation of the people whom it represents. It is distinguished from other allegories by the interposition between the narrative and predictive parts of a different figure. "My beloved had a vineyard on a high and fruitful hill. And he fenced it round, and cleared it from the stones. And he planted it with the vine of Sorek; and he built a tower in the midst of it; and he hewed out, also, a lake therein; and he expected that it should bring forth grapes, and it produced wild grapes," v. 1, 2. This narrative is uttered by the prophet, and all its terms, as translated, are used in their literal sense.

2. An apostrophe. The allegory is now suspended, and an appeal introduced to the inhabitants of Jerusalem and men of Judah, to judge between God and his vineyard: "And now O inhabitant of Jerusalem and man of Judah, judge, I pray you, between me and my vineyard. What could have been done more to my vineyard than I have done unto it? Why, when I expected that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?" v. 3, 4. It is not the owner of the vineyard that had been described, but God who utters this apostrophe, as is seen from his announcing that he would command the clouds not to rain, which is appropriate only to him. Such a purpose in a creature, who has no control over the clouds, were absurd.

3, 4. Synecdoches, in the use of inhabitant for the inhabitants of Jerusalem; and man for the men of Judah.

The allegory is now resumed by Jehovah, and the purpose announced of dismantling and destroying his vineyard. "But come now and I will make known unto you what I purpose to do to my vineyard: Remove its hedge, and it shall be devoured; destroy its fence, and it shall be trodden down. And I will make it a desolation. It shall not be pruned, neither shall it be digged; and there shall come up thorns and briers in it; and I will command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it," v. 5, 6.

5. A hypocatastasis in the use of the act of commanding, instead of causing, that the clouds should not rain. It is not employed metaphorically, as to command the clouds is not impossible nor unsuitable to God. The expression is far more beautiful and effective than though the verb cause had been used; as it indicates his absolute dominion and power, with a sublimity to which no literal language is equal. All the elements of nature are as subservient to his will, as though they were intelligent, and yielded him a voluntary obedience.

The people are now designated whom the vineyard represents, and their rebellion specified, which it is employed to exemplify. "For the vineyard of the Lord of Hosts is the house of Israel; and the men of Judah his pleasant plant. And he looked for judgment," or justice, "and behold bloodshed, and for righteousness, and behold the cry of the injured," v. 7. The sins of the Israelites which the figure exemplifies were not, as many have assumed, their evil agency universally towards God, as well as towards men, but their bloodiness and injustice to one another. Instead of that regard for the rights of life and person which the divine law enjoins, they wantonly shed each other's blood. Instead of uprightness in the enforcement of claims, the exaction of labor, or the payment of dues, they wronged the defenceless to such a degree, that they cried out under their injuries. And the figure has an eminent adaptation to exemplify their transgressions in that relation. There is a conspicuous analogy between the measures pursued by the owner of the vineyard to cause it to yield good grapes, and the means employed by the Most High to lead the Israelites to act with the justice

and goodness towards each other, which became them as moral and social beings, of the same nature and family, and under the same lawgiver and laws. He had given them the necessary knowledge of their mutual relations and rights. He had imposed on them the requisite laws. He had enforced his commands by the promise of a blessing on those who should obey, and a curse on those who should transgress. He had verified that promise and threatening through a long series of years in his providence over the nation. All the considerations were thus presented to them that could most effectively restrain them from injustice towards one another, and prompt them to rectitude and benignity. Wantonly to shed each other's blood, and abuse, defraud, and oppress one another, was, therefore, as monstrous in them, as it were unnatural in a field of cultivated vines to yield wild and poisonous grapes. Their violation and contravention of the laws of their moral nature were as gross and startling as such a reversion would be of the laws of the vegetable world. What literal language could have presented so vivid a picture of their hideous depravation! And what a terrible accomplishment has the prediction received! Through eight hundred years the Israelites were ravaged and devoured by the cruel and bloody tyranny of the Babylonians, Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, Syrians, and Romans; and then divested of their national organization, driven into exile, and forced to exist through eighteen centuries more, as mere individuals, or families, instead of a distinct and independent people. As a vineyard that is divested of its fences, left without care, and devoured by beasts, becomes at length a wild or waste, as though it had never been cultivated; so they have been deprived of all the defences on which their existence as a separate nation, under their own peculiar polity, depended, and bereft by being placed out of the sphere of each other's influence, of the extraordinary aids, and deprived of the opportunities they had enjoyed for the exercise towards one another of the just and benevolent affections which they were formed and required to yield.

What an impressive demonstration this fulfilment presents, that the threatenings of the Almighty are not, as some represent, mere hyperboles, designed to dupe men into a false and blind awe and horror! And what a ground for the assurance,

in like manner, that his predictions and promises of good to that people, are not mere extravagances of speech that can only delude and cheat the believer, but express purposes that are to receive an accomplishment as great and august as the inflictions of his justice are awful.

The prophet now proceeds to unfold and enforce the denunciation of the parable, by pronouncing a woe on several classes of those who were guilty of the offence which it represents.

The first are the avaricious, who, regardless of the well-being and rights of others, covet and grasp their possessions, and endeavor to monopolize all that lies within their reach. "Woe unto those who join house to house, who lay field to field together, till there is no place, and ye have your dwelling alone to yourselves in the midst of the land. In mine ears Jehovah of Hosts said, of a truth many houses shall become a desolation, great and fair without an inhabitant; for ten acres of vineyard shall yield one bath; and the seed of an homer shall produce one epha," v. 8-10. The judgments threatened were to involve the most perfect disappointment of their schemes. Their great and beautiful houses were to be of no service to them, but monuments of their guilt and defeat, because there were to be no inhabitants to occupy them. Their fields were to be of no value, because they were to be smitten with barrenness, and not yield enough to pay for their cultivation.

He next denounced a woe on those who addicted themselves to wine-drinking, feasting, and frivolous amusements, and forgot God.

6, 7. Metaphors in the use of follow, to indicate seeking, and inflame, to denote the unnatural heat and flush excited by intoxication. "Woe unto them that rise up early in the morning, that they may follow strong drink; that continue until night till wine inflame them," v. 11.

8. A hypocaustasis in the substitution of hands for the attributes by which God exercises his providence. "And the harp and the viol, the tabret and pipe, and wine are in their feasts; but they regard not the work of the Lord, neither consider the operation of his hands," v. 12.

It was because of this addiction to sensual excesses and

total forgetfulness of God, that he had inflicted on them the calamities which they had suffered. "Therefore my people are gone into captivity because they have had no knowledge; and their honorable men are famished, and their multitude dried up with thirst," v. 13. They had been subjected to deprivations and miseries that were the opposites of the pleasures to which they had been devoted: famine instead of feasts, and devouring thirst instead of drunkenness.

9, 10. Metaphors, in exhibiting the grave as enlarging itself and opening its mouth. "Therefore the grave hath enlarged herself, and opened her mouth without measure; and down goes"—as hers—"their glory, and their multitude, and their noise, and he that exults over her," v. 13. The grave is regarded by Lowth, Vitringa, and Rosenmüller, as personified as a monster that devoured the dead to satiate its appetite. In personification, however, the object is always exhibited as what it is, and the figure ascribes to it the acts, and only the acts, of an intelligent being, never those of a mere animal; as an animal is not a person. Thus, in the summons of the heavens and earth by the prophet to hear his description of the unteachableness and perverseness of the Israelites, "Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth, for Jehovah speaks," the heavens and the earth are called, as such, to listen to his narrative, not as divested of their nature and transformed into intelligences. The summons is founded on their being in a position, by which, if they were intelligent agents, they could be supposed to hear the announcement he uttered, and see the proofs of its truth. Had the grave, then, been exhibited here as a monster, it would not have been by personification, but by a metaphor directly affirming it to be such. It is not, however, represented as an animated being. It is the grave itself, as such, that is said to have exerted the acts, and to be the subject or scene of the events that are affirmed of it; and all that is tropically ascribed to it is, the enlargement of itself and opening of its entrance, which is called a mouth without measure. The figures, therefore, are metaphors, by which acts are ascribed to it of which it may be the subject, but cannot be the agent; and its entrance denominated its mouth. And what a terrific delineation! The grave, used as a collective for the places of burial, is exhibited as

expanding itself to an unnatural extent for such a receptacle; and the multitude, in all the pomp and noise of their revelry, swept headlong down into its abyss. What an effective proof that they were in the hands of that Great Being of whose sway over them they took no notice! What an impressive exemplification of the law of God's providence, that the means employed to demonstrate his dominion and vindicate his rights, have a greatness and awfulness proportional to the insensibility, blindness, and presumption, which they are used to convict and overcome!

11, 12, 13. Hypocatastases. "And the mean shall be brought low, and the great man cast down, and the eyes of the lofty shall be cast down," v. 15. Here, a movement of the body from a higher to a lower, or from an erect to a prostrate position, is employed to denote an analogous depression in rank, in power, and in feeling; or a fall from independence, self-confidence, and pride, to subordination, dishonor, and chagrin. And the depression or direction of the eyes to the ground is used to denote an analogous dejection and humiliation of the mind.

14. Hypocatastasis, in the exhibition of God as exalted in place, to signify the higher estimate of him to which men will be led by these judgments. "And Jehovah of Hosts will be exalted in judgment, and the Mighty, the Holy One, be sanctified in righteousness," v. 16. His design in these inflictions, thus is to manifest and vindicate himself, and bring the Israelites to a perception and realization of the truth in respect to him; and the effect is to be that they are to be cured of their pride and brought to a full sense of themselves as creatures and sinners; and perception and realization of him, as reigning over them in infinite righteousness and holiness.

The next verse is by many interpreters regarded as symbolical.

"And lambs shall feed as in their pasture, and the wastes of the fat ones shall strangers eat," v. 17. Thus Vitringa held that the lambs are representatives of sanctified Jews; the strangers of converted Gentiles; and their feeding without restraint, of their enjoying the blessings of the gospel; and he referred its accomplishment to the apostolic age, when Jews and Gentiles were united in the

same churches. It is a literal, however, not a symbolical prediction, and has had its fulfilment in the conversion of Palestine into vast wastes and pasture grounds, and occupation for a long series of ages by foreigners, who keep herds and flocks. That it is not symbolical is apparent from the fact that the lambs and strangers were not beheld by the prophet feeding on the wastes of Judea and Galilee, either naturally or in vision; and that it is predicted as future, not described as having already taken place; which would have been the form had it been a symbolical prediction. Nor were the passage representative, could it have the signification which he ascribes to it. The occupation of Palestine as a pasturage by strangers, or, according to Vitranga, by foreign flocks, was consequent on the judgments inflicted on the Israelites, by which they were destroyed, or driven into captivity, and their land made a waste. But the conversion of Jews and Gentiles on the first proclamation of the gospel was not consequent on the final dispersion of the Israelites and desolation to their country, but preceded it. The herbage of Palestine, moreover, on which flocks feed, has no adaptation to represent Christianity as a means of spiritual life to men. If it were used as a symbol of a resembling sustenance of human beings, it would be of the food of their bodies, not of their minds; as it is not the knowledge, truth, or other spiritual gifts by which their minds are nourished, but the flesh, fruit, and bread which they eat, that are to men what herbage is to flocks and herds that feed on it. The analogy of animals to man is to their corporeal, not to their intellectual nature.

15. Metaphor. The prophet next denounces a curse on several classes of persons who corrupt the principles of others and spread irreligion by false doctrines and wicked examples. "Woe to them that draw iniquity with cords of vanity, and draw sin as with a cart rope," v. 18. As things are drawn with cords and ropes, either because from their size or weight they cannot be borne in the hand, or in order to a more rapid accumulation, the figure seems to be employed to denote that those on whom the woe is denounced, use means to propagate and multiply sin that are extraordinary, and augment it on a far greater scale than ordinarily takes place with the wicked.

16. Simile. This is indicated by the comparison of their

mode of drawing sin with that by which things are drawn with a cart rope, which is strong, and formed expressly for dragging heavy burdens.

17, 18, 19, 20. *Metaphors.* This is confirmed by the expedient which they employed, which, if successful, would have introduced universal irreligion. They expressed a total disbelief of the threatenings and predictions uttered by the prophets; and claimed that they could have no certainty that God was to inflict such judgments and execute such purposes, until they saw them accomplished; saying—"Let him speed, let him hasten his work that we may see; and let the counsel of the Holy One of Israel draw nigh and come, that we may know," v. 19. This was an open denial of the authority and credibleness of the prophets, and challenge of the Almighty to prove that he had the purposes which they announced, by immediately executing them in their sight. It was an explicit profession, therefore, of infidelity. The verbs speed, hasten, draw nigh, and come, literally denote a motion from one place to another. They are applied by a metaphor to acts and purposes, to signify their prompt exertion and accomplishment.

21, 22. *Hypocatastases.* He next denounces a woe on those who reverse the law of God by treating that as good which is evil, and that as evil which is good. "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter," v. 20. The first form in which they offend is described literally,—calling evil good, and good evil. There have been many false teachers of that class at every subsequent period, and are at the present time. Such are those who exhibit piety as the homage of creatures instead of the homage of God; who represent submission to man as of supreme authority over them in religion as a duty, in place of subjection to God; who treat the love of self as the love of God, and the love of God as nothing but the love of self. In the other forms, light and darkness are substituted for true and false views, and sweet and bitter for true and false enjoyment. They put darkness for light, and light for darkness, who set forth false views of the doctrines of God's word, as truth, and discard and denounce just views of them as

false. They put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter, who represent sinful pleasures that are to be followed by miseries in this world and everlasting punishment in the next, as the highest species of enjoyment, and treat legitimate pleasures as worthless and distasteful.

They are, then, denounced who assume that they are themselves best able to determine what is most expedient for them, make their own judgment and inclination the rule of their conduct, and deny their need of instruction either from man or God. "Woe unto the wise in their own eyes, and prudent in their own sight," v. 21. These, perhaps, do not affect to be guided by the divine law, or the rules of right and wrong that are generally held to be authoritative, but openly make their own theories or passions their rule. They are far from being peculiar to that age. There are multitudes now who in effect deify their nature, and hold that whatever they persuade themselves their reason sanctions, is conformable to truth, and whatever their appetites and affections prompt is expedient and right, and that the true law of their being is that to which they thus find themselves inclined.

23. Metaphor. The last woe is uttered against those who drink to excess, and betray others to intoxication, in order to justify the wicked for a bribe, and to withhold their right from the righteous. "Woe to the mighty men to drink wine, and men of strength to mingle strong drink; justifying the guilty for the sake of a bribe, and they take away the righteousness of the righteous from him," v. 22, 23. To take away his righteousness from the righteous is put for withholding his right from him, in giving a judicial sentence against him, as though he had not a just cause, which was, in effect, like taking away his rectitude itself. It was treating him as to his rights and righteousness, as though he had none.

24, 25, 26, 27. Comparisons. God now announces the punishments that were to be inflicted on these several classes of transgressors who employed themselves in depraving the principles and corrupting the morals of their fellow men. "Therefore, as a flame devours chaff, and grass is consumed by fire, so their root shall be as rottenness, and their blossom shall go up as dust," v. 24.

28. An elliptical metaphor in the exhibition of them as a plant or vegetable that has a root and blossom. The meaning is the same as though the figure had been expressed in the usual form ;—so they are a flower, and their root shall be as rottenness, and their blossom shall go up as dust.

It is now again announced that it is their sin as disbelievers and rejectors of the revelations of the will and purposes of the Most High through the prophets, and of his law, that is the occasion of this terrible destruction. "For they have rejected the law of Jehovah of Hosts, and the word of the Holy One of Israel they have treated with contempt," v. 24. What an impressive proof that those who deny that the word of God is from him, and endeavor to lead men to disregard his law, by the pretence that it is not of his institution, or by the substitution of reason, passion, or their own will in its place, are regarded by him as the greatest and most guilty of offenders! They not only themselves refuse him the homage which is his due, but attempt to prevent his being acknowledged and honored by others. They not only themselves plunge to destruction, but endeavor to drag all within their reach with them down the steep of ruin. They are not only transgressors of his laws, but conspirators against his government.

29. A metaphor. "Therefore the anger of Jehovah has burned against his people," v. 25. His anger is said to have burned, because it was manifested so that they were devoured by it as by a fire.

30. Hypocatastasis. "And he stretched forth his hand against them, and smote them," v. 25. Stretching forth his hand and smiting them were not literally the acts he had exerted, but are put for analogous acts of his power and providence, by which the evils they had suffered were inflicted on them.

31. Comparison. "And the mountains trembled, and their corpses were as filth in the midst of the streets," v. 25. They were destroyed, perhaps, both by a pestilence and an earthquake, and, as is not unusual in such catastrophes, left by survivors without burial.

32. Metaphor. "For all this, his anger is not turned back," v. 25. Being turned back is literally a motion or

movement that is predicable only of a corporeal agent or material body. The verb is here used to denote an analogous act of God. His anger had not subsided. He had not ceased to manifest his displeasure by the infliction on them of punishment.

33. Hypocatastasis. "But his hand is stretched out still," v. 25. This act, which was not literally exerted, is put by substitution for the act of his providence, by which their chastisement was still continued.

34, 35. Hypocatastases. "And he will lift up an ensign to the nations from far, and will hiss unto them from the end of the earth," v. 26. Lifting up an ensign and hissing to them are put for resembling acts of his providence, by which they were to be induced to invade Palestine. Means were to be employed that would be as influential as a call by his voice, and the elevation of a standard, to indicate the place at which they were to assemble. What a sublime exhibition the figure presents of God's absolute control of the nations! He has but to present a signal; he has but to call; and they instantly move to execute his will.

The description of them which follows is terrific. "And behold, in haste, swift, they shall come. There is no one faint, and there is no one stumbling among them. He—the enemy—sleeps not, and he slumbers not, and the girdle of his loins is not opened, and the latchet of his shoes is not broken; whose arrows are sharpened, and all his bows bent," v. 26–28. God not only summons them to whatever work he pleases, but arms them with power and resolution to accomplish it.

36, 37, 38, 39, 40. Comparisons. "The hoofs of his horses like flint are reckoned, and his wheels like a whirlwind. He has a roar like the lioness, and shall roar like the young lion, and shall growl and seize the prey, securing it; none delivering. And he shall roar against him"—Israel—"in that day, like the roaring of the sea. And he"—Israel—"shall look to the land, and behold darkness, distress; light, darkness in the clouds," v. 30. What a picture of helplessness and terror! Assailed by a hostile host, whose battle shout was like the roar of lions and thunder of the ocean; in the direction to which they turned for safety, darkness—the agony of feeling that they were hedged round by impassable barriers; their

only light, the glare of avenging shafts from clouds enveloping the skies in darkness !

There are several lessons taught in this prophecy that deserve a special consideration.

1. The conduct of the Israelites shows that no mere legislation, instruction, or motives of duty or expediency, are adequate to induce men to make a wise choice even of the enjoyments and the means of enjoyment in this life. They were placed under the most authoritative and benignant laws, were furnished with the most ample knowledge of their duty, and the consequences that were to result from their obedience or rebellion ; and had the most abundant means placed within their reach of a virtuous, full, and secure felicity : yet, instead of that happiness suited to their nature as intelligences, promotive of one another's wellbeing, and in spite of all the considerations that restrained them, they chose the pleasures of wealth, and lawless sensual indulgence, and to gain them resorted to fraud, oppression, and bloodshed ! This was their course while God was using all the means which were proper to him as a lawgiver to induce them to a just and virtuous conduct towards one another ! This was the issue of an experiment with them of several hundred years ! What an exemplification of man while unrenewed ! Notwithstanding the sympathetic and generous sentiments of which he is susceptible ;—notwithstanding his supreme regard for himself, and wish to secure uninterrupted and perpetual happiness, the predominance of his passions is such, that he is ready, if necessary, to cheat, rob, and murder, to gain the means of their sinful gratification !

2. God punishes men by depriving them of the blessings which they misuse, and subjecting them to the evils that are the opposites of the pleasures which they aim to enjoy. Those who addict themselves to drunkenness and feasting are made to suffer thirst and hunger. Those who are eager for property and grasp at the possessions of others, are reduced to poverty, or deprived of all benefits from the lands and houses which they acquire. Those who tyrannize over the defenceless, are themselves oppressed by tyrants, or sold into captivity ; and by these terrible retributions the folly is demonstrated of attempting to make themselves happy by the violation of his laws.

3. They are in his eye the greatest and most mischievous offenders, who endeavor to subvert religion and virtue by denying that the revelations he has made of his will are from him, and teaching that each one's inclination or reason is his true and only law. And what a crowd of that class there now are in the church! A great proportion of both the Protestant and Catholic clergy of the continent of Europe are undisguised infidels.

4. Such audacious conspirators are seldom reformed. God does not employ extraordinary means to correct them, but demonstrates his being and dominion over them by striking them to destruction. "As the flame devours chaff, and stubble is consumed by fire, so they are like a flower whose root is rottenness, and whose blossom goes up as dust." It is rare that an infidel who holds the sacred office and abuses it to the propagation of his disbelief, and hatred of Christianity, is arrested by the Spirit of God, and led to repentance and faith.

5. His dispensations towards the wicked are to bring them and the whole world to a full perception and realization of his being, providence, and moral administration, and the wisdom and rectitude of his rule. He is to be exalted by his judgments, and seen to be holy by their manifestation of his righteousness.

CHAPTER VI.

In this chapter the prophet describes a vision which he beheld of Jehovah, and announces the prediction that was then revealed to him. The design of the vision was to impress him with a resistless sense of the being and grandeur of God; to show, by making the temple at Jerusalem, or a similar temple in heaven, the scene of the manifestation, that he was the God of Israel; and to commission him in a new, august, and awful form, as a prophet to that people, to foreshow their continuance in rebellion, and the direful punishments with which they were to be destroyed.

"In the year that King Uzziah died, I saw the Lord sitting on a throne high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple, and seraphim stood above it. To each there were six wings. With two he covered his face, and with two he covered his feet, and with two he flew. And one cried to the other say-

ing, holy, holy, holy, is Jehovah of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory. And the threshold of the door moved at the voice that cried, and the temple was filled with smoke," v. 1-4.

The elevation of the throne indicates that the temple was not that of Jerusalem, but a visionary one. That part of the temple that was filled with the skirts of Jehovah's robe was, doubtless, the holy of holies. The position of the seraphim, of whom there were probably but two, seems to have been, like that of the cherubim, on the ends of the mercy seat. They stood on the extremities of the throne: the one at the right, the other at the left. Their ascriptions had a special reference to Jehovah's administration towards our world, and were designed to show the prophet that the glorious beings who serve in his presence and understand his ways, see that all his acts, as the ruler of men, are marked by perfect righteousness, and fill the earth with his glory. He is holy in instituting a government over them. He is holy in imposing such laws. He is holy in exercising such a providence. He is holy in manifesting his displeasure at sin, in the infliction of such punishments on the evil. What a beautiful and effective method of filling the prophet with the profoundest conviction of that truth! It accomplished in him in a moment, and by very similar means, we may justly believe, what is wrought in the spirits of believers on their entrance into heaven by the vision of the Almighty, and the homage offered him by the celestial hosts: a realization of his being and glory, and a conviction of his infinite rectitude, immeasurably transcending the loftiest views and strongest impressions which his worshippers ordinarily attain here. This is indicated by the prophet's response. He was instantly filled with a sense of his obnoxiousness to death, because of his sinfulness and the sinfulness of the people with whom he dwelt.

1, 2. *Hypocatastases*, in the use of unclean lips to denote the imperfect and sinful judgments, probably, which they had uttered of the ways of the Almighty: "And I said, woe is me, for I am undone, for I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for my eyes have seen the king, Jehovah of Hosts," v. 5. As it is not to be supposed that the impurity ascribed to the lips was literal, it

must be taken as standing for an analogous imperfection of the homage they had uttered, or the sentiments they had expressed in respect to the government of the Most High. The prophet was conscious that he had not rendered him the homage that was due, nor realized and acknowledged as he ought the displays of his glory that are made in his administration over men. He saw how immeasurably his and the worship of the Israelites fell below that of the heavenly hosts; and felt that in place of being entitled to acceptance, it formed a just ground for condemnation. Such is the realization with which the vision of God ever fills his people.

3. Metaphor, in the use of taken away, for forgiveness. "And there flew to me one of the seraphim having a live coal in his hand, he had taken with the tongs from off the altar, and he laid it on my mouth, and said, lo this hath touched thy lips, and thine iniquity is taken away; and thy sin expiated," v. 6, 7. What a beautiful proof of the efficacy of Christ's death! What a sublime exemplification of the harmony of God's justice in the institution and enforcement of his law on the one hand, and the forgiveness of sin and redemption of sinners through Christ's sacrifice on the other! The earth is filled with the glory of his sanctitude in each. The effect of the vision on the prophet, thus, was to impress him with clear and vivid realizations of God's perfect and adorable rectitude in his dispensations towards men. He was thereby prepared to fill the office to which he was called with fidelity, and acquiesce in the revelations which God was about to make of his sovereign and avenging purposes respecting the Israelites.

"And I heard the voice of the Lord saying, whom shall I send, and who will go for us? And I said, here am I, send me. And he said, go and say to this people, hear indeed, but understand not, and see indeed, but know not," v. 8, 9.

4, 5, 6, 7. Hypocatastases: "Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and close up their eyes, lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and turn and be healed," v. 10. Making the heart fat, and the ears dull, and closing the eyes, are put for analogous acts on the mind; and turning and being healed, for repenting and obtaining exemption from punishment.

They are not used metaphorically, as those effects and acts were possible to the Israelites. The prophet was not to seek those results; they were to be the consequences of his fulfilling his duty, and were as infallibly to follow his ministry, as their blindness, deafness, and stupidity would follow, were he miraculously to make their heart fat, and their ears dull, and close up their eyes; and one principal object in addressing to him this command probably was, to apprise him how inefficacious his ministry was to be for good, and call him at once to a full submission to God's sovereignty: to show him that the glory of Jehovah's sanctitude is displayed in the earth in his thus leaving men to continue in alienation; and to guard him from discouragement and despair from the unteachableness and incorrigibleness with which his messages were to be received by the people.

"Then I said, How long, Lord? And he said, Until that cities are desolate for want of an inhabitant, and houses for want of men; and the land shall be desolated,—a waste. And Jehovah shall have removed men far away, and there shall be much in the midst of the land that is deserted; and yet in it there shall be—remain—a tenth, and it—others—shall return—from exile, and be again—wasted," v. 11, 12, 13.

8, 9. Comparisons. "Like the terebinth, and like the oak, which fallen have substance in their roots, so a holy seed shall be a substance in it" for the perpetuation of the nation, v. 13.

10. Metaphor, in the use of seed, for offspring. This prophecy, though extremely obscure, indicates that a portion of the people should remain in the land during its desolation by the slaughter and exile to which the Babylonians were soon to subject the nation; that afterwards there should be a return of captives, and another destruction; but that at length a body of sanctified descendants should appear in the land, from whom the nation should again spring, like a tree from the roots of one that had previously fallen. And this accords with the prediction in other prophecies, that the Israelites who are to be adopted at Christ's coming, and reorganized as a nation, are to be penitent and believing.

1. The vision of Jehovah beheld by the prophet exemplifies the possibility of the Redeemer's revealing himself to men in

his glory, in a manner suited to their nature, and its adaptation to impress them with a sense of his being and greatness, penetrate them with a feeling of their subordination and guilt, and fill them with awe, humbleness, and penitence. There are many who hesitate to receive the numerous announcements in the prophecies that he is to come visibly at the overthrow of the antichristian powers and institution of his millennial kingdom, and reign on the earth, on the ground that it is unsuitable to his dignity, unadapted to our constitution, and can subserve no useful end. What surprising inconsideration it bespeaks! Is there any more reason to assert that it is inconsistent with the majesty of the Eternal Word to reveal himself to those whom he redeems here, than it is to those whom he has raised to heaven? Is there any more ground for the assumption that he would descend from the dignity that becomes his station in unveiling himself to men, and reigning over them as their king, than in visibly manifesting himself to the inhabitants of other worlds, and exercising an administration over them? What grosser impeachment of his wisdom can be uttered, than to declare it to be inconsistent with his grandeur to descend openly to judge the beings whom he died to save, and act as their monarch in the administration under which the race at large is to be sanctified, and the world filled with the glory of his power and grace! Or what can be more mistaken than to assume that such a manifestation of himself is unsuited to our constitution, and can answer no good end? If it is unadapted to our nature, why did he visibly appear thus to the ancient prophets, and give in the pillar of cloud and fire a sensible signal to the Israelites of his continual presence? What can be more in contradiction to our nature and the representations of the Scriptures, than the fancy that the vision of him could make no useful impression on us, nor subserve our knowledge of ourselves and him? It is to detract from his infinite glory and title to our homage, and, in effect, declare, that though raised to the clearest perception of his being and presence, and the fullest sense of his greatness and majesty of which we are capable, we still shall find that there is nothing in him to awaken our awe, impress us with a sense of our subordination and guilt, nor inspire us with adoration and

love! Instead of such ineffectiveness, the overwhelming impression it produced on Isaiah, Daniel, John, and others, was natural. And such is to be the effect, we are expressly forewarned, of Christ's visible advent. The lofty eyes of men are to be humbled, and the height of mortals brought down; and the Lord alone exalted in that day. His enemies are to be filled with terror, and call upon the rocks to fall on them, and the hills to cover them; the saints are to glorify him, and they that believe adore him. And the manifestation of himself to men during his millennial reign, will doubtless be productive of similar effects—fill the beholders with the highest sense of his being and glory, his relations to them, and their indebtedness to him for redemption, inspire them with awe, adoration, love, joy, and devotedness; and be a most important means of the exalted knowledge and virtue to which they are to be raised.

2. It is the duty of his ministers to proclaim his will, and make known his purposes with fidelity and zeal, although their labors are not to be the means, to such a degree, of the salvation of men as they wish. There are some who suppose that if the endeavors of the people of God to make known the gospel to the nations are not actually to be the means of their christianization and conversion, they have no inducement to continue their toils and sacrifices for that purpose, and that a conviction that they are not to be absolutely successful must naturally lead to an abandonment of missions, the dissolution of Bible societies, and the disuse generally of means for the spread of knowledge and the promotion of religion. No fancy, however, could be more mistaken. The Most High not only commanded the prophets to proclaim his messages to the Israelites, whether they would hear or whether they would forbear; but directed Isaiah in this vision to make known to them that his ministry was to harden them, and render them more faithless and incorrigible, instead of conducing to their instruction and sanctification. The apostles likewise were commissioned to preach the gospel to all nations, although they were apprised that they were sent forth as lambs among wolves; and that they were to be persecuted and put to death for their fidelity. The duty of the church to communicate the gospel to the ignorant and

perishing does not depend in any degree on the measure of success that is to attend their labors. The command is absolute, and is to be obeyed out of respect to God, not simply from benevolence to men. To make the wellbeing of men its sole object, is to exalt them to a higher place than God. To claim that the salvation of the nations must be made infallibly to result from their agency in order to constitute it their duty to make known to them the gospel, is to claim that as a trophy of their labors, which can only be given as the reward of Christ's expiation.

3. A profound realization of God's infinite greatness, sanctitude, and sovereignty in the work of redemption, is an indispensable qualification for the office of prophet and preacher. He whom God thus fits for his service will, like Isaiah, answer when he calls, Here am I, send me ; and will proclaim the messages which he has communicated, according to their true meaning ; not attempt to reverse them into a harmony with his errors, or remould them into an expression of his ignorance.

ART. III.—THE SACRED CALENDAR OF PROPHECY ; or a Dissertation on the Prophecies which treat of the grand period of seven times. By George Stanley Faber, B.D., Rector of Long Newton. In three volumes. London : 1828.

BY THE EDITOR.

MR. FABER founds his explication of the slaughter and resurrection of the witnesses, like many of his other views, in a large degree, on his chronological theory, and is led by it into great and palpable error. He says :

"Before any application of this remarkable prophecy is attempted, several particulars which it sets forth must be considered in the *abstract*.

"The first point to be determined is *the time* when the two witnesses are described as being slain. Now this time is set forth by two very

specific notations; for St. John predicts, that the witnesses shall be slain, *when*, on the one hand, *the period of the second woe shall have nearly expired*, and *when*, on the other hand, *they shall have finished their testimony*.

"Let us begin with the *first* of the notations. . . . From this we learn that the witnesses are slain *very shortly before the expiration of the second woe*. Hence it is evident that if we ascertain the time when the second woe passes away, we shall have made a very close approximation to the time when the two witnesses are slain.

"With respect, then, to the second woe, all our best commentators agree, that it is the woe brought upon Christendom by the Turks. Hence it will follow, that very shortly before the Turks cease to be a woe to the Roman empire, the two witnesses are to be slain and to lie dead, and to revive and to ascend to the figurative heaven. But the war of the Turkomannic horsemen commenced when the four angels were let loose upon the eastern empire; and its duration is limited to the term of a prophetic day, and month, and year, or to the term of 396 natural years and 3 months. The four angels, however, were let loose in the summer of the year 1301. Therefore, the woe of the Turkomannic horsemen passed away in the year 1697. Accordingly, as the voice of history bears witness, ever since the battle of Zenta, which was fought at this precise period, the Turks have become weaker and weaker; *and instead of being any longer a marked and terrible woe*, which threatened the subjugation of all Christendom, they now feebly exist as a power, at the sole will of their formidable neighbors. Hence, as the second woe passed away in the year 1697, the slaughter of the witnesses must have occurred almost immediately before that year; but, at all events, it cannot have occurred *after* it."—Vol. iii. pp. 73–75.

He thus holds that their slaughter must have taken place a short time before the year 1697, on the ground that the second woe, or Turkish scourge, ended at that period. But that is built on the singular assumption that the Turks were a woe only to those whom they *threatened* with slaughter, conquest, and torture; not to those whom they actually *subjected* to those evils. But what error can be greater or more manifest? It implies that none of the slaughters of the population of the eastern empire; none of the oppressions, persecutions, and compulsions to apostasy, of which they were the authors, were included in the woe they were to inflict; and would prove, therefore, that their career, as the agents of a woe, in place of commencing in 1301, as Mr. F. represents, did not begin till the following century, when they

had completed their chief conquests in Asia and Thrace, and *threatened* Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, and Italy. Instead of that mistaken view, the Turks were a woe to the people of the eastern empire, whom they conquered, harassed with cruel oppressions and persecutions, and tortured with their false religion; and to them they continue a woe as long as they continue to maintain their power over them. They are as truly a scourge to the churches of Asia Minor, the Mediterranean Isles, Armenia, Syria, Assyria, and Egypt, at the present time, as they were two centuries ago; though they may oppress them less. How surprising, that Mr. F. and others, who have put such a construction on the woe, could have adopted any other than this opinion! Mr. F.'s whole explication, accordingly, falls with that theory in regard to the end of the second woe.

He is equally mistaken also in one of the principal grounds on which he founds that theory. He assumes that the woe is to continue through a period of 396 years, which he regards as symbolized by a day, a month, and a year. But on the supposition even that those periods are used as symbols of 396 years, it is an error to regard them as denoting the time during which the horsemen are to prove a woe to those whom they are commissioned to scourge. The representation of the prophecy is, that *the angels are prepared* for an hour, and a day, and a month, and a year, *to slaughter a third of men*. As their torturing by the horses with the serpent tails is a different act from their killing with the fire, brimstone, and smoke, that proceed from their mouths, they obviously may continue a woe to their victims long after they have ceased to make new conquests, or wage offensive wars. His assumption that their being a woe was to cease on their ceasing to make conquests, is wholly unauthorized, therefore, by his premise, and mistaken.

He offers it as another reason for referring their slaughter to that period, that he regards the prophecy as representing that the witnesses should finish their testimony before the wild Beast should make that war on them, in which they were to be slain; and reaches that conclusion by translating the verb *τελεσῶσι*, "shall have been finished."—Vol. iii. pp. 71, 75, 76. The literal English, however, of the phrase, *ὅταν τελεσῶσι τὴν*

μαρτυρίαν αὐτῶν, is, "when they would finish their testimony." It indicates, therefore, not their actually finishing it, but merely their *disposition* to discontinue it, under the persuasion, perhaps, that it is no longer necessary, and that they are called to fulfil a different duty. It is inconsistent with the representation of the prophecy also, to assume that they are to finish their testimony before the wild beast makes that war on them in which they are to be slain. They are to be slain *as witnesses*, and are to act in that relation, therefore, at the time of their slaughter. In all these respects his constructions are thus palpably at variance with the prophecy.

His views of the nature of their death are still more mistaken. He regards their slaughter as a mere political death. —Vol. iii. pp. 81, 82. He founds that construction partly on the assumption that they are churches, and can be put to death, therefore, only as churches, or by a dissolution of their union in a body as worshippers. That, however, is wholly mistaken. The two witnesses are representatives of a succession of teachers of the gospel, and of a succession of unofficial believers, who unite in bodies to offer worship, partake the ordinances, support those teachers in their office, and attend their ministrations; and though in many of their acts the latter unite as bodies, yet it is as individuals that they offer their testimony. Churches are never as bodies arraigned before tribunals, compelled to testify for Christ, put to the torture, and slain. The supposition is solecistical. It is as individuals that they are seized, imprisoned, called to avow or disown their faith, stretched on the wheel, and put to death. Were a whole church or community arraigned and condemned, it would be as individuals, not as a body. There would either be a separate writ for each one, or at least a writ in which each one was named. There is no such thing known in jurisprudence, as the arraignment, trial, sentence, and execution of persons, except by documents stating their names, and the charges alleged against them. Were an attempt made to arraign and martyr a whole church, it could not be known without such a specification of individuals that all who belonged to it were taken and slain.

Moreover, if a church were capable of being put to death politically, as he assumes, it could not be by such an act as

he supposes ;—the mere expulsion of its members from the place of their birth and residence, and dispersion in other lands. As their being a church lay in their voluntary union in a covenant to worship together, and attend on the ministry of the gospel ; their forcible dissolution as a church must have been by some official act, of some one who had power to terminate their union as a church. But there was no such official dissolution of the connexion of the Vallenses, whom he regards as the witnesses, as members of their churches, at the period, 1686, to which he refers the slaughter. They did not by a public and formal act annul their covenant, and terminate their relations as members of their church. The wild beast that made war on them exerted no such act, and had no power to annul their relation as church members, had it attempted it. Nor did their dispersion into other countries annihilate that relation. Their covenant remained unaltered, and had they pleased, they might have reassembled out of their ancient country, and united again as a body in worship.

There was, on his construction of their slaughter, no denial to them of a burial. There was no dead body whatever left to be denied a burial ; their death being, according to him, an annihilation of them as a body—a resolution into their original elements, and dispersion into distant lands. They could not, therefore, by possibility be denied a burial as a dead body. But he misconceives the nature of the burial that was denied them, as much as the nature of their death. He says :—

“But their lacerated members were not buried. On the contrary, *they were not suffered to be absorbed by the several communions* of those Protestant States, within whose dominions they had taken refuge. They were still preserved in a separate, and distinct, and visible condition on the surface of the earth, or the western Roman Empire, notwithstanding the Popish inhabitants of that earth rejoiced over them as if irrecoverably dissolved, and never more to be resuscitated.”—Vol. iii. pp. 89, 90.

But their “absorption” as individuals into other Protestant communions, would not, as he represents, have been a burial as a dead body. Instead, it would have been an entrance into another living organization. Besides, were his supposition allowed, that their union as individuals to other true churches would have been a burial, still it would not have

been *the* burial which the prophecy contemplates; *inasmuch as that burial was one that was denied them* by the peoples and tribes and tongues and nations and the wild beast or civil rulers; but it was not the wild beast, nor the peoples, and tribes, and tongues, and nations, that prevented them from uniting with the Protestant churches, among which they were dispersed. It is not improbable that some of them, in fact, united with those communions. It was of their own choice that others declined such a union, and returned at the end of a few years to their native valleys.

He regards their recovery of their country by arms in 1690 as their resurrection :—

“Their unexpected resurrection, however, was near at hand. The two witnesses were slain, or the two churches were dissolved, on the 31st day of January in the year 1686; but exactly three years and a half after this marked epoch, or on the 16th day of August in the year 1689, when the exiles in a body crossed the Lake of Geneva, and invaded Savoy, the Spirit of Life from God entered into them, and they stood upon their feet.”—Vol. iii. p. 90.

It was not, however, as a church but as soldiers, that they recovered their valleys. They entered into no formal reorganization as a church after their return. They regarded their former covenant and organization as still subsisting, and again acted in their relations as a church, as before, without any new institution.

But there is no analogy between a resurrection, and their recovery of their country, and re-establishment there. A dead body does not rise to life by virtue of its own powers. It is by the fiat of the Almighty only that the dead are raised. But the Vallenses themselves were the authors of their return and re-establishment in their native valleys. They were not put in possession of them by miracles; nor aided in regaining them by foreign powers. It is to violate analogy, therefore, to denominate that self-restoration, a resurrection from death.

And, finally, as a climax to these misinterpretations, Mr. F. exhibits the voice that summoned them to ascend to heaven, *as uttered by the wild beast*, and interprets it of their receiving from the Duke of Savoy a legal toleration in their worship!

"Victory attended their progress, and great fear, as history most remarkably and most literally bears testimony to the truth of prophecy, fell upon them that saw them. For, notwithstanding the opposition made by the troops of France and Savoy, ere the month of April in the year 1690 had elapsed, the two united churches were again firmly placed in their ancient seats, restored from their allegorical death, and instinct with new vitality. Shortly after this extraordinary political resuscitation, prophecy teaches us that they heard a great voice from the symbolical heaven, saying to them, come up hither; and accordingly, on the 4th day of June, in the year 1690, *the edict for their full and legal establishment, as independent churches, was signed by the sovereign of the country.*"—Vol. iii. pp. 90, 91.

The annals of false and absurd interpretation, perhaps, do not present a more extraordinary instance of the misconception and confusion of symbols. The assumption that the voice from heaven proceeded from the wild beast, or civil rulers who had put the witnesses to death, is doubtless founded on the consideration that the heavens are sometimes exhibited as the station of the symbols of civil rulers. *That, however, is only when the heavenly bodies whose actual station is in the heavens, are employed as their symbols.* When a wild beast is used as their representative, it is exhibited as on the earth, the actual sphere of wild beasts, not in the heavens or atmosphere. It were incongruous in the utmost degree to exhibit a huge beast as in the atmosphere or sky, where it could have no support, and no sphere for the exercise of its peculiar powers. What hunting grounds would it find there? What game to satiate its appetite? What harmless animals on which to wreak its ferocity? The fact, then, that the voice came from heaven, calling the witnesses to ascend thither, in place of indicating that it came from the civil rulers who are symbolized in the passage by the wild beast, is a resistless demonstration that it did not proceed from them, as that is not the wild beast's station, but from the Almighty, who, when he appears visibly, appears enthroned in the clouds. This consideration alone overturns the lofty structure Mr. F. has reared with so much labor, and assurance of its stability. And what a misrepresentation to ascribe that great and gracious act of the Redeemer, in which he is publicly to recognise the witnesses as his, and call them to

the rewards of his presence—to the wild beast, whose mouth, according to the prophecy, instead of being employed in summoning the risen and glorified martyrs to heaven, is opened in blasphemy against God, to blaspheme his name and his tabernacle, and them that dwell in heaven! And its blasphemy lies, undoubtedly, in a large degree in its acts, like that which Mr. F. here attributes to it, that involve an arrogation of the throne and prerogatives of the Most High. But Mr. F. sees nothing of this.

Next, his assumption that their ascent to heaven denoted an elevation to political power, is founded on the same mistake. The elevation of persons to heaven is not a symbol of their exaltation to political stations or power. Heaven is never exhibited as the station of rulers, or their thrones, when they appear in their own persons. It is only when they are symbolized by celestial bodies, that it is the scene of their symbols. When the kings of the earth, the chief captains, the commanders of thousands, and others invested with military or civil powers, appear, as under the sixth seal, in the vision of the woman seated by the waters, and the battle of Armageddon, they are exhibited as on the earth, the actual scene of their agency; not in the sky, where they could have no natural support, no throne, no subjects, and no antagonists. Besides, who were the subjects over whom the "Vallensic" witnesses possessed and exercised political power? Over one another? That were to contradict the symbol; as *all* of them ascended to heaven. Over their enemies, or other fellow men on the earth? That were to contradict history. The Vallenses were not invested with any political power over one another, nor over any other body of persons. How surprising that none of these considerations should have occurred to Mr. F.!

Thirdly. But were it admitted that an ascent to heaven might denote an elevation to political power, still an ascent in a *cloud* could not. As were the sun, moon, and stars, when used as symbols of rulers, exhibited as overcast with a cloud, it would indicate a diminution or interruption of their influence; so if the station of the witnesses in heaven denotes their exaltation to civil power, their being *veiled in a cloud* would indicate their withdrawment from the presence and

observation of their subjects, and the interception, therefore, of their influence on them.

Fourthly. But Mr. F. misrepresents the change in the political condition of the Vallenses, which he calls their elevation to civil power, as much as he misconceives the symbols. His construction exhibits them as invested *with political offices and authority over subjects*. It is because he imagines heaven is the symbol of the station of rulers, that he regards their ascent to heaven as denoting their exaltation to political power. To verify his interpretation, therefore, the Vallenses should have been created civil rulers, and invested with legislative or judicial authority over subjects. They were not created rulers, however, or invested with any civil authority, by the decree of the Duke of Savoy. That decree merely gave them toleration in their faith and worship *as subjects*; not as princes, legislators, or magistrates. No misrepresentation could be more absolute and preposterous, than to exhibit that mere concession to them, as subjects, of their natural rights, and pledge that they should no longer be wantonly harassed, plundered, outraged, and slaughtered, because of their obedience to God, as an investiture with the political power of kings, princes, and magistrates!

Fifthly. But, besides these proofs of the total error of his interpretation, it refutes itself again, by implying that, after all, the condition of the witnesses, on their ascent to heaven, was essentially no other than that which they had occupied antecedently to their slaughter. The decree of 1690 only gave back to the Vallenses the toleration which had been withdrawn from them by the decree of 1686. They were again allowed to live as they had lived before; watched, oppressed, and harassed, indeed, but yet exempted from bloody persecution. But that is to contradict the prophecy, which represents that they had before dwelt on the earth, and there uttered their testimony; and exhibits their elevation to heaven as their introduction into a new scene;—a removal from the sight and power of their enemies, and exaltation to the divine presence, and the joys and glories of an immortal life. According to Mr. F., it was not an assumption to a new scene and a new relation to God. They had not only held a station in heaven before, but had occupied it during

a large part of more than a thousand years, that had passed from the time to which he refers the beginning of their prophesying! His construction implies also that they had uttered their testimony as kings, princes, legislators, and magistrates, and had suffered their persecution and been put to death in that relation. The Revelation, however, represents them as prophesying in sackcloth, and ascribes to them no other power than that of prophets over their enemies; of devouring them by the fire that proceeds from their mouths; of shutting heaven that it rain not; of turning waters to blood; and of smiting the earth with plagues.

He mistakes, in like manner, in representing that the grant of toleration to the Vallenses impressed their enemies with great fear. It was their swords, their courage, and their success, that inspired their antagonists with apprehension, not their obtaining a pledge of safety from the government. That did not arm them with power to assail and molest their ecclesiastical enemies. It may have disappointed and chagrined them, but it had no adaptation to render them fearful for their own safety. It certainly could not have been the occasion of great fear to their political enemies. Why should the Duke of Savoy, or the nobles and magistrates who took a part in the administration of his government, regard with extreme alarm a grant of toleration to the Vallenses, which he had voluntarily given, and which he had it in his power to rescind at any moment he pleased?

And, finally, Mr. F. contradicts the prophecy, in like manner, in representing the English Revolution in 1688 as the event denoted by the fall of the city; first, because the fall of the tenth of the city was caused by an earthquake that took place the same hour as the ascent of the witnesses. But the English Revolution preceded the gift of toleration to the Vallenses a year and a half. James II. was dethroned in December, 1688; the decree recalling the Vallenses and yielding them toleration was not issued till June, 1690.

Next: because the English Revolution was not the fall of a tenth of the city. The city is not the symbol of the states or kingdoms of the Roman empire, but of the nationalized hierarchies of those kingdoms. It is the symbol of the same organization, we are expressly told, as the woman who was

seated where the waters were, representing the peoples and multitudes and nations and tongues ; and who was borne on the wild beast, and enticed the kings to fornication. " And the woman whom thou didst see, is the great city which has empire over the kings of the earth," chap. xvii. 18 ; while great Babylon is called " The great harlot who corrupted the earth with her fornication," chap. xix. 2. She is shown to be the symbol of the same body as the city also, by the name on her forehead, " The great Babylon, the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth." " She has empire over the kings of the earth." But the states have not authority over their kings. The monarchs are not under the dominion of their own subjects. There is no civil body that has dominion over them. The nationalized hierarchies are the only organizations that have reigned over the kings. They are the only organizations also that sustain such a relation to the civil rulers as is denoted by the station of the woman on the wild beast ; or such a relation to the people and multitudes and nations and tongues, as the woman seated where the waters, the symbol of the nations, were ; and those hierarchies answer to these descriptions in all respects. The fall of the tenth of the city, therefore, is not a fall of one of the states or monarchies of the Roman empire, but a fall of the nationalized hierarchy of one of those kingdoms from its station as an establishment.

Nor was the legislation and establishment of the English church as a Protestant instead of a Catholic church, a fall of the tenth of the city. Its relation to the civil rulers was not changed. It continued to be supported by the wild beast, as much as before. It continued to arrogate and exert authority over the nation. It is a dejection from the station of a national church, that is denoted by its fall ; not a mere secession from the church of Rome, which did not affect its relations to the state.

Nor, were it admitted that the secession of a church from Rome is its fall, would it imply that it ceased thereby to be a part of great Babylon. As it would fall as a tenth part of great Babylon, it would of course still be a tenth part of it *as fallen* ; precisely as when the remaining nine parts fall, they will continue to be great Babylon as absolutely as before,

and the servants of God will be summoned to come out of her as such, that they may not partake of her sins, nor receive of her plagues. Their only difference will be, that they are fallen instead of standing, and are become a habitation of demons, and a station of every unclean spirit, and a station of every unclean and hated bird;—more profligate and shameless in apostasy than before! How preposterous to regard the fall of a tenth of the city, which involves such an augmented depravation, as a change from a Papal to a Protestant nationalization!

There were no seven thousand men of name slain by the English Revolution. There was no slaughter or execution of princes, nobles, and dignitaries; and no bloody insurrections or strifes in which great numbers of distinguished persons were put to death. The Catholics who survived did not become fearful and give glory to God. They continued, as far as they ventured to express themselves, to be animated by hatred, malice, ambition, and revenge; and denounced and opposed the Protestant establishment, through a long series of years.

And finally, the second woe did not terminate at that period. The Turks still continued to maintain and exercise their cruel dominion over the apostate churches of the east, without any essential alleviation, and continue to maintain it to the present hour.

There thus is not a single particular of importance, in which Mr. F.'s construction is not totally wrong. We invoke the attention of the students of the prophecy to this demonstration of the error of the principles on which he proceeds, and the contradictions and absurdities that mark his solutions. His explication of this passage is a fair specimen of his usual method. It is one of the most important in his "system of abstract arrangement." It is one on which he has bestowed great labor, and in his historical investigations, with as much discrimination and success, perhaps, as any other. Yet what a total inattention to the nature of the symbols it betrays! On what sheer and obvious mistakes are his most important and confident assumptions founded! What can be more manifest than that instead of interpreting the vision by its proper laws, he merely employs himself in perverting it to

the support of his arbitrary theory ? The moment the specious structure which he has reared with so much toil, and endeavored to invest with an air of solidity and strength, is examined by the torch of truth, it proves to be but the fabric of his fancy, and sinks back into the chaos from which he drew it.

§. The same want of attention to the nature of the symbols, and the same arbitrary method of construction, mark his exposition of the twelfth chapter. He begins with the assumption that the heaven in which the woman and dragon were seen, "is the visible church under its spiritual governors," p. 112; by which he doubtless means that it is the symbol of that church. He, however, offers no proofs of it, nor could he. Mark xiii. 24-31, to which he refers in his preliminary chapter, as exemplifying that construction, yields it no support. Mere space cannot serve as a symbol of intelligent beings. There is no analogy between them. The heavens are not an agent. They are the mere scene of the symbols of the vision, not any of those symbols themselves. Those symbols are exhibited in that scene, doubtless, to indicate the conspicuity and greatness of the agents whom they represent. He contradicts his assumption, indeed, in his exposition of this vision, in exhibiting the woman as the symbol of the faithful part of the church of the western empire, and the dragon as the representative of its unfaithful members; as that is to make the scene of the vision, and the woman, and the dragon, the symbols of the same agents; which is wholly without authority, inconsistent with their nature, and contradictory to other parts of the prophecy. Mr. F. offers nothing to support it, and we are not aware of any consideration that can yield it any sanction. It is to betray the grossest ignorance of the nature of symbolization, to imagine that a mere portion of remote space above us, or of the atmosphere, can symbolize agents, and the same agents as are denoted by the seven-headed dragon. It is preposterous to imagine that the dragon is the symbol of the unfaithful part of the church of the western empire. What, on that construction, do its seven heads mean? What is symbolized by its diadems? What by its horns, by its striking down the stars to the earth, and its desiring to devour the man-child? It is impossible to

assign a satisfactory import to them, consistently with his assumption. But he contradicts his construction, by alleging that the dragon is also the symbol both of the evil spirit or Satan, and of the western Roman empire! Were a child to commit such blunders, it might raise a smile at the want of discernment which it betrays; but that an interpreter who has devoted a long life to the study of the subject should remain so totally unaware of its first principles, excites astonishment. Mr. F., it would seem, has not the faintest conception of symbolization. He has only caught, it appears, a few terms, and formed a few technical phrases without any perception of their meaning. His explanations are mere guesses and assumptions, wrought into a showy fabric, without any consideration of the nature of the materials of which it is formed, or the foundation on which it rests.

If the dragon denotes alike the great fallen spirit, the western Roman empire, "viewed geographically," and the unfaithful part of the church of that empire, it is apparent that its meaning must be wholly arbitrary, and not founded on any analogy of its nature to that which it is used to represent. But it is not the symbol either of the devil, that empire, or the members of that church. There is no adaptation in such an animal to represent a mere spirit. There is nothing in the prophecy to justify the ascription to it of such a meaning: and it is shown to be false by the consideration that it is the symbol of the rulers of the ancient Roman empire. It gave its power, throne, and great authority to the seven-headed wild beast, which is the symbol of the rulers of the western empire after its division into ten kingdoms. It is the symbol, therefore, of a combination of men, who had power, a throne, and great authority in the western empire, to transfer to that body of rulers; and thence must be the symbol of the ancient dynasty from which the new body of rulers denoted by the wild beast, derived its peculiar power and authority.

It is shown by the prophecy also that it cannot be the symbol of the unfaithful members of the visible western church; inasmuch as they are included in the whole earth that worshipped the dragon because it gave authority to the wild beast, and that wondered after the wild beast. As the whole earth, the symbol of the whole population, is thus dis-

tinguished from the dragon, and the whole population are exhibited as apostate, it is manifest that the dragon cannot be the symbol of that apostate population.

Nor can it be the symbol of the western Roman empire "geographically considered." It has no adaptation to denote a mere territory. It were incongruous in the utmost degree to make it the symbol of an inanimate object. Of what acts is a mere territory capable? Of what actions is it capable that present an analogy to a dragon standing on the moon, striking down stars, and desiring and designing to devour a man child? It is equally unjustifiable and preposterous to regard it as the symbol of the apostate population of the Roman empire; for who then are they who worship it, because it gave authority to the wild beast? Yet these assumptions, that are thus not only without any foundation whatever, but are in the most open contradiction to the plain characters of the passage, are advanced by Mr. F. with the utmost assurance, and made the basis of his construction of the whole of the twelfth and thirteenth chapters.

But we have not pointed out all the errors of his explication of these symbols. In order to reconcile its contradictions, and give it an air of consistency, he makes the further assumption that the corporeal dragon itself is not the primary symbolic agent bearing that name, but only an instrument or engine of that agent, which is the devil. He accordingly calls the body and limbs of the dragon, his "borrowed members," and his "secular borrowed members." A bold assumption certainly, and fraught, if allowable, with a law that must overturn not only most of his constructions, but those also given by the interpreting angels, and all others that have ever been offered of the prophecy. Is there any reason for supposing that the perceptive and voluntary nature of the dragon was a different agent from the dragon itself; and the symbol of a different agent from that which its body represents? Was that brute any more a double agent, or suited to represent two different classes of agents, than any other used as a symbol in the visions? Is there any more ground for distinguishing between its conscious nature, and its body, than there is for distinguishing between the souls and bodies of the horsemen of the seals, of the white robed multitudes, chap. vii., and of

the kings and their subjects, chap. vi., xvii., xviii., and xix. ; or between the conscious and corporeal natures of the locusts and horses, chap. ix., the birds, chap. xix., or any other bodied symbols of the prophecy? There certainly is not. The dragon is a single agent, having one nature, and only one, and can no more be divided into parts, and made the symbol of different classes of agents, than the witnesses can, their dead bodies, the people, and tribes, and tongues, and nations, that gaze on them, or any other symbols of the visions. The assumption is against nature. It is contradictory to all the views on which we act in our conduct towards one another, and towards inferior orders of creatures, and if allowable, would render the prophecy wholly inexplicable; for who can tell, if the dragon be a double agent, but that the other symbols are also? But how can it be known who or what the invisible agent in each is? How is it to be ascertained what spirit animates the hail, fire, and blood, of the first trumpet; the volcanic mountain, sea, fish, and ships of the second; the meteor and waters of the third; the sun, moon, and stars of the fourth; the locusts of the fifth; the monster horses of the sixth; the two wild beasts and the image; or the horses at the last great battle, and the fowls that devour them? If the symbols exhibited in the visions are not the real and sole representatives, and all that is to be interpreted, it is obviously beyond our power to determine what the representatives are, and wholly impossible, therefore, to know what they foreshow. But such an ascription to them of a second invisible and spiritual agent, is wholly without authority, and as unphilosophical and monstrous as a like ascription were to the ordinary animals and inanimate objects with which we are familiar. What a boundless license Mr. F. arrogates in this assumption! On what a stupendous scale does the principle on which he here proceeds, add to the words of the prophecy;—doubling the symbols throughout by making each one “the borrowed members” of an invisible agent of a wholly different nature! This theory is like that of Origen, that the sun, the planets, and the stars are animated by spirits; bespeaks as gross an ignorance of nature, and as wild a fancy, and is as discreditable to an interpreter, as a similar hypothesis now were to a geologist or an astronomer.

He plunges, in interpreting the acts of the dragon, into other absurdities. In undertaking to explain how all the members of the church, whom he supposes the dragon to symbolize, became unfaithful, he assumes that they must have been "influenced by an unfaithful clergy;" and then proceeds to account for the existence of such a clergy, by the representation that the stars denote the ministers of the word, and that the act of the dragon, in dragging and casting one third of them to the earth, symbolizes their seduction by the devil to apostasy. But that is to account for that apostasy by assuming its previous existence. If the dragon's body denotes the unfaithful members of the church, as that body existed before it struck down the stars, the unfaithful members whom it represents must have existed before they exerted the act which that stroke symbolizes. Besides, his explication makes "the unfaithful members" of the church the cause of the apostasy of the clergy, not "the unfaithful clergy" the cause of the apostasy of the members of the church. If, as he assumes, the stars are the symbols of the ministers of the word, or the clergy; if the dejection of the stars denotes the seduction of the clergy to apostasy; and if the tail of the dragon, by which they were cast to the earth, symbolizes the unfaithful members of the church; then clearly it was by those unfaithful members that the clergy were seduced to apostasy, not those unfaithful members that were seduced to apostasy by the clergy!

His views of the birth of the man-child are marked by an equal violation of logic and congruity. He says, "The birth of a man-child denotes the setting apart of a community from the great general mass, with which it was previously commingled," vol. iii. p. 116; regards "the Vallengico-Albigensic church" as the small community symbolized by the man-child, pp. 126, 140; and exhibits their preaching the gospel as the peculiar work denoted by their ruling the nations, pp. 131, 132. His definition, however, is wholly unsupported and unauthorized. The mere migration of persons from Lombardy to Piedmont, from Cambray to Albige, from Europe to America, is not a birth. A birth is an introduction of an agent into a new mode of existence, as well as a new sphere; not a mere removal from one place to another,

while the nature of the life and agency remains the same as it had before been. It indicates, therefore, the introduction of those whom the man-child represents, into a form of life of which they had before had no experience, and where they fill an office, and exert powers and prerogatives they had never before possessed; and what that new form of life and office are, the prophecy expressly states. The man-child was one who was about to rule all nations with a rod of iron, and was caught up to God and to his throne. He was the symbol of one, therefore, who was made by the church a candidate for the throne of the empire, and who was to commence his career as monarch, under the promise that he would repress the enemies of the church, but who was immediately led to arrogate the throne and prerogatives of God, and tyrannize over it, in place of protecting it: and the vision had its accomplishment in Constantine and his successors, who professed Christianity. Mr. F.'s reference of this symbol to the Vallenses and Albigenses is, accordingly, as mistaken as his views are of its meaning. The Vallenses and Albigenses were not monarchs. Their preaching the gospel and testifying against the usurpations, superstitions, and idolatries of the apostate church, were not ruling the nations with an iron sceptre, nor an arrogation of the throne and rights of God, and tyranny over other worshippers! What astounding blunders! He exhibits the symbol of the usurping apostate and persecuting dynasty of rulers of the Roman empire, who are represented also by the seventh head of the dragon and of the wild beast, as the symbol of the witnesses of Jesus, ascribes to those witnesses the blasphemous arrogations and bloody tyrannies of those monarchs, and makes them, therefore, the slaughterers of themselves, instead of the victims of their persecutors! The whole of his construction of the symbol is thus the mere work of inconsiderate and blind theory, not only without a shadow of authority from the symbols, but in palpable contradiction to their obvious meaning.

After these bold constructions, he endeavors to confirm his views of the chronology of the vision, by attempting to prove that the holy city, chap. xi., and the heaven of this vision are

the same. The following passage exhibits his method of establishing that proposition :

"In the preceding vision of the two witnesses the various actors are all comprehended within the limits of the holy city, however different may be the stations which are assigned to them within those limits. In the present vision both the woman, and the man-child, and the dragon, are described as equally occupying the symbolical heaven. Heaven, *therefore*, in the present vision, corresponds with the holy city in the *last* vision ; *accordingly*, both heaven and the holy city alike symbolize the visible church existing under the sway of its spiritual governors, or viewed under the aspect of a regularly organized polity."—Vol. iii. p. 121.

Where now are his proofs ? How does the fact that one set of symbols was in the holy city, and the other in heaven, show that heaven and the city denote the same thing ? How does it follow, because those symbols were in heaven, that heaven represents the same thing as the holy city, any more than the fact that the symbols of the fourth trumpet were in heaven, proves that they denote the same things as the symbols in the holy city ; or the fact that the symbols of the second trumpet were in the sea, demonstrates that the sea symbolizes the same thing as the holy city ? His premises obviously furnish no ground whatever for his conclusion. It is a merely gratuitous assumption, set off according to his usual manner, in the forms of logic, but without any sanction, either immediately from the symbols themselves, or from any other parts of the prophecy.

After exalting this preposterous conclusion to the station of a demonstrated proposition, he attempts to prove that the vision of the temple and witnesses treats throughout of essentially the same things as the vision of the woman and dragon. We shall not follow him through the labyrinth of misrepresentation and absurdity in which he involves himself in the undertaking. It is sufficient to say, that the results to which he is led are as unauthorized and as monstrous as the assumptions from which he deduces them. No one of whom we are aware, in the long series of fanciful and fanatical interpreters, has transcended the lawlessness and folly of his chapter on this

subject. He asserts the boldest and most sweeping propositions, without a particle of proof. He offers the most palpable contradictions to the plain teachings of the prophecy, as logical deductions from self-evident, or demonstrated principles. He veils the flattest blunders and most shapeless incongruities under the form of rigid argumentation! There is nothing throughout his long dissertation on the theme that merits the name of exposition. The only instruments with which he works, are gratuitous assumptions, and inferences from false theories and unauthorized constructions he had advanced in his explanation of other chapters. Had the symbols of this vision been of a wholly different nature, we see no reason to suppose that he would not have put on them the same construction: as he takes his hypothesis as his guide, and employs himself in accommodating the prophecy to his "general idea of its import first gained in the abstract," not in interpreting it by its proper laws; and in that presumptuous endeavor, makes heaven, the woman, the dragon, the man-child, the sealed, and the witnesses, the symbols of parts of the same body; converts the dynasty of emperors, who usurped the throne of God and tyrannized over the church, into the witnesses; transfers to the fourth century, the Reformers of the sixteenth, and 144,000 sealed who are not yet in existence; and perverts and confounds the prophecy at every step by other similar blunders! Can any symbols be imagined more unsuited to support his "idea in the abstract" than these? If there were no barrier to his placing on them such a construction, is it to be supposed that he would not have deduced his system with equal facility had any other combination of symbols been used in their place?

His exposition of the war of Michael and the dragon is conducted on the same principles, and marked by equal errors. He regards Michael as Christ, which is to contradict the representation, chap. v., that no creature is adequate to take his place in the visions. He exhibits the dragon as the great red dragon of the former vision, not Satan; which is contrary to the express designation of him as the devil, and to the representation that he had angels, and that he fought in heaven. The seven-headed dragon had no angels and was not fitted to fight in mere space, where it had

no ground on which to stand. Though it is exhibited as in heaven in the preceding vision, yet it is as standing, and standing, doubtless, like the woman whose man-child it designed to devour, on the moon. The dragon he again represents as a double agent, the devil as its animating spirit, its body as denoting the western Roman empire, and its angels as symbolizing the "Latin priesthood;" while the angels of Michael he holds were symbols of the ministers of the pure western churches. He treats heaven again, also, without proof and in violation of congruity, as a symbol of the visible church. He, accordingly, regards the war as denoting a contest between the ministers of the pure or Protestant churches and the Latin priesthood. But if those assumptions are correct, then the dejection of the dragon and his angels from heaven to the earth, must symbolize the excommunication of the Latin priesthood from the visible church, of which heaven he asserts is the symbol. But there was no such excommunication of the whole body of Latin priests in the eighteenth century, to which he refers the vision, nor at any other period. Mr. F., however, in place of adhering to his theory, and treating a dejection from heaven to earth as symbolizing an expulsion from the visible church, interprets it as meaning a mere change in "public opinion" in respect to the persecution of the witnesses, by which it became so unpopular, as to induce Satan to adopt a different method of opposing them. Heaven is, accordingly, in his explanation, the symbol, not of the visible church, but of a "public opinion" in favor of persecution; and a fall from heaven to earth a symbol of the change of "public opinion" in favor of toleration. This "general idea of its import gained in the abstract," without a shred of ground to sustain it, and in defiance of all the laws of symbolization, he puts forth with all the pomp of a logical deduction from a "scientific principle," as an interpretation of this great vision. Is there anything in the annals of explication that surpasses it in error or folly?

He returns immediately, however, to his first definition of heaven, and construes the denunciation of war to the inhabitants of the earth, because the devil had come down to them, as denoting that he was to assail them from without the visible

church; and then, again, as promptly contradicts that assumption, by representing that the agents through whom he assailed them from without the visible church, were the infidels of France, not the "Latin priesthood," whom he had represented as symbolized by the devil's angels by whom he carried on his war.

The serpent which pursued the woman and cast waters from its mouth, and which is shown by that peculiarity to be the great red dragon, not a mere spirit, he treats as the devil that fought with Michael, and interprets the waters as denoting the infidels of the last century who assailed Christianity. But those infidels attacked the "Latin priesthood" and the Latin church as directly and violently as "the collective body of sound believers." Their arms were, indeed, directed chiefly against the false doctrines and impious superstitions of the Catholics; and drew their force in a large degree from the false assumption that the apostate religion of the Catholic church is the religion of Christ, and the priests of that apostate religion his ministers. Mr. F.'s construction, accordingly, exhibits the devil's own army, "the Latin priesthood," as the special victims of his persecution and flood of waters, instead of being the agents by whom he carried on his war on the woman! The prophecy, moreover, exhibits the devil as cast down from heaven by force, against his most strenuous endeavors to maintain his station there. It was because he could not prevail that he was cast down. According to Mr. F., however, it was not of necessity but voluntarily that he and his angels left the visible church, and arrayed an army of infidels against the woman, pp. 154, 157.

We have another specimen of the mode in which he establishes propositions, in his interpretation of the thirteenth chapter.

"By the unanimous consent of commentators, whether they be ancient or modern, Popish or Protestant, however they may differ in subordinate particulars, the seven-headed and ten-horned beast of the Apocalypse is pronounced to be substantially the same as the fourth and ten-horned beast of Daniel. But the ten-horned beast of Daniel is indisputably the Roman Empire. Therefore, the seven-headed and ten-horned beast of the Apocalypse must be the Roman empire likewise."—Vol. iii. p. 169.

In the passage, however, in his second volume, p. 63, to which he refers for proof of this construction, in place of presenting any demonstration of it, he merely asserts that it is so clear as not to need any proof; and in support of the definition which, in his preliminary chapter, he gives of a wild beast, as denoting "a great secular empire, which professes to act, and acts upon principles adverse to true religion," he only alleges Daniel vii. 4, 17, in which the beasts are expressly declared to be symbols of kings, not kingdoms. The horns also are interpreted by the angel of the Apocalypse, as representing kings, not kingdoms. He thus takes a definition which he has advanced, unsupported by any evidence, in direct contradiction to the interpretation given of the symbol both in Daniel and in the Apocalypse, and in violation of congruity, as an "indisputable" axiom, and employs it as such in the explication of the whole series of the symbols of Daniel and of John. But the wild beast is not the symbol of "the Roman empire, considered geographically," vol. iii. p. 170. That construction is forbidden by analogy. There is no similitude between a wild beast and a mere geographical territory. The wild beast is an agent, and is represented as acting like a ferocious brute. It were preposterous to ascribe the disposition and acts of a brute to a geographical territory. One of its heads is said to be wounded, as it were, to death. What infliction is there to which a territory can be subjected that bears any analogy to such a wound? A territory is not capable of death, or a death wound. The beast is stamped with names of blasphemy, and has a mouth which it opens in blasphemy. Has a territory any such organs as heads and a mouth, or any power of exerting acts of that nature? The beast has crowns on its horns. A territory has no crowns or kingly powers such as crowns may be thought to denote. The horns, moreover, are expressly declared to be symbols of kings. Its most conspicuous parts are indisputably, therefore, symbols of men in civil authority; and analogy requires that all its other parts should be taken as symbols of persons in civil authority acting in union with and subordination to those kings. This construction is confirmed by the discrimination of the beast from every tribe, and people, and tongue, and nation over which it had authority, and by whom

it was worshipped. It cannot symbolize a mere territory therefore, as the territory of the Roman empire never had authority over any tribe, and people, and tongue, and nation that dwelt in it, nor was the object of their religious homage. In like manner, the wonder with which the beast is regarded as invincible in war, is appropriate only to armed rulers. A territory is never the object of such admiration. This is seen also from the catastrophe of the beast, at the last great battle. It is to be taken with the false prophet, and cast alive into the lake of fire and brimstone, which is the second death. It were absurd to suppose that "the Roman empire, considered geographically," is to be taken alive and cast into that lake. A territory is not capable of the second death.

He subverts his construction of the symbol by the import which he ascribes to the heads and horns, which he interprets as representing—not territory, but civil rulers. If the whole beast denotes territory, its several parts must undoubtedly bear the same meaning.

His interpretation is refuted also by the impossibility of finding any event in consistency with it, that can answer to the emergence of the wild beast from the sea. If the beast symbolize a geographical territory, what can its emergence from the sea denote, but the emergence of the territory from chaos, or the ocean, in which it was first involved; or its being moulded in that form which its surface wore while under the dominion of the Romans; by the elevation of its mountains and hills; the scooping out of its valleys; the levelling of its plains; the gathering of its waters into the streams, lakes, and seas? But what can be more preposterous than to assign such a meaning to the symbols, or suppose that the vision is employed in representing the great acts of the first four days of the creation, which are recorded in Genesis?

His interpretation, accordingly, overturns his chronological theory respecting the rise of the Roman empire. If the emergence of the wild beast represents the emergence of the territory embraced in the Roman empire, from chaos, or the primitive ocean, and arrangement of its surface in its present form, then the period of its emergence, in place of but 753 years before our era, as he represents, must have been, at the

least, more than 4,000 years before the vision! Yet, disproved as his assumption that the wild beast denotes "the Roman empire considered geographically," thus is, by its palpable incongruities and formal contradictions to the prophecy, there is no construction throughout his whole series which he regards as more indisputably correct, or employs more largely in determining the meaning of other symbols.

But apart from his error in interpreting the wild beast as symbolizing the Roman empire, "geographically considered," in place of its rulers, he is mistaken in regarding the emergence of the beast from the sea as representing the first institution of the Roman state. Instead, it undoubtedly denotes the rise of the rulers symbolized by the wild beast on the termination of the imperial sway, and substitution of the kings represented by the horns; as the dragon symbolized the rulers of that empire when under the sway of the seven heads. This is indicated by the different position of their diadems. They were worn by the dragon on its heads: denoting that the rulers symbolized by the heads held the sceptre during the domination of those represented by the dragon. But their station on the wild beast was not on the heads, but on the horns; indicating that the imperial sway which preceded the division of the empire into ten kingdoms, had ceased, and was succeeded by that of the kings.

It is apparent that those represented by the dragon preceded those symbolized by the wild beast, from the gift by the dragon to the wild beast of its power, and throne, and great authority. It could not have transferred to it its prerogatives, and throne, and influence, unless it had possessed them at an earlier period. The dragon rule over the western empire must have terminated with that transference, and, therefore, the reign of the wild beast must have been subsequent to that of the dragon. This is expressly taught, also, in the representation that while the heads denoted kings, five of whom had fallen, one was, and one was not yet come,—the wild beast itself, as a whole, is an eighth, and is of the seven;—that is, derives from them its power, and throne, and great authority, and succeeds in their place. It represents the rulers of the Roman empire, therefore, after the sway of the heads, whose powers it inherits, has ceased; and the whole

body of rulers whom it symbolizes, are called an eighth, to show that they are of a later period than those symbolized by the beast while under the seven heads. This is corroborated by the description of the beast as not in existence at the time of the vision, and to rise at a future period from the abyss. "The beast *was*, and is not, and is about to rise from the abyss." That is of easy explication, if the rulers denoted by the beast, in distinction from the dragon, had not then come into existence, but were to attain their thrones at a future time, when the population should be thrown into confusion by the overthrow of the ancient rulers denoted by the heads. It "*was*," as five of the classes of rulers which its heads denote had already existed, and the sixth then held the throne. It "*was not*," as that combination of rulers which it peculiarly denotes under the sway of the horns, was not yet in existence. And it *was* about to rise from the abyss, as that body of rulers were to rise to power, and assume that organization which the beast denotes in distinction from the dragon, at a period of war and commotion when the ancient rule of the heads should be brought to a close. The emergence of the wild beast from the sea, therefore, undoubtedly denotes the rise of the monarchs, with their subordinate officers, to power, after the dissolution of the imperial government at the fall of Augustulus.

We are led to the same conclusion, if we regard the other expression, "the beast which *was*, and is not, and yet is," as descriptive of the beast at its emergence from the sea. It "*was*," as it had existed in another form before that emergence, under the sway of the seven heads. It "*is not*," inasmuch as the rulers whom it denotes no longer have a supreme head; and yet it "*is*," as the body of rulers whom it represents, though distributed under ten kings, yet succeed to the ancient rule, and still act in many relations, as though they were rulers of the same great empire.

His interpretation of the first head, as denoting not only the Roman kings, but the emperors of France also of the ninth century, and afterwards of Germany; and exhibition of the French emperor Bonaparte, as the seventh head, are wholly mistaken. First: because those French and German emperors were not Roman kings. The Roman empire no longer subsisted. The kingly and imperial Roman rule had been.

superseded by the ten Gothic kings in the fifth century. Next: because Charlemagne and Bonaparte were *horns* of the wild beast, not heads. Mr. F. himself represents the kings of the Franks as one of the dynasties denoted by the horns, vol. ii. p. 73. It is inconsistent with the symbol to exhibit the heads and horns as denoting the same dynasties. This consideration alone overturns his whole explication of the heads. There have been no kings or emperors in the ten kingdoms, since the fall of the last Roman emperor in 476, except those of the kingdoms whose kings are denoted by the horns. The period of the heads, therefore, whatever they were, must have preceded that of the horns. This is proved, also, by the consideration that the dragon,—which symbolized the rulers of the Roman empire, before the emergence of the wild beast from the sea under the sway of the horns, and the rulers of the eastern empire *after* that period,—as well as the beast, had seven heads. As there was no new order of supreme rulers in the eastern empire, after the fall of the western, the emperors of that period must have been those denoted by its seventh head. According to Mr. F. the dragon has never had more than six heads.

This is confirmed by the representation that the image to the beast was an image of the beast whose head had been wounded to death and had lived; which implies that the form of the beast, after which the image was modelled, was that which distinguished it under the head that was wounded to death. The beast must have existed under that head, therefore, before the erection of the image. The nations could not have made an image of the beast in a form in which it had not existed at the time of the modelling the image. Statues of persons are not sculptured, nor portraits drawn, before the persons themselves exist, of whom they are statues and portraits. Mr. F., however, represents the seventh head as not reigning till the elevation of Bonaparte to the imperial throne in 1804, and as being wounded to death at his deposition in 1815, while he refers the erection of the image to the eighth century—more than a thousand years before! He falls, indeed, into the error of representing that the image was not an image of the beast, but merely an idol for its worship, and supposes it denotes the images that are wor-

shipped by the Papists. It is, however, expressly called the image of the beast. That it was an image *to* the beast whose head was wounded, means, doubtless, that it was made in the likeness of the beast under that head. As the beast under its seventh head symbolized the rulers of the empire, the image of the beast under that head must symbolize an analogous body of rulers, not mere idols; and those rulers must, by analogy, be ecclesiastics, not men holding civil stations: and that analogous organization is the vast hierarchy of the Catholic communion, embracing the ecclesiastics of the ten kingdoms, and having the Pope as its head; and the form after which it is modelled, is that of the imperial government under Constantine and his successors.

He violates analogy, in like manner, in his interpretation of the woman borne by the wild beast, whom he represents as the symbol of Rome as a city, vol. iii. p. 275. He founds that construction on the representation that the woman is the great city that has empire over the kings of the earth. But the meaning of that obviously is, that she is the symbol of the same combination of persons as are represented by great Babylon, whose name was graven on her forehead. They are, accordingly, expressly declared to be the same, chap. xix. 2. The heavenly host, in celebrating the destruction of "Babylon the great city," ascribe salvation and glory to God, "because he had judged the great harlot who corrupted the earth with her fornication, and had vindicated the blood of his servants from her hand." Rome, as a literal city of commerce, arts, and luxury, did not reign over the kings of the earth after the fall of the empire. She was not, as a city of commerce, supported by the rulers of the western kingdoms, in a manner analogous to the support of the woman by the wild beast. She has never been under the dominion of the combined rulers symbolized by the wild beast under the sway of the horns. She has been the seat, during a large part of the period, of a civil government wholly separate from those of the ten kingdoms, and as independent of them as they are of one another. It is against analogy to make a woman a symbol of a material city. Living agents are symbols of living agents, not of inanimate objects; and, finally, she is the symbol of the same body of agents as the city, great Babylon.

She has the same name, "great Babylon." She bears the same cup. She exerts the same agency on the kings and people, seducing them to a false worship. They both shed the blood of the martyrs, and, finally, the destruction of "Babylon the great city," in which the blood of prophets and of saints was found, and of all who had been slain on the earth, is expressly celebrated by the heavenly host as the judgment of "the great harlot who corrupted the earth, and the vindication of the blood of God's servants from her hand." As, then, the woman and the city denote the same thing, to make the woman denote material Rome, is to make great Babylon also the symbol of that material city. But it is against the laws of symbolization to make a city the representative of the same thing as itself. His interpretation of the woman, therefore, as the symbol of Rome, is, in every relation, indisputably wrong. And, finally, he himself contradicts that construction in other passages, by representing that the woman, in place of the city of Rome, is the symbol of the Catholic church. But he errs here also, first, in confounding the hierarchies, or ecclesiastical teachers and rulers who exert authority, with the unofficial members of the church. It is the former only whom the woman and great Babylon symbolize, as is seen from the discrimination of the woman from all mere members of the church. Thus she is distinguished from the waters where she sits, which symbolize the people, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues, and from all nations whom she seduced. She is distinguished from the wild beast, which represents the civil rulers of the ten kingdoms; and again from the kings, all of whom are members of the church, and were, for nearly the whole of her career, members of the Catholic church. And, finally, she is discriminated from the merchants, and pilots, and sailors, and harpers and musicians, and pipers and trumpeters, and artists, and bridegrooms and brides, who likewise belonged to her communion. She represents those, therefore, only who exercise office as teachers and rulers, and have authority over the unofficial members of the church; and thence is the symbol of the hierarchies, in whom alone that power is lodged.

He errs, likewise, in excluding from his explication, her relation to the civil rulers as a combination of political estab-

lishments. She is a symbol not merely of teachers and rulers of churches of the ten kingdoms, but, in the relations of naturalized hierarchies. This is manifest, first, from the station of the woman on the wild beast. The relation in which they are supported by the civil rulers is as legalized establishments. She is exhibited as borne by the wild beast in her peculiar character as a harlot, dressed in finery, bearing her badge—great Babylon, holding her cup, drunk with blood, and acting as the mother of harlots and abominations; and that is in her station as a combination of nationalized hierarchies; as it is in that relation alone that she united with the kings, seduced the nations, and shed the blood of the saints. There is no other relation that she sustains, or has sustained to the civil rulers, that answers to her position on the wild beast. She has never been merely tolerated by them, while uniting with the kings in the practice and propagation of a false worship. It is only as a civil establishment that she has exercised her empire over them. This is manifest also from the mode in which she has shed the blood of the saints. It has been by delivering them to the civil rulers, whose office it was by the terms of her nationalization to execute her decrees and sentences, and punish and exterminate those whom she denounced as heretics. No hierarchy, except such as was nationalized, has ever put the witnesses of Jesus to death. No civil government has ever attempted to execute the decrees and sentences of any ecclesiastics, except those whom they had nationalized. The persecuted have without exception been those who, in some form, refused obedience to the legalized hierarchies. It were a self-contradiction in a government to punish subjects for holding a faith and offering a worship which it expressly allowed or had not prohibited by law. It is a self-contradiction to suppose a toleration except to dissentients from an established religion. No governments except those that nationalize a religion, grant toleration to them who hold a different faith, and offer a different worship. The term toleration is, we believe, unknown in the constitutions and laws of the United States. The legislators expressly disclaim all authority over the faith and worship of the citizen, and treat it as the natural right of all to worship according to the dictates of their consciences, unobstructed by the ruler.

That it is the nationalized hierarchies which the city represents is seen also from her fall. Her fall is not to be her dissolution as a communion or hierarchy, as is apparent from the command to God's people to come out of her after her fall; the representation that she has become a habitation of demons and a station of every unclean spirit, and a station of every unclean and hated bird; and the warning afterwards given not to worship the image which is the symbol of the Catholic hierarchies in their subordination to the Pope. As she is to survive her fall, her fall is not to be her destruction, nor a change of the ecclesiastical relations of her rulers and members to one another. It is not to be a dissolution of the hierarchies of the Catholic church or their relation to the Pope as their head. It must, therefore, be a change of the relation of the nationalized hierarchies to the state; and is to be what the dejection of the woman from her position on the wild beast would be,—a fall from their station as civilly established, or a total deprivation of the power derived from the state of enforcing their sentences and decrees. There is no other change conceivable that answers to the symbol.

It is shown also by the consideration that the destruction is to be subsequent to the fall, and is to occasion the merchants a loss of their merchandise. It is at her final overthrow that they lament the loss of their gains from her, which implies that her fall is not to involve the loss of her property. She is still to have benefices and patronage. Her fall, therefore, must be her denationalization or deprivation of all her peculiar privileges and power of enforcing her decrees, while she is still left in possession of the property, or much of it, which she has acquired, and her patrons of their patronage, or right of bestowing her benefices.

Great Babylon, then, is the symbol of the nationalized hierarchies, and her fall is to be to her what the fall of ancient Babylon was to that civil capital; a change from her position as the seat of power, to the condition of a common province. She is to be divested of her peculiar prerogatives, and reduced to a level with other denominations. She is to have no exclusive license from the state to exercise her worship; she is to have no power to enforce her decrees; she is to have no peculiar privileges.

We might thus go on and point out other errors equally singular and fatal in Mr. F.'s views of the second wild beast, which he exhibits as symbolizing the whole Catholic church, in place of the body of Catholic civil and ecclesiastical rulers and teachers of the papal state, which alone answers to the description of its form and agency. We might refute his exposition of the name of the beast as blasphemer or apostate, which are merely descriptive of men as *acting* in a particular manner, not proper or patronymic names. As the beast is the symbol of civil rulers, and as its number is the number of a man, or number expressed by the letters of the name of a man or family, and the name of some of that family of rulers which the beast denotes, it must be a proper name by which that body of rulers is distinguished from the rulers of other nations, and *Answers* therefore, as there is no other that answers to the conditions. But Mr. F., disregarding this consideration, founds his construction on the mere names of blasphemy that were graven on the head of the beast, which were only descriptive of its *acts*, not the patronymic or family name of the line of rulers whom it symbolized. His explication of the vision of the 144,000 on Mount Zion, of the harvest and vintage, of the hymn that followed the seventh trumpet, of the descent of Christ and his armies, of the battle of Armageddon, the binding of Satan, the first resurrection, and other symbols, is fraught in like manner, we might show, with the grossest misconceptions; but we are weary of the task which recurs at every step, of refuting the false principles on which he proceeds, and pointing out the arbitrary assumptions, erroneous inferences, and gross misstatements, which he perpetually puts forth under the name of interpretations. It must have long since become apparent to the reader that his work is a mere tissue of what Mr. Mede calls "begged principles." He employs himself throughout in little else than verifying a "general idea of the import" of the prophecy, "first gained in the abstract;" and independently, therefore, of the symbols and in defiance of their laws. There is nothing in the whole course of his discussions that is entitled to the name of interpretation. Take away his "begged principles," his unsupported assertions, and his false inferences, and the whole fabric which he has reared with

such a pretence of demonstration, is swept from existence. His method is like that of Spinoza and other *à priori* philosophers, who begin by advancing a set of shallow or false propositions as self-evident axioms; then deduce or assert as deductions from them a series of senseless or false inferences; and having pursued their gratuitous assumptions to what they deem their legitimate results, gravely offer the system they have formed in that manner in the abstract, as a just exposition of our intellectual and moral nature, or the laws of the universe. Mr. F. in like manner beginning with postulates and assertions that are arbitrary and false, deduces from them a series of arbitrary and false conclusions, and then boldly pronounces the ideas he has thus gained in the abstract, an explanation of the symbols.

The period during which he has pursued this course has been preëminently a period of critiques and reviews; yet no one of the large body of professors and teachers who have been devoted to the interpretation of the sacred word, has thought proper to point out the fallacies on which he proceeds, and expose his great errors. How long is this abuse of the prophecy to prevail? How long is such quackery to be received by the church as legitimate interpretation? Its day has nearly passed, we trust. We know, indeed, the difficulty of working a revolution in the views of expositors. We are aware of the extreme misconceptions that prevail in regard to the laws of symbolization. We are sensible of the prejudice that exists against even the study of the subject. That prejudice, however, is not invincible. Those who have misrepresented the prophecy may be so effectually refuted, as to constrain the church to abandon them as guides. The laws by which it should be interpreted may be so clearly shown to be revealed by the Redeemer, as to command the assent of the impartial; and there are large numbers of the intelligent and pious, who feel a high interest in the great things which are made known in the prophecy, and need but to be furnished with the key to the symbols, to be induced to engage with zeal in its study. We design, therefore, to go on in the unreserved exposure of the errors of those who misinterpret it, on the one hand, and endeavor on the other to unfold the laws by which it is to be interpreted, and the results to which they lead; in the per-

suasion that God will own his truth, and make it instrumental to the preparation of his people for the great duties and trials to which they are ere long to be called, and under which the prophecy is to be, in an eminent degree, their guide and support.

ART. IV.—THE REASONS OF THE RESTORATION OF THE ISRAELITES.

BY THE EDITOR.

AMONG those who hesitate to receive the predictions of the restoration of the Israelites as God's people, there are many who appear to owe their doubts in a measure to their not being aware that important ends are to be answered by it. They seem to think not only that its benefits would necessarily be confined to that nation, and that its consequences would be merely such as would naturally result from the restoration and reorganization of any other people that had been forced to leave their native country and reside in other regions; but that it would be a return to an inferior and preparatory condition, in place of an advancement to the full blessings of Christianity; and be to the Israelites themselves, therefore, disadvantageous instead of beneficial. Such impressions, however, are not authorized by the Scriptures. They exhibit it as a measure of the divine government of the utmost importance in itself, and designed to exert a vast and enduring influence on the race.

1. It is an important element in an administration that is to be exercised over the world through endless ages, and under which all nations are to become holy. It is expressly predicted that after their restoration they are to occupy their land for ever, and be universally sanctified. "For lo the days come, saith the Lord, that I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel and Judah, saith the Lord, and I will cause them to return to the land that I gave to their fathers, *and they shall possess it*. For it shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord of Hosts, I will break his yoke from off thy neck,

and will burst thy bonds, *and strangers shall no more serve themselves of him. But they shall serve the Lord their God,* and David their king, whom I will raise up unto them," Jeremiah xxx. 3, 8, 9. It is predicted of Zion, after her restoration, "All thy children shall be taught by Jehovah, and great shall be the peace of thy children. Thou shalt be established in righteousness," Isaiah liv. 13, 14. "As for thy people, *they shall all of them be righteous. They shall inherit the land for ever*; the branch of my planting, the work of my hands, that I may be glorified," Isaiah lx. 20. The Gentiles are also to be converted at that period. When "the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established upon the height of the mountains, all nations shall flow to it. Yea, many people shall go and say, come let us go up to the mountain of Jehovah, to the house of the God of Jacob, that he may teach us his ways, and that we may walk in his paths," Isaiah ii. 2, 3. Then "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of Jehovah, as the waters cover the sea," Isaiah xi. 9. But an administration under which such vast and momentous results are to be secured, must undoubtedly differ very greatly from the present, and be adapted in a far higher measure to accomplish such an end. It must involve especially the use of far more effective means to impress men with a realization of the being, presence, and agency of God, and their relations to him. Multitudes who now enjoy the knowledge of the gospel, do not even believe in his being. Though against the testimony of their senses, and the remonstrances of their reason, they give their faith to conjectures and theories, that deny either his existence, or the possibility of proving it; while millions who speculatively acknowledge his being, have no effective realization of it, but live almost as regardless of him as though he did not exist. To remove this general unbelief and bring the whole race to a full discernment and sense of his being, will obviously demand means far more influential than any that have hitherto been employed.

The elevation of the race at large to an exalted piety will doubtless require the use of extraordinary means to give them just views and impressions of the work of redemption. In order to such a piety, a clear understanding of the ruin of the race, of the condition from which it is raised, and of the

means by which its redemption is accomplished, will unquestionably be essential. Without a knowledge of what they would have been without Christ, of the consequences of sin, and of the sacrifice by which he redeemed them, they cannot realize the nature of their salvation, regard him with the gratitude and love which they owe him, nor ascribe to him the honors that are his due. The general prevalence of holiness, however, will naturally leave them without many of the proofs and exemplifications of these great truths which are now felt and seen by us, and create a necessity for new and peculiar means to bring them to their realization. Let us, for example, suppose a series of ages to have passed, during which all the individuals of a nation or a continent had been sanctified from infancy; how, unless through some extraneous means, or extraordinary measures, could they adequately understand what the condition is from which they are saved, and appreciate their obligations to Christ? They would have no such experience as ours of what the heart is, left without the renovating and sanctifying influences of the Spirit. They would have no such exemplifications around them as we behold, of the forms which revolt assumes, and the dreadful consequences to which it naturally gives birth. Without extraordinary means expressly adapted to the end, it would seem inevitable that they must fail of adequate views of those great realities, a just comprehension of which is indispensable to a becoming faith in Christ, and acknowledgment of his grace. Their universal sanctification will render it necessary, then, that peculiar instrumentalities should be employed to give them such a knowledge of him and of themselves. The institution and use of such means is accordingly foreshown; and among them the restoration and redemption of the Israelites is an important element.

II. Among those extraordinary methods of teaching and impressing the race, the most august and momentous is the visible manifestation of the Eternal Word, and communication of his will to the nations; and that is to be, at least in a degree, in connexion with the restoration and re-establishment of the Israelites.

He is to descend visibly, on the capture of Jerusalem by the Gentiles after their return, and deliver them from their

power. "Then shall the Lord go forth and fight against those nations, as when he fought in the day of battle, and his feet shall stand in that day upon the Mount of Olives, which is before Jerusalem," Zechariah xiv. 3, 4. "For behold, the Lord will come with fire, and with his chariots, like a whirlwind, to render his anger with fury, and his rebuke with flames of fire. For by fire and by sword will the Lord plead with all flesh, and the slain of the Lord will be many," Isaiah lxvi. 15, 16. And that is to be at the period when he "will gather all nations and tongues, and they shall come and see his glory;" and he "will set a sign among them, and send those that escape of them among the nations, and they shall declare his glory among the Gentiles, and shall bring all the Israelites an offering unto the Lord out of all nations, upon horses, and in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to the holy mountain Jerusalem," Isaiah lxvi. 18-20. He is to reveal himself visibly to them also, or give sensible signs of his presence at subsequent periods. "Then shall Jehovah create upon every station of Mount Zion, and upon all her places of conyocation, a cloud and a smoke by day, and the brightness of a flaming fire by night, which shall be over all the glory for protection," Isaiah iv. 5. "The Spirit took me up and brought me into the inner court, and behold, the glory of the Lord filled the house. And I heard him speaking unto me out of the house, Son of man, the place of my throne, and the place of the soles of my feet, where I will dwell in the midst of the children of Israel for ever, and my holy name, shall they no more defile," Ezekiel xliii. 4-6. "And many people shall say, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths," Isaiah ii. 3. He is thus to give such visible manifestations of his presence there, as he gave to the Israelites in ancient times, and make new communications of his will; and these revelations of himself will be more efficient means than any others of impressing beholders with a realization of his being and majesty, and inspiring them with awe and submission. There will then be no doubters of his existence. There will be none who will feel uncertain of his dominion over them, or question the righteousness of his sway. This is shown by

the effects which the vision of his glory wrought in Isaiah, Daniel, and John ; and the terror with which we are forewarned it is to strike the wicked. Those prophets were overwhelmed with a sense at once of his infinite greatness and sanctitude, and their nothingness and guilt. His enemies are to be struck with dismay and despair, and cry to the rocks to fall on them, and to the hills to cover them from his wrath.

III. But that visible manifestation of himself will naturally require the institution of a worship, or the appointment of specific and appropriate acts by which he is to be acknowledged in those revelations of himself, and honored as the incarnate Jehovah who has redeemed them ; and that will naturally involve the consecration of a place in which he shall appear and that homage be offered, and the institution of ministers by whom it shall be conducted, as they are indispensable conditions of public acts in which numbers unite. That many may join in them, and especially from a distance, the scene must be previously designated ; and that many may perceptibly to one another unite in them, visible acts must be exerted, in which an assembly may in some form participate. We are accordingly foreshown that a temple in Jerusalem is to be the scene of those manifestations and that worship, and that the Levites are to be its ministers. "In the last days, the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established upon the height of the mountains, and all nations shall flow to it," Isaiah ii. 3. It is the temple denoted by that beheld by Ezekiel, which God designates as "the place of his throne, and the place of the soles of his feet, where he will dwell in the midst of the children of Israel for ever." And the Levites are to be the ministers of that temple, as their ancestors were of the ancient tabernacle and temple. "They shall bring all your brethren an offering unto the Lord out of all nations, and I will take of them for priests and for Levites, saith the Lord," Isaiah lxvi. 20, 21. "Thus saith the Lord, David shall never want a man to sit upon the throne of the house of Israel ; neither shall the priests, the Levites, want a man before me to offer burnt offerings, and to kindle meat offerings, and to do sacrifice continually." "As the host of heaven cannot be numbered, nor the sand of the sea measured, so

will I multiply the Levites that minister unto me," Jer. xxx. 17, 18, 22. The appropriation of a single place to the exclusion of all others for the offering of that homage, and the designation of a particular class of ministers to conduct it, will, doubtless, then be as essential as it was in ancient times, serve to guard it from perversion, and contribute to its sanctity and grandeur.

IV. Although the design of those sacrifices is not expressly stated, it can scarcely admit of question, that, like the ancient sacrifices, they are to be means by which the offerers are to express in a visible and emphatic manner their acknowledgment of Christ's death as their expiation, acceptance of him as their Redeemer, and ascription to him of their salvation from sin and its penalty. They are not to be typical of what is future, but, like the Passover and Lord's Supper, representative of what is past. They are not to be the instruments of a mere ceremonial purification, but the media of a public and social commemoration of Christ's sacrifice, and to such an office they are undoubtedly eminently adapted.

Could we transport ourselves into distant ages, and realize in any degree what the condition of the race is then to be, we should doubtless see not only that rites of that kind may be highly appropriate and useful, but that some such method of publicly recognising and celebrating Christ's death will be indispensable to the full realization of his work, and vivid expressions of faith in him, that are essential to a lofty piety and a perfect homage. In order to such a regard of him, as must necessarily be an element of faith and love, there must undoubtedly be a clear comprehension of the way in which they are redeemed, of the alienation and debasement from which they are raised, and of the everlasting miseries from which they are delivered. Otherwise the true nature and greatness of the salvation which he bestows could not be seen and felt. In order, accordingly, to a becoming homage of him, there must be an acknowledgment and celebration of him as the author of that salvation, as accomplishing it by his death, and as conferring it of his sovereign grace. But how are they to rise to these full and effective realizations, unless by the aid of extraordinary means? The most effective media of our sense of our sinfulness and ruin, the reign of

evil within us, and the spectacle around us of a revolting and miserable world, will be unknown to them. Other means will be required to furnish that knowledge ; and what can be so appropriate as external representative actions, which, as we are constituted, not only assist the expression of our views and affections, but add greatly to their vividness and strength ? The use of such rites will, therefore, not only be suitable to their nature, but essential to the perfection of their faith and homage. They will be necessary, also, to a social or united celebration of Christ's work. How can assemblies, or even families, unite in expressions of homage and commemorations of his death, except by common public and visible acts in which all take a part, either directly, or by a representative, or minister ? Merely to meet in the same scene, without any joint act indicative of their common views and affections, would not be a public social celebration. Merely assembling in the same place and meditating in silence on his work, would not be visibly commemorating it ; as there would be no open public *expression* of sentiments, and no evidence, therefore, of a concurrence of views respecting him, nor even that he was to all the object of thought and emotion. A social recognition and celebration of his death must, of necessity, be by common and visible acts, in which all can unite ; and in order that they may be of the most effective kind, they must be such that the worshippers may formally express their views and emotions by them, as in presenting a sacrifice, or receiving the Lord's Supper. Such is the nature of all the commemorative rites that God has instituted. Thus the celebration of the deliverance of the Israelites from the destroying angel in Egypt, by the Passover, was made far more effective by its being embodied in that rite than it could otherwise have been. The slaughter of a victim, the preparation of it in a peculiar way, and eating it in an unaccustomed attitude, and at an unusual hour, gave it a significance, raised their sense of that which it denoted, and made it a vehicle of expressing their thoughts and feelings, in a far higher measure than would have been possible without such a rite. Had they simply been required to spend an hour in silent meditation on their deliverance, their ideas would undoubtedly have been comparatively faint, and their emotions languid. Such

is the effect, also, of the commemoration of Christ's death by the reception of bread and wine. Thousands and millions of his disciples, by that rite, in which they take these symbols of his body and blood, in acknowledgment of their redemption by his death, have been raised to a realization of his work, a direct acceptance of him as their Redeemer, a sense of his love, and an assurance of their union to him, far more vivid and energetic than they could possibly have gained without such aids.

The offering of sacrifices, however, has, beyond any other of which we have a knowledge, an adaptation to subserve that office at a period when all nations being sanctified, they will be without the means from which we derive our most effective sense of our guilt and ruin, and fullest realization of the work which he accomplishes for us. In the offering of the victim, they will be able to give a visible and most emphatic expression of their thoughts and emotions, in respect to all the great truths of their redemption. Thus, in presenting it to be sacrificed in their behalf, laying their hands on its head, and making confession that they are of a race that has revolted and is obnoxious to death, they will, in the most specific manner, acknowledge the ruin in which they were naturally involved, express their sense of their need of salvation, and testify their recognition and acceptance of him as their Redeemer. In slaying the victim, they will signify their sense and acknowledgment, that it was by his death that their redemption was accomplished; and, in offering the sacrifice to God on the altar, by fire kindled from heaven, they will show their sense and acknowledgment that he offered himself to God's justice in their stead, and by that means accomplished their redemption. What other rite could combine such a clear and impressive recognition of all these great truths? What other acts could raise the offerer to such a vivid feeling of them, and enable him to express them with such energy? And what could raise these acts to such a grandeur of significance, and invest the facts and truths on which they proceed with such an effulgent reality, as the offering of the sacrifice in the immediate presence of the Redeemer, and reception from him of visible tokens of its acceptance! To what a towering sense of his work must such a transaction, in which

the Eternal Word himself takes a visible and conspicuous part, naturally raise them ! To what a rapturous realization of their relationship to him, and the certainty of their everlasting enjoyment of the infinite blessings of his salvation ! The rite may undoubtedly, then, be made the instrument of far higher views and emotions, and a far more energetic expression of them than would be possible without the aid of such means, and be eminently suited to meet their peculiar necessities.

V. The ministers who offer those sacrifices must, of necessity, be expressly appointed to their office by the Most High, and the people to whom they belong, and who occupy the land which is the scene of the worship, sustain an intimate and peculiar relation to him, and be placed under a polity adapted to their office. Not to be especially designated to that place and work would be to be without a divine sanction for their official station and service. Not to be placed under a peculiar polity would be to be without authority for their official acts, and indicate that there was neither any peculiar sanctity in their relationship to God, nor any unusual respect due from them to him. The institution, accordingly, of such a worship of necessity involves the appointment of a tribe or nation to that office as God's peculiar people, and a designation to them of the official services which they are to perform. The adoption of the Israelites as his chosen people, and appointment to the office of occupying the land in which that worship is to be offered, and exercising the ministry of the sanctuary, and direction by express laws of all the official duties which they are to perform, are precisely such as befit the institution, and are essential to its existence. Their filling that station and exercising that office through everlasting ages was accordingly contemplated in their original adoption as God's people. The covenant which God made with Abraham and his seed was an everlasting covenant ; and the land which he gave them, he gave as an everlasting possession. " And God talked with Abraham, saying—I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and thy seed after thee ; and I will give unto thee and thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a

stranger, all the land of Canaan *for an everlasting possession*," Genesis xvii: 3-8.

VI. Though on the institution of Christianity, there was no express abrogation of the sacrifices ordained by the Mosaic law, and they continued to be offered by Jewish believers as well as unbelievers generally, till the destruction of the temple and exile of the people, yet it is clearly intimated in the New Testament that they were superseded on the introduction of the new dispensation by Christ's sacrifice which they typified. And if they were for a time allowed to the Jewish converts, they were not, nor were any of the other rites that were peculiar to the Israelites, obligatory on the Gentiles, as is apparent from Paul's contest with the Judaizers, and from the decree of the church at Jerusalem. They cannot become obligatory on Gentiles, therefore, without an express command, nor can they again be offered by Jews conformably even to their ancient law, without a direct interposition and re-injunction of them; inasmuch, as without a revelation the Israelites cannot determine who among them are descendants of Levi and entitled to exercise the priestly office. It is foreshown accordingly in the vision of Ezekiel, chap. xi., that when that interposition takes place, sacrifices are to be expressly commanded, and the mode made known in which they are to be offered.

VII. The ejection of the Israelites from their station and office as God's chosen people, and subjection through a long series of ages to punishment for their unbelief, will not necessarily preclude their readmission to that office. The destruction of the temple, the dissolution of their polity, and the withdrawal from them of all the peculiar blessings which they had enjoyed as God's people, was not in order to such a perpetual disinheritance. They were left to fall into unbelief, divested of their sacred privileges, and driven into exile, on the one hand, we are expressly taught, to show that God acts as a sovereign in the gift of salvation, having mercy on whom he will have mercy, and leaving whom he will to blindness and obduracy; and on the other, to open the way for a similar display of sovereignty towards the Gentiles; and these extraordinary measures are in order ultimately to a more gracious administration over both. For when that

experiment has been made with the Gentiles through a series of ages, and resulted also in their general apostasy, Christ is to interpose in person, and introduce a new dispensation, under which Israelites and Gentiles are alike to be sanctified. "For I would not, brethren, that ye should be ignorant of this mystery—lest ye should be wise in your own conceits—that blindness in part is happened to Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles shall be come in. And so all Israel shall be saved ; as it is written, There shall come for Zion the Deliverer, and shall turn ungodliness from Jacob : For this is my covenant with them when I shall take away their sins. . . . For the gifts and calling of God are without repentance. For as ye in times past have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy through their unbelief; even so have these not now believed, that through your mercy they may also obtain mercy. For God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all," Rom. xi. 25–32. We are thus shown that the blindness, fall, and temporary disinherittance of Israel was not in absolute frustration of the ends for which God adopted them, but took place by his sovereign permission, and is to be overruled, so as to issue in the conversion of the whole nation ; that at the period of their conversion, the Redeemer is directly and openly to interpose for them ; and that that is in accordance with a specific engagement with them, or promise, and is infallibly to be accomplished, because his promise of gifts to them, and call of them as his people, are unchangeable. It is at this preparation of the way for the conversion of the world, by leaving both Israelites and Gentiles to apostatize, and show by a vast and dreadful agency what they are, and who is the author of their sanctification when they turn from transgression, that the apostle exclaims, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God ! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out ! For who hath known the mind of the Lord ? or who hath been his counsellor ?" Who could have conceived that such a dispensation would be chosen to accomplish such a result ; that the limitation of the gifts of the Spirit for a time to a small number, could prepare the way for their bestowment for ever afterwards on all ; that the unbelief of the race at large, through comparatively a short period, could

lead to its redemption through everlasting ages? But the manner in which it contributes to that result is indicated by the apostle. It is by the exemplification of what men are when left without renovation, and what the condition is from which they are redeemed. It is by the demonstration which it furnishes that they have no title whatever to salvation, but are sanctified, forgiven, and raised to blessedness, of infinite grace; and that the glory of contriving and bestowing redemption belongs exclusively to God. "Who hath been his counsellor, or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again?" No one had any share in devising the administration under which men are saved; no one has rendered any service that entitles him to justification. "For of him, and through him, and to him are all things, to whom be the glory for ever, Amen," Rom. xi. 35, 36. And this wonderful sway which, by the verification which it presents of the great truths on which the work of redemption proceeds, is thus to lead to the salvation of the whole world, will doubtless serve in an equal degree to prepare the way for the appropriate exercise of the offices to which the Israelites are then to be exalted. The dispensations of God towards them for four thousand years, and their conduct under them, will constitute a vast and awful manifestation of all the great facts of his rights and sovereignty, and their relations and character, and form a ground for their everlasting humiliation, submission, and gratitude.

Their rejection of Christ through such a series of ages will show them, that left to themselves, they are enemies in place of friends, apostates instead of disciples. The terrible punishments inflicted on them by famine, pestilence, and the sword, their exile from their country, deprivation of religious rites, and disinheritance of national blessings, will show them that they have no title to God's favor on the ground of merit. Their restoration and readmission to their relations to God as his chosen people by Christ's personal interposition, and miraculous gifts and deliverances, will demonstrate that they owe the blessings with which they are distinguished to his sovereign goodness. And by the realization of these great truths fully unfolded and impressed by the Spirit, they will be brought to such a sight and sense of God and of themselves, as for ever to

keep them humble, fill them with awe and watchfulness, and lead them to contemplate the offices to which they are exalted in their true relations, and discharge them with the pure and lowly affections which become their dignity and sacredness. This it is foreshown is their design and to be their effect. "For thus saith the Lord God, I will remember my covenant with thee in the days of thy youth, and I will establish unto thee an everlasting covenant. Then shalt thou remember thy ways and be ashamed; and thou shalt know that I am the Lord; that thou mayst remember, and be confounded, and never open thy mouth any more because of thy shame, when I am pacified towards thee for all that thou hast done, saith the Lord God," Ezekiel xvi. 59-63.

VIII. The Gentiles are then to go to Jerusalem to worship God, and receive communications of his will. On the erection of the temple and institution of worship in it, "all nations shall flow to it," that they may be taught by him his ways, and walk in his paths; "for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem," Isaiah ii. 3. This is to be in the last days, when he is to judge the nations, and they are to beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks. It is predicted, that "they shall call Jerusalem the throne of the Lord, and all the nations shall be gathered unto it, to the name of the Lord, to Jerusalem; neither shall they walk any more after the imagination of their evil heart;" and that is to be at the time "when the house of Judah shall walk with the house of Israel, and they shall come together out of the land of the north to the land that was given for an inheritance unto their fathers," Jeremiah, chap. iii. 17, 18. The Gentiles are to unite in celebrating the feast of tabernacles. "It shall come to pass that every one that is left of all the nations that came against Jerusalem, shall even go up from year to year to worship the king, the Lord of Hosts, and to keep the feast of tabernacles: and it shall be that whoso will not come up of all the families of the earth unto Jerusalem, to worship the king, the Lord of Hosts, even upon them shall be no rain," Zechariah xiv. 16, 17. And they are thus to go to Jerusalem and worship through the endless round of ages. "For as the new heavens and the new earth, which I will make, shall remain before me, saith the

Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain. And it shall come to pass that from one new moon to another, and from one Sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord," Isaiah lxvi. 22, 23.

Such are the views the Scriptures present of the relation which the Israelites are to sustain to God at their restoration, of the mode in which he is to manifest himself to them, of the ministry they are to exercise, of the sacrifices they are to offer, and of the participation by the Gentiles in their worship. Is it not singular that doubts should be felt as to their meaning? Are there any predictions in the Old Testament that are more clear and specific? Was the original covenant itself with Abraham, in which the land of Canaan was given to him and his seed as a possession, expressed in more unequivocal and emphatic terms? Were any of the revelations made to the ancient prophets, of the assumption of our nature by the Eternal Word, of his death for the redemption of the world, of his resurrection, ascension, and reign on the throne of the universe, more obvious and indubitable in their meaning? We apprehend not; and it seems to us one of the most extraordinary errors that their clear import is rejected, and a different and arbitrary signification ascribed to them. To these plain teachings, however, of the sacred word, several objections are alleged.

1. It is held, that as it is the office of the Spirit to renew the heart, and his influences are to be bestowed during the millennium in larger measures than now, the use of such a vast system of extraordinary means to aid the knowledge and piety of the race will be unnecessary, and detract from the Spirit's work and glory.

This is, however, wholly without authority. In the first place: the assumption that the employment at that period of great and extraordinary means for the sanctification of men, will be unnecessary and inconsistent with the Spirit's glory, is shown to be groundless by their use at the promulgation of the gospel, and in all subsequent ages. How will the employment of means then, disprove the fact, that the Holy Spirit alone renews the mind, or debar him from the glory of that work, any more than it does now? Is it any less certain that he creates all those anew in Christ who now become partakers

of salvation, than it would be if no instruments whatever were employed by him to bring them to a knowledge of their ruin and need of regeneration? Is it made in any degree uncertain that he is now their sanctifier, because he sanctifies them through the truth; or does it diminish his title to the glory of that work? If God appoints the extraordinary means which are to be employed under that new dispensation, will the glory of producing the effects that are wrought by them be any the less his, than it is of the benignant results that now spring from the use of the instruments which he has instituted for that purpose? The objection is manifestly as applicable to the present administration, as it is to that which is then to be exercised; and, instead of accomplishing its object, involves such a detraction from the work and glory of the Holy Spirit, as it ascribes to the views it endeavors to overturn.

In the next place, there are no intimations in the Scriptures that the effusions of the Spirit in that age are to supersede the use of means for the communication of knowledge and excitement of holy affections. Instead, we are expressly fore-shown, that then knowledge, which is the great instrument employed by the Spirit in the work of conviction and sanctification, "shall fill the whole earth as the waters cover the sea." It is then to be a characteristic of his administration, that his law is to be written in their hearts. "Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah; not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, which my covenant they broke, although I was an husband unto them, saith the Lord; but this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel. After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts and write it in their hearts, and will be their God, and they shall be my people; and they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying know the Lord; for they shall all know me from the least of them, unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord, and I will forgive their iniquity, and will remember their sin no more." *Jeremiah* xxxi. 31-34. To put the law in the inward parts and write it in the heart, are metaphorical expressions that indicate

with unusual strength that they are to be raised to a full understanding and abiding realization of the divine law. Like an engraving on a tablet of stone, it is never to be superseded by any other inscription, nor erased ; but it is to remain continually, and be the rule to which all their thoughts and affections are to be conformed. It is to be the means to them therefore, doubtless, of exciting awe, adoration, love, trust, and submission in as much greater degrees than they are now exercised, as their knowledge and sense of God's will are then to transcend the imperfect views which are at present entertained. To suppose that it is not to be the instrument of awakening those holy affections, is to suppose that it is to be intercepted from its natural influence, and be unproductive of any beneficial effect ; which is to contradict both the prediction and our nature.

In the third place, there is no reason to suppose that means will not subserve as important an office then, as they now do, and will not be as necessary to the communication of knowledge and excitement of obedience. Why should they not ? Why should the Spirit disuse them then, any more than he does now ? Why should they then be any less beneficial than they now are ? They will not be any less adapted to our nature. The knowledge of God, of his rights and will, of man's ruin, and of Christ's work as Redeemer, will then be as requisite to right affections and acts as now. It will then be as possible as it now is to acquire and cultivate it by means of God's word and providence, and to learn it from teachers, and as obligatory to employ all the aids which he furnishes for its attainment. Not a solitary consideration, so far as we are aware, yields any support to the assumption that means will not be as useful and essential to the great effects that are then to be produced, as they are to the inferior measures of illumination and sanctification to which believers are now raised.

In the fourth place, the visible manifestations of God's presence and communications of his will, instead of being wholly uninfluential or useless, are to excite fervent desires to visit the scene where he reveals himself, behold his glory, and receive new expressions of his will. When the Lord's house, which is to be the place of his throne for ever, and

over which a cloud is to hover by day, and a pillar of fire by night, is established on the height of Mount Zion, all nations are to flow to it, in order that "*he may teach them his ways, and that they may walk in his paths.*" And they are the natural effects of such direct interpositions. It is to detract from the majesty of the Almighty, and contradict our nature, to suppose that the visible manifestations of his presence, and communications of his will, should make no profound impression on the heart, and awaken no desire to receive the sensible tokens which he grants of his favor, and be made acquainted with his laws and purposes. They are to strike the mind with a power, and excite awe, love, submission, and desires to know and do his will, in degrees proportional to their greatness and grandeur.

The objection is shown to be mistaken also by the fact that all the seasons of an extraordinary effusion of the Spirit of which we have a notice in the sacred volume, were seasons in an equal degree of the use of new and powerful means of instruction and impression, and that the direct effect of his most conspicuous and unusual gifts was the multiplication of those means. Thus, the period when his influences were bestowed on the Israelites in such measures that the whole nation were filled with his fear, was the period of their sojourn in the wilderness when he manifested himself by visible signs, made communications of his will that were directly perceptible by all, and wrought continual miracles to supply and defend them. When he descended on the day of Pentecost, and converted three thousand, his presence was indicated by a rushing mighty wind, flames of fire, and the gift of languages by which the spectators were roused to attention, disarmed of prejudice, and touched with awe, and the truths announced by the apostles, thereby invested with an immeasurably higher power than they would otherwise have possessed. And the whole period of the apostles' ministry, which was distinguished beyond any other by the renovating agency of the Spirit, was signalized in an equal degree by the gift of miraculous powers, and works that were adapted to impress the beholders with a conviction that he was their author, startle them from unbelief, and strike them with wonder and fear. All subsequent seasons of extraordi-

nary effusions of the Spirit have in like manner been seasons of the unusual use of means. At such periods the word is preached with more than ordinary clearness and force, prayer is offered, warnings, appeals, and exhortations are uttered with greater frequency and urgency than usual; and it is in connexion with these subordinate agencies that the Spirit exerts his all-subduing and transforming power, while a discontinuance of them, and cessation of public worship, is speedily followed by a lapse to insensibility and worldliness.

And, finally, the objection is confuted by the consideration that if means are not to be employed at that period in the communication of knowledge and excitement of holy affections, they must take place by mere infusion. But that would be inconsistent with the nature and ends of a moral government. It would make men passive not merely in the reception of religious knowledge, but, at least, in a large degree also in the excitement of the affections, which is impossible to our nature, and incompatible with our responsibility. By the law of our constitution, our emotions and affections are excited by perceptions, thoughts, or feelings, of which we are conscious, that precede the emotions or affections themselves. All mental feelings have an object by which they are awakened, and towards which they are exercised, and must from their nature. They are not isolated or independent acts or processes. That the awe, love, or dread of God may rise within us, he must be the object of thought, and in a relation adapted to excite the emotion that is felt towards him. That humbleness, submission, faith, or penitence, may be felt, an object or consideration must be present to us to awaken it. Without the aid of these means, emotions and affections are physically impossible. They could not be directly infused or generated by the Spirit, without a violation of our nature. They could not be absolutely created in us without having their ground or reason solely in the creative act, instead of the object towards which they are exerted, which would both divest them of all merit, and make us irresponsible for their existence and nature. What would be the value of a love that was called into existence without any consciousness in the agent that the object towards which it was directed, is lovely, and was made the object of the affection because of the views that are formed of

it? But it is in contradiction to the nature of such affections that they should be immediately created in that manner. It is in contradiction to them also that the agent should not have a consciousness that the reason of their being exercised, lies in his views of the objects towards which they are exerted.

The communication of knowledge also to all individuals by mere infusion would be incompatible with the ends of a moral government; as it would debar, at least in a great measure, from the voluntary agencies which it is the aim of such an administration to excite and direct. The design of imposing laws, ordaining rites, giving instructions, and instituting means to ends, is to put men in a condition to act as intelligent agents, display their affections, and render a voluntary obedience. The purpose for which prophets and apostles were inspired was, that the revelations made to them might be communicated to others, and become a permanent means of knowledge and influence. No individual, so far as we know, has ever been inspired except for the purpose of qualifying him to be a teacher of others. But the communication to men universally of all truth that excites and sanctifies, by mere infusion, would preclude the reception of instruction from others, and the voluntary acquisition of knowledge, and excitement of the affections by individuals. It would make them passive in respect to their thoughts of God, of their obligations, and of the work of redemption, and leave them without any emotions but such as rose involuntarily. To read the word of God, to meditate on his government, to study and contemplate his works, would be to use means, to gain knowledge in a different form from immediate infusion. Voluntarily to revolve the truths that had been revealed, contemplate their greatness and majesty, offer acts of homage, or observe commemorative rites, would be to employ means to excite and give intensity to the emotions and affections in a method wholly different from their direct infusion by the Spirit. In whatever relation, then, the objection is considered, it is untenable. Instead of vindicating the Holy Spirit's office, it is in fact inconsistent alike with his word and our nature, gives a false view of his work, and in effect exhibits him as intercepting the race from an intelligent and voluntary obedience, instead of raising them to exalted piety.

2. An objection drawn from the re-institution of sacrifices is far more generally relied on, and is thought by many to confute the whole system of views we have advanced, respecting the restoration and re-adoption of the Israelites. The sacrifices, it is alleged, of the Mosaic dispensation being typical of Christ, were superseded by his death. It is not supposable, therefore, that they are to be re-appointed. The period during which the office they filled was requisite to the faith of the church, has passed. They now not only are not needed, but are wholly inappropriate. But if they are not again to be offered, why should a Levitical priesthood be re-appointed? And if there is neither to be a re-offering of sacrifices, nor a re-institution of Levites in a ministry, why should a temple be re-erected at Jerusalem? And if there is not to be a temple, a peculiar worship, nor a Levitical ministry, why should God manifest himself visibly there? And, if none of these are to take place, what end is to be answered by the restoration of that people?

But the premises of this objection, though indisputable, furnish no ground for the conclusion. The sacrifices of the ancient temple were most certainly typical of Christ's sacrifice, and owe their significance and dignity to that office; and though not abrogated by a formal command at the institution of Christianity, nor immediately discontinued by Jewish converts, were, in fact, superseded by his death. The apostle represents the promise of a new covenant with the house of Israel, under which God is to put his laws into their minds, and write them in their hearts, as showing that the first covenant with them was old, and was, therefore, to be set aside. "In that he saith a new covenant, he hath made the first old; now that which decayeth and waxeth old is ready to vanish away." He represents, also, the ordinances of divine service and a worldly sanctuary as elements of that covenant, and exhibits that sanctuary and its rites as imposed only "till the time of reformation," Heb. viii. 10-13; ix. 1-10.

The fact, however, that these sacrifices were types of Christ who was then to come, and that the peculiar dispensation of which they were a part was set aside by his death and the institution of the church under the gospel, does not prove that the offering of victims in a different relation is not

to be renewed under a future dispensation. That is a question of revelation. If God has announced that they are again to be offered by his appointment, that annunciation is to be received with the same implicit faith and submission as any other. The certainty we have from his word that they were set aside at the introduction of Christianity, no more proves that he does not teach us in the prophecies that they are again to be offered at Christ's second advent, than the certainty we have from his word that they are then to be re-appointed, proves that they were not abrogated at his first coming. Their being offered in one relation under the first dispensation, is no evidence that they cannot be offered in another, under that which is to come. There is no absolute inconsistency between their being presented as types of Christ under the first, and as commemoratives, or memorials of his death, under the other. Has God clearly foreshown that they are again to be offered? We have then as absolute a certainty of it, as of any other future event which he has revealed. Is there a relation in which they may be offered, that, as far as we can see, is in perfect harmony with Christ's work? Are they adapted in an eminent degree to such a commemoration of his death, expression of faith in him, and recognition of all the great truths which his redemption involves, as become his people? And have we reason to believe that the nations, at the period when they are to be re-offered, will peculiarly need some such rite, through which they can acknowledge and commemorate those truths and gain deep impressions of them? Then we have an adequate indication of the reason for which they are to be reinstated. And that such a necessity will exist, that they have such an adaptation, and that their re-appointment is clearly predicted, we have already sufficiently shown. The fact, accordingly, that they are to be re-appointed, yields corroboration to all the other events that are predicted in connexion with them. They are an element in a great system of means, each one of which naturally involves the others. If sacrifices are again to be offered, there must be a ministry to present them. If there are to be sacrifices and a ministry, then there must be a temple; and if a temple, it must be in a designated place. If Jerusalem be that place and the Levites its ministers, then

the Israelites must be restored. If the Israelites are to be restored in order to that ministry, and sacrifices are re-enjoined, then there must be a new revelation ; and if a new revelation and institution of such a dispensation, it will be in harmony with it, that God should visibly manifest himself there, and give signals of his gracious presence, that all the worshippers may behold.

3. The representation that the Most High is then to manifest himself visibly to men, and give them new commands and revelations, is held by many to be a strong objection to these views. It is inconsistent with the dignity of the Eternal Word, it is said, to descend and reign on the throne of the world ; and that no reason can be seen why he should then reveal himself visibly, institute new laws, and receive a direct homage, any more than now, and no ground for the supposition that it could be the means of any beneficial effects. But the question, we reply, whether he is to come in person and reveal himself visibly at Jerusalem, does not turn on its according with our views of what is suitable to his dignity, nor on our being aware of all the beneficial effects that may result from it. Has he clearly announced to us that he is thus to come, reveal himself, and reign ? If, as we have shown, he has, it does not become us to set aside that annunciation and substitute another in its place. It is not our prerogative to determine what measures he shall employ to make himself known to men, and raise them from the thralldom of sin.

But why should it be incompatible with his infinite majesty to descend to the earth and manifest himself to men ? Can it be any more inconsistent with the grandeur of his perfections to reign over them when redeemed from sin and misery, than it was to become incarnate and die for their redemption ? Can it detract from his glory to reign over them here, any more than it does to reign over the spirits of the just made perfect in heaven ? Or why should his visible presence, the communication of his will, a direct homage of him, and the reception from him of sensible manifestations of his favor, be any less adapted to produce a deep realization of his being and majesty, and fill the heart with awe, love, submission, and joy, than they are in the heavenly world ? Or why should

they be any less necessary to raise the race here to a perfect obedience, than they are in heaven to maintain the sanctified there in unspotted holiness? Those who offer this objection surely cannot have realized its import. They cannot have considered what the wants of the race are then to be; what the condition is to which it is to be raised; nor what the impressions are that must naturally be produced by the visible presence of the Almighty, and manifestation of his will.

4. It is objected, also, that the elevation of the Israelites to such an exalted relationship to God would naturally inflame their bigotry and pride, and unfit them for their office, for which meekness and humbleness must be indispensable qualifications.

To this we reply, that God has expressly foreshown that instead of pride, they are to be penetrated with a sense of their unworthiness, and give to his grace the glory of all their peculiar blessings. The loftiness of man is then to be cast down, and the height of men to be brought low, and Jehovah alone exalted: and this full and eternal prostration of their pride is to be accomplished by his interposition in the terrors of his majesty to destroy his enemies, and redeem his people, *Isaiah ii. 10-22.*

5. And, finally, to the representation that all nations are to repair to the house of the Lord at Jerusalem, and all the families of the earth worship there, it is objected that an annual journey there of individuals universally will be physically impossible. It will not be necessary, however, to the verification of the prophecy, that all individuals should go there. The nations may appear by their rulers or representatives. As the prediction that God would gather all nations at Jerusalem to battle at the period of Christ's advent implies—not that all the individuals of all nations will be assembled there, but, as we learn from other passages, only their rulers and armies.

None of these objections, then, are of any validity. These great purposes which God has revealed, instead of being reasonless or inappropriate, are worthy of his perfections, and suited to the ends which he is to accomplish by them, and should be contemplated with adoring acknowledgments by

men ; for they are designed to raise them to the lofty knowledge, and impress them with the deep convictions that are necessary to perfect their sanctification. And with what grandeur they unfold the great scheme of God's administration ! They show that he designs to grant men here such visible manifestations of his presence and tokens of his favor as are now enjoyed by the redeemed in heaven ! Can any other measure be conceived of such adaptation to produce a resistless realization of his being, his greatness, his glory, and his dominion, to touch the heart with awe, submission, and faith, and fill it with love and devotedness ? How will blindness, unbelief, doubt, and indifference vanish for ever at the splendors of his presence ? There will be no atheists, no infidels, no idol worshippers, no scorners then. The first gleam of his diadem, the first accent of his voice, will do more to convict his enemies and annihilate their errors than all that his people could do in a thousand generations. Are there any among his disciples who would not welcome such a method of conquering the world,—who would not be awed and transported at the prospect of such a vision,—who would deem it no accession to their privileges to enjoy his presence here, as the redeemed enjoy it in the skies ?

They show that it is his purpose to enact such new laws and make such new revelations of his will, as will be suited to the altered condition of the world, and the peculiar duties to which men are then to be called. The nations are to go to the temple where he reveals himself, that he may teach them his ways, and that they may walk in his paths, for the law is to go forth from him, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. They will there obtain all the knowledge they need both of him and themselves. They will no longer be lost in uncertainties ; they will no longer be embarrassed with doubt ; they will no longer be misled by false prophets who deliver unauthorized messages in his name ; nor by incompetent and deceitful teachers, who give a false construction of his word ; and from what a crowd of dangers will that deliver them ! What an exhaustless source will it prove of accessions to their wisdom, and aids and excitements to their piety ! How many questions will then be resolved that have in all past ages been in ceaseless debate ? How many sophisms, how many false

theories, how many impious assumptions that have been the means of betraying thousands and millions into delusion and ruin, will then receive an eternal confutation and be swept for ever from the faith of men! How many truths that are now doubted, misconceived, or unknown, will then be unfolded to the universal gaze in their true proportions, and shine with a dazzling splendor!

They show that a system of rites is then to be instituted suited to the wants of the race when sanctified, through which they may publicly testify in the most emphatic manner their recognition and belief of all the great truths on which the work of redemption is founded, rise to a lofty sense of their relations to him, and receive direct and transporting signals of his acceptance of their worship. Is there anything in our condition now that approaches in dignity and grandeur to this? What are our present dim assurances, compared to the tokens he will then give of the reception of his people's homage? What are our joys now in comparison with the raptures the accents of forgiveness from his lips, and welcome to the blessings of his eternal kingdom, will then inspire?

They show that all nations are to share in the benefits of the visible manifestations he is to make of himself at Jerusalem, and the worship that is to be offered there. They are to go there annually to pay their homage, meet the tokens of his acceptance, and obtain instruction respecting their duty and his purposes. And what a beautiful and effective method will that be of maintaining in them a vivid sense of their relations to him, quickening expectation, kindling love, raising them to exalted knowledge, and confirming them in allegiance. Let us suppose a body to proceed from our country to present the homage of this nation, what an interest would it excite in the whole population? How momentous would the embassy be felt to be! What profound realizations would be awakened of the condescension and love of God in meeting in that manner the representatives of his people? What a season of awe, adoration, faith, and thanksgiving would that be at which the sacrifices were to be offered, and the signals of God's favor received! What an epoch would it be of joy, of gratitude, and of adoring celebration, when they returned and made known the fulfilment of

their embassy ; depicted the grandeurs they had witnessed of the Almighty's presence, and announced the assurances they had received of his favor ! And with what awe would the laws he had enjoined be received ! Can any doubt that it would be a season of transcendent interest ; that it would exalt the thoughts and raise the affections, to an elevation immeasurably beyond the loftiest forms of our present experience, and be eminently suited to the wants and dispositions of the race, when universally sanctified ?

And, finally, they show that the race is to dwell on the earth, and continue to be sanctified through an endless round of time. As the new heavens and the new earth are to remain for ever before the Lord, so are the Israelites and Gentiles to remain, and all flesh worship before him from one sabbath to another for ever. How worthy of Christ's interposition does the work of redemption, as thus exhibited, appear ! Instead of being completed, as is generally expected, within a few hundred years, it is to continue through eternal ages ! Instead of being confined to a small number, it is to extend to a vastness and illimitableness, proportional in a measure to the greatness of the condescension and awfulness of the sacrifice by which he accomplished it !

ART. V.—SWEDENBORG'S THEORY OF SYMBOLS AND LANGUAGE.

BY THE EDITOR.

EMANUEL SWEDENBORG, who about the middle of the last century wrote largely on the Apocalypse, and under a claim to extraordinary illumination, advanced a new and peculiar view of symbolic representation, founded not on the nature of the symbols or law of analogy, but partly on an hypothesis, or dogma in respect to the nature of God and creatures, and partly on a theory of a second, or spiritual sense of words.

I. He held that God and each of his creatures and works has both an interior and an exterior nature ; and especially that angels have, like men, a body as well as a spirit, and ani-

mals, vegetables, and all other organized existences, a soul, as well as a body ; and that the body is the out-birth and effect of the soul, in much the same manner as a flower is the out-growth of the plant by which it is borne. He says :

"That nothing exists in nature, but from a spiritual principle, is because there cannot anything be given, unless it has a soul. All *that* is called soul, which is essence ; for what has not in itself an essence, this does not exist, for it is a nonentity, because there is no *esse* from which it is. Thus it is with nature : its essence from which it exists is the spiritual principle, because *this* has in itself the *divine esse*, and also the *divine power of acting, creating, and forming*, as will be seen from what follows. This essence may also be called *soul*, because all that is spiritual *lives* ; and what is alive, when it acts into what is not alive, as into what is natural, *causes* it to have as it were *life*, or to derive somewhat of the *appearance thereof from the living principle* ;—the latter in vegetables—the former in animals. That nothing in nature exists but from what is spiritual, is because no effect is given without a cause. Whatever exists in effect, is from a cause. . . . Thus it is with nature. The singular and most singular things thereof are an effect from a cause which is prior to it, and which is *interior* to it, and which is superior to it, and also is immediately from God ; for a spiritual world is given ; that world is prior, *interior*, and superior to the natural world, whereof everything of the spiritual world is a cause ; and everything of the natural world is an effect. . . . And so it is that nothing in nature exists except from something spiritual, and by it."—Ath. Creed, 94, quoted by Professor Bush, and in respect to which he says :

"If this be well founded we can no longer recognise creation as the immediate product of the divine *fiat*, but as always proceeding *through the spiritual world*, which itself proceeds, *by emanation*, from the Lord himself. All living organisms, whether animal or vegetable, are the elaborations of spiritual essences, which become fixed and sensibly mirrored in material embodiments ; and this fact discloses the true ground of correspondences. . . .

"The essence of a bird, therefore, is a spiritual entity, which becomes a living bird, by being *fixed in*, or clothed with, a material body ; and this entity is from the infinitude of the divine affections and thoughts. In the first bird created there is primarily existing a psychical form, or *spiritual body, which*, by the inflowing of the *divine life*, and by the law which connects matter with spirit, *works out a material body*, corresponding with what we may term the *psychical, or soul body*, and adapted to its uses and ends in the natural world. But with all subse-

quent birds the case is different: here the creation is by *pro-creation*, in which the parent transmits the psychical principle, the interior form; and *this is endowed with the power of gathering around it the earthly elements necessary to the construction of the body of the bird*; the all-pervading life of the divine love meantime flowing in and animating it, and endowing it with the intelligence or instinct appropriate to the peculiar character of its reigning affection. This psychical principle, however, in birds and beasts, unlike that of man, is not immortal, but is dissipated at death."—Letter to Dr. Woods, pp. 58, 59.

II. He held that the relation in which symbols, which are universally perceptible by the senses, and are corporeal, therefore, or the phenomena or effects of what is material, are used as representatives, is that of effects to their interior or spiritual causes, and thence that the things which they represent are universally spiritual. He says:

"It is known, or may be known, that there is a spiritual world, and that there is a natural world. The spiritual world, in its universal sense, is the world where spirits and angels dwell. In a particular sense, there is a spiritual world and a natural world appertaining to every individual man; *his internal man being to him a spiritual world*, but *his external being to him a natural world*. The things which flow in out of the spiritual world, and are *presented in the natural*, are in general *representations*; and so far as they agree together they are correspondences."—Arcana Celestia, 2920. "*That natural things REPRESENT spiritual, and that they correspond together*, may also be known from this consideration: that what is natural cannot possibly have existence, except from a cause prior to itself. This cause is of spiritual origin; and there is nothing natural which doth not thence derive the cause of its existence. Natural forms are effects, nor can they appear as causes, still less as causes of causes, or principles, but they receive their forms according to their use, in the place where they are. Still, however, **THE FORMS OF EFFECTS REPRESENT the things appertaining to their CAUSES**: yea, *these latter things represent those which appertain to their PRINCIPLES*. **Thus all NATURAL things REPRESENT the things appertaining to the SPIRITUAL, to which they CORRESPOND**; and spiritual things, also, represent the things appertaining to the *celestial* from which they are derived," 2991. . . . "From hence it may further appear how all natural forms, both *animate* and *inanimate*, are representative of spiritual and celestial things which are in the Lord's kingdom; that is, that all and single things in nature are representative, according to the *measure and quality of their correspondence*."—A. C. 3002.

"Hence, then, it may appear *what correspondence is*, and whence it is; also *what representation is*, and whence; viz. that *correspondence is* between those things which are of the light of heaven, and of the light of the world; that is, between *those things which are of the internal, or spiritual man*, and *those which are of the external, or natural man*; and that *representation is* whatever exists in the things which are of the light of the world; that is, *whatever exists in the external or natural man*, respectively to those things which are of the light of heaven; that is, which are from the internal, or spiritual man."—A. C. 3226, quoted by Mr. Clissold, Letters to Dr. Whately, pp. 197, 198, and Mr. Bush, Swedenborg Library, pp. 120–124.

Mr. Clissold and Professor Bush present the same views in their statement of Swedenborg's theory of the relation in which symbols are used as representatives.

"Analogy implies, in its primary form, a relation, not between one *natural thing* and another *natural thing*, but between a *natural thing* and a *spiritual thing*, such as the relation of the spirit to the body, or of the spiritual world to the natural. The relation of analogy, therefore, when considered in its strict signification, is not the relation of one natural effect to another, of one natural cause to another, and so forth, but the relation of a *natural effect* to its *spiritual cause*, or the spiritual cause to its natural effect; thus the relation of a *prior* principle to a *posterior*, of a higher to a lower, or *vice versé*. The order of analogy is thus the order presented to us in processes of creation, generation, or production. It is by analogy, in its primary sense, that we interpret the Word of God, and the visible creation in relation to that Word; and by analogy, in its secondary sense, that we interpret the phenomena of visible nature. The foundation of this distinction rests upon the principle that the natural world, with all its secondary causes, is but a world of effects, the spiritual world alone being the world of causes: hence the analogy of the natural world to the spiritual is that of effect to cause, whereas all analogies between one natural thing and another are analogies between one natural effect and another; hence analogy in its secondary, not in its primary sense."—Letter to Dr. Whately, p. 194.

"The doctrine of correspondence, as developed by Swedenborg, is nothing else, in fact, than the relation of *cause and effect*. A smile on the countenance *corresponds* with a particular state or affection of the spirit, simply for the reason, that the interior pleasurable affection is the *cause* of the peculiar conformation of the muscles of the face which we

call a smile. . . . But if this holds in regard to the countenance, why not in regard to the whole body? How can we resist the impression, that the body is elaborated by the soul, and brought into a universal conformity or *correspondence* with its distinguishing powers, or attributes? If so, it is easy to perceive that the hand is not merely a fitting metaphorical emblem of the *power* of the soul, of which it is the executor, but that it is the true *correspondent* of this principle, inasmuch as it is the *power of the soul which causes the hand to exist*. But why shall the principle be admitted as 'having this extent, no more?' Why should it not be conceded as obtaining throughout the whole range of created things? Why not regard it as the all-pervading law of the universe, that *form corresponds with essence*, and as all essence is spirit, that *every material object is the correspondent to some spiritual affection or thought*? . . . We hesitate not to subscribe to Swedenborg's doctrine, that the whole universe is an outbirth from the Deity, every part and portion of which *corresponds to some one of the infinite divine perfections and attributes*, just as *the human body, in whole and in particular, corresponds to the faculties and properties of the human soul*. *The relation in both cases is that of cause and effect, and as the body is the mirror of the soul, so the universe is a mirror of its Author.*"—Professor Bush, Swedenborg Lib., pp. 118, 119.

III. He held that the representative office of the symbols is nothing more than that of the mere words in which they are described, taken in their spiritual sense, and thereby divests them of their peculiar function as symbols, and makes their interpretation turn, not on their nature, but on the laws of a spiritual philology. He says:

"When man's interior sight is opened, which is the sight of his spirit, then there appear the things of another life, which cannot possibly be made visible to the sight of the body. *The visions of the prophets were nothing else.* There are in heaven, as was said above, continual representatives of the Lord and of his kingdom; and there are also significatives, inasmuch that nothing at all exists before the sight of the angels, which is not representative and significative. *Hence are the representatives and significatives of the Word*; for the Word is through heaven from the Lord."—A.C. 1619.

"It may appear surprising to every one, that the *animals* mentioned in the Word, and also those offered in sacrifices, should signify goods and truths, or what is the same, celestial and spiritual, but it is permitted to state in a few words whence it is. In the world of spirits

various representatives are exhibited, and frequently there appear before the eyes of spirits animals, as horses with various trappings, oxen, cows, lambs, and divers other kinds, sometimes such as were never seen on the earth, but are only representatives; *such things were also seen by the Prophets, as they are recorded in the Word, which likewise were from them.* The animals that appear there are representatives of the affections of good and truth, and also of evil and the false: good spirits know perfectly well what they signify, and also collect thence what is the subject of discourse amongst the angels; for the discourse of the angels, when it flows down into the world of spirits, is sometimes thus exhibited in representatives. As, for example, when horses appear, the good spirits know that the discourse of the angels is about things intellectual; when oxen and cows appear, that it is about natural goods; when sheep appear, that it is about rational goods, and about probity; when lambs, that it is about goods still more interior, and about innocence: and so on in other cases. Inasmuch as the men of the most ancient church communicated with spirits and angels, and also had visions and dreams continually, like those of the prophets, hence, as soon as they saw any beast, the idea occurred to them what it signified. From them first arose representatives and significatives, which remained long after their times, and at length were held in such veneration by reason of their antiquity, that *men wrote by mere representatives*, and the books which were not so written were accounted of no value, and if written within the church, of no sanctity. Hence, and from other hidden causes . . . *the books of the Word also were written.*—A.C. 2179. Quoted in Professor Bush's Letter to Dr. Woods, pp. 56, 57.

It is apparent from these and other similar passages that the office of these representative objects is nothing more than that of the nouns, as he interprets them, by which the things they denote are designated. A horse, like the word understanding in his spiritual vocabulary, stands for the human intellect. A lamb, like the word innocence, for mildness and inoffensiveness of temper.

IV. And, finally, he regarded the words of the Scriptures generally, especially of the Old Testament, as having a representative function, like that of symbolic agents, which he denominated their spiritual sense, and thereby denied that the office of symbols is peculiar to them, and exhibited the historical and didactic portions of the sacred word, as subject to the same rules of interpretation as the visions of Daniel and John.

"The angels do not retain the least idea of any *person* mentioned in

the Word, nor consequently of his *name*. What Abram is, what Isaac, and Jacob, they no longer know, forming to themselves an idea from those things which, in the Word, are represented and signified by them. Names and vocal expressions are like earthly coverings, or scabs, which fall off when they enter into heaven. Hence may appear that by names in the Word are signified nothing else than things, concerning which I have frequently discoursed with the angels, and have been fully instructed by them as to the truth. The speech of spirits among themselves, is not a speech of words, but of ideas, such as are those of human thought independent of words."—Ac. 1876,

"The names and vocal expressions" of the Scriptures, then, according to this statement, in their spiritual office, stand for a wholly different set of things from those which they denote in their ordinary and natural use. The name Abram, in its spiritual sense, does not stand for the man Abram, whom it is employed in ordinary speech to denote ; but for that thing in the spiritual world, which, according to Swedenborg's psychological theory, is its correspondent or cause.

"Names, countries, nations, and the like, are not at all known to those who are in heaven ; they have no idea of such things, but of the realities signified thereby. It is from *the internal sense* that the word of the Lord lives, *this sense being like the soul*, of which *the external sense is as it were the body* ; and the case with the Word is as with man, when his body dies then his soul lives ; and when the soul lives, then he is no longer acquainted with the things that relate to the body : thus when he comes amongst the angels, he knows not what the word is in its literal sense, but only what it is in its soul. Such was the man of the ancient church ; were he living at this day on earth, and were he to read the Word, he would not at all remain in the sense of the letter, but it would be as if he did not see it, but only the internal form abstracted from the letter, and this in such a manner as if the letter had no existence. Thus he would dwell on the life or soul of the Word. *The case is the same with every part of the Word, even with the historicals*, which are altogether such as they are related : *but yet not even the minutest word is given, which does not in the internal sense involve arcano*, which never become apparent to those who keep their attention fixed on the historical context."—A. C. 1147, quoted in Mr. Bush's Letter to Dr. Woods, pp. 54, 55.

The spiritual sense then of the words of the Scriptures, is the

sense which in heaven or the world of angels and departed spirits, is attached to the things of which they are here the names. The spiritual sense of the word horse, for example, is the idea which a horse itself represents in the speech of angels: and that is the human understanding. The spiritual meaning of the word lamb, is the idea which a lamb itself represents in heaven, and that is innocence. The office of the spiritual interpretation of words, accordingly, is simply to indicate what it is which the things here literally denoted by the words, represent in the hieroglyphics of heaven.

Such are the great elements of his peculiar views of symbols and a spiritual sense. In respect to the first of these hypotheses, that all the agents and organisms of nature have a formative soul, of which the organism itself or body is the outgrowth or effect, which is the basis of his theory, both of symbolization and a spiritual sense, we remark, first, that it is wholly gratuitous. He offers no proof of it, beyond his own asseveration; and that is a sufficient reason for rejecting it as a guide in the interpretation of the Apocalypse. To take it instead of the revelation which is presented in the prophecy itself of the principles on which its symbols are used, were to reject God's own testimony, and receive a creature's in its place.

Next, his theory of God and creatures is a theory of pantheism, differing in no important element from that of Spinoza, except that it represents all material forms as *emanating* from God, instead of an eternal expansion of the divine essence; and *becoming* material by their emanation, in place of having subsisted eternally as matter. Every material existence, every finite spirit is, on his hypothesis, as much a part of the sole self-existent essence, as the infinite intelligence himself is which the word Jehovah is employed to designate. This monstrous feature sufficiently shows it to be a total and stupendous error.

Thirdly. But apart from that consideration, there are ample proofs of its erroneousness in regard to men, animals, and other organized existences. It is inconsistent with the account given in the Scriptures of the creation of man. God formed his body out of the dust, not out of his soul, and anterior to the creation of his soul, not subsequently.

If our souls are the causes of our bodies, their agency in their formation lies wholly out of the sphere of our knowledge, and can never be proved by us. We have no consciousness of their exerting it. If they are then the formers of our bodies, it must be by powers of which we are wholly unaware, and the exercise of which is not only independent of the will, but unknown to the perceptive faculties. How, then, are their existence and agency to be proved? Not by experience. Not by the testimony of creatures, for they cannot know that they have faculties of which they have no consciousness. If such powers, then, exist, they can be known only by a revelation from God. But we have no such revelation. This theory, then, is not only not proved to be true, but cannot be shown to be such except by an express and miraculous announcement from heaven. How improbable it is that the mind has any such agency in the formation of the body is seen from its absolute ignorance of the structure of a large portion of its minute parts. It has no knowledge whatever of one of a million of its constituents. It knows nothing definitely, for example, of the muscles which it plies every moment. There is nothing in the universe with which it is more totally unacquainted than the organs which it moves in speech. It has no conception of their numbers, their arrangements, their powers, the mode in which they relax and contract, or what the exciting agent is which is transmitted to them whenever it moves them. There probably is not an individual on the earth, except those who have studied anatomy, and not all of those, who have any conception or can form a tolerable conjecture where the muscles are attached by which breathing is accomplished; or who know what it is that causes the air to enter the lungs. It is incredible that the soul is the formative cause of organs of which it is thus utterly unconscious and ignorant; that it gives them existence, determines their nature, numbers, and functions, settles their arrangement, and unites them together, so as to form such a harmonious and living whole, and make them capable of the agencies they exert. To ascribe to it that office, is to invest it with the attributes of the Deity, and make it the contriver and creator of its body, and in absolute unconsciousness both of that work and of the powers by which it accomplishes it! Can

ingenuity frame a proposition involving a more stupendous solecism?

It is in contradiction to innumerable facts in respect to the body of which we have the most ample knowledge. It is absolutely known that it is not an outgrowth of the soul, but that its primary elements are derived from its parents and are material, and that all the subsequent accessions made to it anterior to its birth, are drawn from without. It is equally well known that the particles that are afterwards incorporated with it are introduced from without, and wrought into its frame by the body itself, not the soul. It is the body that eats and drinks, not the spirit. It is the body that elaborates the food it receives, and incorporates it with itself in the form of blood, flesh, muscle, and bone, not the soul. Can anything be more obviously in contradiction to these great facts of which we are thus fully cognisant, than the assertion that the body which is thus formed, is the outbirth or effect of the soul?

It is inconsistent with the phenomena of the body in sickness and under injuries from violence. If the soul be the formative cause of its body, as it ought to be conscious of the momentous office which it fills, so it ought to be able at its will to reproduce any part that is rent away by violence, and renew and restore to health what is impaired by disease. When the limbs of a soldier are carried away by a shot, his spirit, if armed with such creative powers, ought to replace the severed parts by new limbs, and restore his "organism" to its original integrity and vigor, with at least something of the facility with which Satan recovered—

"When Michael's sword, with discontinuous wound
Passed through him, but the ethereal substance closed,
Not long divisible."

But no such self-restoration by the agency of the soul is ever witnessed on the field of slaughter, or on the couch of the diseased. If wounds are healed, if health is recovered by the sick, and strength by the feeble, it is by remedies administered to the body, and from without; not from the independent energies of the mind. Were the soul the cause of its body, it would not be possible from their nature to prove that

the curing of the deaf, blind, and lame, the restoration of the sick, and the resurrection of the dead, ascribed to our Lord and his disciples, were not wrought by the souls of the individuals who were the subjects of those miracles, in place of his Almighty power. If the mind possess and exert the power by which its body is formed, how can it be demonstrated from the nature of such events, that a sudden recovery from disease to health or return from death to life, is not the work of its own powers also, and not of God's? As it would be as adequate to the one effect as the other, there is nothing in the nature of such a restoration, to show that it could not equally well as the other be the work of the soul.

And finally, it is inconsistent with the phenomena of death. If the soul were the cause of its body, and the source of its life and energy, it would seem that the obstruction of its functions, the decay of its powers, and its death, must also be the work of the soul. Disease and death, however, do not have their origin in the mind. It is not by a volition either directly or indirectly, that the body becomes the prey of fever, inflammation, paralysis, debility, and death. Instead, it is in spite of the fervent wishes and endeavors of the spirit, that disease ravages the body, and that it sinks at length under the stroke of death. Arm it with the omnipotence which Swedenborg ascribes to it, and who would ever yield himself to the king of terrors? Who would permit old age to fix its blight upon his aspect; to rob his limbs of strength and elasticity, and blast all his powers with deformity and decay? Who would not perpetuate the freshness and glow of youth, and live on in vigor and activity through eternal years?

To this it will perhaps be objected by the disciples of Swedenborg that he did not regard the soul as consciously exerting the agency which he ascribes to it, in the formation of the body, and that we are reasoning, therefore, against a false construction of his theory, instead of the theory itself. But we reply, in the first place, that it is in our judgment inconsistent with the nature of the soul, that it should be the formative cause of such stupendous effects, without any knowledge of it whatever. In the next place, if it truly possess the power and exert the agency which Swedenborg ascribes to it, it still is as difficult to account for the pheno-

mena of disease, decay, and death, on the supposition that it is unconscious of the office it fills, as it is on the other hypothesis. If there is such a power lodged in it, as to give existence to the body, quicken it with life, and endow it with all its energies, inasmuch as the soul is ever the same in nature and powers, and never by its own will intercepts or diminishes that creating and animating influence, why should it not act with uninterrupted and uniform vigor, and make its effects as abiding and unchangeable as itself? Why should a cause that never intermits its activity, nor diminishes its force, fail to give birth without variation to the same effects? If it act by a natural law, why should not that law be as invariable as other natural laws, by which the action of bodies on the earth is determined? Thirdly, if the soul were the cause of the body in the manner which Swedenborg represents, as it would force us to refer to it, in an equal degree, all the changes of which the body is the subject, it would compel us to regard the soul itself as undergoing changes in its nature and activity that correspond to those that take place in the body, and thence that it suffers disease, decay, and death. Those alterations of the body are, on his theory, as referable to the soul as are its existence and nature; and the discontinuance of activity and life forms as absolute a proof of the discontinuance of the soul as life and activity are of its presence and agency. His theory, therefore, would necessarily lead to the conclusion that the death of the body is a consequence of the death of the soul, or, at least, of that part of it of which the body is the effect. But, fourthly, if it be held that the soul is wholly unconscious of the great effect which Swedenborg ascribes to it, then his theory is of no significance whatever, inasmuch as it furnishes no solution of the mysteries it is designed to explain. By that concession the soul is not the formative cause of the body by virtue of any of its powers of which we have any knowledge. It is not by its intellect, its affections, or its will, that it exerts that creative agency, but by some element of its nature or energy that is wholly unknown to us, and that lies beyond the grasp of our faculties. But that implies that the soul has an active nature that is wholly different from the intelligent and voluntary part of its being and of whose constitution and

attributes we have no knowledge. The theory furnishes no explication, therefore, of the origin and life of our bodies. It leaves us in as absolute ignorance as we were before. It only puts a mere *word*, that, by confession, stands for what is wholly unknown, in *the place of a cause*. It merely transfers the mystery from the body to the soul,—from what lies in a degree within our cognisance, to what is wholly beyond the circle of our vision, or else substitutes an unknown agency of the soul for the agency of God, and calls that “a great psychological fact,”—a grand solution of what on all other theories is an inexplicable mystery! Had he simply said—There is a cause intervening between God and man's body, to which the formation of the latter is to be referred, but of whose nature we have no knowledge whatever, it would have given us as much information, and been as much entitled to be regarded as an explication of the origin of our bodies, as his theory now is. What a consummate delusion to imagine that this particle of pitchy darkness is a great sun of truth, that flashes irradiance over the universe of creatures, and unveils to our full gaze all the otherwise impenetrable arcana of their nature!

To escape this result, his disciples will perhaps allege that as his theory is not founded on consciousness or observation, but was revealed to him, and discloses a fact that is without the scope of our unassisted faculties, its apparent inconsistency with what we know of the soul, is no decisive proof of its erroneousness, and that it must be received on the ground of the divine testimony on which Swedenborg himself received and taught it. To this we reply, that it not only was not in fact revealed to him by the Almighty, but that on his theory of God and creatures, it is absolutely impossible that a revelation should be made to him, or any one else, that could have any more authority than the ordinary opinions or conceptions of any other individual. On his pantheistic hypothesis no visions, imaginings, or ideas of any one creature can be communications from God any more than those of any other. All creatures, according to him, are parts of God, as absolutely as his undivided, or unemanated essence is; and their acts are his, as much as those of his infinite intelligence, will, or power. No one of them, therefore, can any more be a

communication from him, or of any more authority than any other. We are as much entitled to regard our rejections of his theory as the act of God, or the train of considerations in virtue of which we reject it, as a revelation from him, as Swedenborg had for the assertion that it was by a revelation from him that he received his theory. Inasmuch as by his psychological hypothesis, all our acts are but outbirths or phenomena of the one great self-existent essence, why is not our conviction that Swedenborg's theory is not a revelation as decisive a demonstration that it is not, as the opposite conviction which he felt is, that it is a communication from the Almighty?

These considerations then, not to allege a crowd of others that confirm this conclusion—sufficiently show that his psychological theory, which he makes the basis of his scheme of interpretation, is wholly false in respect to our race, and equally so undoubtedly in regard to all other orders of conscious creatures and forms of organized matter.

His theory which he founds on that hypothesis, that in symbolization, the objects which are symbolized are wholly spiritual, and the causes of the symbols by which they are represented, which is the chief peculiarity of his theory of symbolization, is equally groundless and false.

There are but few instances in the symbolic prophecies in which a purely natural or material thing denotes what is purely spiritual. The most conspicuous are the seven lamps before the throne, Rev. iv. 5, the seven eyes of the Lamb, Rev. v. 6, which represent the Spirit of God; incense which denotes acts, Rev. v. 8, and white robes which symbolize a relation, Rev. xix. 8. All the other corporeal or material symbols without exception, we believe, denote corporeal or phenomenal things in this life, that are as natural as they themselves are. We at least know from the interpretations given of them in the prophecies themselves that that is the relation in which a large part of the most important of them are used. Thus the great tree of Nebuchadnezzar's dream is explained as representing himself. The image is interpreted as symbolizing the rulers of the four great kingdoms. The four great beasts and the ram and the goat of Daniel's visions are also explained as representing the rulers of those

empires. The seven golden candlesticks and seven stars of the Apocalypse, the seven-headed wild beast, the woman borne on it, great Babylon, and the waters that surrounded the mountains, are employed as symbols of men in the natural body. In all these instances, the things represented are no more spiritual than the symbols themselves. A cruel, conquering, and slaughtering monarch, is as much a corporeal and natural agent, and acts as exclusively in the sphere of the natural life, as a voracious lion, bear, or leopard, or a domineering goat. A faithful, a usurping, or an apostate ecclesiastic, is as much a corporeal agent, and acts as obviously in the sphere of this life, as a conquering warrior, a bloody usurper, or a cruel oppressor. They both act towards men as corporeal as well as intellectual beings. The difference is that they act towards them in different relations, employ different instruments, and produce different effects. The one employs force, and the menace of force; the other knowledge and persuasion. The one acts chiefly, on the body, the other on the mind. The one kills the body, or inflicts misery by taking away that which is necessary to its sustenance and enjoyment. The other subjects the soul to moral evils, and destroys it, on the one hand, by depriving it of the means that are essential to illumination, sanctification, and eternal life; and on the other, by leading it into sins that involve it in everlasting destruction. The one inflicts a death by which the soul is separated from the body; the other consigns both soul and body to an eternal death.

We have, therefore, in the interpretations that are given us in the prophecies themselves, the most ample demonstration of the error of Swedenborg's theory. On his hypothesis, the great image, in place of denoting dynasties of monarchs, or combinations of rulers, must have symbolized the god, who, according to the Babylonian faith, was enshrined in it. The tree, instead of symbolizing Nebuchadnezzar, must have denoted the formative principle or interior nature that animated it, and of which its trunk, branches, leaves, and fruit were the outgrowth and body; and the wild beasts, in place of representing the monarchs of the four great empires, should have severally represented their own interior nature.

The assumption on which he proceeds in this theory, that

the relation in which the symbols are used, is that simply of effects to their causes, is equally mistaken and contradictory to the prophecy. Nothing can be more certain than that the symbols of the prophecies are not effects of the things which they represent. Nebuchadnezzar was not the cause of the great tree of his dream, by which he was symbolized. The rulers denoted by the great image were not the causes of that image. Most of them were not in existence at the period of the dream in which Nebuchadnezzar beheld it. The wild beasts of Daniel's visions were not effects of the Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman dynasties which they symbolized. Most of the individuals represented by those beasts were not in existence at the time of the vision, and those that were had no agency in causing the visions in which their symbols were seen. The seven churches of Asia and their seven messengers were not the causes of the seven golden candlesticks and seven stars by which they were symbolized. The nationalized hierarchies of the ten kingdoms, which did not exist till ages after, were not the causes of the great harlot and great Babylon, by which they are represented; nor the peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues, the causes of the waters surrounding the seven hills by which they are denoted. His theory is thus in the most open contradiction to the Scriptures, and is certainly, therefore, mistaken.

In exhibiting the relation of effects to their causes, as the basis of symbolization, it rejects the analogy on which they are in fact founded, and is again, by that consideration, shown to be erroneous. In order to an analogy, there must be a correlation between the representative and that which it represents. If the symbol be an agent, that which it denotes must also be an agent. If the symbol exert a representative act, that which the act symbolizes must also be an act. If it produces an effect in some other agent or object, that which that effect symbolizes must be a corresponding effect produced by the represented agent in some analogous agent or object. The relation of the several things represented to one another, as cause, act, effect, and object of action, must correspond to the relations to one another of the things by which they are denoted; otherwise there would be no parallel between them. Such is the principle on which all the symbols of the

prophecies are employed. As the wild beasts of Daniel's visions, for example, are agents, and seize, kill, devour, and trample down inferior animals, which are their natural prey ; so the monarchs whom they represent are agents, who assail, slay, and oppress their fellow men, who are the natural objects of their passions. As the great tree of Nebuchadnezzar's dream yielded shelter and sustenance to the fowls that lodged in its branches, and the beasts that reposed under its shadow ; so Nebuchadnezzar yielded protection to the subjects of his rule, and contributed by his fostering care and bounty to their well-being.

But Swedenborg's theory rejects this correlation, and exhibits the only correspondence that subsists between the symbol and that which it denotes, as that of an effect to its interior or spiritual cause. There is, however, no analogy between an effect and the cause which produces it ; between an act and the agent that exerts it. Instead of a correspondence, they present a contrast. According to him, the wild beasts should have been used as symbols in the relation simply of effects, not as agents devouring inferior animals, or contending with one another ; and the agents represented by them should have been their own interior natures ; the lion soul, the leopard soul, "the formative principle" of the bear, "the formative principle" of the ten-horned monster, the ram and goat "principles,"—not the monarchs of the four great empires ; and the acts ascribed to these principles should have been the outworking and animation of their respective bodies ; not the conquest and slaughter of the population of their own and neighboring kingdoms. As analogy is indisputably the basis of the symbolization of the Scriptures ; and as thence an agent cannot be represented except by an agent, nor a cause except by a cause ; were Swedenborg's assumption correct, that the symbols are all used, and of necessity, in the mere relation of effects, there neither would nor could be any symbolization of a *cause* or *agent*. The correlatives to the symbols would be mere effects, as universally as the symbols themselves were used in that relation. There could be no prediction, therefore, of actors, nor of actions, but only of effects, or events, independently of their causes. No scheme of interpretation can be devised more obviously at

war with the prophecies, or that would more summarily empty them of all their significance.

His theory implies that the symbols, if predictive, foreshow nothing more than that precisely such things as they are, were to exist at a future time. He represents them as employed universally in their relations as mere effects, and as denoting nothing more than their interior and formative causes, in their relations as their causes. "The forms of effects represent the things appertaining to their causes:" "all natural things represent the things appertaining to the spiritual, to which they correspond." If, then, they are *prophetic*, they can foreshow nothing except the existence at a future period of precisely such formative causes, and as the causes of such effects; and, therefore, that such effects as they themselves were, were to exist at a subsequent period in our world. But that is wholly at war with the office ascribed to the symbols in the prophecies themselves. Nebuchadnezzar's great image and tree, and Daniel's great beasts, are there interpreted as denoting *men* and *monarchs*; not an image, a tree, a winged lion, a bear, a winged leopard, a monster with ten horns, a ram of two horns, and a goat of four heads, precisely like themselves. The candlesticks and stars, and the wild beast, the woman borne on it, and seated before the seven hills, and the waters, are explained by the angel as symbolizing *human beings*; not a wild beast of seven heads and ten horns, a woman, and a flood of waters, such as they themselves were. This branch of his system, which is founded on his psychological theory, and constitutes his great law of interpretation, is indisputably, therefore, erroneous, and leads universally to the most false and absurd results.

His theory that the representative office of symbols is nothing more than that of the words by which they are designated, taken in the spiritual sense he ascribes to them, is equally erroneous.

In the first place, the spiritual sense which he attributes to the names of the symbols is wholly different from the import which the prophecies themselves ascribe to them, and inconsistent with the analogy on which they are employed. Thus he exhibits waters in the Apocalypse as signifying "the truths of faith."—Apoc. Exp. 71. But they are explained by the

angel, chap. xvii. 15, as denoting "peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues." He represents white robes as signifying "divine truths from the Lord and protection," Apoc. Exp. 395. They are interpreted in the Apocalypse as denoting "the righteousnesses of saints." His representation of the horsemen of the first three seals, as symbolizing the Scriptures or Word of God, is in violation of the analogy on which symbolization is founded. There is no correlation between a horseman and the Scriptures: the one is an agent, the other is but an instrument. The one exerts acts, the other is only an unconscious means by which effects are produced by or in intelligent agents. The Scriptures cannot be exhibited as an agent voluntarily producing effects, except by a metaphor. The correlative of the horseman is a real agent who voluntarily exerts acts, and produces effects that are as suitable to his nature and sphere of agency, as those of the horseman himself are to his. Swedenborg's theory is thus at open war with the express interpretation of the symbols given in the Apocalypse, and in contradiction to the principles on which they are founded.

Next: the office of the symbols is wholly unlike that of the names by which they are designated. Their names are employed simply to denote the agents and objects to which they are appropriated. The word lion denotes the animal of which it is the peculiar name; the word leopard, the animal of which that is the proper name. Their whole function terminates there. They are not descriptive of the nature of those animals, nor of the acts they are accustomed to exert. If their natures and modes of life are to be described, other terms and of a wholly different meaning are requisite. But when a lion itself, or a leopard, is used as a symbol, it denotes a wholly different thing from a creature of its own nature and habits. Its correlative is an agent of a different species, instead of its own; and a human being, therefore, in place of a mere animal; and the correlative of its acts are the acts of a human being, prompted by a resembling passion towards fellow beings, the usual objects of the ferocious dispositions of men.

Thirdly. His theory disregards the differences of the symbolic from the other Scriptures, and exhibits them all as

equally representative. All corporeal things in the histories and verbal prophecies of the Old Testament, that might be used as symbols, it interprets as such as much as those that are employed in Daniel and John. The things universally denoted by the nouns it treats as representative, whether they are exhibited in vision, or persons, animals, or inanimate objects mentioned in the narrative of actions and events. But that is to invest all the objects of the other Scriptures with the office that is peculiar to symbols, which is not only wholly without authority from them, but inconsistent with their clearest representations, and contradictory, as we shall next show, to the laws of language itself.

His theory of a spiritual sense is in like manner a mere hypothesis, without any just foundation, inconsistent with the nature of language, and in every relation mistaken and preposterous.

The words of the Scriptures neither have a spiritual sense in distinction from their literal and metaphorical meanings, nor is such a sense possible. The import of the words of our language and all others, is wholly conventional, and has no existence except in usage. Vocal words are utterances expressive of the thoughts and emotions of the utterer. There are no words except such as are spoken, and they have no meaning, except that which they are employed to express, and which custom assigns them. Written and printed words are mere representatives of spoken words, and have no meaning except that of the vocal words which they represent. But spoken and printed words have no meanings by usage, but such as are either literal or figurative. If they are nouns, they are either the proper names of the things which they are employed to denote, or else the names of other things transferred to them, in order to indicate that the things to which they are transferred, in some respect, resemble those from which they are metaphorically named. Thus, man is Judah's proper name as an agent, or the name that literally denotes his nature, in distinction from other creatures. If another noun is employed to describe him, which implies that he has a different nature, such as "a lion's whelp," it is transferred to him from that animal which it literally denotes, in order to indicate that Judah resembled it in nobleness, fearlessness,

ferocity, or some other quality. If the words are *verbs* and employed in ascribing actions to agents, they universally ascribe to them actions that are appropriate to their nature, and are used, therefore, in their literal sense; or else impute to them actions that are not proper to them, but either peculiar to some other class of agents, or else to agents of their own nature acting in a different sphere, and in order to indicate that their acts resemble those that are ascribed to them. Thus, when men or animals that move on their feet are said to walk, the verb ascribes to them an act which they exert, and is used literally; but when a boat is said to walk the water, the verb ascribes to it an act which it does not in fact exert, in order to point out a resemblance which the buoyancy, ease, and regularity of its motion, present to walking, and is used metaphorically. On the other hand, when a critic is said to dissect or cut up an author, although the act ascribed to him is suited to his nature, yet he is exhibited as exerting it not on the author's body, which is its natural object, but on his mind or thoughts, which are not its proper object, and it is used by a figure; and so in respect to all other words. All their uses are of one or the other of these species. The same term, indeed, often has more than one literal and more than one figurative meaning, but there is no one that has a sense that is not of one or the other of these classes. And such, from the office of words, must of necessity be the fact. All names of things must either be their proper names, and employed literally to denote them, or else names that are not proper to them, but are transferred from some other things, of which they are the proper and literal names. There can, by the terms, be no third class. All words that ascribe acts to agents, must ascribe to them acts that are proper to them, and which they actually exert, or are supposed to exert, or else acts that are not proper to them, but peculiar to a different class of agents, or that at least are not proper to them in the spheres in which they are represented as acting, and be used, therefore, metaphorically. There can be no third species ascribed to them. And all words that ascribe qualities or conditions to agents or objects, ascribe to them qualities and conditions that truly belong, or are supposed to belong to them, and are, therefore, used lite-

rally ; or else qualities and conditions that do not truly belong to them, but are peculiar to other agents or objects, and are used, therefore, metaphorically. There is no third class.

Swedenborg's theory, therefore, of a spiritual sense of the words of Scripture, additional to their literal and metaphorical meanings, and diverse from them, is demonstrably erroneous. It imputes to them what not only does not, but what cannot exist. It is no more within the compass of possibility that words should have a third meaning, diverse from their literal and figurative import, than it is that an angle should be formed by more than two lines, or a triangle by more than three. That such a spiritual sense is wholly unknown to usage—which is the only origin of meanings, and proof of their existence—and would never be devised, or discovered by men, Swedenborg himself was fully aware, as he represents it as lying beyond the reach of our unassisted faculties, and as made known to him and others only by express revelation. "Unless these things had been revealed to some one, the *internal contents* of the revelation must have remained hidden and unknown, forasmuch as they principally treat of such things as were to take place in the spiritual world."—Ap. Ex. 392.

His theory of a spiritual sense is in fact, therefore, not a theory of a third sense of the words of Scripture, diverse from their literal and figurative senses, which have their origin in convention and usage ; but instead is simply the theory that *the things* which those words in their literal use here denote, are in the angelic world representative of their celestial spiritual causes. Thus the word man properly denotes a human being consisting of soul and body ; but that complex being in the angelic world denotes the celestial spiritual causes of which man is the effect, which, according to Swedenborg, are divine wisdom and love. The spiritual sense of words is thus no meaning whatever of *the words*, but a meaning attached in the angelic world to the things which the words are in human usage employed to signify, and representative to them of the great attributes which Swedenborg supposed are concerned in their production and manifested in their nature ! Such is the whole amount of the spiritual sense, to which he and his followers ascribe so sublime a significance !

What merer shadow was ever invested with the name of a great reality! If it were true, it is not of the least importance. It clears up no difficulty. It gives no information whatever in regard to the meaning of the Scriptures. It adds nothing to our knowledge of the nature of heavenly things. It merely teaches that the things which we represent to one another by words, are by the angels used as representatives of different and higher things, such as the attributes and acts of God! But what is that to us? Is it of any more significance;—does it yield any more important information, than a declaration would, that the angels use our words themselves to denote a different set of things; that they employ Egyptian hieroglyphs in place of words; or that they express themselves to one another by mere modifications of the countenance and gestures? No delusion can be greater than to suppose that such a revelation could be of any essential importance, or subserve any other end than the gratification of a vague curiosity.

And finally, the proof that his theory of symbolization is erroneous, is completed by the contrariety of the interpretations, which he gives under its guidance, to those which are presented in the prophecies themselves. Thus he represents animals as denoting affections of good and truth, and evil and false.—A. C. 21, 79. But all animals used as symbols in the Scriptures that are interpreted, are explained as representatives of men; as Daniel's six beasts that denoted monarchs, and the fowls that lodged on the great tree, and the beasts that gathered under it, that represented Nebuchadnezzar's subjects. He explains waters as signifying the truths of faith. They are expounded in the Apocalypse as the symbols of peoples and multitudes. He interprets white robes as denoting "divine truth from the Lord, and protection." They are exhibited in the Apocalypse as symbolizing the righteousnesses of saints. He was thus led by his principles to constructions in open contradiction to those which the Revealer himself has given. There is not a single explication in the prophecy itself, which he has not thus set aside and substituted another in its place. Such is the extraordinary system put forth by that writer under a pretence of inspiration,—at war alike with the Scriptures, with analogy, and with the laws of language. Our readers will see from this brief statement how urgent the

motives are by which its disciples are prompted to controvert other views of the subject. If overturned, the whole fabric of Swedenborgianism falls with it.

ART. VI.—NINEVEH AND ITS REMAINS, with an Account of a Visit to the Chaldean Christians of Kurdistan, and the Yezidis, or Devil-worshippers; and an Inquiry into the Manners and Arts of the Ancient Assyrians. By Austin Henry Layard, Esq., D.C.L. In two volumes. London: John Murray. 1849.

A MORE effective exemplification of the vanity of human greatness the world has perhaps never seen, than is presented in the oblivion into which for ages the ambitious conquerors and magnificent monarchs of the ancient nations have sunk. No others of the long train who have risen to power and grandeur, resorted to such extraordinary expedients to perpetuate their fame. In Egypt they erected massy temples, reared pyramids, and excavated sepulchres, and filled them with representations and records of their achievements. In Assyria and Babylonia they founded splendid cities, built vast palaces, and raised structures to the skies for the residence of their deities, engraved their names and histories on their walls, and peopled them with sculptures commemorative of their victories, and with symbols of the gods to whom they paid their homage. Yet none who have ever obtained distinction have been more completely swept from the knowledge of men. Their dynasties were soon overthrown; the nations over which they reigned exterminated, or lost in those by which they were conquered; their cities, palaces, and temples, burned, and the monuments that remained buried beneath ruins; and the language of their records lost, so that they ceased to answer the end for which they were designed. What could be more improbable to the builders of the great pyramids of Egypt, or more wholly defeat their object, than that though their massy structures were to survive through thousands of years, yet no one, after a short

period, should either know the names of their founders, their date, or the purpose of their erection; and that the only information respecting them should be obtained by penetrating into their recesses, conjecturing the import of their monuments, and plundering them of their relics? Until taught from heaven, what could have seemed more incredible to Nebuchadnezzar, or cross to his expectations of eternal greatness, than that the vast city he had erected and filled with apparently imperishable structures, should, in a brief period, become a waste of ruins, and its very site for ages be forgotten and undiscoverable! The ambitious endeavors of the great monarchs of Assyria to transmit memorials of their grandeur to all after time, have been equally defeated. Struck down by their Babylonian rivals, their cities sacked, their palaces and temples burned, they soon became to the world as though they had never been. Age after age passed without a knowledge even of the places where they stood, or a suspicion that beneath their ruins relics lay of their greatness and the arts with which they were adorned. After more than two thousand years of silence and forgetfulness have passed, strangers from regions and nations that were then unknown, search amidst their ashes, and find vast remains of their massy structures, in a measure unimpaired by the lapse of time, with kings, warriors, battle scenes, and gods, graven in marble, and as fresh almost as when they came from the hand of the artist, and indicating in a degree their religion, their manners, and their history. The giant deities, stationed at their thresholds to guard them against the destroyer, in place of exerting the omnipotence that was expected of them, were, like their sculptured worshippers, reduced to dust by the fires by which their temples were devoured, or owed their preservation to the ruins under which they were interred.

The first discovery of these remains was made in 1842, at Khorsabad, by M. Botta, French consul at Mosul. He had made some excavations at Kouyunjik, nearly opposite to Mosul, without success, and was induced by information obtained from a peasant to make a trial at Khorsabad, fourteen miles N.N. East on a tributary to the Tigris, where there are extensive ruins. On descending a few feet from the surface he came to the top of a wall formed of sculptured

slabs of gypsum, and found, on extending the excavation, that he had entered a vast building consisting of numerous apartments constructed of such stones graven with representations of warriors, battles, and sieges. The style of the sculptures, the dresses of the figures, and their arms, were novel, and left him in doubt of their epoch, and the people by whom they were wrought. The inscriptions that were intermixed with them, were in the cuneiform or arrow-headed character, and uninterpretable. The structure had been destroyed by fire, and many of the slabs so heated that on exposure to the air they almost immediately fell to pieces. Of the most valuable of those, however, drawings were taken. The search was continued, till the whole structure was explored, and it resulted in the discovery of many fine specimens of sculpture, and a large collection of inscriptions, which were transmitted to France. Mr. Layard, who had already been at Mosul and become acquainted with M. Botta, was apprised by him of these discoveries, and the desire revived which he had before felt to make a similar examination of the ruins at Nimroud. Sir Stratford Canning, residing at Constantinople, undertook to defray the expense of an experiment, and Mr. Layard proceeded from that capital to Mosul in October, 1845, and in the following month began his excavations at Nimroud, on the north side of the Tigris, about thirty miles below Mosul, and met with immediate success. He says,

“The absence of all vegetation enabled me to examine the remains with which the mound was covered. Broken pottery and fragments of bricks, both inscribed with the cuneiform character, were strewed on all sides. The Arabs watched my motions as I wandered to and fro, and observed with surprise the objects I had collected. They joined, however, in the search, and brought me handfuls of rubbish, amongst which I found with joy the fragment of a bas-relief. The material on which it was carved had been exposed to fire, and resembled in every respect the burnt gypsum of Khorsabad. Convinced from this discovery that sculptured remains must still exist in some part of the mound, I sought for a place where excavations might be commenced with a prospect of success. Awad led me to a piece of alabaster which appeared above the soil. We could not remove it, and on digging downward, it proved to be the upper part of a large slab. I ordered all the men to work around it, and they shortly uncovered a second slab

to which it had been united. Continuing in the same line, we came upon a third; and in the course of the morning laid bare ten more, the whole forming a square, with one stone missing at the north-west corner. It was evident that the top of a chamber had been discovered, and that the gap was its entrance. I now dug down the face of the stones, and an inscription in the cuneiform character was soon exposed to view. Similar inscriptions occupied the centre of all the slabs, which were in the best preservation, but plain, with the exception of the writing. Leaving half the workmen to uncover as much of the chamber as possible, I led the rest to the south-west corner of the mound, where I had observed many fragments of calcined alabaster. I dug at once into the side of the mound, which was here very steep, and thus avoided the necessity of removing much earth. We came almost immediately to a wall bearing inscriptions in the same character as those already described, but the slabs had evidently been exposed to intense heat, were cracked in every part, and reduced to lime, threatened to fall to pieces as soon as uncovered. Night interrupted our labors."—Vol. i. pp. 26, 27.

On clearing the chamber first opened, he found it formed of slabs about eight feet high and from four to six in breadth, set upright and closely fitted to each other. It was paved with slabs of smaller size, that were also covered with inscriptions. In the earth and ashes with which it was filled several ivory ornaments were found that were wrought with elegance. On continuing the excavations at the south-west corner of the mound, they soon reached a wall that was faced with sculptures.

"After removing a large accumulation of earth mixed with charcoal, charred wood, and broken bricks, we reached the top of a wall. In order to ascertain whether we were in the inside of a chamber, the workmen were directed to clear away the earth from both sides of the slabs. The south face was unsculptured, but the first stroke of the pick on the opposite side disclosed the top of a bas-relief. The Arabs were no less excited than myself by the discovery, and, working until dusk, completely exposed to view two slabs.

"On each slab were two bas-reliefs, separated from each other by a band of inscriptions. The subject in the upper part of the first was a battle scene. Two chariots, drawn by horses richly caparisoned, were each occupied by a group of three warriors; the principal person in both groups was beardless, and evidently an eunuch. He was clothed in a complete suit of mail, and wore a pointed helmet on his head, from

the sides of which fell lappets covering the ears, the lower part of the face, and the neck. The left hand, the arm being extended, grasped a bow at full stretch, whilst the right, drawing the string to the ear, held an arrow ready to be discharged. A second warrior urged, with the reins and whip, to the utmost of their speed, three horses, in their galloping over the plain. A third, without helmet and with flowing hair and beard, held a shield for the defence of the principal figure. Under the horses' feet, and scattered about the relief, were the conquered, wounded by the arrows of the conquerors. I was surprised at the elegance and richness of the ornaments, the faithful and delicate delineation of the limbs and muscles, both in the men and horses, and the knowledge of art displayed in the grouping of the figures, and the general composition. In all these respects, as well as in costume, this sculpture appeared to me not only to differ, but to surpass the bas-reliefs at Khorsabad. I traced also in the character and in the inscription a marked difference from that found on the monuments discovered by M. Botta. Unfortunately, the slab had been exposed to fire, and was so much injured that its removal was hopeless. The edges, moreover, had been cut away, to the injury of some of the figures and of the inscription; and as the next slab was reversed, it was evident that both had been brought from another building.

"The lower bas-relief on the second represented the siege of a castle or walled city. At the left were two warriors, each holding a circular shield in one hand, and a short sword in the other. A tunic, confined at the waist with a girdle, and ornamented with a fringe of tassels, descended to the knee; a quiver was suspended at the back, and the left arm passed through the bow, which was thus kept at the side ready for use. They wore pointed helmets. The foremost warrior was ascending a ladder placed against the castle. Three turrets with angular battlements rose above walls similarly ornamented. In the first turret were two warriors, the one in the act of discharging an arrow, the other raising a shield and casting a stone at the assailants from above. The besieged were distinguished by their head-dress—a simple fillet binding the hair above the temples. Their beards at the same time were less carefully arranged. The second turret was occupied by a slinger preparing his sling. In the interval between this turret and the third, and over an arched gateway, was a female figure, known by her long hair descending upon the shoulders in curls. Her right hand was elevated, as if in the act of asking for mercy. In the third turret were two more of the besieged, the first discharging an arrow, the second elevating his shield, and endeavoring with a torch to burn an instrument resembling a catapult, which had been brought up to the

wall by an inclined plane built on a heap of boughs and rubbish. These figures were out of all proportion when compared with the size of the building. A warrior with a pointed helmet, bending on one knee, and holding a torch in his right hand, was setting fire to the gate of the castle, whilst another in full armor was forcing the stones from the foundation with an instrument resembling a blunt spear. Between them was a wounded man falling headlong from the walls."—Vol. i. pp. 40–42.

The lower bas-relief of this stone represented a woman standing on the walls of a castle, tearing her hair, to show her grief. Beneath, by the side of a stream, figured by undulating lines, sat a fisherman, drawing from the water a fish he had caught. He soon after found sculptures of far greater size, and of a different character. Among them, a crouching lion, in basalt, that appeared to have been long exposed to the atmosphere, a pair of gigantic winged bulls, the upper parts of which had been destroyed, and a pair of small winged lions, the heads and wings of which were also defaced, and a human figure of gigantic size. He was at this period interrupted in his work for a short time by the pasha. On resuming it, in the S. W. palace, he met with numerous bas-reliefs of still greater interest—kings, warriors, captives, and other personages, carved with great elegance. Among them were two figures, above the natural size, in bas-relief, and exhibiting all the freshness of a recent work.

"The ornaments delicately graven on the robes, the tassels and fringes, the bracelets and armlets, the elaborate curls of the hair and beard, were all entire. The figures were back to back, and furnished with wings. They appeared to represent divinities, presiding over the seasons, or over particular religious ceremonies. The one whose face was turned to the east carried a fallow deer on his right arm, and in his left a branch, bearing fine flowers. Around his temples was a fillet, adorned in front with a rosette. The other held a square vessel or basket in the left hand, and an object resembling a fir cone in the right. On his head he wore a rounded cap, at the base of which was a horn. The garments of both, consisting of a stole falling from the shoulders to the ankles, and a short tunic underneath, descending to the knee, were richly and tastefully decorated with embroideries and fringes, whilst the hair and beard were arranged with study and art. The limbs were

delineated with peculiar accuracy, and the muscles and bones faithfully though somewhat too strongly marked. An inscription ran across the sculpture.

"To the west of this slab, and fitting to it, was a corner-stone, ornamented with flower and scroll-work, tastefully arranged, and resembling those of the injured tablet in the S. W. building. I saw at once whence many of the sculptures employed in the construction of that edifice had been brought, and was satisfied that I had at length discovered the earliest palace of Nimroud.

"The corner-stone led me to a figure of a singular form. A human body clothed in robes similar to those of the winged men on the previous slab, was surmounted by the head of an eagle or of a vulture. The carved beak, of considerable length, was half open, and displayed a narrow pointed tongue, which was still colored with red paint. On the shoulders fell the usual curled and bushy hair of the Assyrian images, and a comb of feathers rose on the top of the head. Two wings sprang from the back, and in either hand was the square vessel and fir cone.

"On all these figures paint could be faintly distinguished, particularly on the hair, beard, eyes, and sandals. The slabs on which they were sculptured, had sustained no injury, and could be without difficulty packed and moved to any distance. There could no longer be any doubt that they formed part of a chamber, and that to explore it completely, I had only to continue along the wall, now partly uncovered."

—Vol. i. pp. 64, 65.

This figure, with the exception of the wings and drapery, resembles the hawk-headed deity of the Egyptians, and with the winged bulls, sphinxes, and several other representations, indicates that the designs were derived from that people. The next objects found beneath the ruins were still more important.

"The following morning disclosed an enormous human head and the upper part of a figure, sculptured in full out of the alabaster of the country. The remainder was still buried in the earth. I saw at once that the head must belong to a winged lion or a bull, similar to those of Khorsabad and Persepolis. The expression was calm, yet majestic, and the outline of the features showed a freedom and knowledge of art scarcely to be looked for in so remote a period. The cap had three horns, and unlike that of the human-headed bulls hitherto found in Assyria, was rounded and without ornament at the top."—Vol. i. p. 65.

Assuming that this was one of a pair, he dug for the mate, and found it in a few hours at the distance of a few feet. The discovery of these figures excited and alarmed the Arabs in a high degree. The first was supposed to be the image of Nimrod, and a report was spread at Mosul that the mighty hunter had himself again appeared in his ancient capital. The commotion was so great that the pasha desired Mr. Layard to suspend his excavations till the agitation should subside. On re-commencing his search, he found a second pair of winged human-headed lions, differing from those previously discovered in form, the human shape being continued to the waist and furnished with arms. Each figure carried in one hand a goat or stag, and in the other which hung by the side a branch with three flowers. They were stationed at a northern entrance into the chamber, at the southern portal of which the other lions stood.

"They were entire, about twelve feet in height, and the same number in length. The body and limbs were admirably portrayed; the muscles and bones, though strongly developed, to display the strength of the animal, showed at the same time a correct knowledge of its anatomy and form. Expanded wings sprang from the shoulder and spread over the back; a knotted girdle, ending in tassels, encircled the loins. These sculptures, forming an entrance, were partly in full and partly in relief. The head and fore-part, facing the chamber, were in full; but only one side of the rest of the slab was sculptured, the back being placed against the wall of sun-dried bricks. That the spectators might have both a front and side view of the figures, they were furnished with five legs; two were carved on the end of the slab to face the chamber, and three on the side. The relief of the body and three limbs was high and bold, and the slab was covered, in all parts not occupied by the image, with inscriptions in the cuneiform character. These magnificent specimens of Assyrian art were in perfect preservation; the most minute lines in the details of the wings and in the ornaments had been retained with their original freshness. Not a character was wanting in the inscriptions."—Vol. i. p. 69.

In some of the views with which Mr. Layard contemplates these extraordinary figures, we cannot concur. Shapes of this kind, formed by the union of parts taken from different orders of corporeal beings, are undoubtedly eminently adapted

to represent an order of *creatures*, in whom the powers and characteristics denoted by these parts are conjoined in high degrees; and they were employed for that purpose in the Israelitish tabernacle in the temple, and in the visions of the prophets. But they have no adaptation to denote a purely spiritual deity. If representatives of a god, they would imply that he had assumed a corporeal nature. He says,

“I used to contemplate for hours these mysterious emblems, and muse over their intent and history. What more noble forms could have ushered the people into the temple of their gods? What more sublime images could have been borrowed from nature, by men who sought, unaided by the light of revealed religion, to embody their conception of the wisdom, power, and ubiquity of a Supreme Being? They could find no better type of intellect and knowledge than the head of man; of strength, than the body of the lion; of rapidity of motion, than the wings of the bird. These winged, human-headed lions, were not idle creations, the offspring of mere fancy; their meaning was written upon them. They had awed and instructed races which flourished three thousand years ago. Through the portals which they guarded, kings, priests, and warriors had borne sacrifices to their altars, long before the wisdom of the east had penetrated to Greece, and had furnished its mythology with symbols long recognised by the Assyrian votaries. They may have been buried, and their existence may have been unknown, before the foundation of the eternal city. For twenty-five centuries they had been hidden from the eyes of man, and they now stood forth once more in their ancient majesty. But how changed was the scene around them! The luxury and civilization of a mighty nation had given place to the wretchedness and ignorance of a few half barbarous tribes. The wealth of temples and the riches of great cities had been succeeded by ruins and shapeless heaps of earth. Above the spacious hall in which they stood, the plough had passed, and the corn now waved.”—Vol. i. pp. 69, 70.

But what a demonstration the ignominious burial and oblivion to which they had thus for ages been consigned presents, that the beings whom they represented were not deities! What a proof, the extermination of the monarchs and nations that relied on them for protection, and conversion of the lands that were under their guardianship to a vast solitude of ruin and barrenness, form, that they had not the powers that were ascribed to them! They were regarded by their wor-

shippers as real deities, and expected to perpetuate the prosperity and grandeur of their adorers. Their burial beneath the ruins of their temples and palaces was a most effective confutation of that faith. Had that been the express design of the Almighty in appointing their overthrow, what other form could he have chosen more suited to confound their worshippers, and show to all succeeding generations the folly of ascribing the honors of deity to such idols, than to cause the most gigantic and noble of them to be interred beneath the ashes and relics of the structures in which they were stationed, and lie there in helplessness and concealment through thousands of years, while the cities and lands of which they were held to be the gods were swept of their population, and converted to a waste? Can any destiny be conceived more shameful for gods? Is there any condition to which they could be reduced more demonstrative that they have neither ubiquity, intelligence, nor power? This is the great lesson doubtless their preservation in such an ignominious form is designed to teach, and it is now almost as much needed by the world, as it was then. A large share of the nations of Asia, Africa, and even Europe, still pay their adoration to images as powerless and senseless as these gypsum deities of the Assyrians. There are millions even in the churches of Assyria, Asia Minor, and the western kingdoms, who would do well to listen to the great truth which these creature gods proclaim, that, after a slumber in the dust for so many ages, now owe their resurrection, not to their own powers, but to the pickaxe and spade of a foreigner of whose race and country neither they nor their adorers ever heard.

He subsequently disinterred a winged human-headed bull of limestone that had fallen, and beneath which was found a group of copper lions forming a regular series from an inch to a foot in length, with a ring attached to their backs, as though they were designed for weights. On a slab near by is a representation of a castle built by a river; one tower is occupied by an armed man; two others by females. Several warriors attempting to escape are swimming across the stream on inflated skins, in the mode now practised by the Arabs on the rivers of Assyria, excepting that in the bas-relief the swimmers are exhibited as holding the aperture in their mouths,

through which the air is introduced. Another pierced by arrows, discharged by two warriors kneeling on the bank, is struggling, without the support of a skin, against the current. On the next slab is a representation of the siege of a city with a battering-ram and moveable tower. The lower part of each of these is occupied by a king receiving prisoners brought before him by his vizir. Above their heads are vases, dresses, and various objects representing the spoil taken by the victors. On others there are delineations of bull and lion hunts, executed with great spirit. Scores and hundreds of slabs graven with these and similar figures and scenes, were uncovered. As he advanced in his excavations he was able to determine the dimensions of the apartments of which these sculptures formed the face. They are from twenty to one hundred and sixty feet in length, and from ten to thirty-five in breadth. After proceeding in his researches as far as the means furnished by Sir Stratford Canning would allow, he packed such of the sculptures as he designed to remove, and sent them down the river to Busrah, to be transported by the way of Bombay to England.

To occupy the time that was to pass before he could receive the means of continuing his labors, and to recruit his health, which had suffered from excessive heat and exertion, he made an excursion to the mountains north of Mosul occupied by the Nestorians who escaped massacre by the Kurdish chief, Beder Khan Bey, in 1843. Though a large proportion of those then spared and sold into slavery were afterwards, through the interposition of Sir Stratford Canning with the Sultan, recovered and restored to their country, their number is still small, several of their villages remaining nearly depopulated, and their condition insecure. He represents the region as highly picturesque.

"The country through which we passed after leaving Asheetha can scarcely be surpassed in the beauty and sublimity of its scenery. The patches of land on the declivities of the mountains were cultivated with extraordinary skill and care. I never saw greater proofs of industry. Our mules, however, were drawn over places almost inaccessible to men on foot; but we forgot the toils and dangers of the way in gazing upon the magnificent prospect before us. . . .

"I had been expected at Zaweetha, and before we entered the first

gardens of the village, a party of girls, bearing baskets of fruit, advanced to meet me. Their hair neatly platted and adorned with flowers fell down their backs. On their heads they wore colored handkerchiefs loosely tied, or an embroidered cap. Many were pretty, and the prettiest was a liberated slave, who had been for some time under the protection of Mrs. Rassam, the lady of the English Consul at Mosul. . . The girls were followed by the Rais and the principal inhabitants, and I was led by them into the village.

"The Rais of Zaweetha had fortunately rendered some service to Beder Khan Bey, and on the invasion of Tiyyari his village was spared. It had not even been deserted by its inhabitants, nor had its trees and gardens been injured. It was, consequently, at the time of my visit, one of the most flourishing villages in the mountains. The houses, neat and clean, were still overshadowed by the wide-spreading walnut-tree; every foot of ground which could receive seed or nourish a plant was cultivated."—Vol. i. pp. 182, 183.

He gives the following description of the scene of the principal massacre, and the ruins and relics with which it is still strewn.

"Lizan stands on the river Zab, which is crossed by a rude bridge. I need not weary the reader with a description of desolation, hardly concealed by the most luxuriant vegetation. We rode to the grave-yard of a roofless church, slowly rising from its ruins—the first edifice in the village to be rebuilt. We spread our carpets amongst the tombs, for as yet there were no inhabitable houses. The Melek, with the few who had survived the massacre, was living during the day under the trees, and sleeping at night on stages of grass and boughs, raised on high poles fixed in the bed of the Zab, for the sake of the breeze that wafts down the ravine.

"It was near Lizan that one of the most terrible incidents of the massacre occurred, and an active mountaineer offering to lead me to the spot, I followed him up the mountain. Emerging from the gardens, we found ourselves at the foot of an almost perpendicular detritus of loose stones, terminated about one thousand feet above us by a wall of lofty rocks. Up this ascent we toiled for above an hour, sometimes clinging to small shrubs, whose roots scarcely reached the scanty soil below; at others, crawling on our hands and knees, crossing the gullies to secure a footing, or carried down by the stones which we put in motion as we advanced. We soon saw evidences of the slaughter. At first, a solitary skull rolling down with the rubbish, then heaps of

bleached bones; further up, fragments of rotting garments. As we advanced these remains became more frequent; skeletons, almost entire, still hung to the dwarf shrubs. I was soon compelled to renounce an attempt to count them. As we approached the wall of rock, the declivity became covered with bones, mingled with the long platted tresses of the women, shreds of discolored linen, and well-worn shoes. There were skulls of all ages, from the child unborn to the toothless old man. We could not avoid treading on the bones as we advanced, and rolling them with the loose stones into the valley below. 'This is nothing,' exclaimed my guide, who observed me gazing with wonder at these miserable heaps, 'they are but the remains of those who were thrown from above, or sought to escape from the sword by jumping from the rock. Follow me.' He sprang upon a ledge running along the precipice that rose before us, and clambered along the face of the mountain, overhanging the Zab, now scarcely visible at our feet. I followed him as well as I was able to some distance, but when the ledge became scarcely broader than my hand, and frequently disappeared for three or four feet altogether, I could no longer advance. The Tiyari, who had easily surmounted these difficulties, returned to assist me, but in vain. I was compelled to return after catching a glimpse of an open recess, or platform, covered with human remains.

"When the fugitives who had escaped from Asheetha spread the news of the massacre through the valley of Lizan, the inhabitants of the villages around collected such part of their property as they could carry, and took refuge on the platform I have just described, and on the rock above, hoping thus to escape the notice of the Kurds, or to be able to defend against any number, a place almost inaccessible. Women and young children, as well as men, concealed themselves in a spot which the mountain goat could scarcely reach. Beder Khan Bey was not long in discovering their retreat; but being unable to force it, he surrounded the place with his men, and waited till they should be compelled to yield. The weather was hot and sultry; the Christians had brought but small supplies of water and provisions; after three days the first began to fail them, and they offered to capitulate. The terms proposed by Beder Khan Bey, and ratified by an oath on the Koran, were the surrender of their arms and property. The Kurds were then admitted to the platform. After they had taken the arms from the prisoners, they commenced an indiscriminate slaughter, until, weary of using their weapons, they hurled the few survivors into the Zab below."—Vol. i. pp. 188–191.

Another massacre of the Nestorians of Tkhoma—a district

east of Lizan—was perpetrated by the same monster soon after Mr. Layard's visit. He says,

"A few days after my return to Mosul, Beder Khan Bey marched through the Tiari mountains, levying contributions on the tribes and plundering the villages on his way to the unfortunate district. The inhabitants of Tkhoma, headed by their meleks, made some resistance, but were soon overpowered by numbers. An indiscriminate massacre took place. The women were brought before the chief, and murdered in cold blood. Those who attempted to escape were cut off. Three hundred women and children who were flying into Baz, were killed in the pass. The principal villages with their gardens were destroyed, and the churches pulled down. Nearly half the population fell victims to the fanatical fury of the Kurdish chief.

"The Porte was prevailed upon to punish this atrocious massacre, and to crush a rebellious subject who had long resisted its authority. An expedition was fitted out under Osman Pasha, and after two engagements, in which the Kurds were signally defeated, Beder Khan Bey took refuge in a mountain castle. The position had been nearly carried, when the chief, finding defence hopeless, succeeded in obtaining the terms which had been offered him before the commencement of hostilities. He was banished from Kurdistan, to the Island of Candia."—Vol. i. pp. 238, 239.

Mr. Layard subsequently visited the Yezidis, a tribe of demon worshippers residing in the mountains thirty miles north of Mosul, and Sinjar, a dilapidated city a hundred miles east of that place, and gives many interesting details of the manners and history of the inhabitants.

Having been furnished with funds to prosecute his researches by the British Museum, he in November resumed his excavations, and was rewarded by the discovery of many sculptures and other objects of interest. Among them was an obelisk of black marble, seven feet in height, and covered with sculptures and inscriptions.

"There were in all twenty small bas-reliefs, and above, below, and between them, an inscription two hundred and ten lines in length. The whole was in the best preservation. Scarcely a character of the writing was wanting, and the figures were as sharp and well defined as if they had been carved but a few days before. The king is twice

represented followed by his attendants; a prisoner is at his feet, and his vizir and eunuchs are introducing men leading various animals, and carrying vases and other objects of tribute on their shoulders and in their hands. The animals are the elephant, the rhinoceros, the Bactrian or two-humped camel, the wild bull, the lion, a stag, and various kinds of monkeys. Amongst the objects carried by the treasure-bearers may perhaps be distinguished the tusks of the elephant, shawls, and some bundles of precious wood. From the nature, therefore, of the bas-reliefs, it is natural to conjecture that the monument was erected to commemorate the conquest of India, or of some country far to the east of Assyria, and on the confines of the Indian peninsula."—Vol. i. p. 346.

Between two winged lions, forming an entrance to an apartment, a pair of sphinxes were found, differing from all sculptures that had been discovered there or elsewhere in Assyria. They were not in relief, but entire, and about five feet in length and height. The head was beardless, as though a woman's, the body that of a lion. A pair of gracefully formed wings appeared to support a kind of platform in a line with the top of the head-dress, which it is supposed may have been an altar for sacrifice, or a depository of offerings or tribute. The entrance was covered with charcoal, and the fire which had destroyed the building had calcined the sphinxes to such a degree, that there was barely time to take drawings of them before they fell to pieces. In the south-east corner of the mound, an earthen sarcophagus was disinterred, covered with a marble slab, and containing a human skeleton, two jars of baked clay, and a small alabaster bottle, resembling vessels that are found in Egyptian sepulchres. The skeleton, though entire when uncovered, almost immediately dissolved to dust under the action of the air. He subsequently found, in the centre of the mound, many sarcophagi, vases, and depositories of the dead. Among them was a tomb built of bricks and covered with a slab of alabaster.

"It was about five feet in length, and scarcely more than eighteen inches in breadth in the interior. On removing the lid, parts of a skeleton were exposed to view; the skull and some of the larger bones were still entire; but on an attempt being made to move them they crumbled to dust. With them were three earthen vessels. A vase of

reddish clay, with a long narrow neck, stood in a dish of such delicate fabric, that I had great difficulty in removing it entire. Over the mouth of the vase was placed a bowl, or cup, also of red clay. This pottery appears to have stood near the right shoulder of the body. In the dust which had accumulated round the skeleton were found beads and small ornaments belonging to a necklace. The beads are of colored opake glass, agate, cornelian, and amethyst. A small crouching lion of lapis-lazuli, pierced on the back, had been attached to the end of the necklace. The vases and ornaments are Egyptian in their character, similar remains being found in the tombs of Egypt, and preserved in collections from that country. With the beads was a cylinder, on which is represented the king in his chariot hunting the wild bull. The surface has been so much injured that it is difficult to distinguish the figures. A copper ornament, resembling a modern seal, two bracelets of silver, and a pin for the hair, were also discovered. I carefully collected and preserved the remains, which seemed to prove that the body had been that of a female.

"In digging beyond this tomb, I found a second, similarly constructed, and of the same size. In it were two vases of highly glazed green pottery, elegant in shape, and in perfect preservation. Near these was a copper mirror, and a copper lustral spoon, all Egyptian in form.

"Many other tombs were opened containing vases, plates, mirrors, spoons, beads, and ornaments. Some of them were built of baked bricks, carefully joined, but without mortar; others were formed by large earthen sarcophagi, covered with an alabaster slab, similar to those already described."—Vol. ii. pp. 21, 22.

On further excavation he found that these tombs, which were at a considerable elevation, were placed on the ruins of a building like the palaces he had already explored. Immediately beneath them was an apartment filled with marble slabs, adorned with sculptures and inscriptions that had been taken from the walls and set upright against each other, apparently in order to be removed to another structure.

¶ "These sculptures resembled, in many respects, some of the bas-reliefs found in the south-west palace, the faces of which were turned towards the walls. It appeared, therefore, that the centre building had been dismantled to supply materials for the construction of another; and in the earth and rubbish accumulated above its remains, a people whose funeral vases and ornaments were identical in form and material with those found in the catacombs of Egypt, had buried their dead. What

race then occupied the country after the destruction of the Assyrian palaces? At what period were these tombs made? What antiquity do they assign to the buildings beneath them? These are questions I am yet unable to answer."—Vol. ii. p. 23.

The south-east corner of the mound appears to have been the principal burying-place of those who occupied the country after the destruction of the oldest Assyrian palaces. The sarcophagi, generally, are shaped like a dish-cover. The tombs are of brick, and covered by a slab. In nearly all these were earthen vases, copper and silver ornaments, lacrymatories, and small alabaster bottles. The skeletons, though entire, crumbled to pieces as soon as uncovered. Scattered among the tombs were vases of all sizes, lamps, and small articles of pottery.

After completing his excavations at Nimroud, Mr. Layard descended the river to Kala Sherghat, where there are vast remains of an ancient city; but he made no important discoveries there. He subsequently explored the ruins at Kouyunjik, a few miles above Mosul, on the opposite side of the Tigris, and found there, as at Nimroud, vast remains of an edifice panelled with sculptures.

"The palace had been destroyed by fire. The alabaster slabs were almost reduced to lime, and many of them fell to pieces as soon as uncovered. The places which others had occupied could only be traced by a thin white deposit, left by the burnt alabaster upon the wall of sun-dried brick, and having the appearance of a coating of plaster.

"In its architecture, the newly discovered edifice resembled the palaces of Nimroud and Khorsabad. The chambers were long and narrow. The walls were of unbaked bricks, with a panelling of sculptured slabs. The bas-reliefs were, however, much larger than those generally found at Nimroud, being about ten feet high, and from eight to nine feet wide. The winged human-headed bulls, forming the entrances, were from fourteen to sixteen feet square. The slabs, unlike those I had hitherto discovered, were not divided in the centre by a band of inscription, but were completely covered with figures. The bas-reliefs were greatly inferior in general design and in the beauty of the details, to those of the earliest palace of Nimroud; but in many parts they were very carefully and minutely finished. In this respect

Kouyunjik yields to no other known monument in Assyria."—Vol. ii. p. 99.

All the chambers into which he penetrated, extending several hundred feet, were adorned with bas-reliefs, representing war scenes. Some of them, like the following, were of great interest.

"Upon two slabs, vessels filled with warriors and females were represented leaving a castle built on the sea-shore, and on the declivity of a mountain. A man stood at the castle gate, which opened immediately upon the water. A woman who had already embarked in one of the ships was seen stretching out her arms to receive a child, which the man was giving to her. The sea was indicated by wavy lines carried across the slab from top to bottom, and by fish, crabs, and turtles. The vessels were of two kinds; some had masts and sails, as well as oars; others were impelled by rowers alone. They were formed with two decks. On the upper stood warriors with spears, and women wearing high turbans or mitres. On the lower were double sets of rowers, eight, and sometimes ten sitting on a side, making sixteen or twenty in all. The sides of the upper deck, as well as the battlements of the castle on the sea-shore, were hung with shields. From the costume of the figures and the position of the city, it would appear that they were not Assyrians, but a conquered people, flying from the enemy. An Assyrian conquest of the Tyrians or some other nation occupying the coast of the Mediterranean, was probably recorded by the bas-relief."—Vol. ii. p. 164.

The ruins at Kouyunjik are the relics evidently of a building of great extent and magnificence, constructed on much the same plan as those at Nimroud. The delineations, from the size of the slabs and the number of figures, must, when entire and painted, as they probably were, have rendered the apartments gorgeous. What the exterior of these vast structures was, however, or the use to which they were appropriated, is quite uncertain. The mass of earth and ashes beneath which the chambers that have been explored are buried, indicates that the edifices originally rose to a great height; and the discovery in several places of an upper and lower tier of rooms, shows that they had at least in those parts a second story. No traces of stairways, however, have been detected; no indications that the apartments were

lighted by windows, and no means of determining whether the buildings were covered with roofs. If the rooms next to the outer walls were furnished with windows, there were many in the interior that must have been absolutely dark, unless lighted from above. They are generally narrow parallelograms, and received that form perhaps, that beams might be found of sufficient length to span them for the ceilings and roofs. The widest at Nimroud, though one hundred and sixty feet in length, is but thirty-five in breadth. They were erected on a vast platform of sun-dried bricks raised to an elevation of thirty or forty feet. That much wood was used in their construction is apparent from the fact that they were burned, and that the charcoal and ashes are everywhere intermixed with the earth beneath which they are now buried. If reared, as they not improbably were, to a height of eighty or one hundred feet above the platform, and cased with white marble, they must have been visible at a great distance, and presented a splendid spectacle. Their founders, the date of their erection, the conquests which their sculptures commemorate, and the period of their overthrow, are as yet undetermined. Mr. Layard deems it probable that Nimroud, Kouyunjik, Khorsabad, and several other important ruins in their vicinity, were all parts of ancient Nineveh. Should the scholars who are engaged in endeavoring to decipher the inscriptions succeed, these and many other important questions will be resolved, and much light thrown undoubtedly on the history of the magnificent monarchs of that early age.

Mr. Layard has lately returned to Mesopotamia to renew his search for relics. His success at Nimroud and Kouyunjik will induce others probably to explore other ruins. Many remains may yet be found of as great interest as those which he has discovered. Whatever their researches may unfold, it will be welcomed by the believers and students of the Scriptures, in the assurance that, like all that has hitherto been drawn from the ruins of Egypt, Edom, and Assyria, it will confirm the narratives and predictions of the sacred word, and exemplify the truth and wisdom of the Almighty, by whose providence these relics have been preserved of the ancient nations that revolted from him, and the deities that were adored by them as his superiors. The blight and ruin

with which the whole of those parts of Asia and Africa are smitten, which were the scene of the manifestations he made of himself to men, and the ministry of his inspired messengers, are direct, extraordinary, and stupendous proofs of his being, dominion, and righteousness. Those countries were naturally fertile, and were long thronged by a vast population, advanced, in many respects, to a high degree of culture. With the exception of a single race, however, the nations that peopled them are swept from existence. There are no longer Assyrians or Chaldeans, Egyptians or Medes, the conquerors or the conquered: there are no longer monarchs at Nineveh or Babylon, Jerusalem or Damascus, Memphis or Thebes. And they have perished, not because they were not versed in the art of war, great and powerful, brave and ambitious, nor because they had no gods on whom they relied for the perpetuation of their dominion, but because of their apostasy from Jehovah to the homage of false deities. The question between their creature gods and the Self-existent and Eternal, on which, on their own views, their destiny depended, has been put to a practical determination, and we have the issue in the absolute extinction, through a long series of ages, of the adorers of idols, and the conversion of their luxuriant territories into a vast waste and solitude. What a confutation of them! What a verification of him! The only races of the ancient inhabitants of those regions that survive are the two branches of the descendants of Abraham, the friend of God;—the one the uncovenanted, who have for many centuries been the principal occupants of Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and a terrific scourge to the tribes with whom they have been intermingled;—the other, the Israelites, who have for near eighteen centuries been exiled from their national country and scattered amongst distant nations; and these, though conquered by the same eastern, western, and northern tribes and nations as the others, have been preserved by the Almighty's special care, and because of their peculiar relations to him. What a demonstration of his existence and the absoluteness of his dominion! But the vindication of himself and verification of his supremacy is not yet completed. It is to reach its consummation only when he recalls his covenant people from their dispersion, reinstates them in their

ancient country, and, reigning over them as their monarch, brings all the other nations into subjection to himself, and converts the wastes with which sin has spread the world into a paradise again of fruitfulness and beauty. What a majestic proof will that form that he is Jehovah, and that there is none else! How worthy of him is this great scheme of his providence! How beautiful his design to put an end to the ravages of sin; to reclaim the world from the curse with which it is stricken, and raise it to the splendor with which it would have been adorned, had its inhabitants never revolted!

It is when that great result has been reached, that the purpose and propriety of these avenging judgments on the rebellious nations will be fully comprehended. It is when the innocence, wisdom, and bliss of a countless population under his reign shall present their contrast to the debasement and misery of sin, that the grandeur of his perfections will be seen, and the realization fill every heart of his infinite worthiness of the homage which he claims.

ARTICLE VII.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *THE LIFE OF ASHBEL GREEN, V.D.M.* Begun to be written by himself in his eighty-second year, and continued to his eighty-fourth. Prepared for the press at the author's request by Joseph H. Jones, Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1849.

THIS memoir, though occupied disproportionately by the incidents of his youth and the events of the Revolution, presents an interesting view of Dr. Green's life, and together with the remarks of the editor, and the letters of Dr. Miller, Dr. Janeway, and Dr. Murray, with which the volume is closed, makes a strong impression of his talents and worth. He had not, indeed, a brilliant intellect, nor any great and commanding powers. His sense, however, was clear and vigorous, and he had in an unusual degree what is perhaps as rare, and as essential to the completeness of one's endowments as any other,—the faculty of using his several gifts to the full measure of their strength, and making them effective. He was master of himself; the elements of his mind worked

together harmoniously; he took practical views of subjects, and addressed his efforts to that which lay within his reach; and rose thereby to an eminence and success that few attain whose endowments render them capable of a higher order of excellence. Without such powers, he could not, through so long a career, have exerted the large influence—and over those of his contemporaries most distinguished for intelligence and piety,—which is universally ascribed to him. He was a prompt and efficient friend of knowledge, virtue, and religion, took a conspicuous part in the organization and conduct of benevolent institutions, and exemplified his principles in his private life, as well as his public agency. Religion was with him a reality. He beheld its great truths; he embraced them with an undoubting assurance, and felt their subduing and transforming power. Dr. Miller and Dr. Janeway, who were long intimate with him, have, in their letters on his character, paid a just and elegant tribute to his worth.

2. *LIFE AND WORKS OF MISS MARY JANE GRAHAM*, late of Stoke Fleming, Devon. By the Rev. Charles Bridges, M. A. New York: R. Carter and Brothers. 1849.

AN event of much interest in Miss Graham's history was her fall into infidelity, after she had for several years lived what she deemed a religious life, and cherished a hope of salvation. Such lapses to doubt and disbelief are probably less rare than is generally supposed. Her scepticism was the work chiefly of her own false feelings and speculations. It is the effect probably with most of the agency of others, the artful objections, the sophistical reasonings, the imposing theories of malicious assailants of Christianity, who make it their business to entice the unguarded into uncertainty and unbelief. This diabolical influence is exerted in some instances by men who are intrusted with the education of persons for the sacred office. We have heard the details from his own lips of the manner in which an individual, who had undoubtedly been renewed, was betrayed by the arts of one of these conspirators into a total disbelief of the Scriptures, distrust of his religious feelings, and discontinuance for a considerable period of prayer. Not unfrequently, instead of formal infidelity, they are led to a rejection of the doctrines of revelation, and substitution in their place of another gospel, or philosophy, which the name and authority of God are falsely employed to sanction; while a third class are prompted by a distrust of themselves and of the Scriptures, to turn from proofs to testimony for reliance, and yield themselves the uninquiring disciples of teachers who claim authority over their faith, and undertake to guide them infallibly

to salvation. It is in this way, we doubt not, that many of the converts to Puseyism have been betrayed into their abject trust in man. Led by their German metaphysics to the adoption of views of their nature that make it impossible to prove that Christianity is true, they have, in order to avoid the horrors of an absolute doubt of redemption, a future life, and of God, turned to creatures for support, and surrendered themselves blindly to the hands of a priesthood, that promises, on condition of implicit faith, to conduct them to heaven with the utmost certainty and ease. This seduction of the young into unbelief, which is taking place, we apprehend, on a far larger scale than is generally suspected, should lead parents to guard their children against the books that assail the authority of the Scriptures, or present false views of their doctrines; and prompt the churches to discard those teachers who, under the pretence of science and philosophy, employ themselves in denying or misrepresenting the great truths of revelation, and propagating the subtle forms of infidelity that now prevail, which make man his own deity, and his consciousness the universe.

The narrative which Miss Graham gives of her recovery from scepticism is highly instructive and affecting. Her restoration was the work of the Spirit of God; and the sight and sense of his being, and the great realities of his government, were flashed on her with such resistless power, and brought her to such a clear and fervid recognition of him, as to leave no doubt of her sanctification. Her powers, which were of a superior order, reached maturity at an early age, and were unfolded and refined by unusual cultivation. Her letters, which fill a considerable part of the volume, are written with ease and spirit. Her Test of Truth, in which she treats of the proofs of the divine existence, and details the history of her scepticism and conversion, is of unusual interest. We have seldom seen a more vivid delineation of the lofty thoughts, the expanded views, and the fervid emotions, with which the Spirit of God, sometimes in a moment, fills the darkest minds, and changes them from unbelief to faith, and from enmity to adoration and love.

3. **HIGHLANDS AND ISLANDS OF THE ADRIATIC**, including Dalmatia, Croatia, and the Southern Provinces of the Austrian Empire. By A. A. Paton. In two volumes, with illustrations. London: Chapman & Hall. 1849.

THE author presents a highly interesting account of the principal cities on the north-east shore of the Adriatic, from Albania to Venice; of the chief islands that line the coast; and of the most important inte-

rior towns of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Illyria. Dalmatia, which through much of its length is a mere line of coast, extends from the 19th degree of east longitude two hundred and forty miles towards the head of the Adriatic. It is bounded in the interior by a lofty range of mountains, and is, at its broadest part, less than fifty miles in width. The islands that throng the coast, many of which are mountainous ridges, and are eminently beautiful, form nearly one fourth of its territory. It has a great number of harbors, and several cities once of great commercial importance, and scenes of contests that affected the fate of empires in the wars of the Romans, Goths, Slavonians, and Turks. Several of them were erected in the early centuries of the Christian era. Spalatro, the birth-place of Diocletian, was his residence during his last years. Portions of the vast palace he erected there still remain; and its temple, originally consecrated to Jupiter, almost uninjured by the lapse of fifteen centuries and a half, is now a Roman Catholic cathedral. The population of the cities on the coast is a mixture of Slavonians, Italians, and Austrians. The Montenegrines and Morlacks, who inhabit the interior, are extremely ignorant, barbarous, and miserable. Much of the country, devastated and depopulated by the frequent invasions of the Turks in the seventeenth century, still remains a waste. The chief cities, Zara and Ragusa, were for a long period powerful commercial competitors of Venice. The massy fortifications with which they were surrounded at that period still survive, and cathedrals and other public edifices that were erected many centuries ago. Dalmatia is now under the dominion of Austria.

4. GLIMPSES OF MESSIAH'S GLORY; being Lectures delivered during Lent, 1848, at St. George's, Bloomsbury, by twelve Clergymen of the Church of England, with a preface, by the Rev. A. Dallas, M.A., Rector of Wotton, Hants. London: J. Nisbet and Co., 1848.

THESE Lectures are the sixth series that have been delivered and published by clergymen of that communion who receive the predictions of the Scriptures that Christ's advent is to precede the millennium. These treat of the visible majesty of his coming, his victory over the hostile nations, the deliverance of Israel, the gathering of the saints, the character of those who are to be admitted to his kingdom, his reign, the perpetuity of his kingdom, the fruitfulness of the earth, and other kindred themes. They are eminently plain, serious, and practical, and indicate a large interest in the subject among the evangelical in the establishment.

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ART. I.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By J. D. Morell, A.M., Author of the History of Modern Philosophy. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton & Co. 1849.

BY THE EDITOR.

IN our former article on Mr. Morell's work, we stated the chief characteristics of his speculations as a system of idealism;—first, that the external world is merely conceptional, and exists only in the mind that perceives it; next, on the ground that if there is nothing external to the mind, there can be no media of perceiving what seems to be external to it,—that reason discerns all supersensuous objects, such as God, the soul, ideas, affections, rights, laws, and purposes, by an immediate intuition, without the aid of any instrumentality; that knowledge cannot be conveyed to us by God through language; that to make a revelation is simply to place a subject before the mind, so that it discerns it by the ordinary exercise of its powers; and finally, that inspiration is simply a stimulation of the mind to discern what is in that

manner presented to it. There is, accordingly, on his theory, no objective Christianity, universe, or deity. They, like everything else, are merely conceptional, or forms of thought. Inspiration, revelation, and religion, are only natural modes in which the intellect exerts itself; and, consequently, the Scriptures are no more a revelation than any other truths or ideas that naturally rise in the mind, and no more to be taken as an authoritative expression of God's will.

After discussing these subjects, in which he contemplates religion subjectively as a mere form of feeling and thought, he proceeds to the philosophy of theology, fellowship, certitude, and other themes in which he treats Christianity as having conceptionally, at least, an objective existence. Proceeding on the theory of idealism, that there is no external deity, no Redeemer, no material world, no human race to be saved, and no method of salvation; and that Christianity, consequently, is a mere combination of ideas and emotions that exist only in the mind that is the subject of them; it is thence assumed that if a religion, a Christianity, or a theology, be conceived as having an external existence, it must, in the first place, be founded wholly on that subjective Christianity, or be drawn from the thoughts and feelings of the mind that frames it; and, in the next place, must relate to a different reality from that which the subjective respects, or be of a species that differs from the object which it presents to the mind. Of all the mystifications and false results into which speculatists have betrayed themselves, there is, perhaps, no one that surpasses this. Yet it is on this assumption that Mr. Morell constructs his philosophy of theology.

Thus he represents that consciousness is the sole source from which theology, or a systematic statement of the truths of Christianity, is to be drawn.

"The effort of theology is always to give a definite form and scientific basis to *our religious life*, and to the spiritual truth involved in it. The religious *life*, entirely consisting as it does in emotion and intuition, presents this truth to the mind of man in the concrete, *and as a whole*. Were the view we thus obtain perfectly clear and uniform, we should need nothing more. But divine things, alas! are reflected upon the surface of our spiritual nature after it has been ruffled by distracting

passions, prejudices, or cares; just as when the bosom of a lake is fretted by the wind and the storm;—and thus the divine symmetry of the objects presented is broken and lost to our view.”—Pp. 182, 183.

But how can this be, if, as he holds, we have by our reason a direct vision of them, and see them in their “concrete reality?” And—what is of equal moment—if, as he here represents, our intuitions themselves are not only radically defective, but little better than mere caricatures, how is it that a theology that is to be founded on them, and constructed by “the logical faculty,” can correct their errors, and be made absolutely conformable to truth? Has the understanding at length acquired a higher power of spiritual intuition than the intuitional faculty itself? If his theory of the reason be correct, any error into which that power falls must be wholly remediless, except by itself. As it acts independently of means, means cannot rectify its intuitions. Any attempt which the logical faculty may make to correct them, must necessarily be by a false process, and unsuccessful. He proceeds:—

“It is *then* that the logical or analytical faculty comes to our aid, and seeks to restore to us *the harmonious proportions of truth*; not, indeed, by affording an immediate glance at the concrete whole, but by separating it into its parts, comparing one portion with another, and thus discovering, if possible, the consistency which exists through them all.”—P. 183.

No representation could be more mistaken, than that theology must be wholly derived from “the intuitional consciousness,” and be a mere expression of the views and feelings of the individual who frames it. It is no more to be drawn exclusively from that source than geology, astronomy, or history. Instead, it is to be derived chiefly from the word of God, and subordinately from whatever other sources the knowledge of him and his government may be drawn, such as the material and intellectual worlds, and his providence over them. Mr. Morell would exclude from it nearly the whole of the great truths and facts of which it treats: such as the laws God has imposed, the worship he requires, the

method of salvation through Christ, his purposes, and all the great measures of his government. Reason has no direct intuition of them: they do not exist in our consciousness. We have ideas of them, and a consciousness of those ideas, and the emotions they excite, but we are not conscious of his will itself, his purposes, or his institutions. It is *he* that is conscious of them, not *we* who only know them by his announcing them to us. Besides, what can be more absurd than the pretence that our knowledge, for example, of the theological truths presented in the ten commandments, is deduced from consciousness, not from the written decalogue? What can be more solecistical than the representation that our knowledge that the dead are to be raised, is drawn from our consciousness of it? It is the grossest abuse of terms, and indicates the most extraordinary confusion of ideas. Can Mr. Morell imagine that he is now intuitively conscious of an event that is not to happen till a future period? Can he persuade himself that he has now an intuitive perception of an event that is both future, and of a nature wholly different from any of which he has ever been the subject? A theology formed strictly according to his theory, and embracing no truths respecting God, but such as reason discerns by a direct intuition; none respecting ourselves, but such as we actually feel, would exclude, at least, everything that he has made known to us by a revelation; his laws, therefore, the method of redemption, and his purposes, which are the great subjects of theology; and would embrace nothing but a bare idea of God and his supremacy over us; and the fact that we are his creatures, moral beings, sinners, and suffering penal evils. Instead of this meagre shadow, Christian theology is properly the systematic statement of all the great truths which respect God, his empire, his government, and our nature, obligations, character, and condition, as his subjects; and as those truths are almost exclusively made known to us by the revelation which is recorded in the Scriptures, they must in that degree be derived from that written revelation. It is as impossible to form a theology, as it is a history of the world, from mere consciousness. It is as impracticable to construct a Christian theology, except from the revelations which are recorded in the Scriptures, as it is

to write a history of the race, except from the records and memorials of events that have descended to us from former generations.

This theory is embarrassed by the further objection, that if consciousness is the sole source and standard of religious truth, then systems of theology formed on it, however false and contradictory they may be, must be equally legitimate and authoritative, and there must consequently be as many true systems, and as many authoritative theologies, as there are diversities of views and affections in different individuals. The system of a deist must be as genuine and authoritative as that of one who receives the Scriptures as a revelation, and conforms his views to their teachings; the theology of a Spinoza, a Swedenborg, an idealist, a Catholic worshipper of the virgin, a Greek adorer of images, as genuine and just as that of pure worshippers, who keep the faith once delivered to the saints. Statements of the views and affections of the unsanctified and apostate, must be as much entitled to be regarded as true representations of Christian theology, as the systems of the pious that accord with the doctrines taught by Christ, the prophets, and apostles! But that is to assume that there is no absolute truth, nor any such objective realities as theology represents, and resolve them into mere conceptions, without any ground in anything without us.

But it is an equally formidable objection to his theory that it represents that the objects that are presented to the mind by theology, are not the real objects of religious regard which are intuitively discerned by reason, but of a different species,—a mere set of substitutes or signs that have no nearer relation to the realities for which they stand, than statues to the persons whom they represent, pictures to the forms of which they are imitations, or shadows to the objects from which they are cast: and accordingly, that the Jehovah of reason who is adored and loved, is a different entity from the Jehovah of theology; and the Christianity of reason a different Christianity from that of theology. He says:—

“Of Christian theology as distinguished from religion, we may say in general, that, as the one is connected with the operations of the intuitional faculty, and the other with that of the logical, so they will

each manifest the characteristics peculiar to these respective spheres of our consciousness. First of all, the one gives us *presentative* knowledge, the other *representative*; for the fresh and concrete perceptions we obtain of spiritual things are, in fact, direct presentations of truth to the inward eye; while the propositions of formal theology are but the best representation we can make of the truth, in definite and abstract terms, to the understanding."

"Religion has a *material* value,—theology only *formal*. But for the intuitional process involved in the former, we should not be brought into contact with the objective elements of Divine truth at all; for intuition always marks the boundaries of our actual experience: but for the logical process implied in the latter, we should never be able to mould these elements into the form of a science or a system."—Pp. 183, 184.

"Such are the distinctive characteristics of religion and theology. . . . The one takes us at once beyond the reach of the human faculties, and offers to us perceptions of truth such as we never could gain by any formal effort of our own, and never infer from prior data; the other seeks to define these very perceptions, to make them reflective, and to reduce them all to the form of the logical understanding. Religion, accordingly, is always *beyond*—theology, as such, always *within* the limits of the natural reason."—Pp. 184, 185.

He thus exhibits theology as wholly within the sphere of the understanding, which he holds is occupied with conceptions that are generated by itself, and have no objective counterpart, and with words which it employs as the names of those conceptions. Theology, therefore, does not present to the mind the great spiritual realities and truths which are the objects of religion, or the intuitional consciousness, but only a set of spectral substitutes. The Jehovah of theology, accordingly, is a different entity from the Jehovah of reason: and the Christ of theology different from the Christ of religious faith! This theory will strike the reader doubtless with surprise. It seems scarcely explicable that men of sharp intellects and large learning can entertain so false and preposterous a scheme. It is indisputably, however, Mr. Morell's philosophy of theology, and the only view that he can maintain consistently with his theory of the understanding. If, as he holds, that faculty deals only with forms of thought which are generated by itself, never with the

realities which those thoughts seem to respect, then if theology is the product of the understanding, it can deal only with those forms of thought, never with the realities of which they are substitutes. And that is the ground of the distinction which he attempts to make between the intuitional and the logical faculty, and between religion and theology.

If the objects of perception by the reason and what he calls the understanding—if the objects of religion and theology are identically the same ; then there is no ground for his discrimination of them. The one is no more perceived independently of media than the other ; and the knowledge given by the one is no more presentative and immediate than the knowledge given by the other. But what can surpass the falsehood and absurdity of the supposition that the Jehovah of theology is a different object from the Jehovah of religion, and the Christ of theology a different being from the Christ of Christianity ! the latter only being real entities ; and the former only conceptions that are created by the mind ; or mere symbols or shadows that are substituted in their place, with which the mind is necessarily so exclusively occupied when it contemplates them, that it never ascends to the relations which they seem to respect ! No one can need any other proof than is furnished by his consciousness, that the scheme is utterly groundless. We know that the Jehovah on whom we meditate, respecting whom we argue, and of whom we converse, is the Jehovah of our reason, adoration, and love. The pretence that it is otherwise, is an affront to our intelligence. There is no more room for such a philosophy of this subject, than of any other. It might as well be held that the words dollars and pounds sterling in the promises of bank bills and bills of exchange denote nothing but mere logical conceptions, and that therefore the entities of which those instruments treat, are not the metallic coins which the holders are entitled to demand for them, but things of a different species. For according to Mr. Morell's theory, bank bills and bills of exchange are logical representatives of silver and gold coins. The coins themselves are not the objects of immediate intuition when those paper representatives are read. They are, according to his philosophy, contemplated by the understanding only, and the real objects

of attention therefore are mere conceptions which that faculty generates ; and conceptions that are embraced in the categories : They are forms, dimensions, colors, values, relations. If the fact, then, that in theology, objects are contemplated and treated conformably to their natures, attributes, and relations, is a just reason for the assertion that the entities of theology are different from those of religion ; then the fact that the dollars and pounds of bank bills and bills of exchange are contemplated in those instruments, logically, that is, are represented by shapes, sizes, and colors, is also an equal reason for the assertion that the dollars and pounds of which those instruments treat, are wholly different from metallic dollars and pounds. On the same principle,—as in history persons are treated logically, that is, according to their several natures, stations, relations, acts, and the effects of which they were the subjects,—the personages, acts, and events presented in Hebrew, Greek, or Roman history, are not the same as the Hebrew, Greek, and Roman individuals whom they represent. The latter, which were real personages, actions, and events, are not the objects to the reader of direct perception, but only of the understanding, and are mere forms, therefore, of thought that exist solely in the mind that conceives them. The Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans themselves cannot be the objects of thought, because we have never had an immediate intuition of them ! and consequently we have no knowledge whatever of any actual Hebrews, Greeks, or Romans. The entities to which we give their names are a set of shadows which the understanding has generated and substituted in their place ! Nothing that is not now absolutely present to us, and the object of an immediate perception, is or can be the object of our thoughts :—the absent, the departed, persons of former generations, we never make the subject of conversation, memory, or consideration. Our mental processes, therefore, are only a vast system of delusions ! We are mistaken in the persuasion that we had ancestors of the same nature as ourselves ; that we have contemporaries who are not in our presence ; that there are other regions of the globe besides those which we now see, and fellow-beings that reside in them ; that there is or has been any agent, object, act, or

event, besides those of which we are now immediately conscious. Such is the preposterous issue to which his philosophy of theology leads! Such is the total repudiation of our consciousness to which we must descend in order to receive it: for we contemplate all other subjects logically, or according to their natures and relations as absolutely as this, when we remember them, reflect on them, and converse, write, or read, respecting them.

Yet it is this preposterous misrepresentation of our faculties and the objects of our knowledge that Mr. Morell makes the ground of his depreciation of the Scriptures. He says:

“The essential pre-requisites of Christian theology are these two,—a religious nature, awakened by the development of the Christian life; and the application of logical reflection to the elements of divine truth, which that life spontaneously presents.

“It may, perhaps, be remarked by some with surprise, that in enumerating the *essential* conditions of Christian theology, I have said nothing about the Bible. If I have succeeded, however, in making our view of the inspiration of the Scriptures clear and valid, their relation to Christian theology will at once become apparent.”

He in fact, however, denies that they were written by inspiration, or any “distinct commission from God,” and holds that they were the product of minds acting according to their natural laws. He continues:

“It will be seen, first of all, that the existence of the Scriptures, *as such*, was not *essential* to the rise and maintenance of Christian theology at all. Take the case of any of the early churches, who had perhaps heard, or perhaps had not heard the preaching of the apostles, but who certainly never enjoyed a sight of their writings. These churches, assuredly, would enjoy the power of true Christianity, and could have possessed a valid Christian theology as well as *we*. And yet there were no Christian Scriptures in the case: there could be, therefore, no poring over the letter, no induction of passages, no verbal criticism whatever.” —P. 187.

But how could “those churches enjoy the power of true Christianity, and possess a valid Christian theology as well as *we*?” Was it not by hearing the same facts and truths from

the lips of the apostles and other inspired teachers, which are recorded in the writings of the New Testament? And were not those facts and truths presented by them logically, as much as they are in the gospels, the acts, and the epistles? And was it not as necessary, therefore, to ponder the language in which they were uttered, compare the several statements that were made in respect to them, and enter into verbal criticisms in order to construct a theology from their teachings, as it now is in forming one from the Scriptures? How, then, do his allegations prove that theology now is not to be constructed from the Scriptures, but derived solely from consciousness, and is to be a mere statement of what the individual who forms it thinks and feels; not an exhibition of what God has revealed in his word? He in fact abandons his own theory in the next paragraph, and admits that the Scriptures are now necessary to us, in the same relation as the verbal teachings of the apostles were to the churches anterior to the composition and publication of the New Testament.

"Now the Bible stands to *us* in the same light in which the agencies which brought the Christian life into the hearts of these early disciples stood to *them*. We want to know of Christ—we want to gaze upon his moral image—we want to *live* through the scenes of his history, sufferings, death, and resurrection, as did *they*; and whatever means could bring these things vividly and authentically before our minds, and awaken our religious emotions by the Spiritual influences operating through them, would give to *us* the basis of a Christian life and a Christian theology, just as it did to the multitudes who never saw the letter of the word."—Pp. 187, 188.

But the Scriptures can fulfil this office to *us* only as they bring before us the same facts and truths respecting Christ's person, teachings, sufferings, resurrection, and the message he commissioned his disciples to proclaim, which were presented to the first believers by the apostles. If they are thus necessary to us in order to the formation of a Christian theology in the same manner as apostolic teachings were to those who believed anterior to their being written, then such a theology is not, as Mr. M. holds, to be drawn solely from consciousness.

But he recedes again from this admission, and avows that the Scriptures, instead of absolutely presenting to us the truth, cannot be intelligible unless the truth has already been discerned by intuition; and that their office, therefore, is simply to corroborate by the testimony of others what is previously known to our consciousness.

"What is *necessary* to Christian theology, is an historical knowledge of *Christ*, and a perception of the spirit and matter generally of the apostolic teaching; for without these we can have no religious life *in the distinctively Christian sense*. To whatever extent, then, the Bible is necessary to communicate such a knowledge and such a perception, it is necessary *at present* to the existence of Christian theology."—P. 188.

What a gracious concession for a philosopher! How grateful must those who regard the Scriptures as an authoritative revelation feel, that Mr. Morell condescends, with such generosity and delicacy, to spare those sacred records from total and ignominious repudiation! If we would have a *Christian* theology, we must have some knowledge of the fact that such a person as Christ appeared in the world, and of the nature of the doctrines which his apostles taught: and as far as the Bible is necessary in order to that, it is necessary to such a theology! Is there any other source, then, from which we can derive it? Most certainly not. We cannot, as Mr. Morell's theory asserts, discern it by direct intuition, independently of means. We can no more see by the mere force of reason, that Christ appeared in the world eighteen centuries ago, taught, wrought miracles, suffered death on the cross, rose from the grave, appeared to his disciples after his resurrection, commissioned them to preach salvation through his death, and ascended to heaven in their sight; than we can see by a direct vision any other persons, agencies, and events, of that or any other remote age. They are not cognisable without media: they are not facts of consciousness. The supposition that they are is solecistical. We cannot be conscious of crucifixion unless we experience it. We cannot be conscious of a resurrection, unless we are the actual subjects of it. We cannot know that Christ was the subject of those and the other events of his existence here, except through

means ; and we have no means of that knowledge except the Scriptures. To represent that we have become cognisant of Christ, his work, and doctrine, through wholly independent media, is in effect to represent that a knowledge of them has been communicated to us miraculously. He continues :—

“ But it will be seen at once that the position it takes in relation to theology, is totally different from that which is assigned it by those who ground their theology, professedly at least, upon an induction of individual passages, as though each passage, *independently of the spirit of the whole*, were of *divine authority*.”—P. 189.

Mr. Morell here intimates that the individual passages of the Scriptures, taken separately, are not expressive of the truth, and of divine authority. But how then can the whole be true and authoritative ? How can a series of propositions that are universally false and without any claim to be received as divine, acquire by their union in a volume, the character of a communication from God ? Can a more preposterous fancy be conceived ? How can the affirmation, “ God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life,” be made true and of divine authority, by other passages, if it is not true of itself, irrespective of them, and without any consideration what the general scope and spirit of others are ? The supposition is absurd. It must be true and authoritative of itself, or it cannot acquire that character. It cannot be invested with a new and opposite nature by other affirmations, and especially others that have intrinsically no more truth and authority than itself. Individual passages, then, are necessarily of divine authority, and may be made the ground of theology, or else the aggregate is not. Each proposition, also, must be taken as meaning what it expresses, or none of them can. There can be no medium of ascertaining what the whole means, if the parts do not denote what they express. If the meaning of each were different from that which it denotes, as interpreted by its proper laws, there would be no possible clue to its signification, and none, therefore, to the import of the whole. He adds, in respect to the induction of individual passages as an authoritative ground of theology—

"Against such a formal use of the letter of Scripture in theology, our whole view of inspiration is a protest and an argument. The inspiration of the apostles was vested in their intuitional nature, not in the ordinary and logical use of their faculties; and the only way in which *we* can see the truth as they did, is by entering into the spirit of their life and writings, not by adhering simply to words and expressions."—P. 189.

But how are we to enter into the spirit of their life and writings, except by ascertaining the meaning of their acts and doctrines as they are presented to us in the Scriptures; and how can we ascertain that meaning except by the words and expressions through which it is conveyed to us? Are there any other media? Are we able to see them without means? What can be more senseless than this clamor against reliance on the language of the Scriptures, and the testimony of individual passages, when nothing short of the faculty of omniscience can, without them, make it possible to us to know what they teach? He continues:—

"Nay, even supposing the letter had been *verbally* imparted from heaven, yet the comprehension of it must still depend upon the extent to which our whole spiritual nature is unfolded, so as to enter *essentially* into its meaning and force. A mere induction of passages, therefore, grounded on the mere *logical* force of the words, could give us no fixed result, simply because it would present no fixed data; for as the subjective part of the process—that, I mean, which is contributed by the intelligence and spiritual comprehension of the inquirer—varied, so would also the meaning and intensity of the sacred words themselves vary, as data standing connected with his own peculiar system of theology. Nay, we may put the question in yet a stronger light; for as the actual material of our knowledge all comes through direct and intuitional processes, it is evident that a man bringing simply the formal or critical faculty to the work of constructing a theology, might create out of the Scriptures a system purely logical, without ever perceiving in it a single element of positive truth. Words, propositions, definitions, &c., may be the representatives of living ideas to those minds which have *personally experienced them*, but to others they are only logical forms, with *no reality in them*. The words of Scripture, to give us a valid theology, must have *ideas* attached to them, which ideas *can never be made a matter of direct experience* by any kind of definition whatever. Theology must have a *matter* as well as a form; and the matter of it can only be

derived from the revelation of truth to the inward consciousness as a living experience."—Pp. 189, 190.

He then returns to the theory that all knowledge of divine things must be obtained "through direct and instinctive processes;" that history, therefore, must be derived wholly from the "experience" of the individual who frames it; that the language and propositions of the Scriptures present nothing but mere forms of thought, "with no reality in them;" that a logical system, formed out of them, may not exhibit to the mind a "single element of primitive truth:" and consequently, the only useful office which the Scriptures can fill, is to remind persons of what they have already "experienced." They cannot furnish them with any new ideas. They may, if their readers are not actually inspired, totally mislead them; and at best, with those who have a direct intuition of divine things, they can only reproduce a consciousness of which they have already been the subjects. But this is as mistaken and unjust, in respect to the Scriptures, as it is false and absurd in respect to us. It proceeds on the error we have already pointed out, that runs through the whole web of Mr. Morell's philosophy, that our consciousness comprehends the consciousness of God the Father, Christ, the Holy Spirit, the prophets, the apostles, believers, unbelievers, Jews, Gentiles, and all other agents of whom affirmations are made in the Scriptures, and all the acts, events, and conditions, that are predicated of them! "Words, propositions, definitions, &c.," he says, "may be the representatives of living ideas to those minds which *have personally experienced them*, but to others they are only *logical forms with no reality in them*." "Theology must have a *matter* as well as a form; and the matter of it can only be derived from *the revelation of truth to the inward consciousness, as a living experience*." We can have no fact of theology, then, except by a "revelation" of it to our "inward consciousness as a living experience." We accordingly are, or have been, conscious by experience, of all the facts that are embraced in our system of theology. If our theology, then, embraces the being and acts of God, as creator, upholder, lawgiver, ruler, avenger; and the being, acts, and sufferings of Christ as Mediator; the being and acts of

the Holy Spirit, as inspirer and sanctifier; the teachings of the apostles, and all the other facts and events that are presented in the Scriptures; then we must have been the conscious subjects of all those acts, *as exerted by ourselves*, and of all those events *as of our personal "experience."* Each one, therefore, must be conscious that he either is, or has been, God the Father, and exerted all the acts that the Scriptures ascribe to him; and that he is, or has been, Christ, and has exerted all the acts, and been the subject of all the events that are predicated of him—a birth of the Virgin Mary, a baptism by John in Jordan, a temptation by the devil in the wilderness, a ministry of three years and a half in Judea and Galilee, the working of numerous miracles, attendance by the twelve apostles, a betrayal by Judas Iscariot to the priests and rulers, a trial before Pontius Pilate, a crucifixion on Golgotha, a burial in Joseph's tomb, a resurrection on the third day, a commission of the apostles to teach in his name, and an ascension to heaven:—that he is, or has been, the Holy Spirit, and exerted all the agencies that are ascribed to him; and that he is, or has been, each one of the apostles and evangelists, and exerted each of their agencies, been the subject of their several sufferings and deaths:—and that he is, or has been, every other actor, and exerted every other agency, that is mentioned in the sacred word, and properly embraced in a Christian theology! For there is no other mode of being experimentally conscious of those agents, agencies, and events, but by actually being those agents, truly exerting their acts, and being the subject of the conditions and events, that were experienced by them. We cannot be conscious, experimentally, of a baptism in Jordan by the Baptist, unless we are actually baptized by him there. We cannot be conscious of the Holy Spirit's descending on us there like a dove, unless we are the actual subjects of such a descent. No one can be conscious that a voice there from heaven proclaims, in reference to him, "This is my Son, in whom I am well pleased," without actually hearing such a proclamation in that scene. In like manner, we cannot be conscious of a temptation, a ministry, the exercise of miraculous power, a contest with priests and rulers, the institution of a commemorative ordinance, a trial by a Roman Procurator, a crucifixion, a resur-

rection, and an ascension to heaven, except by literally exerting those acts and being the subject of those events. As all these great realities are embraced in all our systems of theology, Mr. Morell assumes that we all actually have been the subjects of them, or have a consciousness that we have! Such is the horrid self-deification which his philosophy of religion and theology involves! Such is the revolting contradiction which it offers to our common sense! The annals of self-deception and bewilderment by the sophisms of metaphysics present nothing that transcends it! He falls into this fathomless gulf of misconception and error, by confounding our consciousness of our *ideas or conceptions* of the acts of God, the acts and sufferings of Christ, the acts of the Holy Spirit, and other things taught by the apostles, with a consciousness of those *acts, sufferings, and things themselves*; as gross a mistake as it were to confound ourselves directly with God, Christ, and the apostles. When we read the narrative of Christ's trial and crucifixion, we are conscious of *the thoughts* which that narrative conveys to us, and *the emotions* which it excites; but we are not conscious of the trial and crucifixion themselves, any more than we are of betraying him, throwing thirty pieces of silver at the feet of the priests, and hanging ourselves with Judas Iscariot. What surprising inconsideration that Mr. Morell, and the Germans whom he follows, missed this truth which is wrought with the utmost clearness into our consciousness, and needs but to be announced to meet the assent of every intellect! Were his theory legitimate, then, that our theology can embrace no acts, truths, or events, but those of which we have a personal consciousness, it would not include any of the acts of God the Father, as creator, upholder, lawgiver, benefactor, or revealer; any of the acts, doctrines, or sufferings of Christ as mediator, his resurrection, or ascension, nor any of the teachings or experiences of his apostles! for we are not, and cannot possibly be conscious of them. What a magnificent result for a philosophy that assumes to be wiser than God, and better able to teach us the great truths of his being and government!

Should Mr. Morell quit this narrow and absurd theory, and admit that it is not necessary that we should be conscious

of God's being, attributes, and acts; and Christ's person, ministry, sufferings, and resurrection, in order that they should have a place in our theological system, but that our ideas and conceptions of them are proper "matter" for theology, and that God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, their acts, and other divine things of which we cannot be directly conscious, may, through that medium, be its subjects; he still will be involved in inextricable difficulty: for, in the first place, if the mere fact that we have had an idea or conception of a divine thing, entitles it to a place in our system of theology, then false and absurd notions merit admission to it, as much as those that are just, which is preposterous. Mr. Morell's theology would, on that supposition, embrace the various ideas respecting divine things of which he is, or ever has been conscious, without any consideration whether they are right or wrong, consistent or self-contradictory, the offspring of reason or the work of the imagination. It would include the whole train of conceptions of divine things, that has ever passed through his mind, without any discrimination of their character! And, in the next place, it would make the theology of those who take the Scriptures as their guide, and regard its "individual passages" as of "divine authority," as legitimate as his, and involve the rejection, accordingly, of his theory, that no knowledge but that which is obtained by immediate intuition, is entitled to a place in theology; for they allege individual passages of the Scriptures as of divine authority, in order to express ideas which have been excited in their own minds; and as revealing facts and truths through the medium of language, of which we could never acquire a knowledge by an immediate intuition, independently of means. Thus, whichever way he turns, his whole system falls.

He proceeds in his next chapter to apply this theory to the theological systems that are held by the church, and show that the views that are generally entertained by them are wholly erroneous. As, according to him, a theological system must be the work of the logical understanding, and the objects, therefore, of which it treats purely conceptual, and wholly different from the great entities to which it professes to relate, the propositions of which it consists are not truths, nor expressions of truths. They do not even relate to them,

but are mere exponents of the conceptions entertained by the individual who frames them. They are therefore completely without authority, and the supposition that such definitions and doctrines express realities is a mistake.

"Let us look to the popular theology of our own age and country, *as a whole*. We find existing amongst different communities a system of theoretical doctrine, which defines with considerable precision the truth they regard as valid and divine, respecting the relations which the Almighty sustains to man in his creation, preservation, redemption, and final salvation. This doctrine having been gradually brought into the form of a clear and logical statement, now presents the above relations to us, not as though they were spiritual *conceptions*, which are involved in the awakening and illumination of our religious nature, but rather as *facts* which can be presented in their full proportions to the *understanding*. Hence to those who from want of education, or of mental culture generally, are totally deficient in the critical faculty, the most natural course is, to receive the traditionary system of their own community as a complete and distinctive statement of the truth itself *in its exact objective import*. Where the cultivation of the religious *life*, indeed, wisely forms the most prominent feature of attention, *such an artificial view of theoretical doctrine* is not so strikingly manifest; but in all cases where the inculcation of a definite formal theology is regarded as being *the main point* that has to be secured in the evangelization of mankind, then the whole system is naturally accepted by *the pliant mass as literal fact*, to which no kind of criticism is at all accessible. Propositions, indeed, as a matter of course, assume *the form* of a distinct statement of fact, and it requires some little consideration before the propositions of theology are seen to be the expression, *not immediately of an objective reality*, but of an *inward conception* as to what that reality may actually be."—Pp. 206, 207.

Assent, therefore, to such a system as truth, is not only not obligatory, but is not justifiable. It is to receive as true a mere series of conceptions that are wholly artificial, and without any correspondence to the entities which they profess to represent. They are mere products of the imagination, like pictures of persons, objects, or scenes, drawn by individuals who have never beheld them. To take them as expressive of realities, is as mistaken, therefore, as it were to take such delineations as fac-similes, or to confound them

with the persons and scenes themselves of which they purport to be representatives. This is certainly the legitimate consequence of his theory. As all doctrinal statements of necessity treat the subjects which they respect relationally; or as of specific natures, attributes, qualities, and relationships; if that of which they treat is purely conceptional, and has no correspondence to the beings or things whose names they bear, then they cannot express absolute facts respecting them, and therefore cannot be true and authoritative. They are merely exhibitative of the conceptions which the understanding has generated as representations of those entities and facts: like the ideal pictures of agents or scenery that are drawn by artists to express their conceptions of them. The only respect in which they are true, is as exponents of the "logical consciousness" of those who frame them; and in that sense those of them which are the most false in reference to the spiritual entities to which they professedly relate, are as veritable as those which are the most true. But this is as predicable of doctrinal propositions and statements of the Scriptures, as it is of the theology of uninspired writings. For they treat the subjects which they respect relationally, or as having attributes, properties, and connexions with other subjects, as absolutely and universally as any other compositions. When, for example, they affirm anything of God, it is as a Spirit, self-existent, eternal, almighty, all-knowing, the creator and upholder of all, having rights over men, and exerting acts towards them. Mr. Morell's theory, therefore, denies the truth and authority of all those propositions of the Scriptures as directly as it does those of systematic theology, and converts them into mere expressions of their conceptions who wrote them. No statement respecting a material or spiritual entity, though uttered by the Almighty himself, can, on his scheme, by any possibility be true. Every utterance God has made, whether descriptive of himself, his acts, his works, or the duties or actions of his creatures, or expressive of his will, is shown by the very fact that it is uttered, to be absolutely false! Such is indisputably the import of Mr. M.'s theory. Why does he not, without reserve, avow and adhere to it? Why does he not resolutely proclaim the assumption on which his whole discussion

proceeds, that by our very nature it is physically impossible either to express truth in language, or form accurate conceptions of the realities to which it relates, and reject the Scriptures at once as wholly deceptive?

He next proceeds to show, that while all formal theological creeds and doctrines, like those of catechisms, articles of faith, and other systematic works, are made up of pure Scriptural statements on one side, they consist on the other of "logical processes by which those statements are moulded into scientific forms," and that though the former are to be received; the latter are to be rejected.

"The view of theology, accordingly, which is derived from such an analysis as I now describe, is the following: 'That every actual system of doctrinal belief may be separated into two elements—the scholastic and the biblical. The form, the phraseology, the whole scientific *tone*, come from the schools; they are the products of the human *understanding*, and must not be maintained *as in any sense possessing a divine authority*. On the contrary, the plain, pure, primitive, spiritual *fact* comes directly from the Bible, in which we have presented, not formal doctrines, indeed, but simply *information* respecting the merciful dealings of God in the recovery of man.'"—P. 210.

But, on his theory, those facts are the products of the understanding, as much as the forms in which they are clothed; as there is not a solitary fact stated in the Bible that is not presented relationally; nor one, the knowledge of which is not obtained by us through the senses, and does not, on his scheme, owe its form to what he denominates the logical consciousness, or understanding. They are not objects of direct intuition. They are not known by us independently of media. They are excluded from theology, therefore, by his system, as effectually as the logical forms and phraseology in which they are invested. This is apparent from the views he presents of the nature of those facts.

"So the analysis proceeds with perfect historical and critical accuracy; but on looking somewhat closely at the element which is expressed under the term '*scriptural fact*,' we find that it needs a still further analysis, since the idea there conveyed, so far from being *simple*, manifestly comprehends *other* and still simpler ideas under it. A considerable portion

of the Bible, 'e. g., is occupied in giving us statements of *historical facts*—of events which actually took place, as related by eye and ear witnesses. The term **FACT**, however, is also frequently applied to the **IDEAS** conveyed to us in the Scriptures, respecting the dealings of God to man. But here it has clearly an entirely different signification. There are no facts of *simple history* like those above mentioned; they involve *moral conceptions*,—conceptions, moreover, that cannot teach the exact objective truth, in the same sense as does the description of a real and palpable event, but which are rather accommodated to the practical wants of our spiritual nature. In brief, the Scriptures, while they embody a history of *actual events*, are yet mainly intended to *awaken* our religious nature to the direct intuition of spiritual things. On the one hand, then, there is within them an element of *historical fact*, on the other an element of *moral significancy*; the former consists in a *description of events*; the latter is a description, direct or indirect, of those divine intuitions which revealed to the minds of the writers the great living element of Christian truth."—Pp. 210, 211.

The facts narrated in the Scriptures which he attempts to shield from the application of his theory are thus "historical facts or events that have actually taken place," and are related by "witnesses" who gained a knowledge of them by "the eye or ear." The description of them can be nothing more than representations of sensuous or logical conceptions, and have no more authority, therefore, than "the moral conceptions" with which they are intermixed. On his theory it is physically impossible that either a fact or a doctrine should be expressed in language. But this he teaches directly by denying that there is any religious element at all in their outward facts as such.

"Every man, be his dogmatical creed what it may, who admits that the facts recorded in the New Testament did take place, as they are described by eye-witnesses, is a believer as much as *any man can be*, in the purely historical part of our Christian faith.

"But then, it becomes all the more apparent from this very view of the case, that there is no religious element at all in the outward fact, *as such*. The facts of Scripture derive their religious importance from the *conceptions* united to them—from the feeling that they had a certain significancy in the plans of Divine Providence. The fact, for example, that Jesus Christ came into the world, merely expresses *historically* the

statement, that a *human being* so named appeared at a given period, and performed such and such actions. The *religious* aspect of this fact depends on *the conception* that he had a certain relationship to the Deity, and a certain mission to mankind; a conception that must necessarily embody many high religious ideas and intuitions.

"Take again the great and wondrous fact of the *death* of Christ. As a fact of sense, this is no more than the murder of any innocent man that ever lived, to satiate the passions of a lawless multitude. But the moment we view this fact as a part of a providential *plan* for the salvation of the world, we attach to it a significance of which the senses can know nothing—of which the spiritual nature alone can judge; and so bring all the outward and visible facts connected with the life, death, and resurrection of Christ to a focus; yet, if we sweep away all power of *moral* perception, these very facts, so great, so glorious, so Divine, when viewed by the light of that elevated Christian consciousness, which they themselves contribute to awaken, become comparatively meaningless and ineffective. In every case alike, the historical *actuality* is one thing, the moral significance is quite another."—Pp. 212, 213.

He thus not only represents these facts as of a class that, according to his theory, owe their form wholly to the understanding, and have no likeness whatever to the objects by which that power is prompted to generate them; but he avers that the religious element, or moral significance that attaches to them, is itself another and higher species of mere *conception* that must also owe its existence to that faculty. As, then, according to him, that which is conceptional is a mere creation of the understanding, and not a reality; and that which is expressed in the forms of the understanding is merely ideal, and not real; it follows that the facts narrated in the Scriptures, as they are of that class, are wholly without authority, and as unsuitable to be made a basis or an element of a theological system, as any of the other conceptions which he would exclude from that office. If that which his whole theory asserts, and which it is the express object of his argument here to demonstrate, is true, that nothing that is conceptional has any authority in a theological system, then a conceptional fact is as wholly devoid of authority as a conceptional relation or end. On his principles, therefore, he has no element of theology whatever, either historical or moral. He has no material out of which he can build a system; no media by

which he can acquire a knowledge of realities ; and no means of expressing even the conceptions which the mind itself generates, except that of language, which, according to him, deludes perpetually, by exhibiting that as real which is only imaginary, and that as true, which is wholly false !

His representation, however, that there is no religious element in the facts narrated in the Scriptures, is wholly erroneous. It is as much a fact that Christ is divine, as it is that he is human. It is as much a fact that he died for our sins, as it is that he died at all. It is as much a fact that his incarnation, ministry, death, and resurrection, were in order to the objects that are ascribed to them, as it is that he became incarnate, taught, was crucified, and rose from the grave. To deny that these and others of the kind are facts, is to contradict the statements of the New Testament as directly, as it were to deny that Christ appeared in Judea, exercised a ministry, and was put to death. Our certainty of these facts is as ample, and is obtained through the same medium—the testimony of the apostles—as our certainty of the others. Mr. M. himself, indeed, inadvertently represents that there was, in one of those “outward” events, a moral element that was directly perceptible. Of “the great and wondrous fact of the death of Christ,” he says, “as a fact of sense, this is no more than the murder of any *innocent* man that ever lived, to satiate the passions of a lawless multitude.” But how could the fact that he was innocent be discerned by a mere sight of his crucifixion ? Could the image alone of his body reflected on the eye, any more than the image of the penitent malefactor, show that the spirit that had resided in it was innocent ? Could it any more show that he was innocent than that he was divine ? Was the evidence furnished by the whole scene of his crucifixion any more decisive of the one than of the other ? It indisputably presented ground for the *inference* of each to a beholder who had no other materials for a judgment, but not of an absolute knowledge. A certainty of his innocence and deity must, as ours is, have been derived from some other source. Mr. M.'s representation, however, that all that is religious in the facts stated in the Scriptures is the mere work of the imagination, is in accordance with his idealistic theory. If, as he holds, all that is

objective is purely conceptional, then, as there is no *material* universe, no fellow-being, and no God, all that in the events narrated in the Scriptures which implies that there is a God, a divine law, and a redemption by a mediator, must be purely ideal also, and owe its being wholly to the conceptional faculty. The validity of these objections he subsequently admits. He first denies, indeed, but erroneously, that they are applicable to his view of experimental theology.

"Let no one say, as has been ignorantly or falsely asserted, that this view of *Christian* theology denies either the historical element of Christianity, or the objective validity of its doctrines. It merely *affirms* that dogmatic theology, whether we view it as a whole, or in its individual parts, *is an outward expression of the inward life*, awakened by the revelation of the gospel."—P. 222.

His representation, thus, is, that dogmatic theology is not an expression of outward facts and truths; but only an outward expression of interior facts of the mind's consciousness. But by his theory all the conceptions of exterior things embraced in that consciousness are purely ideal, and owe their being and nature to the agency of the understanding, not to the existence of any external agents, objects, acts, or truths that correspond to them. By the terms, therefore, those conceptions involve no historical element whatever, and have no objective validity. The ascription to them of such a character is wholly inconsistent with his account of their nature and origin. Instead of being historical, they are wholly imaginary; in place of being objective, they are interior, and have no existence or counterpart out of the mind that conceives them. He, however, adds:—

"That inward life *itself* involves a direct perception of objective truth; although, as our religious consciousness is not perfect, but only progressing towards perfection, its perceptions may not be complete, and our expressions of dogmatic truth consequently may be very inadequate."—P. 222.

But this, also, is wholly mistaken. We have no perceptions, as we have already shown, of objective truth, independently of means. If Mr. Morell can directly see God, Christ,

angels, and the spirits of the just made perfect, and discern their natures, relations, and agencies, why does he not make known to us some of the objective truths respecting them that lie within the sphere of his vision? If such a power is common to men, why are they not conscious of it? Why do they not exert it, and extricate themselves from all uncertainty on themes that are of such interest? Why are they not omniscient? But the mind has no perceptions of objective things except such as take place through media. As therefore, according to Mr. Morell, all its perceptions that take place through media are merely conceptional, and form no evidence whatever of the existence of external objects that correspond to them; all the perceptions of objective truth embraced in Christian theology are purely ideal. That theology, therefore, is wholly without any "historical element," and void of "objective validity." He, however, admits the objection to be legitimate in respect to written theology; and in the admission re-affirms his theory and its consequences as we have stated them.

"We are not able to say the same thing respecting *formal* theology. Although it might have indicated primarily a real perception of objective truth, yet it is too often appropriated and professed by many in whom those perceptions have never been awakened. *If in any case, therefore, the charge of denying the objective reality of Scripture doctrine be well founded, it is in the case of those who resist the principle of theology we have laid down, and insist upon the DOGMAS THEMSELVES BEING DIRECT STATEMENTS at first hand of objective facts, without the intervention of the spiritual perception.* To those who seriously take their stand upon such a principle, we cannot imagine Christian theology to become anything greatly better than a mere system-building, in which the form is allowed to stand for the matter, while the mind, absorbed in dialectical subtlety, cheats itself of the living spiritual truth."—Pp. 222, 223.

This is one of the most extraordinary statements that ever fell from the pen of a philosophic critic; as the assertion which he utters is that they are obnoxious to the charge of denying the objective reality of the Scripture doctrines, who affirm that the facts which those doctrines directly state, are really objective! For what is it to "insist upon the dogmas themselves being direct statements of objective facts," unless it be to insist that

the facts which the dogmas directly state are truly objective? The language admits of no other meaning. By his own showing, therefore, his theory of theology denies the objective reality of the doctrines and facts of the Scriptures. But what after all does he mean by their objective reality? Not a real existence exterior to the mind! *He intends only the conception of them by the mind AS REAL AND OBJECTIVE.* Their objectivity is not real, therefore, but is only the form which the understanding imparts to them. They are, in fact, as absolutely subjective and unreal as though they were not conceived as existing out of the mind. "The spiritual perception" of those of which he speaks, is nothing else than *the conception* of them as spiritual truths, that are predicable of the ideal being to whom the mind refers them. And it is on this ground that he avers that to ascribe to the doctrines of the Scriptures an historical element and objective validity, is to deny that they are objective. For if, as his theory represents, there are no existences external to the mind, but the seeming objectivity that attaches to the objects of its perception is altogether conceptional; it follows, that to deny that their objectivity is of that nature, and ascribe to them another species that is wholly unreal, is, in fact, to deny that they have any objectivity whatever! Such is the process by which he attempts to vindicate his system from the charge of making all the agents, facts, and truths of Christianity merely ideal. The objection is false, he argues, because, if the theory accords with fact, then that which the objection alleges also accords with fact, and therefore is not in reality a legitimate objection! A subterfuge worthy of the metaphysics and theology it is employed to vindicate!

Having thus demonstrated to his satisfaction the impossibility of a written or uttered theology that embodies the truth, and made religion alike in respect to objects, facts, and affections, a mere "phase" of consciousness, he "next proceeds to discuss the manner in which it realizes itself in outward communities, by investigating the question of religious fellowship, as to its interior nature and its outward bond," which is for him a delicate undertaking; as the problem to be solved is: On the theory that none of the objects of our regard, God, fellow-beings, the material

substances around us, have a real existence out of the mind that conceives them, but are purely conceptional, how can men, though thus absolutely isolated, and cut off from the possibility of intercommunication or a knowledge of each other's existence, still give to their religion a social form and a common character, and commune and have fellowship with one another in respect to it? The only answer that can be given to the question consistently with the scheme, clearly is, that their fellowship can only be ideal. As the fellow-beings between whom it is imagined to take place are wholly conceptional, and have no actual existence out of the mind that contemplates them, the communication that is supposed to take place between them must also be wholly imaginary. This is not the response, however, which Mr. M. gives. He continues, as in his other discussions, to argue as though the objectivity which his scheme ascribes to God, fellow-beings, and the world, were real, instead of conceptional, and a religious fellowship of men, therefore, possible and real.

He first undertakes to prove that there must be a fellowship in religion, from the tendency of the mind to unite with those who cherish the same views and affections, from the necessity of concurrence and union, in order to impart to religion a distinct form, and give it publicity, and from the social nature of many religious duties. But these are not the points to be proved by him, in order to his object. We know that men are social; that some acts of religion are of a nature that requires them to unite and exert a concurring agency; and that of many of the duties to which they are called, their families, individuals around them, or the communities to which they belong, are the objects; and the question to be resolved by Mr. Morell is, If, as he holds, there are no fellow-beings;—if each individual is to himself the only known existence, how can such a society exist? How can such a fellowship in acts take place? The facts which he alleges, instead of yielding support to his theory, confute it; as they are wholly inexplicable on any other theory than, that God, fellow-beings, and the public and social acts which Christianity enjoins and men exert, have that objective reality which we naturally ascribe to them.

He exhibits this religious fellowship as a mere concurrence

of feeling. "It can have nothing essentially to do," he says, "with formal laws; . . . it cannot be dependent upon outward institutions; . . . it cannot consist in the common profession of any defined doctrines." . . . "The essential idea of Christian fellowship is concentrated in the hallowed unanimity of religious feeling, created by the common experience of that new divine *life* which was first awakened in man by Christ and his apostles." But how, on his theory of perception, can they have any intercommunication, or knowledge of each other's feelings? They are separated from each other by insurmountable barriers. They can exist to one another only as conceptions. Their intercourse must of necessity, therefore, be as imaginary as their being; and their unanimity of feeling as ideal as their existence.

Having thus discussed the necessity and nature of fellowship which on his views of our perceptive powers cannot possibly take place, he next treats of its "outward bond of unity," and endeavors especially to prove that a system of doctrines cannot be its basis; and among other reasons, on the ground that a doctrinal system does not embrace anything that is essential in Christianity.

"We oppose a fixed logical basis, because the statements it involves do not contain any essential element of Christianity. Many a sincere Christian, no doubt, may be somewhat startled at this assertion; but it is one we make very deliberately, and which follows indeed by necessary consequence from the principles we have already deduced. The essence of Christianity, as we said, is only cognisable directly by the power of the intuitional consciousness, for by it alone we are brought into direct sympathy and intercourse with divine *realities*. The truth which we thus acquire, is brought to us *immediately*; it implies the spontaneous perception of the spiritual object; and although this perception may be *dim* and incomplete, yet so far as it is developed *at all* it must be valid and real. On the other hand, the moment we bring these intuitions into the form of logical statements, they do not *necessarily* involve any essential element of Christianity whatever. It is true that if the mind possesses the intuitions fresh and living *within*, and if the logical statement be veritably the reflective representation of them, as actually existing, such a statement *does* contain an essential element within it. But this essential element does not depend upon the logical form. So far from that, it may exist in all its intensity *without*

it ; while in spite of the doctrinal form being complete, the *essence* may be entirely wanting."—P. 240.

But how can "religious feelings" be the medium of fellowship any more than a profession of doctrines? They must be uttered, and in language, as much as the ideas that constitute a doctrinal system, in order that they may be known to exist. They cannot be seen independently of media. The assumption that they can is not only a contradiction to our consciousness, but equivalent to a pretence that we are omniscient. But "the moment" they are brought "into the form of logical statements" they become, on Mr. M.'s theory, as uncertain and equivocal as doctrinal statements and professions are ; and cannot, "*necessarily*," any more than they, "involve any essential element of Christianity." Do not the arguments which he employs to show that language is a wholly uncertain means of expressing thought, prove with a like force that it is equally inadequate to a certain expression of feeling? If propositions that are true in one, after all contain no element whatever of Christianity, must not propositions that are true in the other, be equally devoid of that element? What a pitiable farce is his whole discussion on this subject! A fellowship of religious feeling is no more practicable on his principles, than a fellowship of doctrinal belief. They are alike physical impossibilities. Each individual is separated by insurmountable barriers from all others, and doomed by his nature to live in absolute solitude. He can neither know nor have any reason to believe that any besides himself exists. If he conceives that there are fellow-beings of the same nature, with whom he associates and enjoys a reciprocation of thought and affection, he deludes himself with phantoms that exist only in his own imagination.

Mr. Morell again repeats this empty game of words in his chapter on certitude. On his principles, the question : What assurance has the mind that what it regards as truth is really such? is not of easy solution. He admits that there is a "necessity" that we should have "certain *criteria* by which we may judge whether a given intuition, when realized and expressed, is so distinct and adequate as to be immediately recognised by other properly developed minds,—and thus

serve the purpose of a fixed and abiding conception of the objective reality ;" and holds that "distinctness, uniformity, and universality," are such criteria. But he here, as in his other reasonings, quits his own theory, and treats the outward existence which the mind ascribes to the objects of its thought, as though it were real instead of conceptional. He first assumes that there are other minds besides that which is the subject of the intuition ; then, that the intuition may be so expressed that they may discern and recognise it ; and finally, that their perception and recognition of it may also be known ; and thence a certainty obtained that it is a just conception of an objective reality. But neither of these assumptions is admissible on his theory. The question he is to solve is not, On the supposition that all the objects of knowledge have such an external existence as the mind ascribes to them, how is it to be assured that its views of them are true ? But how is it to know that its views of them are correct, on the supposition of his theory, that they have no real external existence, but are mere spectres of its own fancy ? And the answer is indisputably : So far from having any assurance of their accuracy, it first has the most absolute certainty that they are, in one relation, totally false ; inasmuch as they ascribe a real exterior existence to that which is merely ideal ; and next, apart from that consideration, it has no criteria by which it can determine that they are true. There is no reality with which they can be compared ; and their distinctness, uniformity, and universality, instead of being founded on the nature of the objects which they respect, are imparted to them by the mind, and like those objects themselves are merely ideal.

After urging the necessity of some criteria by which the truth of religious views may be determined, he proceeds to show that we have no such criteria either in the facts of Christianity, reason, tradition, or "the Bible." He denies that the word of God is an adequate standard, on the ground, first, that many of the truths of theology are not contained in it ; and next, that as everything that is seemingly external is purely ideal, the meaning that attaches to the propositions of the Scriptures is imparted to them by the mind ; instead of the mind's receiving that meaning from the propositions them-

selves. How, then, are we to obtain a certainty that our views accord with truth? His answer is worthy of the confusion of ideas and self-contradiction that mark the whole course of his speculations.

"The *absolute condition* for attaining *scientific* certitude in connexion with Christian truth, lies in the possibility of our possessing clear and decisive intuitions of such spiritual realities as are presented by the Christian revelation, of stating them in distinct terms, and applying to them the criteria we have before referred to."—P. 288.

That is: a possibility of attaining views of religious truth, that are correct, is indispensable in order to a scientific demonstration, that views that are entertained are of that character. Or, in other words: we cannot demonstrate that our views of the great realities of the Christian system accord with truth, unless we are constitutionally capable of attaining true views of those realities; inasmuch as if we are physically incapable of discerning the truth, the views we actually entertain must be false! What a gigantic stride towards a determination of the question! What a dazzling light is thus thrown over a point, which "systematic theology" is accustomed to invest with midnight darkness! But to complete the self-contradiction and absurdity of his representation; on his theory not one of these conditions of a scientific certitude of truth exists! First: It is wholly impossible, according to his scheme, to attain accurate ideas of the great realities of Christian truth; for by our constitution we necessarily regard God, Christ, fellow-beings, and other agents and objects of which Christianity treats, as having an actual objective existence: but he denies their objective reality, and asserts that they are only ideal. All our intuitions of them, therefore, are in the most important sense wholly false. Next: It is equally impossible, on his theory, to express our ideas with clearness and certainty. He occupies a great number of his pages in attempting to show that language cannot be a sure and adequate vehicle of thought; that the moment an idea is embodied in terms, it not only becomes vague and equivocal, but the subject itself of the uttered or written proposition is numerically and wholly different from that of the idea; the

latter being a reality—the former a mere shadow ; the theme of the idea an objective verity, but that of the language, a conception that exists nowhere except in the mind from which it emerges ! And finally : On his theory there are no such criteria, as he assumes, by which the truth of ideas can be determined. There are no realities with which they can be compared ; and as on his scheme all ideas are necessarily false, it is a contradiction to suppose that there are any criteria by which some of them can be shown to be true. He proceeds :

“ The real principles of religious certitude can be deduced without much difficulty from the very nature of intuition. Intuition, as we have before explained, implies a direct gazing upon truth in its concrete unity.”—P. 292.

But how can there be an intuition of truth, if there is no truth to be seen ? By his theory the only object of the mind's perceptions is its own operations. Its intuition is nothing more than its consciousness of its own conceptions and feelings. The apparent objects of those conceptions have no existence out of the mind. Its direct gaze upon them, therefore, is no direct gaze upon truth in a concrete form, or as an objective reality. But, if thus without any external reality of which truth is predicable ; without any power of discerning anything out of itself ; and without any means of expressing what it in fact discerns in its own consciousness, how is the mind to determine whether its views of truth are correct or not ? The annals of bewildered speculation furnish nothing that transcends the self-contradiction and folly of his answer.

“ Now the most natural procedure we can follow—one, too, into which we almost instinctively fall—is to appeal to other minds circumstanced in the same manner, or perhaps still more favorably than ourselves. When our intuitions of spiritual things prove to be ideas very partially experienced—when we do not excite any strong sympathy in other minds—when they fail to establish their claims by the readiness with which they are grasped, approved, and appropriated by men earnest for the truth, and placed under the proper conditions for becoming awakened to its reality, there is good reason for us to believe that they are intuitions of a very imperfect character. On the contrary, in

proportion as different minds placed under different circumstances bear a concurring testimony to the distinct realization of any great conception, and fully agree in the mode of its expression—in that proportion we feel the chance of distortion and imperfection in our own vision to be diminished, and a basis of certitude to be laid in the very fact of such a universal consent.

“We are thus brought in fact to the very same great criterion which we laid down as applicable generally to the verification of human knowledge in its fundamental principles; for we require in Christian conceptions as well as all other, that they should possess clearness, uniformity, and in a certain sense universality, to substantiate their full claim to be regarded as sure and *certain*.”—P. 293.

The criteria of truth, then, are wholly objective, and lie in the clearness, uniformity, and universality of the ideas entertained and expressed respecting it by *other persons*! But how can that be? By his theory, there are no other persons. Each individual mind is to itself the only intelligence that has being. All else that bears the name of man, is merely ideal. What he denominates “other minds,” and “men earnest for the truth,” are nothing but mere conceptions of a certain class, that exist only in the intellect that generates them. The criterion, accordingly, by which the truth of its views is to be determined, is “the distinctness, uniformity, and universality” of that species of its own conceptions! But that is to make those ideas their own criteria; for the very question to be decided is, whether they are true, or not; and that is equivalent to the assumption that there are no criteria of their character;—but that the mere fact that they are conceived, is demonstrative that they are true!

Such is the result in which his search after certitude terminates. After admitting the necessity of some criteria of the truth of our views, and denying that there are any either in the facts of Christianity which they respect, tradition, reason, or the records of the Bible, he ends by referring us to themselves for proofs of their accuracy; treats the mere fact that they exist, as a demonstration that they are true; and thereby exhibits that as the character of all our ideas, and renders the supposition that any of them are false, solecistical and absurd! A brilliant *eclaircissement* truly of “the scientific certitude” of our religious ideas!

Mr. Morell's philosophy of Christianity is thus throughout a mere philosophy of idealism, or attempt to explain the existence and nature of the Christian religion on the theory that it is wholly imaginary,—the mere creature of the mind, without any objective ground;—that there is no Deity, no created intelligence, no external world, no moral government, no sin, nor redemption; no objective reality of any description; but that each mind is to itself the only being; and all that seems to be external to it, merely conceptional and the product of its own powers. It is a philosophy, accordingly, of the most comprehensive and absolute infidelity, veiled under a pretence of receiving and professing Christianity; and in that respect the most dangerous that has ever been promulgated. Hume, Voltaire, Paine, and their associates and disciples, in their attempt to overthrow the Christian religion, had the honesty to avow their rejection of it. The school to which Mr. Morell belongs add to infidelity, the guilt of falsely professing to receive the truth which it is their aim to exterminate from the faith of their fellow-men. The belief of Christianity on the principles of this philosophy is physically impossible, and the belief of this philosophy is alike impossible on the principles of Christianity. This Mr. Morell fully understands. He shows at every step of his long and tortuous discussions that he rejects Christianity, and all that it respects, as realities existing out of the mind that contemplates them, and regards them as mere spectra or phenomena of consciousness. He no more regards the Jehovah of the Scriptures as a real existence, than the Brama of the Hindoos, or Jupiter of the Greeks. He is only a form of thought which the understanding in the condition of a Jew or christianized Gentile spontaneously and necessarily generates; but without any more objective ground, or counterpart, than the different form that rises in the imagination of a Hottentot or a New Zealander. He cannot regard him as a real objective existence, while he contemplates him as a mere idea. His principles necessarily lead to the most absolute scepticism, and he fully perceives and openly acknowledges it, in respect to the speculations of Kant, Hegel, and others, from whom he drew his system. He says:—

"The theoretical portion of the Kantian philosophy contained the elements of speculative scepticism, which were sure to have their effect upon scientific theology. . . Christianity itself, as a fact of history, and a phenomenon of the human mind, was exposed to all the criticism of the speculative reason, and to all the uncertainties in which, according to Kant, that speculative reason, when applied to questions of objective reality, involves us. Here there was no fixed principle of certitude pointed out; but, instead of this, a principle of scepticism very distinctly involved.

"The historical results of Kant's philosophy prove to us, most unquestionably, the truth of this representation. . . Its speculative side evolved those sweeping systems of subjective idealism which drew the truths of Christianity along with everything else, into one vast chain of *a priori* reasoning, and stripped it at once of all its objective reality. In Hegel, Christianity became entirely sublimated into a dialectical development of ideas, so that his philosophy of religion, as applied to theology by Marheineke, is no other than the doctrine of the church, made one with the scientific development of theological consciousness, through the perfect realization of the laws of thought. It needed only the speculative keenness of a Strauss and a Feuerbach to cut off the objective reality from religion altogether, and to make the whole but the natural striving of humanity to realize its own dignity, and pay its adoration to a shrine of which itself is at once the deity and the worshipper."—Pp. 272, 273.

But Mr. Morell's philosophy is in its principal element identically the same as that of Kant and Hegel. The theory that all the objects of perception are merely conceptional, and owe their being and seeming outwardness to the understanding, not to the action on our organs of the external objects which they represent, is the germ out of which their whole speculative systems sprang, and the instrument by which "they stripped Christianity of all its objective validity," and introduced a universal scepticism; and that theory is held by Mr. Morell as specifically as it was by them, and is made the medium, in like manner, of his whole philosophical and theological scheme. He denies the existence of anything out of consciousness as absolutely as they. His philosophy is a "sweeping system of subjective idealism," as truly and as conspicuously as theirs; and however disguised by pretensions, he is to be considered an infidel both speculatively and

practically, as indisputably as any who have ever attempted to overturn Christianity and substitute a false system in its place.

It seems in some relations surprising that men of any class should be capable and disposed to embrace a theory so palpably false, so contradictory to our nature, and involving our existence in such cheerlessness and gloom; but there are dreamy, daring, and perverse minds to whom it seems to have irresistible charms. It suits their dispositions and principles. They dislike a self-existing Deity of infinite power, knowledge, justice, goodness, and truth; who has rights over his moral creatures which his perfections require that he should assert and enforce. They shrink from the thought of a God whose very holiness may make it necessary that he should punish them. They turn away with distaste and aversion from a Deity who cannot or will not save them without an expiation. They reject with scorn a salvation which they cannot receive except as a free gift, and with an acknowledgment of their merit of destruction. They wish a God who is their subject, instead of their sovereign, and a religion that sanctions and fosters their passions in place of subjecting them to restraint; and they find such a deity and such a religion in this scheme. They are themselves, here, at once divinity and worshipper, lawgiver and subject, responsible to no one for their actions, and with no one to witness their agency; and such an exemption from the dominion of an Almighty, all-just, and all-holy God; such an isolation from spectators, and such an unrestrained license, meets their wishes; and they embrace and cherish the error, because of the independence and self-disposal with which it invests them. The adoption of it, accordingly, forms as indubitable a sign, probably, as is ever given by men, of total alienation from God; as no other scheme was ever so entirely made up of falsehoods, and of falsehoods so destructive of all truth. In Germany, accordingly, where it was originated, and where infidelity had long prevailed, it has drawn to its train almost the whole body of the clergy and churches. It has obtained many disciples, also, in Great Britain and this country. There is a disposition to embrace it in minds generally that dislike and question the great doctrines of the Christian

system,—God's existence, omnipotence, dominion, sovereignty, and justice,—Christ's deity and expiation, man's sinfulness and need of a gratuitous salvation; and they are very numerous. Its great elements have long had a place in our fashionable literature; they are taught in several of our colleges and theological schools; they have many disciples among those in the sacred office, and here and there an open advocate; and understanding one another, acting in conjunction, and artful, bold, and unscrupulous, they are likely to form a large party and give a wide prevalence to their principles. There is reason to believe that the churches are about to be called through this medium to a great and decisive trial of their fidelity. To many it may, perhaps, seem, that on such a question, there can be little room to fear that any considerable number will fall from their allegiance to God; and, were it a mere question between theism and atheism, between Christianity and infidelity, irrespective of all other considerations, it would, perhaps, prove so. The trial is, however, to be complicated with a variety of influences that will make it a far more severe and decisive test of the heart. There are some whose decision will depend on the popularity of leaders; with some it will be an affair of self-interest. Will it be creditable? Will it exempt them from the necessity of a controversy? Will they be supported by the multitude? With others it will be a question of ambition. Will it be favorable to a reputation for talent and scholarship? Will it be a passport to conspicuity and influence? Will it secure an honorable and lucrative position? With others, still, it will be a question of party or official policy. Will it induce a greater number to act in concert with them? Will it enable them to combine a larger body in the promotion of the public objects to which they are devoted? Will it release them from their fears, confirm them in their position, and arm them with new powers to reward their friends and put down their opponents? And under these powerful temptations, who can doubt that many will be found unfaithful; some from indifference to the truth; not a few from irresolution and reluctance to fulfil a duty that compels them to quit their neutrality and confess Christ at the cost of opposition and reproach; many from vanity and ambition; and crowds from

their dislike of the gospel and preference of a system that sanctions their false views and selfish passions. And what decisive proofs will they give that they are not Christ's disciples! If to neglect and disown his brethren in their wants and sorrows, is to disown him; how much more is this formal denial of his existence, and treatment of him as a mere spectre of the imagination, to disown and reject him! No other act, probably, that men ever exert, forms so decisive a demonstration of a total apostasy. And when once they assume the attitude of open discipleship to the scheme, or even of neutrality, their return may be considered as hopeless. It seems to be a law of the divine administration, that false teachers and their followers should be left to pursue their errors to their natural results, and cause their character to be seen by their fruits. It is rare that the open renouncers of the great doctrines of the Christian system, and propagators of another gospel, are recalled from their errors to a reception of the truth. Their progress is usually in the opposite direction. The converts to this philosophy are peculiarly unlikely to be convinced by any proofs, however unanswerable, of their error. Having renounced not only their senses, their reason, and their consciousness, but their language, also, as wholly deceptive, there are no means through which, as long as they act on their theory, they can be extricated from their delusion. The most resistless evidences, the most overwhelming arguments fail of their end, as necessarily as shot aimed at antagonists stationed at the antipodes, or the inhabitants of another orb. They are deserted by the Spirit; they are surrendered by God to the dominion of their principles, that there may be a practical exemplification of their character, and that the condemnation they are to meet may be seen to be just. May God in his mercy withhold his people from the guilt of yielding their countenance to this impious renunciation of Christ! May he protect the young, who are peculiarly exposed, from the snare, which, by means of it, the great adversary is spreading for their feet!

ART. II.—THE DANGERS AND DIFFICULTIES OF THE MINISTRY.

HAD the problem been submitted to men at the introduction of Christianity: With what reception is the religion of Christ to meet? In what estimation are its teachers to be held? What is the influence which its laws are to exert over his disciples?—the answer would have differed very widely from what has taken place, both in respect to the arrangements of providence and the conduct of men. It was natural to suppose, and the apostles themselves, until taught otherwise, seem to have thought, that the designs of the Most High were quite unlike those which have been unfolded in his administration; and equally natural to assume that the means which were employed to demonstrate and give impression to the gospel would accomplish their end: that Christ having by his death opened the way for the redemption of man, and received all power in heaven and earth to execute his will, would immediately give supremacy to his kingdom, and subject the nations to his sceptre; and that his disciples, commissioned to proclaim the glad tidings of his salvation, and endowed with miraculous power to verify their message, would arrest the attention and command the respect of men, universally, and enjoy a career of boundless popularity and success. That God should, by withholding his Spirit, leave their labors in a large degree to prove inefficacious; that he should by his providence allow them to be embarrassed by innumerable difficulties, and a vast exemplification take place of the inadequacy of their ministry to the conversion of mankind; that men, instead of being convinced by the wonderful works which they performed, and won by the graciousness of their message, should reject their doctrine, disregard the attestations which God gave of it, and pursue them wherever they went with scorn, abuse, and violence, scourging them as felons, and slaughtering them as the enemies of the race; would doubtless have been deemed utterly inconsistent with the very design of Christ's interposition, and in the utmost degree improbable. Yet such was the history of their ministry, and that of their faithful successors, through a long series of ages; and such, except that

they are not persecuted, is, in a large measure, the experience of those who now exercise the sacred office. Though the obstructions and discouragements with which they meet differ much from those of earlier ages, they yet are, in some form or other, their perpetual attendants. The office exposes to many risks; it is embarrassed by many necessities; it involves many self-denials. They who exercise it are called, through the whole course of their labors, to a trial of their fidelity. They are placed in a series of conditions in which they are compelled to make choice between truth and error; between a resolute discharge of their duty to God, and a selfish compliance with the wishes of men; between toil and ease, between poverty and competence, and often between reproach and applause. Their work is emphatically one of difficulties. The allotments of providence are such that they are put under a necessity of acting out their principles and dispositions, and demonstrating visibly whether they are true ministers of Christ, or not. Their conditions, indeed, are arranged as though that were as much their main design as the conversion of men; and when unveiled to the eye of the universe, will doubtless be found to have served that end even more adequately than the other, and given rise to an exemplification that will be the ground of their final award. And the conditions in which they are called to labor, and the obstructions thrown in their way, are the means, also, of a similar trial of their people. They are put to a like necessity of manifesting their dispositions towards God, the estimate they place on the gospel, and the respect in which they hold its ministers; and this, also, is doubtless as adequately exemplified, as though it were the chief purpose of his providence.

This great feature of the ministry deserves to be most attentively considered, and the lessons which it teaches indelibly impressed on the heart. It is to those who assume the sacred office one of the most affecting relations in which it can be contemplated. The fact that the great questions are on trial at every step: What are the views by which they are governed? Are they the true disciples of Christ? Do they preach his word? Are they guided supremely by his authority? Do they ascribe to him the rights that are his? Do they assign to his death its proper office and influence?

Do they view their relations to him aright, and take the station which belongs to them as his ministers? Do they devote themselves unreservedly to his service, and endure, with patience and submission, the trials of their calling? Are they true to his cause, and ready to endure reproaches and meet death rather than swerve from their allegiance? Is their whole conduct such that, when unveiled to the universe, all orders of beings will see indubitable evidence, and feel a resistless conviction that they are his sincere disciples?—That these questions are perpetually on trial gives their office a most intimate reference to him, and invests it with a fearful significance. A proportional interest attaches, accordingly, to the inquiry: How, in these conditions, are they to discharge their duties? What is the peculiar nature of their difficulties and dangers? And what are their proper preventives and remedies?

We propose to discuss this subject, not in reference to the condition of the profession in one division of the church, or part of the country, rather than another, but irrespective of denominations and individuals in its common relations to all. We shall first consider the dangers and difficulties that attend a preparation for the sacred office; and next, the trials and hindrances of the office itself.

I. In preparing for the ministry young men are liable to be betrayed into wrong views of the proper qualifications for the profession. The grounds of admission to it differ very widely in different branches of the church, and have in some but a slight relation to its duties. Thus, in England for a long period an intimate knowledge of the classics was not only the principal requisite to the ministry, but an almost certain passport to a station of influence and wealth. In all churches, and at all periods, there are instances probably in which persons are introduced into the office for considerations that involve at best only very partial qualifications for it; one, perhaps, simply because he is pious, though he has neither suitable knowledge nor talents; another, because he speaks with effect, and would make an influential minister if he were fitted for the profession by proper education and self-discipline; a third, for no higher reason possibly than that he receives

some peculiar tenet that at the moment is the subject of discussion, and may render him a resolute partisan ; a fourth, because he holds a particular theory of metaphysics ; and others on other grounds that are equally inadequate.

An error into which they very often fall, and without suspecting it, is a neglect to make themselves properly acquainted with the teachings and spirit of the Scriptures. Not that they do not read them ; not that they do not professedly make them the standard of their faith ; not that they do not gain much knowledge of them ; but that they do not study them thoroughly, become from a direct examination truly aware of their teachings, and imbued with their truths by meditation, application to themselves, and an earnest cultivation of the convictions and affections they are designed to excite. This is probably a more general and serious omission, in preparation for the office, than any other. They are usually, when they begin their theological course, but very imperfectly acquainted with the sacred word ; and the knowledge they acquire of it in the progress of their studies is derived in too large a degree from other books. Not a few, on entering the ministry, would, if deprived of compends and systems, be incapable of giving a summary of its great teachings. They would need not only a specific preparation, but a study of the Bible in a new relation. Not a few, probably, if questioned, would find themselves unable to state what the chief peculiarities were of God's dealings with the Israelites ; the principles on which his government over them was conducted ; or the relation it bore to the Christian dispensation. And there are few, perhaps, who, if interrogated, would not be perplexed to show, with accuracy, what the great features were of his providential administration, during the first age of the Christian church ; what principal truths were verified in the lives of the first believers and their enemies ; or what the characteristics now are of God's dealings with his children.

Yet this intimate knowledge of the Scriptures, acquired by the direct study and meditation of them ; this adjustment of the views to their teachings, and vivid sense of their truths, is indispensable to a preparation for the ministry. No other knowledge can supply its place ; no other can generate the

deep realizations, or inspire the love, the faith, and the zeal that are requisite to render the duties of the office pleasurable and effective.

Another error to which, from the fashion of the day, theological students, and especially those of talents and ambitious wishes, are probably peculiarly exposed, is the assumption that a proficiency in the sacred languages, and familiarity with a class of modern authors on the Scriptures, theology, and history, are the highest and most ample qualifications for the office. They are, it is well known, not only the chief that are possessed, but that are sought by the ministers and theological teachers of some of the Protestant churches abroad; and there is, we think, a strong tendency here to the same misjudgment. That they are at the moment deemed peculiarly important requisites to theological and literary professorships, and a passport generally, when attained in high degrees, to respectable and influential stations, naturally renders them objects of ardent desire, and leads to their being regarded as the best preparative for the ministry. The study of them is at least treated by many as the most important branch of a theological training. To be able to read Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Syriac, Arabic, Persian, German, French, Italian, or a portion of them; to be versed in modern grammars, lexicons, and the minutiae of the new exegesis; and perhaps in a still higher degree, to be familiar with recent foreign compends of theology; to know who are the latest and most popular authors; to have looked into their volumes, and be able to translate them, is held to be the most meritorious attainment to which a young man can aspire; the acme of a preparation for the ministry! We do not depreciate that species of learning. A knowledge of the ancient languages is not only useful and important, but essential to a thorough theological education. It is not itself, however, such an education, but only a preparative and auxiliary to it. A student may become a proficient in them, and in all the refinements of modern philology, and familiar with a multitude of the volumes of criticism, explication, and doctrine, which their cultivators have issued, and yet know little of theology. He may outstrip them, indeed, in that species of culture, and still be totally disqualified for the sacred office; as is shown by

the fact that a large share of those abroad, who have most distinguished themselves in that branch of learning, neither receive the Scriptures as a revelation from God, nor believe in his existence. There is no natural connexion, indeed, between their irreligion and their learning. Instead, their conjunction is an anomaly. It shows, however, that that branch of knowledge is not by any means a full qualification for the ministry. As well might a student of law assume that an acquaintance with Latin and English, logic and rhetoric, is all that is requisite to the legal profession. Yet this mistake, into which they are betrayed perhaps by the enthusiasm of their philological teacher, or the fashion of the period, may prove fatal to them, cause them to pause at the threshold of their profession, and exhaust their powers on its mere preparatives, instead of employing them as auxiliaries to the ends for which they are designed. It is found, when they enter on their office, that they have been qualifying themselves to teach the languages, not to preach the gospel; to conduct men through a course of academical study, not to guide them to eternal life. Their discourses are literary instead of evangelical; barren of appropriate thoughts, and suitable rather to the chair of a pedagogue, or literary professor, than the pulpit. We do not suppose this to be the greatest danger to which they are exposed; or that any considerable number are likely to fall under its influence. There are, probably, far more who will err in the other direction, and injuriously neglect the sacred languages, and the art of interpretation. Nor do we regard the evil of a zealous addiction to that branch of culture to lie wholly in the disproportionate attention given to it; but in a large degree in the false principles, the insidious attacks on Christianity, and the artful misrepresentations of its doctrines, with which the fashionable foreign criticism, theology, and metaphysics, are fraught. We believe it, however, to be a real danger. The reputation which a few acquired who first cultivated and gave a degree of popularity to those studies, and in a large measure, because of their novelty, and the undeserved commendation which has been bestowed on the exegesis and theology of the modern Germans, has led to an over-estimate of their works, and not only betrayed many into an appropriation to them of an undue share of

time, but seduced them to an acquiescence in their false views of God, the universe, and the work of redemption. It is a danger we trust, however, that will gradually pass away. As the number who cultivate German theology increases, and its character becomes understood, it will sink from its undue estimate; and where there is no other merit, instead of a means, become not improbably an obstacle to reputation and influence.

II. They are in still greater danger of being betrayed into mistakes in respect to theology itself, and adopting a false system in place of the truths which it is their office to preach. That they are exposed to such errors is apparent, not only from the diversity of views entertained by different sects, but by the differences on the most important questions that exist among those of the same denomination. Almost all the larger Protestant churches are divided into two parties, whose creeds vary essentially on some of the great doctrines of theology. Such differences exist especially among Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Methodists, and Baptists. They cannot all be right, nor are their diversities such that it is of slight moment which of several views are entertained. Many of them are fundamentally erroneous, and vitiate the whole system into which they are introduced. There is a variety of means through which they are liable to be betrayed into this error.

They may be misled by their teachers. The power of a theological instructor over his pupils is very great. If talented, learned, specious, earnest, and persuasive, his influence is almost irresistible. They enter on their studies unacquainted with many of the great themes of which they are to form opinions; and unaware of the means by which the errors that are advanced are to be confuted; or the truths that are assailed defended from objection. If the teacher is of comprehensive views, enlightened by the Spirit of God, upright, candid, and skilful, he unfolds the various truths of revelation in their genuine forms and relations, and leads them to receive them in their greatness and harmony. If he be a speculatist rather than a believer, and bent on moulding theology into the form of his theory, instead of adjusting his views to the teachings of revelation; if he be adroit in setting

forth the merits and concealing the defects of his own system, and accustomed to descend to misrepresentation and ridicule to defame and disgrace the truth, he will almost as certainly seduce them to a reception of his peculiar scheme, imbue them with his own partisan spirit, and inspire them with a zealous antagonism to the doctrines which he misrepresents and rejects. How vast and decisive the influence is which is thus exerted, is seen from the fact that the theology of students generally is that of their instructors. The pupils of Luther, Calvin, Arminius, Socinus, and Wesley, generally embraced the faith which they were severally taught. Our theological schools, in like manner, usually impress their doctrinal characteristics, whether right or wrong, on those to whom they give instruction. To know where a youth is educated, is to know either that he has embraced the peculiar system that is taught there, or at least that it is not the object of his decided aversion. The first step which a student takes in preparing for the sacred office, is thus decisive often of the character of his whole ministry. If his instructor imbue him with the truth, impart to him just views of God, of his government, of man, of the work of redemption, inspire him with lofty thoughts of his office, and fire him with the spirit of fidelity, self-denial, and zeal, he becomes a faithful minister of Jesus Christ, and enjoys the blessing of the Spirit in his labors. Happy are they who are educated by such a guide. If his teacher hold an essentially false system, and is artful, aspiring, and bent on making a proselyte and coadjutor in his ambitious schemes, rather than a faithful steward of the gospel, he will almost certainly receive an element into his faith and spirit, that will spread a blight over all his labors, and make him a minister of evil instead of good to his people.

III. They are liable to be led to the reception of an erroneous doctrinal system by ecclesiastical authority. There is, perhaps, but little danger of this here, where each one is at liberty to embrace what creed he pleases without any loss of privilege or position. In those churches in Europe, however, in which the rulers and ecclesiastics assume the right of dictating what faith shall be professed by those who enter the ministry; and make assent to their creed a con-

dition, also, of admission to the seats of learning, and eligibility to employments under the governments, powerful temptations are presented to give a concurrence to systems that involve mischievous errors. In place of that, they are here exposed to the danger rather of adopting a theological scheme through the influence of great and popular names; of judging the word of God by the constructions which have been put on it by men who, from the epoch in which they lived, the agencies they exerted, or their talents and learning, have risen to authority. There have been, and are, teachers in every church, whose opinions, and sometimes through causes that have little connexion with their merits, have acquired such an influence over their followers;—a Luther and Melancthon, in the churches of Saxony, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden; Calvin, among the Reformed; Arminius and Episcopius with their disciples; Wesley with the Methodists; and in our own country, Edwards, Hopkins, Emmons, and others, with their several schools. Thousands, doubtless, are determined in their creed by the mere consideration that it was held by the founder, or some conspicuous teacher of the denomination with which they are associated. Their error lies, not in reading their works, nor in embracing the truths which they teach; but first, in embracing those truths simply or chiefly because they were held by them; and next, in adopting their errors because they were received and inculcated by them as truths. They thereby, in effect, exalt them above God, and interpret his word by their constructions of it, instead of judging their views of its teachings by his word. It is thus that the errors of the founders and leaders of denominations, though a thousand times refuted, continue to be propagated from age to age. . What crowds have in this way been induced to embrace a defective, perhaps a fundamentally false theology! The fame of a teacher, his authority with his denomination, peradventure the fidelity and skill with which he advocated some great truth; perhaps the speciousness with which he invested his errors, or the sway which he acquired by his powers as an orator, rather than a thinker, make him an object of interest, of respect, or of admiration, and seduce those whose confidence and esteem he has thus conciliated, to surrender themselves wholly to his guidance.

Against this danger the student should assiduously guard himself. His sole search should be after truth; his inquiry, at every step: is this what God has taught? and the trial of that question by his word, conducted with the reverence and submission that are due to his authority. One instance of success in such an effort; one triumph in an endeavor to reach that perfect subjection to God, and impartiality towards men; to relinquish prepossessions; to overcome personal and party attachments, and embrace the truth in all its purity and greatness, because it is God's; adjust to it all his speculations, and cherish its influence, is an achievement worth a thousand mere literary attainments; gives elevation and stability to the principles and affections; and, in a large degree, disarms writers and teachers who inculcate false views, of their power to injure. On the other hand, to embrace a tenet merely because it is taught by some great leader or favorite, to become a strenuous partisan, to resort to art and sophistry to give it the color of truth, and misrepresent and torture the Scriptures to escape the proofs of its erroneousness, is to fall from fidelity to God, to a discipleship to man, and admit an element into his mind that may vitiate all his principles and affections, and prove the means of his ruin, and the ruin of those who come under his influence.

IV. They are in still greater danger, perhaps, of being betrayed into an erroneous theology by the adoption of some psychological or metaphysical theory, that exhibits man as a different being from what he is; gives a false view of the attributes or rights of God; or misrepresents the nature of obedience and disobedience, and thereby leads necessarily to the misapprehension, also, of a wide circle of other subjects with which they are connected. There are several such theories that give their tinge to the whole theological system into which they are admitted. If God and man are assumed to be different from what they are in nature, prerogatives, or obligations, it results inevitably, in order to consistency, that false views must also be formed of God's laws and providence, and man's duty. Thus, for example, if the dogma held by some be true, that virtue and religion consist solely in the desire and pursuit of happiness, and that that desire is the only motive from which moral agents can act, it then follows of necessity that

all the moral and religious acts of men are absolutely virtuous ; and that their defect, therefore, if they have any, is merely one of degree, and springs from a cause for which they are not blamable. For if they neither do nor can act except from a single motive, and that motive is virtuous, then by the terms their agency cannot be wrong in kind. If any imperfection attaches to them, therefore, it must be such as results inevitably from the limitation of their faculties, or their condition. The theory thus, at a stroke, sets aside the whole representation given in the Scriptures of our moral nature and agency, and God's administration over us. God, it follows irresistibly, cannot be the author of the laws which his word ascribes to him ; for they exhibit men as under obligation to obey him because of his nature and relations ; not simply because it will secure their happiness. Instead, the happiness that is to result from obedience is proposed as the reward of obedience to him because of his nature and relations. Men, it follows also, are not sinners, but blameless and holy. The evils therefore which they suffer cannot be consequences of guilt ; but are only misfortunes. Their innocence makes it certain, also, that they cannot be punished in a future existence, and thence that they do not need a Redeemer. The doctrine thus leads naturally to a rejection of the Scriptures as a revelation, and the whole system of truths which they teach. And, though it may not be rigidly followed to all its legitimate consequences, it will inevitably overcloud and distort the truths which it thus directly contradicts, and give birth to uncertainty and fluctuation, if not to scepticism. Could their minds who have embraced it, be fully unveiled, it would be found, we apprehend, universally, that their whole speculative systems are essentially shaped and colored by it ; and, in many instances, have become little else than a vague and reasonless naturalism.

An equally fatal result will naturally spring from the adoption of the theory that men act in volition wholly irrespective of motives, and must in order to freedom and responsibility. For if they put forth their volitions independently of motives, they then have no reason for them of which they are conscious, either in their views or emotions. But if they have no conscious reasons for their volitions, then they do not exert them intelligently, and, consequently, they cannot be virtuous

or sinful, as intelligence in acts is essential in order to their morality.

Moreover, if facts, truths, and considerations, cannot have any influence on moral agents in volition, then it is impossible that they should be subjects of a moral government; as the express office of a moral government is, to influence them in their volitions by moral considerations, by rights, laws, obligations, and rewards of good and evil. God commands, and prohibits, and enforces his commands by sanctions, in order to induce men to act conformably to his will. The idea of a rule of action is on any other view preposterous. How can it be a rule to them, if their constitution renders it physically impossible that they should act with a reference to it? How can a government be exercised over them, if they cannot be influenced in their conduct? As then, according to this dogma, they cannot act under a law, it follows that God has not established a government over them; and thence on the one hand that the Scriptures are not a revelation from him, and, on the other, that they are not sinners against him; consequently, that the evils which they experience are not the effects of transgression; and, finally, that as they are not obnoxious to punishment, they do not need a Redeemer. They are thus naturally led by their principles to the rejection of the whole system of revealed truth. If they do not follow it to this issue, it still may betray them into a denial or misconstruction of many of the important doctrines of the Scriptures. Thus if God cannot influence men in their choices, then their illumination, conviction, conversion, and sanctification, cannot be produced by his Spirit; and thence the ascription to him of those effects by the prophets and apostles, is to be set aside. Again, if neither anything in the views and affections of men, nor in God's agency on them, is the reason of their exerting the volitions which they do, but their choices come into existence, and are what they are, without any reason whatever; then God cannot constitute nor possess beforehand any ground of certainty that they are to be exerted; and thence cannot have any media through which he can foresee them. Consequently, the ascription to him in the Scriptures of a foreknowledge of their actions, must be set aside. That that theory of volition leads those who entertain it, in a mea-

sure, at least, to these results, is apparent from the views which they express of the great doctrines of the Scriptures, which it immediately affects. They may not, indeed, directly deny God's foreknowledge, purposes, and providence, the consistency of his exerting a decisive influence with man's freedom and responsibility; nor the fact that his purpose of exercising such a moral and providential administration as he does, constitutes a certainty that their voluntary agency will be what it is; they may yield a vague assent to them; but their conceptions and representations of them are dim and confused; and the feeling is betrayed at every step, that, however they may be real, they are seemingly contradictory and impossible. They, accordingly, are usually either assailed and denounced, or shunned by them, and other views presented of those great subjects that are more in harmony with their theory of moral agency.

The dogma that the mind—not the action of objects on it from without—is the cause of its perceptions of things exterior to itself, and that the universe, therefore, is merely ideal, draws after it, in like manner, the rejection of the whole system of revealed truth. If the reason of the mind's perception of external things does not lie at all in the existence and action on it of such objects, but solely in itself, then its perceptions are no evidence of the existence of such objects. But if its perceptions are no evidence of an exterior cause, then they cannot be the media to it of the knowledge of such a cause, and cannot, therefore, demonstrate the being either of God or fellow creatures. Those, accordingly, who intelligently hold that theory of perception, directly deny the possibility of proving the existence of God, fellow agents, or anything out of the mind itself; and assert that their existence can only be *assumed* or conceived, and that the mind is the absolute creator, also, of its idea of them, in the same manner as, on their theory, it is of perceptions and ideas of all other exterior things. The whole fabric of truth is at once thus annihilated. God, finite intelligences, the material universe, law, are converted into mere ideas without any reality that answers to them, and the mind made the only intelligence, and its thoughts and affections the only universe.

These conclusions are virtually reached, also, undoubtedly, by those disciples of the theory who do not formally avow, but in a degree shrink from them. Could their state be fully unfolded, it would, at least, be found in every instance a result of their theory, that they make their own ideas their sole and absolute law, that their theology is wholly speculative, and their religion a matter of vague imagination and feeling. The mind that yields itself to it must of necessity, in a large measure, be moulded to its shape.

The assumption sometimes made, that a creation of things out of nothing is impossible, leads also to equally fatal results. There are, indisputably, finite material and spiritual existences. If they were not called into being out of nothing, then their existence never had a commencement; and, accordingly, they must have been from eternity, and are self-existent. But, if they are self-existent, they must be absolutely independent of God, and thence cannot owe him allegiance; and, consequently, are not his subjects, and therefore the representations of the Scriptures are not true; or else they must be parts of God, and thence can neither be his subjects, nor sin against him; and therefore, again, the teachings of the Scriptures are not true. How can these results, portentous as they are, be avoided? They probably never are absolutely. If they are not directly embraced, the theory, at least, induces a modification of the doctrines of the Scriptures which it affects, by which they are made to approximate to itself.

These examples show the danger to which students for the sacred office are exposed, of being led to a false theology, by the adoption of a psychological or metaphysical theory that misrepresents God or our nature. Instead of taking his word as their guide, and adjusting their speculative views to its teachings, they make, though perhaps in a measure insensibly to themselves, their mistaken assumptions their law, and either reject, or, as far as practicable, mould into harmony with it all the facts and truths of revelation to which it is opposed. It is by this process that a large share of the perversions of Christianity have been generated, and that the same speculative errors, after having been confuted and apparently extinguished, are reproduced from period to period,

draw a new crowd of disciples, run a new career of popularity, and at length again meet a new confutation, and sink to discredit.

V. But the sources of danger are not wholly external. Their own groundless prepossessions, ill-defined feelings, defective self-discipline, or want of reverence for God, are often the reason of their embracing theories that make shipwreck of their faith.

There are persons to whom it seems to be a sufficient reason for adopting a metaphysical theory, or theological scheme, that it falls in with their wishes: that it presents such a view of God, of man, and of the method of salvation, as suits their tastes, as makes them satisfied with themselves, and gives a sanction to their self-reliance and hope. They do not believe their theory because they have any proof that it is true. Nor are their hopes consequential on their belief; but they believe, because if the system which they embrace be true, God is what they wish him to be, and their condition, consequently, hopeful. They thus, in effect, and perhaps unconsciously, make their own uninstructed thoughts or untutored feelings their law, and proceed to construe by it the whole revelation which God has made respecting his attributes, rights, and will, our condition and duties, and the method by which salvation is to be obtained. Thousands and myriads have thus been fatally led astray, who would have been withheld from error, had they paused and considered that it is not necessarily a proof of the truth of a religious system that it pleases them: that instead, it may be demonstrative of its error; that the only proper ground of embracing a theological doctrine is, that it is revealed by God; and that what he reveals is to be received with implicit faith and submission, whether it suits their tastes and sanctions their hopes or not.

There are others who appear to be drawn to the adoption of erroneous theories by the mere consideration that they are thought, if true, to free some doctrine of the Scriptures, or some act of the divine administration, from what otherwise seems to them an insuperable objection. They are apparently led to that result by a process like the following:

All God's procedure towards the moral universe must be just, wise, and good. But his administration, instead of being wise and good, must be marked by extreme injustice and folly, unless it be such as our theory exhibits it. The theory, therefore, is true, and his word, accordingly, must be interpreted, so as to be harmonious with it. Thus, on the mere ground that if their axiom or dogma be true, it seems, in their judgment, to free theology from a single objection that appears to them otherwise insuperable, they immediately apply it, as made by that consideration indisputable, although it in fact exposes the divine government to a crowd of other objections a thousand times more formidable, and is fraught with the subversion of the whole fabric of revealed truth. Thus, for example, a class of men assume that it cannot consist with wisdom and goodness that God should voluntarily permit his creatures to sin and become miserable. They thence infer that the reason that they sin is, that God cannot prevent them from it; and then, because, if true, it relieves the Most High from the objection which they otherwise allege against his government, they assume that it is as certain that he is unable to prevent sin, as it is that he is wise and good; and proceed to explain, affirm, and apply their theory, although it directly contradicts many indisputable and fundamental truths, and embarrasses theology with a multitude of difficulties more formidable than that which it proposes to set aside. Thus, if God cannot prevent beings from sinning, then he cannot renew and sanctify them; as that is the method by which they are prevented from transgression. But if he cannot renew and sanctify them, then the Scriptures erroneously ascribe to him that work, and therefore cannot be from him. The whole revelation he has made is thus at once divested of authority. Again, if God cannot prevent men from sinning, then, in Christ's mediation, he has undertaken a work that is beyond the scope of his powers; for the design of his sacrifice was to redeem them from iniquity. But, if he cannot accomplish the work he undertook in Christ's mediation, then he can neither be wise nor good, but is indisputably obnoxious to the identical objection which the denial of his power to sanctify men is employed to evade.

There is another class who are betrayed by speculative

difficulties into an opposite and equally unjustifiable course. Instead of being led by an objection to the adoption of a false theory to explain it, its effect is to impair their belief of the fact or truth which it respects, and generate uncertainty and scepticism. And in some minds the degree to which that effect takes place is not at all determined by the importance or strength of the objection. A slight difficulty embarrasses or unsettles them as effectually as the most formidable. They know not how to regard a fact or truth as certain, no matter how vast and indisputable the demonstration of it is, as long as its mode, or its harmony with some other fact or truth, is unknown and seems inexplicable. This is a most unhappy temperament, and leads, when indulged, to the most deplorable results. Those who yield to it are sometimes kept in doubt and perplexity on all the great subjects of theology. The most indisputable certainties remain questionable, while difficulties attend them. A single objection, however slight, weighs more with them than an absolute proof; and fixing their thoughts on it, and cherishing the impressions which it generates, it expands to a significance, and becomes invested with a power, which no opposing considerations can countervail. Thus one class reject the representation given in the Scriptures of the effect of the fall on the race, and treat it as a fable, because they do not see how it is compatible with justice and wisdom that the conduct of the first pair should affect the condition of their posterity so disadvantageously. The fact that God ascribes that influence to their transgression, and that it is confirmed by the condition and history of the race in every age, contributes nothing towards conciliating their faith. That limitation of their knowledge is a thousand times more effective in exciting unbelief, than all the information they possess is in generating trust; and they refuse to receive what is really revealed, because everything is not explained which they think it desirable to know.

Others reject the doctrine of Christ's vicarious death, because they cannot see how it can be just in God that an innocent and holy being should die for the guilty. The clear representation of the Scriptures, the infinite effects that result to the race from his death, and the impossibility of

accounting for it on any other supposition, seem to them of no significance. They look at nothing but the difficulty which they happen to feel, and, in order to escape it, generate a host of others of far greater importance, and which they usually treat as having no title to attention.

A third class withhold their faith from the doctrine of God's sovereignty in the bestowment of salvation, because it seems to them to imply that he is partial. They do not, perhaps, deny that the Scriptures exhibit him as having mercy on whom he will have mercy, and leaving whom he will to meet his justice; they, peradventure, do not deny that as all are guilty, he may, without violating their rights, pursue such a course towards them; they possibly admit that the denial of it embarrasses other doctrines of the Scriptures with insuperable difficulties; yet, as they do not see adequate grounds for it, or reasons that free it, in their judgment, from the charge of partiality, they hesitate to assent to it, and thereby involve themselves in perplexity in respect to many doctrines, because they are not willing to be withheld by the most ample evidence from doubting one.

This weakness needs to be combated with the utmost resolution. If indulged and fostered, it almost inevitably issues either in indifference or scepticism. It strikes its subjects with a moral paralysis, and disqualifies them for a clear, resolute, and effective inculcation of the great truths of the gospel. How can they teach and enforce its doctrines with earnestness and zeal, if uncertain of their truth? How can they vindicate them from the misapprehensions and cavils of the unbelieving and hostile, if they themselves entertain similar objections? Let their course be observed, and it will be seen that the vagueness and hesitation that embarrass their faith, stamp in an equal degree their doctrinal and practical preaching. They either avoid the subjects by which they are perplexed, or content themselves with ill-defined generalities. They are not sure, perhaps, even of their uncertainties. They are positive in nothing but common-places, and the result of their ministry is the decline of their people in knowledge and piety, and preparation to be seduced either by their own speculations, or the arts of false teachers to the direct and zealous adoption of erroneous doctrines. But when this dis-

position to doubt and object is deliberately cherished and cultivated from pride, delight in embarrassing others, or an ambition to be thought learned, acute, or independent, it not unfrequently and naturally issues in recklessness and absolute scepticism. The passion for display that reigns in such minds, the gratification derived from victory in disputation, the conspicuity and applause which reward their assaults on the truth, soon invest their errors with resistless charms, inspire them with confidence and zeal in maintaining them, and lead them to regard the truths which they reject and their advocates with contempt and aversion, and assail them with misrepresentation and abuse.

Let those who are preparing for the sacred office guard with the utmost vigilance against these dangers. That they are not imaginary but real, the most melancholy proofs are seen in the history of the church. A large share of the errors and divisions with which it has been distracted, have had their origin in these causes. Like the shores of a stormy sea, the past is strewn with those who have thus made shipwreck of the faith, either through their own passions or weaknesses, the seductions of a false philosophy, or the authority of erroneous teachers. A careful self-discipline, just views of the office of reason, submission to the authority of God, an humble, watchful, prayerful spirit, would have withheld them from their errors; led them to a knowledge and assurance of the truth; and rendered their ministry a blessing instead of a snare, to those who fell under their influence. Happy are they who pass through these dangers unharmed, and enter the office with their powers properly disciplined, with a just understanding of the doctrines they are to teach, and lofty views of the objects at which they are to aim. There is no position more dignified and hopeful than that of a young man of high powers, thorough culture, and pure taste, on thus assuming the profession. There is no other in which commanding talents, especially of oratory, so immediately make themselves felt, and insure occupation, respect, and influence. There is none that unfolds a prospect so adapted to give elevation to the affections, and excite to strenuous exertion.

VI. The period, however, which intervenes between ad-

mission to the office and a settlement, is often marked by difficulties and trials. They are called to a new experiment of their powers. They are placed in a new relation to man. They are hurried, perhaps, into scenes of toil, sorrow, or perplexity, that they had not anticipated, and for which they are but very partially prepared. Peradventure they are brought into contact with evil men who endeavor to embarrass them in their duties, intercept their influence, or draw them into errors or imprudences. It may be that the first duty to which they are summoned, is the defence of the truth against artful and unscrupulous objectors; or that the first question they are required to decide, is whether they will swerve from their fidelity to Christ, and become the adherents of some ambitious leader, or teach a false doctrine, in order to secure the favor of a party who otherwise will obstruct their settlement. The difficulties of that period are sometimes greater than of any other. Unless well established in their principles, aware of the proper methods of confuting objections and meeting the arts of the plotting, swayed supremely by the fear and love of God, and raised by his Spirit to wisdom and steadfastness, they are in danger of being betrayed, under the color of expediency, into a compromise of the truth, and placing themselves in a position in which, perhaps, for years, they find themselves under the necessity either of disguising their sentiments, maintaining a ceaseless contest, or else consenting to be the disciples and tools of men. A diversity of tastes, captiousness, the wish of ambitious individuals to dictate, the determination of unscrupulous persons to make the minister the instrument of their selfish purposes, partialities for other candidates, and not unfrequently the interference of aspiring individuals in the vicinity, to prevent the settlement of such as are not of their party, make that period of their ministry one of anxieties, difficulties, and dangers, that sometimes exert a sinister influence on all their subsequent lives.

VII. Among the difficulties with which, after obtaining a settlement, they are called to contend, is the want of adequate means for their support. It is expressly ordained that they that "preach the gospel should live of the gospel," and that "he that is taught in the word" should "communicate unto

him that teacheth in all good things." And that is not merely equitable, but indispensable, in order to their discharging the duties of their office. They are generally dependent on their labors for their subsistence. They cannot unite two professions, and succeed in either, any more than a lawyer or physician. Whatever time and care is bestowed on a mere secular occupation, undertaken for a livelihood, is not only injuriously withdrawn from their pastoral labors or studies, but the weariness and distraction which it occasions, diminish the effectiveness of that which is left for their proper work. The office of a church in this relation is very beautifully and impressively illustrated by the use of a candlestick, or lampstand, which is employed in the Apocalypse as its symbol. The function of the lamp or candle placed on the stand, is to shed light through the apartment where it is stationed, that those who dwell or meet there may discern the objects by which they are surrounded, see their nature and relations, and be able to exert the agencies to which they are called intelligently and with success. And that is its sole use. It is not placed there as an ornament. It is not stationed there to be veiled or prevented, by smothering, from diffusing its light. It is not designed nor fitted for any other service than to give light; nor can it in fact be, as a candle or lamp, appropriated to any other. If assigned to another use it must be simply as a material irrespective of its form, as oil, spermaceti, wax, cotton, or whatever the element is of which it consists. On the other hand the office of the candlestick or lampstand is to support the candle or lamp in a proper position to diffuse its light through the apartment. The candlestick itself may be ornamented. Adaptation to its use requires that its parts should be duly proportioned to each other; that its foot should be of sufficient breadth to sustain the stem, and the stem of a height and size in correspondence with the foot, and the whole in harmony with the light it is to sustain and the position it is to occupy. A massy candlestick is not necessary to support a taper. A stand so slight as barely to support a taper, is not suited to receive a large candle. The foot, the stem, and the top, may be shaped with elegance and enchased with flowers, fruits, and other graceful forms, that add, perhaps, to its strength, while they make it an object of beauty and taste.

Its sole office, however, is to support a candle or lamp. If not appropriated to that use, its whole design, except as a mere ornament, is lost. It cannot, with good taste, be employed to sustain anything else. Other objects, however beautiful in themselves, a bunch of flowers, a cluster of grapes, an orange, appear out of place, and grotesque when set in it. In like manner the office of a church, as a support, is to sustain a minister of the gospel; one who diffuses around him the light of God's word, and enables those within his sphere to understand and fulfil their religious duties. It is not its business to support an agent of any other species. It does not fulfil its office while it refuses or neglects to sustain a true minister of the word. It does not answer its end by merely upholding one of that character in a condition in which he can but half discharge the functions of his ministry. From a variety of causes, however, there are many churches that but very inadequately fulfil the office which Christ has thus assigned them.

In some cases it is probably rather from inconsideration than a want either of disposition or means. There are instances in which salaries that were once liberal, have gradually become insufficient by the increased expenses of living. A considerable advance has taken place within thirty years in wages, the prices of food, and the expenses of education; while, on the other hand, the sums to be appropriated to benevolent objects, to books, and the entertainment of company, have been seriously augmented. Wages have become so high that a minister, owning or renting a farm, if obliged to hire laborers to cultivate it, must pay as much in that form for his produce as it would cost to purchase it directly. If a railroad pass near his parish, or a manufactory and village have been erected in the vicinity, the increased demand has raised prices to such a degree, perhaps, that the meat, grain, fuel, and other articles that thirty years ago might have been purchased for one hundred dollars, now cost one hundred and thirty or forty. If he live on a thoroughfare that is much frequented, the number of ministers, agents of benevolent societies, and others, whom he is called to entertain, is perhaps ten times greater than it formerly was; and has become in some positions a most serious evil. The minister's house is

converted into an inn, and his wife and daughters are overburdened with labor and care. Not only do the ministers of the vicinity and their families, who are heartily welcomed, call as they pass, and all also who travel on business for religious and philanthropic societies, but book-distributors, colporteurs, and agents of every subordinate grade, make his house their home as long as their objects require them to remain in his parish.

While, however, the expenses of the office in these and other forms are thus seriously augmented, the salary of many remains the same, perhaps, or nearly the same as was given thirty years ago; and that not improbably in parishes that have in the meantime, by the very causes that have thus augmented prices, become far more capable of making, without inconvenience, a proportional addition to their ministers' stipend. The passage of a railroad or canal near their farms, the establishment of manufactories in their neighborhood, or the erection of a flourishing village in their vicinity, may have doubled the worth of their property, increased largely, if not in an equal ratio, the value of their crops, and multiplied still more advantageously the modes in which they may make their labor productive. In such cases it is most clearly the duty of the church to make a more liberal provision for their minister. It is not right that he should be left to serve them for a sum that is no longer adequate to supply his wants. It is peculiarly inequitable and ungenerous that he should be made to suffer from the very causes that promote their prosperity, and place it more easily in their power to yield him a fair support. And the relief should be afforded as soon as the evil is felt, not postponed till he has become burdened with debt, or disheartened by their want of sympathy. There are other parishes in which there has, perhaps, been no such augmentation of wealth, but which are yet amply able to give their pastor a salary commensurate with his present expenses; and it should be done cheerfully. He is now as fully entitled to an adequate support as his predecessor was, who received the same sum as is now given when four hundred and fifty dollars purchased what now requires six hundred; or six hundred that for which eight hundred are now needed. The number of ministers who have

an inadequate support in parishes of these classes is, we have reason to believe, large. How many hearts, harassed with anxieties and depressed with embarrassments, would be relieved and gladdened could the attention of their flocks be properly drawn to their condition, and a just and generous provision made for their necessities! With what renewed cheerfulness and resolution, with what augmented zeal would many faithful ministers of Christ devote themselves to the labors of their office! How many duties would they be able to perform which they are now forced to neglect! How much would it attach them to their people, and their people to them, and contribute to make their ministry happy and effective!

There are many congregations, however, that if aware of the inadequacy of their pastors' salary, and disposed, if in their power, to increase it, find it difficult, either from the smallness of their number, or the narrowness of their means. Some that were once large have, by some event, perhaps, that was not unfavorable to their general prosperity, been greatly reduced in size. The establishment of a manufactory, perhaps, or the growth of a village at a distance from the centre of the parish, has led to the organization of a new church, and drawn away half of those who originally contributed to the salary. The wealth of both congregations, and their power of earning, may have been increased by the change, and yet they may be unequal to a liberal support of two ministers. A division may have arisen from causes that are not attended by an accession of wealth. A difference of doctrinal views may have led to a secession of one third or one half of the families, and institution of another church. The addition to the population by immigrants, consequential on the erection of manufactories, may have consisted chiefly of persons of other denominations, and led to the organization of so many societies that not one of them is of sufficient number and property to give to their minister an adequate salary. There are many churches in those parts of the country that have been recently settled that have not risen to such numbers and strength, as to make it practicable to appropriate such a sum to their pastor as is necessary to his support. The population of the towns in which they are situated is

sparse. One fourth or one third of them, perhaps, are from Ireland, Germany, or some other foreign country, and do not profess the Protestant faith. A large share of the others are not improbably either wholly indifferent, or universalists, deists, or atheists, who openly oppose an evangelical ministry. The church is small; the aid received from those who are not its members slight; and the adequate support of a pastor impracticable without assistance from abroad. The institution of societies to supply churches of that class with both means and ministers, while struggling with the difficulties of their first years, is the most comprehensive and effective method that has been devised of rendering them the aid which they need; the scale on which they are acting is large, and in a degree magnificent, and the benefits resulting from their agencies immense. They are not, however, commensurate with the wants of the population. They may yet be carried to several times their present extent without fully occupying the scene that is open to their labors; and the field for their activity is likely to widen by the occupation of new territory, as rapidly as they can augment their means.

There are other methods, also, in which necessitous ministers might be relieved. There are many small parishes, especially in the older states, in which there are two or three families of such ample property, that an annual contribution of fifty, one hundred, or one hundred and fifty dollars beyond their proportion, would not only not occasion them any inconvenience, but be a better appropriation than to add it to wealth that already exceeds their wants. The rich in the cities who have means to devote to religious and philanthropic objects, can make no better disposition of a portion of them than to assist pious and useful ministers, with whose wants they are acquainted, and of whose judicious use of their gifts they can feel assured. The injunction: "Let him that is taught in the word communicate unto him that teacheth in all good things," is very comprehensive. It is not necessary that his bounty should be confined to those from whom he himself receives instruction. It may be extended to those also who teach others; for it is added: "As we have opportunity, let us do good unto all, especially unto them who are of the household of faith." And a reason given for it is, that

"in due season we shall reap, if we faint not." The provision which is sometimes made by a wealthy member of a church, in his will, for an annual payment to a minister whose salary is inadequate, during his life, or his ministry in the parish in which he is settled, is very commendable, and might advantageously become much more common. Were the rich to adopt these methods, they might often accomplish more by their gifts, and, from their personal knowledge of the parties, more satisfactorily to themselves than by any other appropriation.

VIII. The worst perplexities and trials of a minister sometimes spring from his church and congregation. It was not peculiar to the primitive ages that men assumed the Christian name who loved the pre-eminence, and made a gain of godliness, and a god of their appetites and passions. They are as numerous now, and as restless and aggressive as their ancient predecessors. Sometimes an artful, ambitious, and domineering individual attempts to rule both the pastor and people, and renders a ministry ineffective by the distractions he occasions, and the evil passions he excites. At another, a bold, pushing, and unscrupulous person enters a church, that he may make religion the instrument or cloak of his avarice or ambition. He thrives, and gives liberally. He is loud in his professions, and makes his influence felt by promptness and zeal in all measures that have the promotion of religion, the instruction of the ignorant, or the relief of the suffering for their object. But he deceives, he cheats, he robs the poor and fatherless who fall within his power. He perverts to his own selfish ends, every interest with which he is intrusted. He joins the wicked in their atrocious schemes, and plots and intrigues to draw the unsuspecting within his grasp, and pursues the upright who obstruct and thwart his evil designs with a rancorous and deadly malice. If the minister privately remonstrates with him, he disregards it. If he publicly rebukes him, and urges him to make reparation for his injustice, he becomes an implacable enemy, and attempts to drive him from his station by intrigue and abuse. If, finding his exhortations ineffective, an appeal is made to the church to correct him, a party, animated, perhaps, by the same passions, drawn

to his side by his acts, or purchased by his wealth, is organized to support him. If the minister hesitates, and endeavors to escape these dangers by silence, he incurs the suspicion and reproach of approving the evil ; while directly to countenance it, were to forfeit the confidence of the upright and pious, and sink from the lofty station of an ambassador of God to a tool and a pander of evil. Religion is thus disgraced, the church dishonored, and his ministry obstructed, by means which he finds it impossible to counteract. To discipline a person of wealth, high professional rank, or large political influence, for any species of offence that is not either punishable by the civil law, or universally felt to be disgraceful, is usually impossible. Could the veil be withdrawn from the struggles to which pastors have in some instances been called by persons of that class, a train of anxieties, mortifications, and discouragements would be disclosed, that few other conditions generate. A more embarrassing position can scarcely be imagined, than that of a minister whose people have been led by such causes, to the feeling that it is more creditable to be mere members of the congregation than to belong to the church ; that to make a profession of religion exposes them to the suspicion of hypocrisy, or the charge of sanctioning men whose unprincipled lives they detest.

IX. A minister is sometimes harassed and obstructed by individuals in his church or congregation who endeavor to constrain him to co-operate with them in some controversy or undertaking that has no direct connexion with the duties of his office. A body, perhaps, of anti-masons, abolitionists, anti-colonizationists, or some other class, urge and demand that he should espouse their cause, and be the organ of inculcating their doctrines and uttering their denunciations. That many of their views are erroneous, that their undertakings lie out of the sphere of his office, that their schemes are impracticable, that to comply with their demands were to desert, instead of fulfilling his duties, is no justification, in their judgment, of his refusal to become the advocate and instrument of their wishes. If he hesitates, they urge him with every plea that can increase his uncertainty or excite his fears. If he decline, they assail him with reproaches and

false accusations ; threaten to withdraw their support ; and intrigue and cabal to alienate his people, and force him from his station. The injustice, intolerance, and fierceness which parties sometimes thus display, were scarcely surpassed by the persecuting rulers and ecclesiastics of the dark ages, and show that if the dungeon, the scourge, and the stake, are not the reward of dissenting from their wishes, it is for want of power, not because their dispositions or principles forbid it. Those who fall under their displeasure are called to a direct and specific decision whether they will act as the ministers of God, or become the organs and slaves of rash and ill-judging men ; whether they will devote themselves to the labors that pertain to their office, or neglecting them, yield their time and influence to discussions and agitations that are foreign to their duties, and can only distract the church, and augment, instead of diminishing, the evils they propose to cure.

X. Periods of religious excitement are often prolific of difficulties and dangers. Some forward, zealous individual, perhaps, wishes to resign his station as a learner and become a teacher, who soon makes it apparent that he is more desirous of gaining hearers and admirers, than to win converts to Christ ; or an indiscreet or sinister party introduces a demagogue from abroad, who founds his system of agitation on a false theory of religion, or our nature, and leads those whom he influences to a delusive and fanatical excitement.

XI. The rise of false teachers and organization of powerful parties to assail the truth and give currency to erroneous doctrines, often subject the ministers of Christ to great difficulties and dangers. Their love of the gospel, their aversion to error, their courage to avow and maintain the truth, their fidelity to the great trusts with which they are charged, are put to a severe trial. If calm, resolute, and faithful in vindicating the gospel, and confuting the false systems substituted in its place, they give, in withstanding the treacherous arts, resisting the malevolent influences, and enduring the reproaches and abuse with which they are assailed, as decisive proofs of their allegiance as they would in a true confession on the scaffold or at the stake ; and if, through indifference, a fear of worldly disadvantages, or a hope of

conspicuity and power, they disown what they know to be truth, and join in assailing it, and teaching a false gospel, they give as ample evidence that they are not his true ministers, as they would in disclaiming him before a persecuting tribunal. As they cannot, at the same time, maintain allegiance to two sovereigns, whose claims are subversive of each other, he whom they directly serve is indisputably their real master. And how many, when subjected to that test, have proved unfaithful ! It leads to a more unfavorable judgment of many in the sacred office than any other criterion. What sudden revolutions of doctrine are sometimes seen in connexion with the movements of a great party ! With what zeal individuals become animated, who had before displayed little fervor ! To what an unscrupulous subserviency to bad leaders and evil schemes they descend ! And what rewards of flattery, office, and influence, are the result of their apostasy !

XII. These dangers come from without. There are some who are exposed to a still more formidable class, that have their origin in a restless temperament, excessive self-estimation, or an ambition of notoriety and influence. There are persons to whom the significance of a theory, or a thought, seems to be constituted by its relation to themselves. The moment it comes into their possession, or awakens their interest, it becomes invested with an extraordinary importance and authority. It may not, indeed, be original with them. It may have been promulgated, gained a crowd of disciples, and been confuted, at a dozen different periods. They may have drawn it from some one to whom they would be reluctant to acknowledge their indebtedness. They, perhaps, may think it inconsistent with their self-respect and reputation, to admit that it is not the offspring of their own lofty powers. Possibly, they not only are not its authors, but are not masters even of its true import ; but, however that may be, their entertaining it is equivalent, in their estimation, to its origination, stamps it with authority, and makes it the duty of mankind to receive it with admiration, and give them the credit of the exalted genius which it bespeaks. This delusion prompts them to quit, for a period, at least, other subjects, and devote themselves to the inculcation of their favorite theme. Each topic

that engages their notice, is, for the time, the greatest, the most essential to be understood, and the most elevating, and owes its power to exalt and delight to its exhibition by themselves. They are, accordingly, occupied with a perpetual succession of hobbies, each of which transcends every other; and make it their business to display themselves, in place of proclaiming the gospel. Their ministry is, consequently, a mere round of superficial excitement. They are always on the point of achieving some great thing, but never advance beyond the promise; and the result is, that they miss the true aim of their office, become objects of disgust and ridicule, and obstruct the gospel, instead of making it the power of God unto salvation.

There are others, to whom the attractiveness and value of a doctrine or theory depend on its adaptation to be the instrument of conspicuity and influence. Will the announcement of it attract attention? Can it be set off as a novelty? Will it give them the reputation of genius and learning? Can they make it the means of winning disciples and forming a party, and raise themselves thereby to a position that will gratify their ambition? If their self-confidence on the one hand, and low estimate of the intelligence and integrity of those whom they are to address on the other, give them assurance of success, they resolve on the experiment, and put forth their dogma or hypothesis with lofty pretensions. The wonder or applause it excites, kindles their ambition. They begin to compass sea and land to make proselytes, and proceed to organize their admirers and disciples. Their scheme is, of course, as false as the end for which they employ it. Were it true, it would not be suited to such a purpose. Its character is seen and exposed, and it becomes a source of discredit in place of honor, and an obstacle instead of an aid to their ambition. The repulse they meet, mortifies and exasperates them. They are too proud to submit to a defeat. They are too unprincipled to retract. They resolve, at all hazards, not to be baffled, and resort to expedients that are as base and profligate as their principles. The objections that are urged against their theory are unanswerable;—the proofs of their ignorance and absurdity resistless. To evade them, therefore, they renounce integrity, and aver that

they are not understood, or disowning the chief features of their doctrine, endeavor to disguise it under a different phraseology ; or set it on a new ground from which it cannot be struck by the blows that have demolished the foundation on which it was first placed. Embroiled, thus, in a hopeless contest both with the truth and with themselves, they proceed from worse to worse, till shamelessness in misrepresentation, chicane, and impiety, become their chief characteristics ; and what they began in vanity and ambition, they end in desperation and disgrace.

There is another class, whose power of entertaining and exciting an audience by singularity, smartness, extravagance, and even buffoonery, betrays them into the cultivation of those faults, till they reach an extreme that is worthy only of a mountebank. They are never content, especially on great occasions, till they have dissipated the gravity of their hearers by some witticism, shocked them by some departure from common sense or good taste, or excited surprise and wonder at the strangeness and unnaturalness of their thoughts. The result is, that their best powers are distorted, and perverted to a false use ; and their people, in place of being instructed, are furnished only with misshapen ideas and extravagances ; instead of being aided in seriousness, are put to a perpetual struggle to preserve themselves from indecorum and irreverence. Into what follies, what sins, and what sorrows, do those who yield to these passions and weaknesses plunge ! Let the history of the ministers of a generation or a church be investigated, and it will be found that it is to causes like these that a large share of those owe their ruin, who make shipwreck of their talents, their usefulness, and their character.

The sacred office is thus the instrument of a perpetual trial of the truth, piety, and wisdom, or the opposite characteristics, of those who exercise it. The adverse influences that assail them, put them under the necessity of acting out their views and affections, and showing whether they are the disciples and servants of Christ or not. And his providence is thus conducted to produce that manifestation, to discipline them to subjection to him, self-denial, humbleness, faith, fidelity, a war with evil in all its forms, and a contest for truth and

righteousness ; or, if animated by an opposite spirit, to a war on them ; and their agency under this training, is an index to their character, and is to be the basis of the awards that are to be assigned them. This great fact gives a fearful import to their ministry, and should prompt to watchfulness, self-denial, and a fervent desire of God's guidance and support. And contemplated in this relation, the spectacle they present to the universe is of immeasurable interest. The great line that divides them into two classes, is as visible and conspicuous as that which separates good from evil, and light from darkness. The worldly, by meeting these tests, show how vain, how ambitious, and how treacherous they are ; and manifest it as effectually in making their office the instrument, in the forms that now prevail, of pride, ambition, and malevolence, as it was shown by the false ministers of other ages who turned from the truth, and made a gain of godliness, in the modes that were peculiar to their periods. And a similar retribution awaits them. No more terrible futurity can be conceived than that of the ministers who prostitute their office to sinister ends ; to whom it owes its attractions to the gratifications it yields to their vanity ; who make it the instrument of ambition, and aim to reach their object by false and impious doctrines propagated in hypocrisy and fraud. They may succeed for a brief period, gather a crowd of admiring disciples, and trample down those who resist their errors ; but their triumph is to be short. Ere a moment—compared to the periods that are to follow—has passed, they will be roused from their delusion, and compelled, through eternal ages, to see and feel that their errors and sins are what they are represented to be by those whom they now condemn. The greater their success, the more terrible will be their defeat. The larger the crowd whom they seduce to apostasy, the more awful the confutation of their false doctrines ; as every one whom they draw to destruction is to be an ever present proof of their error. The question, whatever it be, between them and the Almighty, is to be put to an eternal trial. Do they doubt his existence ? Do they deny the proofs of his being ? He will demonstrate their error by visibly manifesting himself to them on his tribunal, and assigning them their reward. Do they deny his power, or

doubt his right to reign? He will confute them by for ever exercising over them that power, and enforcing that right. Do they reject Christ's Deity and expiation, and make man his own lawgiver and saviour? He will verify his Divinity and maintain his prerogatives, by a retributive administration over them through their immortal being. What an issue of their contest with him! As they advance along the line of interminable ages, and experience the results of their apostasy, what realizations will take possession of them, of their madness in plunging down that abyss of ruin, for the sake of the momentary pleasures which were their objects here! If any who are to people the realms of darkness are to be more wretched than others, and sigh with a deeper intensity for annihilation, they, doubtless, will be the demagogues and heresiarchs of the church, who, for the gratification of a paltry pride and ambition, employ themselves in prompting men to reject the truth, and build their hopes of heaven on a false foundation!

But if their future is dark and appalling; the prospects that unfold to the humble, the unswerving, the zealous, the faithful ministers of the gospel, are as consoling and august. They are surrounded, indeed, by dangers; they are obstructed by difficulties; they are subjected to severe trials; but they are no greater than are requisite to a full proof of their fidelity. It is in these identical circumstances that God calls them to testify their allegiance. It is in these conditions of necessity, of dependence on him, and of contest with evil, that they are to make that manifestation of their awe, love, trust, devotedness, courage, inflexible adherence to his truth, and submission to his authority, that is to demonstrate that they are truly his, and prepare the way for his proceeding on that fact in his administration over them and others throughout the round of everlasting years. Were they aware of the ends that are to be answered by these dispensations; could they see the vast results that are to spring from them—painful as their circumstances often are—they would welcome, in place of shunning them; because they discipline them to a subjection to God that is to prepare them for a crown. And how sublime the change that awaits them when the struggle reaches its end! They are, perhaps, dishonored here; God is there to

acknowledge them as his. Their doctrines are now decried and calumniated; they are then to be owned and vindicated as his eternal truth. They are now harassed by want, obstructed by hindrances, assailed by restless and malignant foes; they are then to be crowned as victors through the blood of the Lamb, and exalted to a glorious and imperishable inheritance.

ART. III.—OBJECTIONS TO THE LAWS OF SYMBOLIZATION.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE views we have advanced of the laws of symbols and figures not only affect the interpretation of the prophecies, but a large body of constructions also that are put on the historical and didactic Scriptures; and, if legitimate, overturn whole systems of speculation, in regard to the import of language, the design of the administration God is now exercising, and the nature of the dispensation he is hereafter to establish over the world. Among these are the doctrines of Swedenborg and his disciples in respect to the import and laws of language and the characteristics of symbols; the relations in which they are employed, and the principles by which they are to be explained. They not only proceed in many of their explications on different theories, but their psychological system is made so directly the ground of their views of language and symbols, and their views of symbols and language are so essential to the support both of their psychology and of Swedenborg's claim to inspiration; that if they are overturned, their whole system falls. This is seen by those who advocate that scheme, and the necessity felt of an endeavor to shield it from that catastrophe, by assailing the principles of interpretation we have advanced. The organ of that denomination, "The New Church Repository," edited by Professor Bush, has, accordingly, been made the vehicle of a series of articles on this subject. No regret is felt, Professor B. assures

us, at this necessity of defending their principles. So far from it, they welcome the opportunity it presents of a fair and thorough discussion of the questions, in respect to interpretation, that are at issue between them and their opponents. He says :—

“The true issue bids fair at length to be made. The principles on which the inspired word is to be interpreted are beginning to attract attention. What the New Churchman has so long desiderated in vain, seems at last likely to be accorded to his wishes—viz. a bold, distinct, unequivocal carrying out, to its just results, of the literal theory of interpretation. It is immaterial to him, whether this be done in formal antagonism to Swedenborg’s doctrine of the spiritual sense, or on any other ground. What he desires is to see the principle asserted, defined, and defended.”—*N. C. Repository*, vol. ii. p. 247.

He and his friends, accordingly—if we are to judge from their protestations—indulge no apprehensions that they shall not prove victorious in the contest. They not only regard themselves as elevated to a height that renders them inaccessible to all hostile shafts, but persuade themselves that the sole reason that their antagonists universally have not long since been dispatched, is that they have not ventured to approach within the sweep of their arms. If, however, they are to achieve so satisfactory a victory, we apprehend it is to be the result of a future effort ; as hitherto they have confined themselves almost entirely, either to attempts to depreciate what they admit to be true, or do not dispute ;—to the mere statement of their dissent from the views which we advance—or, as though that were to determine the conflict, to the announcement, without argument, of their own peculiar theories. The questions on which the issue depends, have been left without any thorough discussion.

Had these writers offered only such objections as are founded on Swedenborg’s theories, and dependent for their validity on the truth of his system, it, perhaps, would not be generally thought necessary that we should respond to them. They have not confined themselves, however, to these limits, but dwelt, in a large degree, on the topics usually urged by those who ascribe a double sense to the language of the Scriptures ; and alleged every species of consideration by which

they could hope either to confute us or excite a distrust of our accuracy. It will be acceptable, therefore, probably to our readers to learn what can be offered either against our views of the laws of symbols and figures, or the applications we have made of them, by parties who are under such inducements to overturn or embarrass them. A refutation of their objections may also be of service to those who, though not inclined to Swedenborgianism, are, from their aversion to the views we maintain, willing to believe, and propagate the impression, that the criticisms of the Repository are unanswerable. We propose, therefore, with as much brevity as is practicable, to notice the principal of their objections, unfold the grounds on which they are founded, and point out their bearing on the doctrines which these critics themselves maintain.

The first allegation offered by Professor Bush is designed to disparage the great law of symbolization we have stated, that the representative and that which it represents, are, when the subject allows, of different orders or species. What then is his objection to it? Not that it is not true. Not that it is not important. But, simply, that it is not adequate to determine all that needs to be known in order to a demonstrative explication of the symbols! He says:—

“This canon he considers as carrying with it the authority of revelation itself, inasmuch as the inspired interpretations of the symbols occurring in the prophets will always be found to conform to it. This law of symbols he holds therefore to be a revealed law, entitled to the same reverential regard with any other portion of the body of the Scriptures. Granting now an intrinsic truth to this canon, how far does it go to furnish a satisfactory solution of the problems of prophecy? From its very nature the law is negative, and not positive. It merely enables us to say that a given symbol does *not* represent a given subject, but it does not itself inform us what it *does* represent. It is a chemical test which detects a spurious coin, but does not precipitate a genuine one. It is a staff which wards off enemies, but not a magic wand that summons aiding spirits. It is a fan that winnows away the chaff, but not a measure yielding good grain. By means of the principle, Mr. L. may expose fifty false interpretations without establishing one true one. We do not deny that there is something gained even on this score. It is well to have a criterion that shall enable us at once to reject a false construction, but it would seem that a rule of such vaunted value should enable us to do more than this.”—*N. C. Repository*, vol. ii. pp. 296, 297.

¶ The objection owes all its speciousness to the implied representation that that is the only law which we have stated for the solution of symbols. If it is but one of a number, if it is proposed by us only to ascertain that characteristic of symbolization which it specifies, then that it accomplishes nothing more, is no just objection either to itself, or the system of which it forms a part. It is on the assumption, accordingly, that that is the sole law that we have advanced, that Professor Bush here proceeds. Would the reader who had no other means of information suspect that it is only one of a system? Is there a hint given that such is the fact? But what could be more inconsiderate or unjust? Professor B. is aware that that is not regarded by us as the sole law of symbols. It is but one of a considerable body. It is not employed by us to determine all the questions that are to be settled in the interpretation of the representative prophecies. It is used only to establish the fact which it specifies. Other facts that are to be ascertained are established by other laws. His objection wholly fails therefore, because of the false ground on which it is placed.

Had he, however, guarded against that misrepresentation by stating that the law in question is but one of a considerable number, and is employed by us only for the end which it specifies, his objection would still have been equally ineffective and absurd; as it then would have implied, as it now does, that no single law, though both true and in a degree useful, can be of any real value, unless it ascertains every fact or truth that needs to be known in order to the determination of a problem. But on that assumption every other law is as obnoxious to the objection as that against which he alleges it. The principle is as applicable to the laws of the exact sciences as it is to those of language. It may be alleged against Euclid with as much effect as against us. "Nothing looms up to the view" of geometers, to use Professor B.'s language, "with more imposing grandeur, than the law which they "regard" themselves "as having established" in respect to quantities and magnitudes,—that "things that are equal to the same thing, are equal to one another." But what a consummate fallacy, according to Mr. B.'s argument! "Granting now an intrinsic truth to this canon, how far does it go to

furnish a satisfactory solution of the problems" of geometry ? It does not explain a single intricacy ; it does not remove a solitary difficulty. It only announces that when you have ascertained that two or more things are equal to a third, you have also ascertained that they are equal to one another. It does not inform you how you are to determine that they are equal to that with which they are compared ; you are left to make that discovery as you can. No thanks to this vaunted axiom, if your efforts are successful ! The objection may be urged with equal force, also, against the laws of God. "Granting now" the fact, that the Most High has enacted the commandment, "thou shalt not kill," how far does it go towards furnishing a complete code for the regulation of our conduct ? "From its very nature the law is negative and not positive." It merely indicates what we are not to do in a certain relation, "it does not inform us" what we are to do. It is a "test" by which it may only be known that a certain act is wrong ; it does not itself show us what actions are right.

The objection is equally valid, also, against the rules by which Swedenborg himself and his disciples are guided in their interpretation of the Scriptures. Their whole system is not embodied in a single law. They have one set of canons for the explication of symbols, and another for the interpretation of words. On the ground, therefore, on which Professor B. proceeds, every one of their laws may be set aside as of no significance, because no one of them by itself is adequate to the "solution of all the problems" that require to be explained. Such is the extraordinary objection which he places in the van of the long array he has marshalled against us. If admitted, it is not only as fatal to himself as to us, but it divests every axiom of science of its authority, and every law of God of its significance, and converts the whole system of knowledge into a chaos of uncertainty. Is it not singular that he selected a law for his attack which he admits to be true ? Is it not strange that he did not pause to consider what the results are to which his assumptions carry him ?—that he did not take the precaution not to inflict a fatal blow on his own system, in his attempt to disparage ours ? Yet this is his great objection ; the only one indeed he has thus far urged against the views we have given of the laws of symbolization ;

as all the others he has alleged are founded on grounds that, if admitted, do not affect their truth, but only the accuracy of our applications of them.

His next animadversion is on the catalogue given by us of the symbols of the Scriptures. To that he objects, not that it embraces any agents, objects, acts, or events, that are not entitled to a place in it;—not that it is without interest or utility, but solely that in his judgment the enumeration is incomplete. He says:

“How it is that Mr. L. should have thought of limiting the number of symbols to 415, we can hardly imagine, when we will pledge ourselves to add, in the space of one hour, one hundred to the list, that are just as well entitled to a place as those which he has selected. . . At any rate, if their claim is disputed, we will engage to show that it is upon the most arbitrary grounds.”—Vol. ii. p. 298.

But suppose the catalogue to be defective, that cannot prove that the law of symbolization, which he is endeavoring to depreciate, is inaccurate, or unimportant; as the truth of that law does not depend on the completeness or deficiency of this enumeration; nor the fulness or defect of this enumeration on the truth of that law. He would have found no difficulty in imagining why we introduced only that number into the catalogue, had he considered that it is a catalogue of *prophetic* symbols, not of mere types, emblems, or objects, used figuratively. But how is it that he can extend the list on such a scale, and with such facility as he alleges? Doubtless by assuming with Swedenborg, that all the agents, objects, and acts of the Scriptures, in addition to their literal or historic function, have also a symbolic or representative meaning, whether they are used prophetically or not; which is not merely to assume the position at issue, but is in effect to deny that the principle on which the representatives of the symbolic prophecies are employed, differs at all from that on which similar agents, objects, and acts, are used in the didactic and historic portions of the sacred word. But that, we apprehend, if admitted, instead of entitling the agents and objects of the historic Scriptures to be regarded as symbols, would render it impossible to prove that there are any symbols

whatever. Strike from the Sacred Volume the passages in which the symbols we have enumerated are used, and how could it be shown that there are any such representatives in the Scriptures? Only by conjecture, assumption, or the mere asseveration of Swedenborg, Origen, or others, who, without the slightest authority in the passages themselves, have ascribed a representative office to agents, acts, or events, that are merely historical. If Professor Bush can show that there are any symbolical prophecies in the Scriptures, besides those in which the symbols we have enumerated occur, let him do it. We shall be obliged to him for the information. If unable to designate any other prophecy of that nature, let him show, if practicable, that there are symbols in those prophecies that are not included in our enumeration. We shall feel no objection to the correction of any error into which we may have fallen. Let him recollect, however, that the detection of a defect in that catalogue cannot contribute anything towards proving that the law of symbolization, which he is assailing, is either mistaken or unimportant. But with how little consideration he makes his objection, may be seen from the specification he gives of what he regards as omissions. He asks: "By what rule shall the following, for instance, be excluded?—serpent, arrow, Balaam, Babylon, Egypt, bride or wife, Canaan, &c." Two of these, bride, and Babylon under the head of city, are included in the enumeration we have given; and serpent, also, if he uses the name as the synonym of dragon and devil, as in Rev. xii. 9, and xx. 2. If he is aware of its use as the name of any other agent in a symbolic prophecy, let him point to the passage. Let him specify, also, in what representative prophecy, Egypt, Canaan, Balaam, or arrow, are used as symbols.

He next proceeds to object to the statement we presented of the interpretations that are given in the prophecies of the symbols. Should all, however, that he here alleges be conceded, it would not in any degree invalidate the law of symbolization which he is attempting to disparage. It would only show that, in stating the explications which the Spirit of God has given, we have fallen into errors. It will be found, however, that with a single exception the error is with Mr. B.—not with us. He first adverts to Daniel ii. 31–45.

"The stone cut out of the mountain, without hands, 'symbolizes the kings whom God is to establish in his kingdom.' But who are these kings? Are they *literal or figurative*? And how do the 'kings' differ from the 'kingdom,' which, instead of kings, is expressly declared, v. 44, 45, to be symbolized by this iconoclastic stone? The kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all those kingdoms, and 'it shall stand for ever.' It is a *kingdom* which is to destroy the image."—P. 298.

This is, certainly, faint objecting. He does not attempt to prove that kings and kingdom are not used synonymously. He does not assert that they are not. He only inquires how kings are used, and how they differ from kingdom. But if he is able to show that we are wrong, why did he not present the proofs of it? If he actually regards us as having mistaken the meaning, why did he not offer the grounds of his conviction? What is to be gained by mere interrogatories, the answer to which, for aught that he alleges, will confirm our statement? Whether we are correct or not, however, depends on the question whether the word translated kingdom, in the interpretation given by the prophet, is used to denote kings, or persons exercising supreme rule; and that, we think, the passage renders wholly indisputable. In the first place, the word kingdom, though used in the 37th verse to denote dominion or kingly power, is employed in the 39th, 40th, and 41st verses, synonymously with kings. "Thou, O King, art a King of kings; for the God of heaven hath given thee a kingdom, power, and strength, and glory." Here the king is distinguished from the kingdom which had been given to him; and the latter is in the following verse explained to denote the power or dominion with which he was invested: "And, wheresoever the children of men dwell, the beasts of the field and the fowls of the heaven *hath he given into thine hand, and hath made thee ruler over them all*. Thou art this head of gold." It is the king, then, that is symbolized by the head of the image, not his territory, nor his subjects; and that which was given to him, and is denominated a kingdom, was his *absolute authority to rule them as king*. But in the next verse, the word kingdom is employed to denote the lines of kings that were symbolized by the silver and brazen parts

of the image. "Thou art this head of gold. And after thee shall arise another kingdom inferior to thee, and another third kingdom of brass, *that shall bear rule over all the earth.*" Here the word kingdom is used synonymously with kings, or line of kings, or a dynasty, manifestly from the consideration that it is symbolized by that part of the image to which it corresponds; which, like the head of gold, is the symbol of a king, or family of kings. The several parts of the image are indisputably used on the same principle. It is shown, also, by the prediction, that the second kingdom should be inferior to Nebuchadnezzar. It was not the mere territory of the Medes and Persians that was to be inferior to Nebuchadnezzar. There was no room for a comparison of a mere territory with him. It was not the population of the Persian empire that was to be inferior to the Babylonian monarch. There was no ground for a comparison of them with him in respect to authority or splendor. That which was to be inferior to Nebuchadnezzar, bore the same relation to him, that the silver part of the image, which was its symbol, bore to the golden head, which was his representative, and was, therefore, a family or succession of kings. This is manifest, likewise, from the agency that is ascribed to the second and third kingdoms. They "*shall bear rule over all the earth.*" They are kings, therefore. They are not territory, as territory is expressly specified as that over which they are to bear rule. They are not the Persian and Greek nations, or the population of their territories, as they did not exercise the rule over them. They were the subjects, not the agents, of that rule. Their governments were monarchical, not democratic or representative.

The term is used in the sense of rulers, also, in the description of the powers denoted by the iron and clay of the image, as is seen from the strength which is ascribed to it, and its being broken, which are not predicable of territory; and their mingling themselves with the seed of men, which shows both that the iron is a symbol of men, and that they are a different class from those with whom they are mingled, and are not, therefore, the population generally, of the fourth empire; but, like those denoted by the other metals, the orders of rulers who exercised authority over that popu-

lation. But, it is placed beyond all question, that this is the sense in which the term is used, by the express designation of these four orders, in the 43d verse, as kings: "And in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom." And, finally, this is corroborated by the interpretation of the four great beasts of the seventh chapter, which are symbols of the same powers, or kings. "These great beasts, which are four, are four kings."

As the term is thus used in these passages to denote those who exercise monarchical power, it is undoubtedly to be taken in that sense also in the interpretation of the stone by which the image was broken. "And in the days of these kings, shall the God of Heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed, and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever." This is seen also from the agency that is ascribed to them. They are to break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms; which is neither predicable of a territory, nor of a population, in distinction from those who exercise supreme power over them. It is by the supreme rulers of a people—through the subordinate agents whom, in virtue of their civil power, they employ to execute their will,—that the rulers of another nation are conquered and divested of their authority, not by a people irrespective of their rulers. And, finally, the truth of this construction is seen from the fact that in the explication of the visions of the four beasts, and of the investiture of the Son of Man with dominion over "*all peoples, and nations, and languages,*" it is expressly stated that that dominion is to be exercised in subordination to him by "the Saints of the Most High." "And the kingdom, and the dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey him." Who the people of the saints of the Most High are, is seen from a preceding verse, in which it is foreshown that they were to be worn out by the agents symbolized by the little horn of the wild beast. They are faithful worshippers of the Most High, therefore, in contradistinction from the vassals of antichrist, or persons of that class; and they are kings or supreme

rulers, inasmuch as they are to exercise dominion under the whole heaven, which is predicable of those only who have authority over subjects. A people, moreover, cannot be said, irrespective of their rulers, to exercise dominion over themselves. It is the rulers who exercise dominion, even though they derive their powers from the people over whom they have authority. We have thus most ample evidence of the accuracy of our statement of the prophet's interpretation.

Professor B.'s objection in respect to Dan. iv. 10, 12, 22, that the leaves and branches of the tree are not explained by the prophet as standing for the dress of the monarch, is legitimate. They were parts of the tree itself, not mere adjuncts or external ornaments; and the inspired interpretation exhibits them as such. "The tree that thou sawest, which grew and was strong, whose height reached unto the heaven, and the sight thereof to all the earth, whose leaves were fair, and the fruit thereof much, and in it was meat for all; under which the beasts of the field dwelt, and upon whose branches the fowls of the heaven had their habitation;—It is thou, O king, that art grown and become strong; for thy greatness is grown, and reacheth unto heaven, and thy dominion to the end of the earth." The interpretation thus simply exhibits the tree as symbolizing the king in his greatness, height, and large dominion, without any specification of the particulars that constituted his greatness and height. Our error, accordingly, lay simply in the statement of that interpretation. It has no relation whatever to the law which Professor B. alleges it to depreciate. The prophet's explication is not only conformable to that law, but would have been, had it embraced the specification which we inadvertently ascribed to it. Such an error—wholly irrelevant to the law—no more invalidates it than an inadvertence in phraseology or orthography. While Professor B., then, has pointed out a mistake, he has himself fallen into an equal one, in offering it as an objection in a false relation. It no more affects the position against which he is arguing, than his own error affects the question, whether his views of the nature of symbols and language are correct. He proceeds:—

"Dan. vii. 9. The 'Ancient of days' is a symbol of the Most High.

But why is not this a direct denomination instead of a symbol? Did the prophet actually behold some symbolical personage who was primarily intended by the title? If so, in what form? In that of a venerable man, with snowy locks, and aged mien? But this would be to contradict the position so expressly assumed, that no created being can be properly made a representative of the Most High. We wait, therefore, for a declaration of the sense in which this 'Ancient of days' is a *symbol*, denoting God the Father as the Most High."—P. 298.

But, here, the seeming ground of the objection is owing wholly to an inadvertency of Professor B., as the word *symbol* is not used by us, but is introduced by himself in what he presents as our statement of the inspired interpretation. Our language is, "The ancient of days, as the Most High;" the verb "is interpreted," being understood, as it is in a series of sentences that precedes and follows it. Our statement, therefore, is wholly unobnoxious to the objection, and precisely such as Professor B. intimates it should be.

He next objects to our statement of the inspired interpretation, Zech. i. 8-11. "The horsemen seen by Zechariah, are interpreted as symbolizing those whom God sent forth to traverse the earth—as ministers of the gospel, doubtless—and the effect of whose ministry was, that the earth sat still, and its population was at rest."—Pp. 298, 299. He treats the expression—"as ministers of the gospel doubtless," as though it were exhibited by us as a part of the angel's interpretation. It is not so, however. It is employed simply to express our opinion that the agents denoted by the horsemen are ministers of the gospel. The passage is itself unusually obscure. There is no formal indication of what class or profession the persons are, who are represented by the symbol. "I saw by night, and behold a man riding a red horse, and he stood among the myrtle trees, that were in the bottom, and behind him were there red horses, speckled, and white. Then, said I, O, my Lord, what are these? And the angel that talked with me said unto me, I will show thee what these be. And the man that stood among the myrtle trees answered and said—These are they whom the Lord hath sent to walk to and fro through the earth. And they answered the angel of the Lord that stood among the myrtle-trees, and said—We have walked to and fro through the earth, and, behold, all the earth sitteth

still, and is at rest." It is not expressly said that the prophet saw more than a single rider ; but it is shown by the response that the other horses were mounted. "They answered, we have walked to and fro through the earth." It is not expressly stated what their profession was ; but from their being a troop, or troops of horsemen, it is probable that they were warriors. It is not directly stated that the quiet and rest of the earth were the consequence of their agency, but it is probable, inasmuch as otherwise their office would be that of mere observers or spectators ; which is wholly unlike the function of any other agents in the symbolic visions. They are universally exhibited as either exerting an influence on persons or objects distinct from themselves ; or else the subjects of an influence from others. As the interpretation, however, does not directly show that the agents symbolized are of a different order from the symbol, on what ground is it assumed that they are ? First, because it is the law of symbols universally, that, when the subject allows it, the representative and that which it represents are of different orders or species. Next, because that is the law of this prophet. Every other symbol exhibited in the vision is interpreted by the angel as denoting an agent or object differing from itself. Thirdly, because there is nothing in these symbols or the agency they exert, that indicates that that which they denote must be of the same species. As there is no reason, therefore, for treating them as standing for agents of their own order ; there is no ground to doubt that they represent an order that differs from themselves. Of what order then are they ? As the quiet and rest of the earth are the opposites of insurrection and war, if they are the authors of that quiet they unquestionably are warriors ; and on that supposition undoubtedly denote ministers of the gospel, as they are the only order who reduce men from insubordination and hostility, to submission and peace, in a relation analogous to the reduction of men to order and tranquillity by conquerors ; and this is in harmony with the other symbolizations of the vision. That it relates to the Christian church is indicated by the use of a candlestick and olive tree as symbols ; the first of which is employed in the Apocalypse as the symbol of a church ; and the other as the symbol of witnesses for Christ, or faithful ministers, conformably to the interpre-

tation that is here given of them as denoting anointed ones. And that it is to be after the destruction of the four great monarchies, and at the time of the advent of Christ and the conversion of the world, is indicated by the promise to Zion that God will then dwell in the midst of her, that many nations shall be joined to the Lord in that day, and shall be his people. "Sing and rejoice, O, daughter of Zion, for, lo, I come, and I will dwell in the midst of thee, saith the Lord. And many nations shall be joined to the Lord in that day, and shall be my people; and I will dwell in the midst of thee, and thou shalt know that the Lord of Hosts hath sent me unto thee." These events most certainly had not taken place anterior to the institution of the Christian church. They are as certainly still future. And that the rest reported by the horsemen is to be at the same period seems to be intimated by the command with which the prediction is closed. "*Be silent*, O, all flesh, before the Lord, for he is raised up out of his holy habitation." Such are the reasons of the judgment we expressed, that the horsemen denote ministers of the gospel. We admit that we have not the high evidence of it—as we indicated in the statement on which Professor B. founds his objection—that we have of the import of most of the inspired interpretations. The whole symbolization is obscure. But this is the explication to which the laws that hold in all the other symbolic prophecies most undoubtedly lead.

His remarks on Rev. vii. 7, 9-17, do not need a reply. He does not attempt to refute the construction placed by us on the passage, nor even to offer specific objections to it; but contents himself with stating that he is perplexed by the representation that men are to live on earth in the natural body, in obedience and blessedness, after the advent of Christ. His difficulty, however, has its ground, doubtless, in his Swedenborgianism, not in the want of authority in the Apocalypse for that representation. The new Jerusalem, which is the symbol of the risen and justified saints, is expressly denominated "the tabernacle of God with men;" in which he is to "dwell with them," and they are to be "his people, and God himself is to be with them, their God." Those with whom he is thus to dwell are wholly different, therefore, from the risen and glorified saints, denoted by the tabernacle. As then they are not to be glorified saints, they must be saints who are

unglorified, and in the natural, therefore, in contradistinction from the spiritual body. That the earth is then to be inhabited by the race in natural, in distinction from glorified bodies, is shown also by the representation that "the nations of them that are saved shall walk in the light" of the new Jerusalem—the symbol of the risen saints; "and the kings of the earth bring their glory and honor into it." Whether he can comprehend it then or not, it is indisputably revealed. That he is unable to understand how it is to be, does not invalidate the prediction. Nor does his inability to reconcile it with the doctrines he has derived from Swedenborg, prove that we are mistaken in representing it as taught in these passages.

He finds it equally difficult also to understand how the saints who are living at the advent of Christ should be gathered together in a manner analogous to a harvest. His not comprehending it, however, does not prove that it is not fore-shown by the reaping of the earth. Apart from that symbol, it is expressly announced by Christ that at his coming, "he shall send his angels with the great sound of a trumpet, and they shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other;" and the announcement that he is to be revealed from heaven in flaming fire, taking vengeance on all them that know not God, and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, may indicate the reason that they are to be separated from those who are to be destroyed, and withdrawn to a scene of safety.

His next allegation is against the representation that the stars are interpreted by Christ, Rev. i. 20, as the messengers of the seven churches. But what does he aim to accomplish? Does he attempt to prove that that statement is wrong? *Not at all. He admits that "angel is a term denoting a messenger." Does he undertake to show that that interpretation is inconsistent with the law, that the symbol and that which it denotes are of different species—which it is the object of his argument to disparage? Not in the least. It is in conformity with that law; and is alleged by us as an exemplification of it. What, then, is it that he objects? That "it is not at all clear that the idea of messenger was intended to be the prominent idea conveyed in this passage by *angel*." Does he, however, offer any proof of this? Not a syllable; nor could he, had he

attempted it; first, because the words employed in the inspired interpretation of the symbols, are used in their plain literal and established sense, and of necessity; as otherwise they would not be intelligible, but in place of explaining would add to the mystery of their meaning. Were the term angel in this passage, for example, used metaphorically, the interpretation would then be simply—the seven stars are *like* the angels of the seven churches;—which, on the one hand, would make it certain that the angels of the churches, whoever they are, are not the agents denoted by the stars, but only *like* them; and, on the other, would leave it totally uncertain who or what it is that the stars denote; as, if the stars are not symbols of angels, then there is no indication who the agents are whom they symbolize; and, if the meaning of the word angel were, as Mr. B. asserts, uncertain, it would be uncertain also who or what it is with which the stars are compared. To treat the explanatory term, therefore, as used metaphorically, is absolutely to exclude the agent, object, or event, that is given as represented by the symbol, and substitute another that is supposititious and absolutely unknown and indeterminable in its place! The word angel, then, cannot be used metaphorically in this explication. It is, therefore, used to denote a messenger, as that is its literal meaning as a denominative of men; and the meaning with which it is employed as their appellative in the New Testament, as in Luke vii. 24, in which the disciples sent by John to Christ are called John's angels, that is messengers; ix. 52, in which Christ's disciples sent before him are denominated angels; and Matt. xi. 10, in which John the Baptist is called Christ's angel sent before his face. Can any higher proof be asked that our translation of the term is correct, than that the meaning we ascribe to it is thus its literal and established meaning; and the only import that can be assigned to it, without totally contravening the end for which the Saviour interpreted the symbol, and make it wholly impossible to determine what it is that it denotes?

He next objects to our statement of the explanation given in the prophecy of the Lamb's wife and the New Jerusalem. "The Lamb's wife is interpreted as the symbol of the justified saints, Rev. xix. 7, 8: the New Jerusalem as denoting, like the Lamb's wife, the risen and glorified saints," xix. 7, 8,

14; xxi. 9, 10. Now, the first of these is indisputably correct, as it is expressly said, that the robe in which the bride was arrayed was the symbol of the righteousness of the saints, and denotes, therefore, that those whom she represents were saints, and were justified. "The Lord God omnipotent reigneth; let us be glad, and rejoice, and give honor to him; for the marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife hath made herself ready. And to her was granted that she should be arrayed in fine linen, clean and white; for the fine linen is the righteousnesses of saints." The term translated righteousnesses, literally denotes the act of a judge in justifying, or a judicial sentence by which a person arraigned, or instituting a cause before a tribunal, is vindicated, or justified. The Lamb's wife, then, is the symbol of saints, and of saints who are justified. Next, the statement that the Lamb's wife and the New Jerusalem are symbols of the same saints, is correct also; as the New Jerusalem is expressly called the bride, the Lamb's wife. "Come hither, I will show thee the bride, the Lamb's wife. And he carried me in spirit to a great and high mountain, and showed me that great city, the holy Jerusalem descending out of heaven from God." But Mr. B. objects that it is not expressly said that those whom the city symbolizes are risen saints. "The interpreting angel does not affirm that those who constitute the New Jerusalem are saints who have risen from the dead, in Mr. L.'s sense of resurrection, which is that of the body." Admit it; and the question then is, whether, still, such explanations are not given, as taken in connexion with what we are taught in other passages of the prophecy, and of the New Testament, supersede the necessity of such an express statement that they are risen saints. We know, then, that the resurrection of the saints is to take place at the advent of Christ. "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive; but every man in his own band; Christ the first fruits; afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming." We know that that resurrection is to take place before the millennium. It is to be at the last trumpet. "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye at the *last trump*, for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible." "For the Lord himself shall descend

from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God, and the dead in Christ shall rise first." We know of no last trumpet except the seventh trumpet of the Apocalypse; and we are expressly informed in the Apocalypse, that the time when that is to be blown, is the time when the dead are to be judged, and the saints receive their reward. Rev. xi. 15-18. And we know that it is to precede the millennium. It is immediately to follow the end of the second woe. It is to be blown when the time is come to destroy them that destroy the earth, by whom are meant the antichristian powers, and that is to take place before the millennium. Rev. xi. 14, 18. It is to be contemporaneous with the seventh vial, and that is to be poured out at the period of the destruction of great Babylon, Rev. xvi. 17-21, which is also to precede the millennium. We are also expressly shown, that the resurrection of the saints is to take place before the thousand years, Rev. xx. 4-6. The enthronement of the souls seen by the apostle is declared to denote the first resurrection, and the resurrection of saints. For those who have part in it are pronounced holy and blessed. That it is a corporeal resurrection is certain, from the consideration that those who were the subjects of it were souls, and many of them persons who had been put to death; and that it is affirmed of them, as consequent on their resurrection, that they *lived*. There is no other life by a resurrection, in contradistinction from a corporeal death, but a corporeal life. We know, moreover, that that resurrection is to include all the saints that shall have then died. It is expressly announced, at the seventh trumpet, that "the time is come of the dead, to judge and give the reward to thy servants the prophets, and the holy, and those who fear thy name, small and great." This language, most certainly, comprehends all. All the other predictions of the first resurrection also, represent that all the saints are then to be raised. "The dead in Christ shall rise first." "Them, also, that sleep in Jesus, will God bring with him." "Christ the first-fruits, afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming." In these announcements and explanations, then, we have the utmost certainty that the saints denoted by the Lamb's wife and New Jerusalem, are risen saints; for if all the saints are to be

raised before the millennium, and thence before their descent from heaven, which is symbolized by the descent of the city, then the saints denoted by that city must be risen saints, *as there will be no others whom they can represent.* They are not symbols of saints in the natural body, manifestly, from the descent of their representative from heaven, and from its discrimination from the nations that are to walk in its light, and bring to it their glory. They must be risen saints, therefore, as there are then to be no others, except those who are in the natural body. And, finally, if they are to be risen and justified saints, then they are also to be glorified, as the resurrection of the saints is to be in a spiritual and glorious body. These great facts, then, shown by the passages of the prophecy to which we referred, that all the saints are to be raised at the first resurrection; that that resurrection is to take place anterior to the millennium, and before the event symbolized by the descent of the New Jerusalem; that all the holy dead are at that epoch to be judged, in order to their justification and reward; and that the bride and the holy city that descended from heaven are symbols of justified saints; present the most ample certainty that those whom they denote, are also risen and glorified, and render a formal statement that that is their import, unnecessary to justify our representation that they are interpreted as their symbols.

Professor Bush proceeds: "Neither is it said that the souls of those who were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and who sat on thrones, and reigned with Christ a thousand years, are the same with the saints who constitute the Lamb's wife and the heavenly Jerusalem. This is Mr. L.'s *inference.*" But where does Mr. B. find a statement by us, that it was said by the angel that they are the same? There is nothing of the kind in the passage. We only said, that "the souls that sat on thrones are interpreted as denoting the risen and glorified saints;" "the Lamb's wife as the symbol of the justified saints;" and "the New Jerusalem as denoting, like the Lamb's wife, the risen and glorified saints;" each of which we have demonstrated. We did not, in addition to this, represent that the angel expressly said that those "who sat on thrones and reigned with Christ a thousand years, are the same with the saints who constitute the Lamb's wife and

the heavenly Jerusalem." That is Mr. B.'s *inference*. It thus turns out that it is the professor himself, not we, who has fallen into the error, which he with such unhesitating assurance ascribes to us. He proceeds, however, on the ground of this imaginary achievement, to assure his readers that we are guilty, in numerous instances, of the misrepresentation which he thus falsely charges on us.

"This is Mr. L.'s *inference* growing out of his peculiar scheme of prophecy, and it will be found in numerous instances that what he has set down as *inspired* interpretation is no more than his own interpretation, which we are called upon to admit as of divine authority. We deny most emphatically the truth of his exhibition of the mind of the Spirit in this connexion. If he believes that this is the true intent of the oracle, let him propound it as his belief formed from the best light he can obtain; but let him not exalt his conjectural commentary to a level with the text itself."—P. 301.

The reader can now judge of the justice of this sweeping accusation, and appreciate the grace with which he parades the charge on almost every page, "of arbitrary interpretation put forth in the style of oracular assurance." Was a more unhappy spectacle ever exhibited by a critic whose talents and learning should enable him, if his cause were not utterly hopeless, to offer at least some plausible ground for his assumptions and imputations? Not a shadow of proof, however, does he even undertake to present of the validity of his objection, either in this instance, or in any of the others to which we have thus far replied. He offers nothing but his naked assertion: "This is gratuitously said:" "The interpreting angel does not affirm:" "We deny most emphatically the truth of his exhibition," and other affirmations of the kind. He enters into no *argument* whatever; he alleges nothing but his mere asseveration, and has no suspicion, it seems, that that is not all that the exigency demands. What an admirable method of determining a great question! He sees nothing in it of overweening self-confidence, arbitrariness, or an affectation of the oracle! Those absurdities are ascribable only to persons who give reasons for their statements that cannot be refuted!

We quote his next animadversion at length:

"Rev. viii. 8-11 : xvi. 4, 5. Rivers and fountains of waters spoken of under the judgments of the second and third trumpets, and of the second and third vials, denote peoples. This again is inference. The angel merely says: 'The waters which thou sawest, where the whore sitteth, are peoples and multitudes, and nations, and tongues.' These Mr. L. himself admits were waters that were seen surrounding the seven hills of Rome, which must, of course, have been the sea; and it does not necessarily follow that rivers and fountains denote the same, in the language of prophecy, with the sea."—P. 301.

Here Professor B. first omits to state that this is placed by us among the *indirect interpretations* given in the prophecy. We did not intimate that each of these symbols is separately explained as denoting peoples. And next, he passes without notice the fact which we alleged as authorizing our statement that the rivers and fountains are shown, by the response of the angel, to be the symbols of men. "And the third angel poured out his vial upon the rivers and fountains of waters, and they became blood. And I heard the angel of the waters say: Thou art righteous, O Lord which art, and wast, and shalt be, because thou hast judged thus; *for they have shed the blood of saints and prophets*, and thou hast given them blood to drink, for they are worthy. And I heard another out of the altar say: Even so, Lord God Almighty, true and righteous are thy judgments." It is thus shown, not by a direct and formal interpretation, but indirectly, that the subjects of the infliction are men; and, therefore, that the waters on which the vial was poured is their representative; and that is the relation in which symbols universally are used. Agents denote agents; acts stand for acts; effects for effects; and the subjects of symbolic inflictions, for those who are to be the subjects of the inflictions that are foreshown. As peoples and nations, then, are the subjects of the judgment here represented, the fountains and rivers in which the effect denoting that judgment was produced, are the symbols of those peoples and nations. Can a more ample vindication of our statement be required? Can Mr. B. wish a more effective confutation of his? We have here another example of his method of criticising by mere asseveration. He does not undertake to prove that the angel does not exhibit men as the subjects of the calamity denoted by the conversion of the rivers and

fountains to blood. He does not attempt to show that it is not a law of symbolization, that the subjects of symbolic inflictions represent the subjects of the inflictions which those symbols foreshow. Nor could he, had he attempted it. Of the numerous interpretations given of them in the Scriptures, there is not one that does not exhibit them as sustaining that relation to each other. Nor does he offer any proof of his assertion that "it does not necessarily follow that rivers and fountains denote the same"—that is peoples and nations—"in the language of prophecy, with the sea." Nor could he have succeeded had he undertaken it; as it would be to show that the relation in which symbols are employed, is not conformable to a law, and uniform; that the reason that they are employed to denote certain agents, objects, or effects, does not lie in their adaptation by the resemblances which they present, to exhibit those agents and effects rather than others; that there is nothing, therefore, in them which can indicate what the objects or events are which they denote; and thence that their use is wholly arbitrary, and their meaning consequently undeterminable. But that would be not only to contradict all the interpretations that are given in the prophecies, and all the representations, commands, and promises which imply that they are interpretable, but it would be to overturn Professor Bush's theory of symbols as effectually as ours, and strike the whole fabric of Swedenborgianism to the dust; for it is a fundamental element of that scheme, and affirmed by Mr. B. as confidently as by Swedenborg himself, as was shown in the article on the subject in our number for January, that the relation of symbols to that which they symbolize is uniformly the same; and has its ground in their nature, and is conformed to what he denominates their "psychological principles." Why did he not turn in this direction and look at the results to which his assertion leads? Why did he leave it wholly unproved, and proceed on the assumption that his "arbitrary" declaration, "put forth in a style of oracular assurance," is all that is necessary to demonstrate its accuracy?

His next allegation is the following:

"Dan. ii. 41, 42, 43. The inadhesion of the iron and clay in Nebu-

chadnezzar's image represents the want of union between the monarchs, and their people holding the elective franchise. This will be seen to be an inference, and a very far-fetched one, by any one who will consult the passages referred to. He will have to look long before finding any allusion to the elective franchise."—P. 301.

This objection, it seems, is directed wholly against the use of those terms, not against that which they are employed to denote. We, however, did not represent that the words, "elective franchise," occur in the interpretation of the symbols given in the prophecy. We used them merely to indicate what we regard that interpretation as expressing, that the inadhesion of the iron and clay represents the want of union between the monarchs and their people who were admitted to a share with them in their administration, as Professor B. might have seen from the statement we presented of the interpretation given of the clay, as "denoting the people who were admitted to a share in the government of the iron dynasty." A people's holding the elective franchise, is their having the right to elect the persons who exercise, or take a part in administering the government over them. And that is the form, and the only form, in which a people have a share in their own government. Mr. B. accomplishes nothing, then, by alleging that the terms, "elective franchise," are not in the prophet's interpretation. That is not affirmed, nor is it involved in the question at issue. To say that they have a part in their own government, is to say that some of their rulers are elective. To say that they have the elective franchise, is to say that they have a voice in their government. The expressions are equivalent to each other. If he would have set aside our statement, he should have shown, either that there is some other mode in which a people may have political power, besides that of appointing those who make or administer their laws; or else that the iron does not denote the monarchical or supreme rulers; that the clay does not represent the people in contradistinction from those rulers; that the incorporation of the clay with the iron does not symbolize the admission of the people to a share in the political power; or else, finally, that the inadhesion does not denote the want of union or concurrence of those two

branches of rulers. Neither of these, however, does he attempt. We, on the other hand, have only to prove the converse of these several propositions, to vindicate our statement of the inspired interpretation; and this is no difficult task. In the first place, then, the iron denotes the monarchical or supreme rulers. That both the iron and clay are symbols of men, not of a mere territory, is seen from the explication; "and whereas thou sawest iron mixed with miry clay, *they* shall mingle themselves with *the seed of men*; but *they* shall not cleave one to another, even as iron is not mixed with clay," Dan. ii. 43. Both are thus interpreted as the symbols of men. The iron denotes the rulers who exercised the supreme power of the empire anterior to its division into ten kingdoms, symbolized by the toes. It is explained as the symbol of the fourth line of rulers, who were strong as iron, and brake in pieces and bruised all the nations whom they assailed. In the next place the clay symbolizes the people, or persons who belong to the people, in contradistinction from the rulers who are denoted by the iron, as is seen from the explication of it, as standing for the seed of men; and the exhibition of it as the symbol of men in the prediction that "they shall not cleave" to those whom the iron represents. In the third place, the men whom the clay denotes are men who have a share in the government, or are joint rulers with those who are symbolized by the iron. This is seen from the fact that the image is the symbol of rulers only, not of territory or subjects. As the gold denoted the Babylonian dynasty of monarchs, the silver the Persian, and the brass the Greek, so the iron represented the corresponding orders of the Roman empire. It is shown, also, by the explication of the union of the iron and clay in the feet and toes, as representing that the ruling power should be divided between two orders of men. "And whereas thou sawest the feet and toes, part of potters' clay and part of iron, the kingdom shall be divided, but there shall be in it of the strength of the iron;" that is, those who exercise the government shall consist of two classes; one of which, the supreme or kingly, shall be of the same character as were those denoted by the iron of the legs of the image; the other shall be of the people. In the fourth place, the inadhesion of the iron and clay symbolizes

the want of union or concurrence of those two classes of rulers in the exercise of their political power. The non-union of the metal and earth is explained as denoting, that those whom they represent should not cleave to one another ; and the admission of the clay into the image is interpreted as indicating, that their power would be thereby weakened and broken. "As the toes of the feet were part of iron and part of clay, so the kingdom," or body of rulers, "shall be partly strong and partly broken." And finally, the form, and the only form, in which the subjects of monarchical governments possess, or can possess political power, and a body of their class be invested with civil office, and exercise a distinct branch of the government in conjunction with the monarchs, is by the elective franchise. The people cannot all have civil offices, as there would then be no subjects in distinction from rulers. Persons of their order, who hold office, must be few in comparison to their whole number, and must be taken, therefore, out of their body by some elective process. But a popular branch of rulers, in contradistinction from hereditary and monarchical orders, cannot be constituted, except by the act of the people themselves, designating them and investing them with power as their representatives and agents ; and there is no other way in which they can thus constitute persons their political representatives, but by an election. That is, in fact, the form in which the population of the European kingdoms exercise their political power, and persons of their order are constituted a distinct branch of their governments ; and in harmony, accordingly, with the prophet's interpretation, those of their governments, in which there is a popular or representative element, are customarily denominated mixed monarchies, to distinguish them from such as are absolute, in which the people have no share. Can Professor Bush wish a more ample vindication of our statement of the prophet's explication of the symbol ? Can he furnish one that is either more just, or expressed in more appropriate terms ? He proceeds :

"Dan. vii. 13, 14, 18-27. The investiture of one like the Son of Man with dominion over all nations, signifies the investiture of Christ and the establishment of his kingdom on earth, in which his reign

saints are to reign with him. Where does Mr. L. find anything in the angel's explanation respecting the *risen* saints reigning with Christ in his kingdom on earth? What is this but compelling the word of God to bear witness to a private interpretation of our own? 'He that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully. What is the chaff to the wheat? saith the Lord.'—P. 302.

This is an instance of criticism by mere interrogatory; and of objection again to the mere use of a word that does not occur in the sacred text; not to that which it expresses. Otherwise why did not Professor B. demonstrate what he insinuates? But he neither offers any verification of his charge, nor, had he attempted it, would he have met with any success. To justify our statement we have only to prove, that the earth is to be the scene of the kingdom with which Christ and the saints are here represented as invested; that the saints of the Most High who are to possess the kingdom with him are not men in the natural body; and that they are to reign with him. These positions being clear from the text, we know from them and from other passages of the prophetic Scriptures that those who are thus to reign, are risen and glorified saints. And each of these propositions is demonstrable. In the first place, the dominion and kingdom with which Christ and the saints are here represented as invested, is a dominion and rule in this world. The object of his investiture we are expressly told is, "that all people, nations, and languages, should serve him;" and the dominion which they are to possess is represented as extending "under the whole heaven." The earth is then to be the scene of that dominion; and men its subjects. Next: The saints who are to take that kingdom and possess it for ever, are not sanctified men in the natural body. This is seen from the fact that all men in the natural body are to be subjects of that rule. All nations and languages are then to serve, not reign.

If the people, nations, and languages, are to take and possess the kingdom, who are to be their subjects? The supposition that dominion is to be exercised by them is a solecism. Nor are the saints of the Most High, as some might perhaps be inclined to assume, his ancient chosen people, the Israelites. That is seen, not only from the foregoing consideration, but

from the employment of the term in the prediction to denote the faithful disciples of Christ who are worn out by the little horn of the wild beast, during that monster's career, v. 24, 25. They are Christian, and therefore chiefly Gentile believers, who have fought their fight of allegiance to the Most High, anterior to their investiture with this dominion. Thirdly : They are to reign on the earth with Christ. They are to reign, for the kingdom they are to possess is a dominion and royalty. It is an authoritative power and sway ; that being the import alike of the word dominion and kingdom in the prophecy, as we have shown on a previous page. That dominion is to be exercised on earth ; for "the kingdom, and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom" that is to be given to them, is to be "under the whole heaven." And it is to be conjoined with and involved in Christ's kingdom ; as it is to be exercised when "all dominions are to serve and obey him." Finally : It is certain, therefore, from these facts, and from other prophetic passages, that they are risen and glorified saints. They are not sanctified men in the natural body, as all such are then to be subjects, not kings. They are, or a portion of them, saints who lived and bore persecution as Christ's disciples during the domination of the ten-horned wild beast, and are, therefore, saints who have passed from the natural life. As, then, they are saints who have passed from the natural life, they must be saints that are raised from death and invested again with bodies, as otherwise they could not reign over the nations. In order that men may be their subjects, and yield them obedience, they must be aware that they have authority over them, and know what their rights are, and must, therefore, have communication with them. The supposition of a kingship and dominion over them of which they are wholly unconscious, and of which they have no proofs, signals, nor information, is absurd. But in order to an intercourse between those saints and men in the natural body, a communication of knowledge, and ostensible exercise of authority, they must be perceptible by the senses, and must, therefore, be invested with bodies. There is no other medium by which they can become visible, and exercise a dominion to which men can render a voluntary and realized obedience. Disembodied saints, who are invisible, cannot exercise a sway

over them which they can recognise, and intelligently obey. We are accordingly expressly shown, in other prophetic passages, that they are risen saints who are thus to reign with Christ on earth. Thus in the vision, Rev. xx. 4-6, among the souls that sat on thrones, received judicial authority, and reigned with Christ a thousand years, they are expressly enumerated, who are here denominated the saints of the Most High, that were worn out by the little horn of the wild beast: "The souls of those who had been beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God, and whoever had not worshipped the wild beast, nor its image, and had not received the mark on their forehead, and on their hand." And their *living* is declared to be the first resurrection. They are risen saints therefore. In like manner we are taught, Rev. xxi. 24, that the risen saints are then to give knowledge to the nations, and receive tokens of homage or subjection from them, in the representation that the nations are to walk in the light of the New Jerusalem, which is the symbol of the risen saints, in their residence and reign on earth with Christ; and are to bring their glory and honor into it. We have thus the most ample certainty, both from the interpretations given in the passages to which we referred and in the Apocalypse, that the saints who are then to receive and possess the dominion over men, which the prediction foreshows, are risen saints, and that they are to reign with Christ on earth. Mr. B.'s criticism has no ground whatever except the mere fact, that the word risen is not employed in the inspired explanation.

His next observations, in which he aims to give effect to these several criticisms, are still more extraordinary. He says:

"It will not be forgotten, that in all this Mr. L. professes to be stating the interpretations of the Holy Ghost, and not propounding his own. He adduces the above, among a multitude of similar instances, as an illustration of what he declares to be the general law of symbols, to wit, that they shall be of a different order from the persons or things represented. This may be true in the main, as we are inclined to believe it is; but we think it clear, that in the above cases he has failed to invest the rule with a divine sanction, as he claims with a certain confidence of tone to have done."—P. 302.

- Mr. B. has fallen into an inaccuracy in representing that we adduced these and the others with which they are intermixed, "as illustrative" of what we have alleged "as the general law of symbols—that they shall be of a different order from the persons or things represented." We did not offer them in that relation, as four of them—the Ancient of days and the Son of man, the risen saints and the palm-bearing multitude, are expressly represented by us as appearing in person for themselves, and not by a symbol of a different species; because no agent or object of a different species could serve as their symbol in the relations in which they acted in the vision; and that in respect to the first two is recognised by Professor B. in his objection to our statement of the angel's interpretation, Dan. vii. 9. We presented the enumeration in which these and the others with which they are associated occur, as the whole series of the interpretations of the symbols that are given in the prophecies, without consideration whether they are of the class that denote agents, objects, or acts, of a different order, or are representative of themselves.

But apart from this misapprehension of our object in those statements, how has Professor B. made it "clear that in the above cases" we have "failed to invest the rule" to which he refers, with the divine sanction," as we "claim with a certain tone of confidence to have done?" He has alleged nothing to that effect. It has not even been the aim of his allegations. So far from it, every one of the statements on which he has animadverted—with the exceptions we have specified, which he is aware are in accordance with a subordinate rule—are in harmony with that law! Thus the stone cut out of the mountain, denotes kings; the tree, Nebuchadnezzar; the warrior horsemen seen by Zechariah, messengers of peace, or ministers of the gospel, who, though men, are men of a different profession. The wild beast of seven heads stands for civil rulers, and its head and horns for kings; the Lamb's wife and the New Jerusalem denote the risen and glorified saints; rivers and fountains of waters represent peoples and nations; the iron and clay, men of two classes; and their inadhesion, the non-concurrence, or want of union of those two classes in the exercise of their

political authority. All these cases are thus verifications of that law, not deviations from it. Nor had Mr. B., until he had reached this point in his discussion, suggested that that is not the fact. He has employed himself solely in attempting to show that we have no authority in the texts for the views we have presented of the inspired interpretation of these symbols; but, instead, "that what we have set down as *inspired*, is no more than our own interpretation," or "inference;" and that, accordingly, we have merely occupied ourselves in "compelling the word of God to bear witness" to constructions of "our own." Were every one of his allegations admitted, they would not yield any support to the conclusion which he now represents as demonstrated by them! Is it not singular that he should have thus mistaken the nature of his objections? He goes on in an equally extraordinary manner:—

"Not only so; the rule not only fails in several cases to be duly authenticated; but even should this be granted, we are prepared to show that the principle is wholly inadequate to the emergency—that it does not afford a competent key to decipher the enigmas of the prophets, and is, therefore, undeserving of the high laudations which Mr. L. bestows upon it"—P. 302.

He, here again, as in the commencement of his objections, represents, in effect, that that is the only law which we have stated for the explication of symbols; that we have exhibited it as competent to the full solution of all "the enigmas of the prophets;" and thence, that as it is not adequate to that office, we have wholly failed in the object we attempted to accomplish. But how is it that Professor B. fell into so gross a misrepresentation? We have made no such representation of the adequacy of that law. We have bestowed on it no such "laudations." We have exhibited it, not as the sole, but only as one of a number of laws, each of which has its peculiar function, and all of which are necessary to the full explication of the symbols. Not only, therefore, is he without a shadow of justification for this extraordinary representation; but it is inexplicable to us, how, with the statement and exemplification before him, of several other laws, he could have fallen into that mistake.

We cannot but think it singular that he should be so extremely eager to depreciate this great law. He does not deny its truth. Instead, he admits it. He says: "It may be true in the main, as we are inclined to believe it is." He does not regard it as unimportant. He allows that it may be highly useful. "By means of the principle, Mr. L. may expose fifty false interpretations without establishing one true one. We do not deny that there is something gained, even on this score. It is well to have a criterion that shall enable us at once to reject a false construction." That it is absolutely essential; that it fills the office perfectly that is assigned to it; and that it sets aside a vast array of false constructions that cannot be confuted effectually by any other means, no one can fail to see, who gives it a proper consideration. It sets aside, for example, all those views of the seals, which represent them as symbolizing the invasion of Judea by the Romans, the capture and destruction of Jerusalem, and the slaughter and exile of the Jews. It confutes, also, all those explications of those seals which represent them as denoting the foreign and domestic wars and slaughters of the Romans, and famines and pestilences with which they were smitten. It thus at once overturns a vast body of interpretations that have never been effectually disproved, nor can be by any other means. Its application is equally important, also, to many other parts of the symbolic prophecies. Can Mr. B. designate any law offered by other expositors that is of equal significance to this? Is the whole that they have ever done to free the prophecies from misconception, of any moment whatever, compared to the vast confutation of error that is achieved by this rule?

But his endeavors to depreciate it are the more singular, from the fact that it is a law of his own theory of symbols, even more absolutely than of ours, and that to confute it, were to overturn the whole fabric of Swedenborgianism. The relation of symbols to that which they represent, he holds is that of effects to their causes; and that is the representation also given by Swedenborg, as was shown in an article on his scheme in our January number. According to them, therefore, the symbol is always of a different species from that which it denotes: And this is not only their

doctrine, but all their interpretations, though deviating, in many instances, from the theory that the things represented are the causes of their symbols,—without a solitary exception, so far as we have observed, besides the divine being,—exhibit the symbol, and that which it denotes, as of different orders. How is it, then, that he is so desirous to disparage a law which is a fundamental element, though in a different form, of his own view of symbols, and the overthrow of which would involve the confutation of his whole symbolical and theological system?

In our statement of the principles of symbolization, we alleged, as a proof of the truth and importance of the law, which he thus assails, that there is a large class of symbols that admit no explication that can be verified, except on the ground that the agents and acts that are foreshown, are of a different species from those by which they are represented. Professor B. now, to confirm his assertion, that “that law does not afford a competent key to decipher the enigmas of the prophets, and is, therefore, undeserving the high laudations which” we have “bestowed upon it,” proceeds to animadvert, through several pages, on the views presented of the import of those symbols; and exults in the conviction that he has shown that many of our interpretations have no ground whatever, even on our own principles, but are mere unauthorized opinions, “put forth in a style of oracular assurance, and virtually claiming for themselves the credit of expositions to which the author has been conducted by a Divine guidance.” But in the first place, he founds the whole of these objurgations, like the former, on the false supposition that the law he assails is the sole law employed by us in those interpretations, and that, therefore, whatever there is in them that is not authorized by that rule, has no ground in our principles, but is the mere offspring of fancy! But was an objector ever guilty of greater or more inexcusable injustice? It is he that is misleading his readers, not we. It is he, not we, that is furnishing “specimens of arbitrary constructions put forth in a style of oracular assurance, and claiming for themselves the credit” of indisputable truth. How is it that he has pursued so injurious and deceptive a course? Does he write in such haste and carelessness as not to be aware of these palpable

mistakes? Has he become so bewildered, as neither to understand us, nor himself? He is not ignorant that that is not the only law of symbols which we have stated and employed in those explications. Had he taken the precaution to examine whether the solutions he denounces with such vehemence as arbitrary, are represented by us as founded wholly on that law, he would have seen that there is neither any formal intimation to that effect, nor the slightest ground in anything we have uttered for such an assumption. Had he paused to inquire whether the fact that some parts of those constructions are not the product of that law, is any proof that they are not correct, he would have seen that there is not the faintest reason for that assumption. That they are not the result of that, is no evidence that they are not of some other law. As well might it be pretended that the whole of the demonstrations in Euclid are "completely arbitrary," because they are not worked out by one single axiom or definition. What confusion worse confounded ever transcended that in which Professor B. has here involved himself? We did not offer those constructions as the result solely of that law. Our object in that argument was simply, first to demonstrate that the symbols which we specified do not admit of a satisfactory explication on the supposition that the representative and that which it represents are of the same species; and the truth of that view Professor B. himself admits. And next, on the other hand, to show that "ON THE GROUND that the agents and acts that are foreshown, are of a *different species* from those by which they are represented," they *do admit of an easy, natural, and demonstrative solution*; and the consideration which we offered to prove it, is, that on that ground they may be interpreted *by the principles of analogy*, which is impracticable on the other theory; and they are *identically the principles that are embodied in our other laws of interpretation*. The object of that law is not directly to determine what the agent, act, or event is, that is foreshown by a symbol, but rather what it is not. It is, as Professor B. himself objects, negative instead of positive. It accomplishes nothing more than to determine that that which is represented is not of the same order as the symbol, but of an analogous class.

*What that order is, it is the function of the other laws we have stated to determine, and they are adequate to that office; for they are the laws themselves of analogy, and specify the resemblances that must subsist between the symbol and that which it denotes, with sufficient clearness to enable the interpreter to determine to what class the agent, act, or event foreshown, belongs. It is thus by wholly disregarding these laws of analogy, the express object of which is to show what it is that the symbols denote, that he gives all its color to his asseveration, that we have furnished no "competent key to decipher the enigmas of the prophets;" and that our interpretations are nothing "more than a *gratis dictum*, or the expression of a private opinion!" We doubt whether the history of controversy presents an instance of more extraordinary injustice. He might as well assume that there is no law of numbers but the rule of three, and then impeach the whole system of arithmetic, because that rule is not adequate to solve all its problems; and pronounce all solutions that are not wrought by that rule, mere "*gratis dicta*, or the expressions of private opinion." He might on the same principle charge the laws of God with a total inadequacy to the end for which they are given, because several of them are merely prohibitory, and only show what is not to be done, not what is! We cannot contemplate without astonishment this extraordinary misrepresentation. We do not regard it as intentional. We do not doubt that he thought his criticism unanswerably just. We ascribe it to his habit of proceeding in his speculations on impressions, instead of principles, or following his feelings rather than his reason. But it shows that his objections and criticisms by assertion and interrogation, should be examined before they are received as authoritative; and teach those parties who have been forward to assign him a triumph, the propriety of ascertaining what the grounds are on which his victories are founded, before they proclaim their admiration of his prowess, and summon the public to yield him an ovation.*

But in the next place, though he thus founds his objection on that false assumption, he admits in the course of his observations, that we in fact explain the symbols of which we were treating by the laws of analogy; but in his usual method,

without the allegation of proofs, pronounces both those laws and the interpretations wholly fanciful and arbitrary. "It is here precisely that we need the aid which Mr. L.'s rule does not afford us. We want a *positive intimation as to the import of the imagery*. But no such adminicular hint occurs, and we are thrown upon analogy for our clew." The only consideration he offers to prove that the laws of analogy, as we have stated and employed them, are not adequate to the office, is, that other expositors have given different expositions of those symbols! "Such is Mr. L.'s interpretation, founded confessedly on an *apprehended* analogy between the symbol and the subject, in regard to which, however, fifty other expositors might fail to see it with Mr. L.'s eyes, as in fact the history of the interpretation of the book makes abundantly manifest. It seems from Mr. L.'s own showing that Grotius, Hammond, Cocceius, Daubuz, Vitringa, Mede, Newton, Cressener, Cuninghame, and Dean Woodhouse, have each of them proposed a different solution from that of Mr. L., and each no doubt was as ready as Mr. L. to suppose that 'no other class of actors, and no other species of agency, answered to the symbols,' and that every other explication was equally 'ineligible.'" If the reader has not become impressed with the feeling that some error is to be expected in whatever Professor B. alleges, he might well be astonished at this representation. Did those writers found their constructions of those symbols on the laws, as we state them, of analogy? Had they any knowledge whatever of them? Is there the slightest indication in their works that it ever entered their minds, for example, that agents must, on the principles of analogy, symbolize agents, acts denote acts, and events represent events? Mr. B. is aware there is not, and that ample evidences of the fact are presented by us in the passages to which he refers. So far from recognising that, or any other law of analogy, they were wholly unacquainted with them, and founded a large share of their constructions on directly opposite principles. In alleging their having "proposed different solutions," therefore, as a proof that the laws of analogy are not adequate to demonstrative interpretations, he proceeds on the assumption, that if the laws of a science, or branch of knowledge, are correct and adequate to the explication of its problems,

then all who have ever treated of that subject, or science, must have founded their solutions on those laws ; though they neither took them as their guides, nor had any knowledge of their existence ! How else does his instance answer the purpose for which he employs it ? But that assumption is as false and absurd, as it would be fatal to us were it true ; and would overturn as effectually his own explications and the whole structure of Swedenborgianism, as it could us ; for were it just, then, on the supposition that the doctrines of Swedenborg are true, all who have ever treated of psychology, symbolization, or any branch of theology or natural science, must have presented the same views of them as are advanced by that critic ; and the fact, therefore, that their views are wholly different, demonstrates that his system is arbitrary and false ! On the same ground Professor B. himself ought always to have entertained and taught the same doctrines, on his favorite themes, as he now advances ; and the fact that he has held a different faith, proves that his present system is erroneous. There is not a truth of science or revelation, that on that method of reasoning, is not convicted of falsehood. All the doctrines of the Scriptures are disproved, because different views of the subjects of which they treat have been held by philosophers and theologians. All the propositions in Newton's principia are shown to be mere gratis dicta, and false, because the theories of the solar system, held by the astronomers and astrologers of the dark ages, were wholly different ! But the folly and absurdity of reasoning on such an assumption, are too obvious to need further exemplification.

If Professor B. would convict the interpretations which he impeaches of error, he must either show that the laws of analogy by which they are framed are not true, that they are not the laws of symbolization, or else that we have not followed them in those explications ; or at least, finally, that though the events which we exhibit as the counterpart of the symbols, are such as those laws require, yet there are other events of the same species that present a still higher correspondence to the symbols, and are better entitled, therefore, to be regarded as those which the predictions denote. If he cannot either demonstrate that those laws are not the laws of

analogy, nor of symbolization ; or that our interpretations of the symbols in question are not conformable to those laws, then he cannot show nor offer any probability that our explanations are not right, in respect at least to the species of agents, acts, and events, which they exhibit as denoted by the symbols ; and if he cannot prove that there are other actors, actions, and events, of the same order, that present a larger and more conspicuous correspondence to the symbols, then he cannot present any proof or probability, that those to which we refer them are not the real agents and occurrences which they foreshow. Neither of those tasks, however, has he even undertaken to accomplish ; in neither of them, we apprehend, will he succeed, should he make the attempt.

Such is the eager and strenuous onset which he makes on the laws of symbolization in his first critical article. Did ever assailant shoot more wide of the mark, or give more ample evidence that he had not adequately considered what it was that he was to achieve, or what the means are by which, if successful in his exertions, his aim was to be accomplished ? He does not offer a particle of proof to support any one of his objections. His only critical media are assertions and interrogatories. He does not absolutely reject the law which he assails ; he admits both its truth and its utility. His whole aim is to detract from its importance, and persuade his readers that we have assigned it too high an office ; and the ground on which he urges that representation is, the false assumption that it is the only law that we have stated, and employ in our explications. He does not attempt to demonstrate that the interpretations which he assails are really inaccurate. He only asserts that they are unproved, mere gratis dicta ; and the ground of that allegation is, the assumption that as they are not the result of that law of symbols, which he makes the object of his attack, they are not the result of any indisputable law whatever. And finally, the principal assumptions on which he proceeds are as incompatible with his own views as with ours, and if conceded, lead of necessity to the prostration of his whole Swedenborgian system.

The criticisms which he offers in his subsequent numbers, we design to notice on a future occasion.

ART. IV.—A DESIGNATION AND EXPOSITION OF THE FIGURES
OF ISAIAH, CHAP. VII.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE events recorded in this chapter, took place at least seventeen years after the vision of the sixth, possibly eighteen or nineteen. The date of that vision, the last year of Uzziah, was the date, also, of Pekah's accession to the throne of Israel; while it was not till the seventeenth year of Pekah's reign that Ahaz succeeded to the sceptre of Judah. According to 2 Kings xv. 27, Pekah's reign closed in his twentieth year. The transactions, therefore, which the prophet here details, must have occurred within a year or two after Ahaz obtained the throne.

The prophecy respecting Immanuel, verse 14–16, is generally regarded as one of the most important and most difficult in the whole series of Isaiah's visions, and has been the theme, perhaps, of more earnest, ingenious, and learned disquisition, than any other. The figures of the chapter are but few, in proportion to its length.

“And it came to pass in the days of Ahaz the son of Jotham, the son of Uzziah king of Judah, that Rezin the king of Syria, and Pekah the son of Remaliah king of Israel, went up toward Jerusalem to war against it, but could not prevail against it,” v. 1. This was, undoubtedly, subsequent to the invasion of his territory separately by the king of Syria and the king of Israel, slaughter of his armies and capture of his people, narrated 2 Chronicles xxviii. 5–15. It is there stated, first, that in punishment of his idolatry, “God delivered him into the hand of the king of Syria, and they smote him, and carried away a great multitude of his people captives to Damascus;” and then, “that he was also delivered into the hand of the king of Israel, who smote him with a great slaughter; killing in Judah one hundred and twenty thousand valiant men in one day,” among whom were his son and

several of the great officers of his court. "The children of Israel carried away captive, also, of their brethren, two hundred thousand, women, sons and daughters, and much spoil," and conveyed them to Samaria. As these invasions were thus independent of each other, they preceded the league of the two monarchs, and joint war mentioned in this passage. It is seen, also, from the fact, that the prediction respecting them which follows, is a prediction of protection from them, not of slaughter and captivity. It was owing to these terrible misfortunes, doubtless, and the hopelessness of a contest in open battle with the two monarchs united, whom, separately, he had been unable to withstand, that the news of their confederacy and renewal of the war struck him and the inhabitants of Jerusalem with the consternation which is depicted in the next verse, and induced him to rely for safety on the walls of his capital.

1. Comparison. "And it was told the house of David, saying, Syria is confederate with Ephraim. And his heart was moved, and the heart of his people, as the trees of the wood are moved by the wind," verse 2. The verb translated "is confederate," is rendered by many marching into, or encamped with Ephraim, which was an indication of their union in the war. Some interpreters employ the verb, shake, or agitate, to express the commotion caused by the news. Move, however, is more appropriate, as it leaves the nature of the affection to be determined by the motion of the trees in a wind, which is that of waving to and fro. The simile is one of the most appropriate and effective that can be imagined, to exemplify the overwhelming impression produced by the intelligence, and the fluctuation of purpose and feeling to which it gave rise. The scene conceived by the prophet, was probably an extensive woodland; the oak groves, perhaps, of Bashan, or not improbably the forests of Lebanon, and the wind a tempestuous one, sweeping over the vales and plains, or along the sides of the mountain, stooping the lofty heads of the trees, and swaying their branches to and fro. The comparison indicates both the violence and the universality of the impression; as in a gusty wind, every tree yields, and sinks in proportion to the strength of the blast, and rises as it intermits. What a vivid picture is thus drawn by a stroke

of the consternation with which they were struck, and the rapid succession of violent thought and emotion which the sense of their danger occasioned !

2, 3, 4. Metonymies, in the use of house for the family of David ; Syria for its population ; and heart the corporeal organ for the mind.

5. Metaphor, in the expression "his heart was *moved*, and the heart of his people." The verb denotes a real motion in space ; and is employed to indicate that the excitement of his thoughts and passions, and those of his people, by the news of the confederacy, resembled in violence the motion of trees by a powerful wind.

"Then said the Lord unto Isaiah : Go forth now to meet Ahaz, thou and Shearjashub thy son, at the end of the conduit of the upper pool in the highway of the fuller's field," v. 3. The upper pool was at the head of the valley of Hinnom. The end of the conduit was the point, doubtless, where it passed beneath the wall into the city ; and the object of the king in going there, not improbably, was, to prepare for the siege, either by preventing Rezin and Pekah from intercepting the water from the city, or emptying it from the pool, that they might not appropriate it to their own use.

6, 7, 8. Metaphors. "And say unto him, Take heed and be quiet, fear not, neither be faint-hearted, for these two smoking tails of firebrands, for the fierce anger of Rezin with Syria, and of the son of Remaliah ; because Syria has devised evil against thee ; also Ephraim and Remaliah's son : saying, We will go up into Judah, to distress it, and make a breach in it for ourselves, and constitute a king in the midst of it, the son of Tabeal," verses 4-6. Softness, which is the proper meaning of the word translated faint-hearted, is not literally predicable of the heart as an organ ; nor of the affections or intellect, if taken as standing for the mind. It is used by a metaphor to denote an analogous irresolution, or want of mental firmness. The ends of firebrands, or parts remaining of sticks that are nearly consumed, are, by the same figure, called tails ; and Rezin and Pekah, smoking firebrands, to signify that their time of destroying was nearly over. Like the sticks of a pyre that have burnt to their outer ends, and expended their power of scorching the victim on whom they have exerted

their force, they were rapidly approaching the moment when their career as conquerors was to end.

9, 10. Metonymies. Syria, the name of the country or kingdom, is used for its population; and Judah, the denominative of the Jews or people of Judea, in the opposite relation, as the name of their territory.

11. Metaphor. "Thus saith the Lord Jehovah: It shall not stand; neither shall it be," v. 7. The antecedent of *it* is counsel; and the verb, stand, is used by a metaphor to signify that it should not be sustained; but the assumptions or expectations on which it was formed giving way, like the base of a pillar, or the foundation of an edifice, it should be overturned; while the prediction, "it shall not be," indicates that it should also be relinquished. The scheme was not only to fail of accomplishment, but soon was not even to be entertained.

12, 13, 14, 15. Metaphors in denominating Damascus the head instead of the metropolis of Syria; Samaria the head instead of the capital of the kingdom of Israel; Rezin the head instead of king of Damascus; and the son of Remaliah the head instead of the king of Samaria. "For the head of Syria is Damascus, and the head of Damascus is Rezin; and within three score and five years shall Ephraim be broken that it be not a people. And the head of Ephraim is Samaria, and the head of Samaria is Remaliah's son. If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not be established," v. 8, 9. Those capitals were to their respective kingdoms, and those kings to their respective capitals, what the head of an animal is to its body.

16. Metaphor. The verb broken is used also by a metaphor, to denote that the organization of the ten tribes, as a separate and independent people, would be dissolved, as a vessel ceases to be such when it is broken into fragments, or a building when its materials are separated, distributed into different scenes, and appropriated to other uses.

17. Metonymy in the use of Ephraim, instead of the kingdom or territory of which Samaria is the metropolis. The head of Ephraim is Samaria.

The reason given that the purpose of the hostile kings should not be executed nor long entertained; "For the head of Syria is Damascus, and the head of Damascus is Rezin,

and the head of Ephraim is Samaria, and the head of Samaria is Remaliah's son," is regarded by Calvin, Vitringa, Hengstenberg, Maurer, Alexander, and others, as denoting that the kingdoms of Syria and Israel should not be enlarged by the accession of other territory, nor their kings reign in any other capitals than Damascus and Samaria. But how did it follow, from the fact that Damascus was the capital of Syria and Samaria of the kingdom of the ten tribes, that those kingdoms should never embrace any of the territory of Judea? Or how did it result necessarily, from the fact that Rezin and Pekah reigned in their own capitals, that they were not to reign over any part of Judea? How could those facts involve such consequences, any more than the fact that St. Petersburg is the capital of Russia, and Nicholas the emperor of St. Petersburg, precludes him from ever extending the boundary of his empire, or reigning over any other territory than that which is now subject to his sceptre? There obviously is no necessary or natural connexion between them and the effect which is thus ascribed to them. Instead of that, the design of the affirmations undoubtedly was to show, *that Syria and Ephraim had nothing but themselves, their capitals, and kings, to rely on for the conquest of Judea*; and so far, therefore, from necessarily succeeding, if their kings and capitals fell, they would themselves also fall. *Their deities, in which they trusted, and which Ahaz himself worshipped, were wholly imaginary, and unable to yield them any aid*; while the God of Judea and Jerusalem, who promised them protection, was JEHOVAH THE SELF-EXISTENT. It was to suggest this contrast accordingly, it is probable, that the denominative Jehovah was added to Adonai, God. "Thus saith God the self-existent." This meaning is natural, and renders the use of the metaphor peculiarly appropriate and impressive. As the Syrians and idolatrous Ephraimites had gods both of their kingdoms and capitals; in denominating Damascus, in this reference, the head of Syria, the sole seat of its will and power, by which its schemes were to be directed and made successful, and Samaria the head, in like manner, of Ephraim; he indicated with an awful emphasis the vanity of their reliance on a higher order of beings for the accomplishment of their projected conquests.

The prediction, that within sixty-five years Ephraim shall be broken, that it be not a people, had an exact fulfilment. Tiglath-pileser, probably the same year, conquered a large part of the territory of Pekah, and carried a great multitude into captivity. In the fourth year after the death of Ahaz, Shalmaneser, king of Assyria, who had three years before reduced the kingdom to a tributary, again, after a long siege, conquered Samaria, and carrying away a large body of the Israelites, colonized them in "Halah, Habor, and the cities of the Medes," 2 Kings xvii. 1-6. And Esarhaddon, who succeeded Sennacherib on the throne of Nineveh, transplanted another body to Assyria, and supplied their place by colonists from Babylon, Cutha, Ava, and other regions, who thereafter occupied the country, and constituted in such a measure its inhabitants that the few remaining Israelites were no longer a people, 2 Kings xvii. 23: Ezra iv. 10.

It has been supposed that the prediction, "within three score and five years shall Ephraim be broken, that it be not a people," is displaced in the text, and should follow the clause respecting Samaria and Pekah.

For the head of Syria is Damascus,
And the head of Damascus is Rezin;
And the head of Ephraim is Samaria,
And the head of Samaria Remaliah's son;
And within three score and five years
Shall Ephraim be broken,
That it be not a people.

Some have even thought it an interpolation. There, however, is not only no ground for either supposition, but the erasure or transposition of the clause would impair the propriety and force of the passage. The reason given that the Syrians should not effect the conquest of Judea, was that they had none but themselves to rely on for its accomplishment. Their deities had no power, as they imagined, to insure the success of their schemes. No direct intimation was given of the period when Syria itself was to be overthrown, though that its king was like a smoking firebrand, implied that his career was near its end; and he was, in fact, almost immediately slain, and his capital conquered by Tig-

lath-pileser, 2 Kings xvi. 7-9. The reason given that the ten tribes were not to conquer Judea and annex it to their kingdom was, that they were themselves within sixty-five years to be broken that they should not be a people ; and the reason that that catastrophe was to befall them was, that having apostatized from Jehovah to idols, they had no one but themselves on whom they could rely for the execution of their schemes. Viewed in this relation the arrangement of the passage is appropriate, and it has a sublimity of meaning that is worthy of its author.

The prediction is closed with a warning to Ahaz and his court, that although they were to be protected from the kings of Syria and Ephraim, yet, unless they put their trust in Jehovah, they would not be secure from other conquerors. "If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not be established ;" or you, however, though not conquered by these kings, will not continue safe, unless you believe. And it was probably to put the king's faith to a trial, and prepare the way for the predictions that follow, that it was proposed to him to ask a sign in confirmation of the promise.

"Moreover the Lord spake again unto Ahaz, saying, Ask thee a sign from Jehovah, thy God : ask it either in the depth or in the height above," v. 10, 11. The sign, to have answered the end, would have been some phenomenon, act, or event, which none but the Omniscient could foreknow, and the occurrence of which, therefore, being made a test of the truth of the prediction, would be a convincing pledge that it would be accomplished. In inviting the king to ask a sign of Jehovah, the Self-existent, in contradistinction from the gods of Damascus, and to choose it wherever he pleased, *and in any department of the natural world, heaven, or earth*, an opportunity was given him of showing, if that was his faith, that he regarded Jehovah as almighty, and the God of the whole universe ; not a mere local deity like the divinities of the Syrians ; and it was to prompt him to such a manifestation of himself, doubtless, that the proposal was made ; and his perception of the design, accordingly, that was the reason that he declined it.

"And Ahaz said, I will not ask, neither will I tempt Jehovah," v. 12. By tempting Jehovah is meant putting him to trial, that proof may be obtained of his veracity. In giving this

reason for not asking a sign, he referred to the command, Deut. vi. 16, "Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God;" and endeavored to veil his refusal under a pretence of obedience. His real reason, however, undoubtedly was, that he regarded his Syrian gods as genuine deities, trusted in them for security, and was unwilling therefore to make an appeal to Jehovah, that implied that they were unreal, and that, if decisive, would put him under a necessity of abandoning their worship. He was an open and unscrupulous idolater, and trusted the gods of Syria to deliver him from the danger with which he was threatened. "He walked in the ways of the kings of Israel, and made his son to pass through the fire, according to the abominations of the heathen whom the Lord cast out from before the children of Israel; and he sacrificed and burnt incense on the high places, and on the hills, and under every green tree," 2 Kings xvi. 34. "For he sacrificed unto the gods of Damascus which smote him, and he said, because the gods of the kings of Syria help them, will I sacrifice to them, that they may help me. But they were the ruin of him and all Israel. And Ahaz gathered together and cut up the vessels of the house of God, and shut up the doors of the house of the Lord, and he made him altars in every corner of Jerusalem, and in every several city of Judah he made high places to burn incense unto other gods, and provoked to anger the Lord God of his fathers." 2 Chron. xxviii. 23-25. He thus not only gave proofs of a higher faith in the deities of the Syrians than in the God of Israel, but actually rejected Jehovah for a period, it seems, and put an end to his worship. But the deities of the Syrians were local, and a sign, therefore, from Jehovah that indicated his dominion alike over all places and beings, as the designation by the king of its nature, and the scene in which it should take place, would have implied, would have confuted his faith in those imaginary divinities, deprived him of his hope of aid from them, and exposed him probably to disapprobation and reproach by his court. His declining to ask a sign, was thus a direct refusal to renounce his Syrian deities, and acknowledge Jehovah as alone divine, and of absolute and universal dominion. What an audacious denial of his nature and supremacy! What an insolent return to his condescension!

What a daring proof that he regarded the gods of Syria, with a higher faith and hope than Jehovah! It was accordingly this ground and bearing of his reply, doubtless, that was the reason of the response which followed, and proposal by God of a sign; *not for the purpose of confirming the prediction respecting Syria and Ephraim, BUT OF DETERMINING THE QUESTION AT ISSUE BETWEEN THE GOD OF JUDAH, AND THE IMAGINARY DEITIES OF SYRIA, IN WHICH AHAZ PUT HIS TRUST.* That sign was the assumption of our nature *and of the throne of Judah*, by Jehovah himself, at a period after Ephraim and Syria had been swept of their inhabitants, and it had thereby become apparent that the gods which they worshipped, had no power to protect them! What a demonstration of his divinity, and confutation of theirs!

18. Metaphor. "And he said, Hear ye now, O house of David. Is it too small a thing for you to weary men, but will ye weary my God also?" v. 13. Weariness is attributed to God by a metaphor, to denote a feeling of irksomeness, or displeasure, analogous to fatigue occasioned by long continued injury and provocation; and the use of the language indicates in an emphatic manner, the extreme offensiveness of the king's rejection of God, and trust in the rival divinities of the heathen. It was slighting him as though unworthy of any consideration. It was implying that the confirmation he proposed to give of his truth, would not form any proof that the idols of Syria were not also gods, and as able to defend their worshippers, as he was to protect his.

19. Metonymy in the use of house, in place of the family of David.

"Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign. Behold! the virgin having conceived, and bringing forth a son, and she calls his name Immanuel," v. 14. This was a sign—not of the certainty of the promise that Syria and Ephraim should not conquer Judea, but that in contradistinction to the deities of the Syrians, Jehovah is the true God, and the protector of the house of David. It is generally supposed, indeed, that its design was to show that Ahaz should not be overpowered, and his territory seized by Rezin and Pekah; but it is obviously a mistake; first, because Rezin was slain and Syria reduced to a tributary by Tiglath-pileser, before the conception, birth,

and growth of a child in any considerable degree towards an age to distinguish good from evil, could have taken place, as they would have required, at least, one or two years. But Rezin was slain, and Damascus conquered by the monarch of Nineveh, probably within a few months of the utterance of the prediction, and, undoubtedly, within less than a year. It is generally referred by chronologers to 741 or 740 before Christ, according as 742 or 741 is taken as the year in which Ahaz ascended the throne; and, therefore, within a year at most of the date of the prophecy. The war of Tiglath-pileser was induced by Ahaz, in order to intercept Rezin from his design on Judea. "Then Rezin, king of Syria, and Pekah, son of Remaliah, king of Israel, came up to Jerusalem to war; and they besieged Ahaz, but could not overcome him. At that time Rezin, king of Syria, recovered Elath to Syria, and drave the Jews from Elath; and the Syrians came to Elath, and dwelt there unto this day. So Ahaz sent messengers to Tiglath-pileser, king of Assyria, saying—I am thy servant and thy son: come up, and save me out of the hand of the king of Syria, and out of the hand of the king of Israel, which rise up against me. And Ahaz took the silver and gold that were found in the house of the Lord, and in the treasures of the king's house, and sent a present to the king of Assyria. And the king of Assyria hearkened unto him; for the king of Assyria went up against Damascus, and took it, and carried the people of it captive to Kir, and *slew Rezin*," 2 Kings xvi. 5–9.

This war on Syria was thus commenced by Tiglath-pileser while Rezin and Pekah were engaged in their war on Ahaz; and was probably the reason that they abandoned the siege of Jerusalem, and retreated to their own territories. It would not at any other time have answered the end for which it was solicited by Ahaz. The fall of Syria and death of Rezin took place, accordingly, within at most a few months after the utterance of the prediction; and, therefore, before the events foretold in it could have occurred and confirmed the promise that Rezin should not conquer Judea. And what an instant and decisive demonstration they were, that Syria had nothing to rely on for the perpetuation of itself as a kingdom but its capital; and its capital nothing to rely on for the perpetuation of itself as the seat of a monarchy but its king! The fall of

Damascus was the fall of the kingdom ; and the slaughter of Rezin was the extinction of the monarchy, and change of the metropolis from a capital to a mere provincial city.

Tiglath-pileser made war, also, at the same period, on Pekah. The proposal of Ahaz was, that he should come and save him out of the hand of the king of Israel, as well as out of the hand of the king of Syria ; and it was to that proposal that the king of Assyria "hearkened," as well as the other ; and it was then, doubtless, that he conquered a large share of the territory of Israel. "In the days of Pekah, king of Israel, came Tiglath-pileser, king of Assyria, and took Ijon, and Abel-beth-maachah, and Janoah, and Kedesh, and Gilead, and Galilee, all the land of Napthali, and carried them captive to Assyria," 2 Kings xv. 29. This took place, therefore, before such a time had passed as was requisite for the events given as the sign, and must have weakened the king of Israel so much as to have precluded him from any further war on Judea. Pekah himself also was slain a few years after, by Hoshea, who succeeded him on the throne. In Hoshea's third year he was conquered by Shalmaneser and made a tributary ; and, on revolting, his capital was besieged, and in his ninth year taken, and the people, generally, carried captive into Assyria. Thus, at a distance of less than twenty years from the date of the prediction, an end was put to the Israelitish monarchy ! What a demonstration was thus also given that Ephraim had nothing to rely on for the perpetuation of itself as a kingdom, but Samaria its capital ; and Samaria nothing to rely on for its continuance as a metropolis, but the son of Remaliah, who was its last independent king ! The death of Pekah was, in effect, the termination of the monarchy ; and the fall of the capital was the fall of the kingdom.

Next, That it was not the object of the sign to confirm the promise, that those kings should not conquer Judea, is apparent also from the name of the child, Immanuel, God with us, *which expresses the truth which the sign was to denote.* Its end, accordingly, was to demonstrate that Jehovah is God, and the God of the house of Judah ; both of which were proved by Immanuel. He showed that he was God by assuming man's nature. He showed that he was the God of Judah

by becoming incarnate in the family of David, and inheriting his throne.

Thirdly. This is clear also from the consideration that such a miraculous conception was not adapted to be a sign to Ahaz that Judea should not be conquered by those princes; inasmuch as he could have no proof, unless by another miracle, or a fresh revelation, that the conception was miraculous. How could he know unless by such miracles as attended Christ's annunciation and birth, that the mother was a virgin, and his conception by the power of the Holy Spirit? But the sign proposed for the confirmation of his faith, in the promise of protection from the kings of Damascus and Samaria, was to be a sign in heaven or earth, which he could witness and regard without any other miracle, as a proof of God's foresight and power.

And, finally, it is indisputable, from the fact, that the child foreshown by the prophecy was Christ, whose birth took place more than seven hundred years after the utterance of the prediction, and could not, therefore, be a sign to Ahaz of the certainty of the promise that he should not be conquered by the king of Syria and Israel. That Immanuel is Christ, is shown by his miraculous conception. "Behold! the virgin having conceived and bringing forth a son." She was still to be a virgin, therefore, after his conception and birth, which was impossible, except her conception were a miracle. But the virgin's conception of Christ is the only conception of that kind that has ever taken place. That he was the subject of the prediction, however, is placed beyond question, by the application of the passage by Matthew, chap. i. 22, who, after relating the annunciation of his miraculous conception to Joseph, adds, "and all this was done that that might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Behold a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel, which being interpreted, is God with us." As the prediction thus related to Christ, and had its fulfilment alone in him, at such a remote period from its utterance, it is clear that his birth was not a sign to Ahaz that he was not to be conquered by the kings of Damascus and Samaria. The great truth, therefore, of which it was offered as a sign, was, unquestionably, that which it

demonstrates,—that Jehovah alone is God, and will support the throne of Judah : And with this reference it is wholly freed from the difficulties in which it is involved by the other supposition, and invested with a meaning suited to the circumstances in which it was uttered, and worthy of the incommunicable attributes and prerogatives which it was designed to vindicate.

“Curdled milk and honey shall he eat until he shall know,” or that he may know “to reject the evil, and to choose the good; nevertheless, before the child shall know to reject the evil and to choose the good, the land of whose two kings thou art afraid shall be forsaken;” or cease to be the residence of the Ephraimites and Syrians. It cannot be regarded as peculiar to the son of the virgin, that he eat curdled milk and honey, inasmuch as it was common to the children of those who lived a pastoral life, as is shown in the prediction, verse 22; that, at the period to which that refers, “curdled milk and honey should every one eat that was left in the midst of the land.” It was ascribed to him, therefore,—not simply as a child,—but in order to indicate something that was peculiar to him in some other relation; and that was, doubtless, as a descendant of David, and the heir of his throne. His eating that food, which was the mark of a simple and pastoral life, in distinction from the usual nurture of royal infants in a luxurious metropolis, was employed to denote that instead of being born and nourished in a palace, like the children of Ahaz and other Jewish monarchs, he was to be nurtured remote from a court, in a simple and humble manner, like the children of pastoral families; which implied that the house of David would then be divested of its authority, and in the poverty and obscurity of ordinary subjects: and would owe its restoration to the throne, therefore, wholly to Jehovah. That the son of the virgin is contemplated in the passage as the descendant of David and heir of his sceptre, is not only indicated by the address of the prediction to the house of David, but is shown decisively in the next chapter,—which is a continuation of the prophecy,—by denominating Judea his land. It is foretold of the king of Assyria, metaphorized as the river,—“It shall pass over into *Judah*, overflow and pass through, and the spreadings of its wings shall be the filling of

thy land, O Immanuel." And again, most expressly, chap. ix. 5: "For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and *the government is upon his shoulders*, and his name is called Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, everlasting Father, *Prince of Peace.*" The prediction accordingly: "He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Highest; and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his father David, and he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end," formed a part of the annunciation of his conception and birth by Gabriel to Mary, Luke i. 31-33. It were wholly irrational, indeed, and absurd, to suppose that he is contemplated in the prophecy in any other than the character which his name Immanuel denotes,—Jehovah incarnate, the heir of the throne of David, the Prince of peace, who is to reign over the house of Jacob for ever.

As he is thus contemplated in the prophecy as the king of Judea, his knowing to reject the evil and to choose the good, relates also, undoubtedly, to his office as king; and the prediction, accordingly, that he should eat curdled milk and honey until he should know, or that he might know to reject the evil and to choose the good, is a prediction that he should live as a private citizen in an obscure and humble condition, until he should enter on his office; and that the humiliation and self-denial of that life should serve to fit him for the reign of rectitude and wisdom on which he was at length to enter. And the prediction had, in all these respects, an exact fulfilment. The virgin and Joseph were of the family of David, and were in a private and humble station. Christ, instead of a palace, was born in a stable, in a country where flocks and herds were kept. He was nurtured and lived as a private citizen, and in a humble condition, remote from the metropolis, till he entered on his official work; and his humiliation, poverty, and sufferings, were preparatives for his investiture with the power with which he is to reign for ever on the throne of David. The meaning of the passage explained in this manner, is thus in every particular that which the language naturally imports, is corroborated by the similar predictions with which it is associated, is confirmed by the event, and frees the prediction entirely from the difficulties

with which it is embarrassed, by the supposition on which interpreters have usually proceeded, that the son of the virgin was contemplated unofficially as a mere child, and that the object of the sign was, to confirm the prediction that Judea should not be conquered by the kings of Damascus and Samaria.

That the humble, unprincely life of Immanuel indicated that the house of David was at that period to be without power, is confirmed by the prediction that immediately follows, of unexampled calamities on his line, and on the nation, and conversion of the land into a solitude and waste.

20, 21, 22. Metaphors. "Jehovah will bring upon thee and on thy people, and on thy father's house, days which have not come since the departure of Ephraim from Judah,—the king of Assyria," v. 7. The verbs to bring, to come, and to depart, literally denote motion in space, the two first to a given place, the other from it. Days, however, are not brought, nor do they come by a passage through space. The verbs are used by a metaphor to denote that they were to be present by the analogous succession of time; and Jehovah is said to bring them, to indicate that it was to his appointment that they were to owe their calamitous character. In like manner the revolt of Ephraim from Judah, was not by a journey, as the word departure literally denotes. It is employed by a metaphor to signify the analogous separation which took place by their refusing a further allegiance to the monarch of Judah, instituting another king, and transferring their obedience to him.

23. Metonymy, in the substitution of house for the family of David. The discrimination of his father's house, from Ahaz, and from his people, shows that the line of David, as well as Ahaz himself, and the nation, were to be overwhelmed by the judgments that were foreshown. And the intimate connexion of this prediction with that which precedes it, and the announcement that Jehovah was to cause the overthrow of the monarch of Judah by the king of Assyria as his instrument, implies again that the great truth at issue between him and Ahaz, to which the sign referred, and that was to be determined by these events, was, that Jehovah alone is God, and the God of the line of David, in contradistinction from

the deities of Syria, in which Ahaz put his trust. The announcement of the agent through whom those calamities were to be inflicted, is sublimely emphatic, from the form in which it is made, and the defeat which it proclaimed of the king's expectations of deliverance by Tiglath-pileser. Jehovah was about to bring on him, on the whole royal line, and on the nation, a period of disaster and misfortune, such as they had never known from the time of the revolt of the ten tribes. But who was to be the instrument of his vengeance? *The king of Assyria!* whom Ahaz had hired, or was designing to hire, as an ally, and a worshipper of the gods whom he was endeavoring, by sacrifice, to induce to yield him their help. What a demonstration at once of the supremacy of Jehovah, and of the helplessness and nothingness of those Syrian deities! This again indicates that that was the truth that was to be exemplified by those events.

24. Hypocatastasis. "And it shall be in that day that Jehovah will hiss to the fly which is in the end of the rivers of Egypt, and to the bee which is in Assyria, And they come and rest all of them in the desolate valleys, and in the clefts of rocks, and in all thorn hedges, and in all pastures," v. 18, 19. Hiss is put by substitution for an analogous act by which God would cause the fly of Egypt and bee of Assyria to migrate to Judea, and light on its desolate fields. It is not used metaphorically, as it was not impossible to God to cause the sound which the verb literally denotes; nor was it unsuitable to the effect. Theodoret relates that those who had the care of bees were accustomed to hiss to induce them to move from place to place. And what a sublime exemplification again, was this act to present of the supremacy of Jehovah, and confutation of the imagined power ascribed by Ahaz to the local divinities of Assyria and Egypt! Those brazen, wooden, or gypsum deities, so far from determining the destinies of men, had no control even over the insects that swarmed in their reputed territories. But the God of Judah had only to give a signal, like that which human beings utter, and they would instantly rise in all their countless myriads, and take possession of the vales and plains left desolate by the slaughter and exile of his apostate people!

25, 26. Synecdoches. The fly is put for the flies of Egypt,

and the bee for the bees of Assyria ; they were all of them to come and rest in the desolate valleys and pastures.

These insects have been considered, by interpreters, universally, as representatives of Egyptians and Assyrians, and their migration to Judea regarded as denoting the invasion and occupation of that country by those nations. It is undoubtedly, however, an error. The fly and bee are not used as symbols of Egyptians and Assyrians ; as, to mention no other reason, to assume that they are, is to assume that Judah, Egypt, and Assyria, also, are used as symbols, and thereby make the prediction relate, not to them, but to other countries, which there are no means of identifying.

The fly and bee are not used by a hypocatastasis in the place of men, as, by the laws of that figure, the agent of the substituted act is always the agent also of that which it denotes. Thus in the figure, chap. ii. 3, " Let us go up to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach us *of his ways*, and *we will walk in his paths* ;" the Gentiles are the people who are to go to Jerusalem to be taught that which is meant by his ways, and the agents of the act, denoted by walking in his paths. In like manner, in the invitation, " O house of Jacob, come ye and let us *walk in the light of the Lord*," the house of Jacob are to do that which is denoted by walking in the light of the Lord ; and so universally. The substitution is of acts, conditions, objects of action, or effects, only. The agents of the acts themselves are those which are directly expressed in the figure. The fly and bee, therefore, cannot be used by a hypocatastasis in the place of the Egyptians and Assyrians. If their passage to Judea and resting there, were supposed to be used by that figure, they would still be the agents of the acts, whatever they might be, denoted by those which are directly ascribed to them. Nor is there any other figure by which they can mean Egyptians and Assyrians. If those nations had been metaphORIZED as such insects, there would have been a direct affirmation that they are flies and bees. This is one of a great number of passages which expositors have misinterpreted from their not having properly investigated the nature of figures. And finally, that those insects are not the representatives of the Assyrian and Egyptian armies, is shown by the fact that it was not till

after the conquest and devastation of Judea, by the Assyrians, that they were to come and rest in it. The valleys, the chief scenes of cultivation, were to be desolate at their arrival; and that they were to light or rest in the clefts of rocks, and in all thorn hedges, and in all pastures, implies that there were to be no inhabitants there to disturb them. A vast multiplication of those insects would be a natural consequence of the deprivation of a cultivated country, in such a clime, of its inhabitants. The growth of wild flowers, from which bees chiefly derive their honey, would then take place on a far greater scale, than when excluded by culture from gardens, grain-fields, vineyards, and pastures: and flies find a greater abundance of food, and swarm in far greater numbers, in regions that are overrun with young trees, bushes, or luxuriant vegetation, that is left to mature without disturbance, and decay, than in fields that are stripped of their crops as they ripen, and exposed much of the year to the glare of the sun and to winds. The prediction accordingly indicates, that the country was to be left without tillage, overrun with a wild growth of flowers, weeds, briars, thorns, and trees, and become, as was usual with such scenes, the haunt of infinite swarms of flies and bees. That the best of the vineyards, and the land generally, were to be occupied with thorns and briars, is afterwards expressly predicted, v. 23, 24.

27. Hypocatastasis. "In that day will the Lord shave with a razor hired in the parts beyond the river, with the king of Assyria, the head and the hair of the feet, and also the beard will it take away," v. 20. Here the acts of cutting the hair from the head, removing the beard, and shaving the feet, which, with the Orientals, was to insult, and degrade in the most infamous manner, are put for analogous acts, by which the most cherished and cultivated part of the population were to be ignominiously stripped of the objects of their pride, and reduced to a condition of extreme humiliation and disgrace; and the instrument by which it was to be accomplished was the king of Assyria, whom Ahaz had hired to protect his people from the devastating inroads of the Israelites and Syrians. It is not, as has been generally supposed, a metaphor; as the act was not an impossible one. Here again was a proof that the gods of the Syrians, whom Ahaz had endeavored to conciliate by sacri-

fices, were not to yield him the aid which he anticipated. So far from any ability to assist him, Jehovah was to make the Assyrians, through whom Ahaz thought they were to exert their power in his favor, the instruments of overwhelming him and his people with the disgrace and ruin which he hoped by their aid to escape.

"And it shall be in that day a man shall save alive a young cow and two sheep, and it shall be from the abundance of the making of milk, he shall eat curdled milk; for curdled milk and honey shall every one eat, that is left in the midst of the land," v. 21, 22. This indicates that the population that should survive would live by the few cattle and sheep they would save, instead of tillage, and implies that their number would be extremely small.

28. Metaphor. "And it shall be in that day that every place where there shall be a thousand vines, at a thousand pieces of silver, shall be for thorns and briers. With arrows and with bow shall one go thither, because the whole land shall be briers and thorns," v. 24. The meaning is, that the whole land should be overgrown with briers and thorns, in such a manner, that it should seem to yield nothing else.

"And all the hills that are digged with the hoe, thou shalt not go there for fear of briers and thorns, and they shall be for a sending-place of cattle, and a trampling-place of sheep," v. 25. No method could have been employed more impressive than this, to foreshow the depopulation of the country, and conversion of its most cultivated and prolific parts to a waste. These were the natural consequences of the general slaughter and exile of the inhabitants, and seizure of their movable property by their conquerors. Instead of numerous flocks and herds, the few families and individuals that should survive, were to save only one or two out of each. The most fruitful fields were to be left without culture, and grow up with thorns and briers. Instead of being peaceful and secure, as when occupied by a numerous and flourishing population, no one would go into them unless armed as though uncertain of his life; and briers and thorns would form such thickets on the hills that had once been cultivated with the hoe, that none but cattle and sheep would ascend them. This prediction was fulfilled under Tiglath-pileser, Sennacherib,

and especially Nebuchadnezzar, who became the monarch of Assyria. Nearly the whole of the population that survived the sword and pestilence, were carried into captivity. A few, only, "of the poor of the land," were left "for vine-dressers and husbandmen," Jeremiah lii. 16.

1. This prophecy shows, in a very conspicuous manner, that one of the great ends of God's administration is the vindication of himself from the false assumptions on which men proceed in their rebellion; and confutation of their faith in their imaginary deities. He puts all the questions at issue between him and his revolting creatures to a practical trial, and verifies in his providence over them, all the rights and truths which he asserts in his government.

2. The most majestic and resistless proof that he is the self-existent, and that there is no deity besides him, is presented by the incarnation and work of the eternal Word. None but Jehovah is capable of such immeasurable condescension and love; such a comprehensiveness and grandeur of wisdom; such infinite exertions of power. No other reign could involve such a demonstration as his is to present that the whole race are his; that he alone has a right to their homage; and that he alone is able to deliver them, or punish them for their rebellion.

3. What an exemplification of the unbelieving and idolatrous heart is presented in the conduct of Ahaz! He continued as incorrigible and presumptuous in revolt under the direct commands and warnings of the Most High, as though he had no knowledge whatever of his being; and instead of his truth and omnipotence, put his trust in the marble images and imaginary divinities of the Syrians, of whose dispositions he had no knowledge, and of whose existence he had no proofs.

4. That God vindicates himself in these awful forms, and continues the vindication through a long succession of ages, indicates that it is of the utmost importance to his glory and the well-being of his kingdom.

5. As it has hitherto failed of its proper effect both on the Israelites and Gentiles, the great ends it is to answer are undoubtedly, in a chief degree, still future; and are to be unveiled under that sway which Immanuel, the prince of

peace, is to exercise, when he assumes the government of the earth, and subdues all nations to his sceptre.

ART. V.—A HISTORY OF COLONIZATION ON THE WESTERN COAST OF AFRICA. By Archibald Alexander, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, New Jersey. Second Edition. Philadelphia: P. S. Martien. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1849.

THE colonization of the free people of color of our country on the coast of Africa, furnishes a finer theme for an historical narrative than almost any other event of the age. It is novel. It presents a remarkable exemplification of the manner in which great evils are sometimes overruled, and made the occasion of unforeseen and extraordinary blessings. It has been attended with difficulties that have elicited displays of fortitude, self-denial, courage, and wisdom, by the chief actors, that are not often surpassed, and invest them with peculiar interest and dignity. It has led many of the conspicuous statesmen of our country to unite publicly in a work of benevolence, shed a ray of splendor on our government itself, and shown with what effect those who usually act only as politicians, may join in measures for the promotion of social and moral ends, that lie out of their official sphere. It has been conducted with an eminent degree of good sense and practical wisdom. It has been attended with signal success. In respect to the colonists themselves, the ends that were proposed by it—their habituation to the condition and feelings of freemen, the government of themselves by just and wise laws, the improvement by their own efforts of their social, moral, and religious condition, and their addiction to habits of industry, enterprise, and the accumulation of property, have been attained in a measure far beyond the most sanguine expectations that were entertained by its projectors; while to the tribes in the vicinity of the colony, it has proved the means of still greater blessings; and the influence it is likely to exert in the suppression of slave-dealing and war, and the civiliza-

tion and christianization of the population of Africa, invests it with a political and moral greatness, that scarcely attaches to any other undertaking of the period.

Dr. Alexander presents in this volume, a full, impartial, and very attractive history of the work from its origination, to the organization of the colony as an independent state. He has not confined himself to a bare recital of the events, but has incorporated in his narrative such a share of the documents of the Colonization Society, and the letters of the agents and governors at Liberia, as to give the reader a view of the form which the undertaking assumed at every step of its progress ; and they are marked in more than an ordinary degree by good sense, manliness, and dignity. Many of the letters, especially from the agents of the Society, display a maturity of judgment, a largeness of views, and a moral elevation, that are admirable. The persons who have been employed by the Society to conduct the affairs of the colony, have generally been excellently suited to the work. Though differing greatly, none of the principal officers have proved unequal to the task with which they were intrusted, and several have been of a very high order of talent. The genius of Ashmun, especially, his far-reaching, statesmanlike views, his lofty principles, his indomitable energy, his dauntless courage, his aptness to command, and his fertility of expedients, would have insured him distinction in any sphere of difficulty, and with any competitors. The history abounds with interesting incidents. There have been noble examples of justice, generosity, and self-denial, in the liberation of slaves to be sent to the colony. The demeanor of the emigrants has generally been highly commendable ; and those who have been appointed to office, have exhibited an ample capacity for their stations. Many of the colonists have engaged in commercial pursuits, and accumulated a respectable property. Most are employed in agriculture. The soil is luxuriant, and yields rice, coffee, sugar, cotton, corn, and all other products of an equatorial clime. The morals of the colonists are exemplary, and their schools and churches flourishing. They have already exerted a large and most propitious influence on the neighboring tribes, in repressing their wars, dissuading them from the capture and sale of

slaves, and inspiring them with a wish for the blessings of civilization and religion. They have already acquired possession of a large territory. Many thousands of the natives have placed themselves under their jurisdiction ; many of their children and youth attend their schools, and a considerable number have embraced the Christian religion, and are exemplary disciples of the Saviour.

The philanthropic projectors and supporters of the colony have thus laid the foundation, there is reason to believe, of a civil and religious empire that is destined to rise to power, and give birth to great and beneficial changes in that part of Africa. Who can conjecture the vastness and grandeur of the effects which the colony may produce ! It is not unreasonable to anticipate that within a few years it will put an end to the cruel wars by which the tribes have heretofore wasted one another, and extinguish the commerce in slaves. It is not too much to hope that it will soon diffuse the blessings of civilization and religion through a wide region, lead to the establishment of schools, and the erection of temples for the worship of Jehovah in hundreds and thousands of the villages that stud the interior of the continent, and cause that wilderness, through wide realms, to bud and blossom as the rose. It may continue to meet with great difficulties. Its success, indeed, and advance to power, may become a source of danger, by converting it into a theatre of ambition. Yet, should the same worldly and aspiring passions reign there, that prevail in all other nations, we trust that its great objects, freedom, just and liberal laws, education, and religion, will still be sedulously fostered, and the state prove to Africa, what the first colonies on our own shores have been to this continent.

We wish this volume may be read by every young man in the country. It is, to a just, philanthropic, and contemplative mind, far more interesting and instructive, than an ordinary history of the struggles of nations to slaughter one another, and waste each other's territories by war. It exemplifies several great truths most essential to be understood by all who attempt to do good to their fellow-men : that just and liberal endeavors, conducted with prudence, and pursued with resolution, may be expected to meet with a good degree

of success ; that the best undertakings usually encounter great difficulties, that put the integrity, faith, fidelity, and wisdom of their projectors and supporters to a severe trial ; that the most unexceptionable, the most benevolent, and the most wisely managed, are often misunderstood, opposed, and misrepresented, by those who should approve and support them ; and that agencies that are in themselves slight and directed to subordinate ends, are sometimes made by the Most High the instruments of vast effects of a higher species, affect the well-being of a wide circle of nations, and form an epoch in the history of the world.

ART. VI.—A DISCOURSE ON THE MILLENNIAL STATE OF THE CHURCH, prepared by appointment of the Synod of Albany, and delivered before that body, October 11, 1849. By Rev. Robert H. Beattie, Pastor of the Church at West Milton, N.Y. Published by order of the Synod. Albany: E. H. Pease & Co. 1849.

BY THE EDITOR.

THERE are many indications that the attention of the ministers of different denominations is drawn, in a larger degree than has been usual, to the great subjects of which the prophetic Scriptures treat. Until within a short period, they have been generally neglected, under the impression, partly, that they are too obscure to admit of a satisfactory interpretation ; and partly, that whatever their meaning is, it must be in accordance with the views that are generally entertained of God's designs in respect to the redemption of the world, and that, therefore, as they could not, if accurately understood, affect the faith or duties of the church, they may safely remain unknown. Only here and there an individual attempted to give instruction in regard to them ; and few thought it necessary to make public efforts to stifle inquiry respecting their meaning, and keep alive the prejudices with

which almost all were imbued against them. A change, however, has taken place. The attention, not only of the ministers of the gospel, but of the pious and thoughtful generally, has been, in a measure, attracted to the subject, and a degree of interest excited that probably had never before been felt. The course of events, for a considerable period, has been adapted to awaken curiosity, and excite investigation; and the extraordinary occurrences of the last two years, roused an almost universal apprehension that other great changes were at hand, and a wish to ascertain more clearly what the intimations are that are given in the Scriptures of the purposes that are accomplishing, and led many to a re-examination of the subject, and adoption of more specific opinions. The chief questions that are debated, respect the means by which the nations are to be converted, the restoration of the Israelites, the reign of Christ on earth, the period of his advent, the resurrection of the saints, and the final judgment. Those who regard Christ's advent and the first resurrection as to precede the millennium, are expressing their views more freely, and presenting them to their people. Those who, without being fully convinced that his advent and the resurrection of the saints are to precede the conversion of the nations, are yet impressed by the arguments that are alleged to sustain them, and feel it to be a duty to give them a candid and thorough consideration, are reading, investigating, canvassing objections, conferring with one another, and endeavoring to ascertain the truth, with a purpose, whenever they reach a satisfactory result, to take a public course in conformity with their convictions. Others, on the other hand, who reject Christ's personal reign, and regard the present as the last dispensation, are endeavoring to confute what they deem to be error, and maintain their own views. The subject has been the theme of much conversation and debate. Essays on it have been read in ministers' meetings; and discourses respecting it addressed to synods and other ecclesiastical and religious bodies: and the fact become notorious that much curiosity, doubt, and apprehension are felt in respect to it.

Of the essays and sermons of that class that have come to our knowledge, Mr. Beattie's Discourse, delivered before

the Synod of Albany, is one of the most respectable. It is not, indeed, eloquent, learned, or convincing. It is but a brief statement of the views he regards the Scriptures as presenting of the administration God is now exercising, and is hereafter to exert over the world; not an attempt at an exact and full proof of them. The great number of topics of which he treats, rendered it impracticable to discuss them at length. It is founded, also, we believe, in a large degree, on unauthorized assumptions, and mistaken in all its principal views. It is, however, written with seriousness, earnestness, good temper, and good manners. He has not dishonored the theme by mere declamation, or buffoonery. He has not treated the large and influential body which he addressed, as though they had assembled to gaze at the tricks of a mountebank, or listen to the ravings of a fanatic. He has not discredited his cause by conducting it as though conscious that it could not be maintained by honorable means; nor betrayed the feeling that detraction and abuse are the only instruments by which those from whom he dissents can be disarmed of their influence. Instead, his discussion is marked by sobriety and fairness. He treats the question as one of revelation, not of human authority or party tactics. He refers to the word of God for the support of his views, and leaves them to be judged by his readers, without any attempt, by false representations, to impose on their credulity, or excite their prejudices. While, therefore, we dissent from the doctrines of his Discourse, we appreciate its decorum, and wish his example may be followed by all who may hereafter engage in the discussion; and that all other ecclesiastical bodies that may make it the theme of their preachers, may assign it to men of sense, candor, and courtesy. It is due to the dignity of the profession, and the credit of religion.

Mr. Beattie's aim is to show that Christ's reign on the earth is to be merely spiritual, not literal; that the nations are to be converted merely by the means now in the hands of the church, accompanied by larger influences of the Spirit, and the millennium pass under the present dispensation; that Christ's advent is not to precede, but follow that period; that there is to be but one resurrection and one judgment; that they are to take place at the close of the thousand years; and

that the multiplication of the race and the work of redemption are then to reach their end, the earth be destroyed, and the redeemed transferred to another scene of existence. That the support of these views can be no easy task, is manifest from the consideration that they are in direct contravention of the clear and emphatic representations of the Scriptures; for the prophecies expressly teach that Christ is to reign on the earth; that other and far more efficient means are then to be employed to teach, impress, and rule the race; that Christ's advent is to precede that reign; that there are to be two resurrections and two judgments, one of each before, and one after the millennium; and that the earth, instead of being destroyed at the last judgment, is to subsist for ever, and be occupied by the race under his sway. To accomplish his object, then, Mr. B. must not only allege other passages of the sacred word that still more directly and unequivocally teach the positions which he affirms, but must prove also that the declarations and predictions to which we refer have not the meaning which their terms bear when interpreted by the usual laws of language, and state and demonstrate other laws by which they can be brought into harmony with his views of the divine designs. The first of these, however, he certainly has not achieved; nor could he, had he attempted it. There are no passages in the Scriptures that directly declare, that Christ's reign on the earth is to be merely figurative, or spiritual. There are none that teach that the dispensation, under which the nations are to be converted, is not to be essentially different from the present. There are none that expressly represent that Christ's advent is not to take place till after the millennium. There are none that formally affirm that there are not to be a resurrection and a judgment anterior to Christ's reign of a thousand years; nor that the earth is not to subsist, the race occupy it, and the work of redemption continue after that period. As, then, there are, on the one hand, direct and positive averments of the doctrines which he rejects; and, on the other there are no countervailing assertions of those which he affirms; it is clear that he cannot establish the views which he advances, unless he can show that there are peculiar and extraordinary laws of language and symbols, by which those

positive affirmations are made to have a wholly different meaning from that which their terms and representatives ordinarily bear, and, in place of contravening, expressly teach the doctrines which he maintains. He, however, presents no such laws. He enters, indeed, into no discussion respecting the principles on which the predictions in debate are to be explained. He takes the whole question, whether their meaning is that which he ascribes to them, for granted, and quotes them without inquiry, as confirming his views. Nor, had he attempted it, could he have alleged any such laws, as there are none. To have assumed that there are would, moreover, have been as fatal to his own doctrines, as to those which he rejects; as any principles of interpretation by which he can set aside the direct meaning of the predictions and announcements of Christ's advent, the resurrection of the holy dead, and judgment of the living, anterior to the millennium, his reign on earth during that period, and the perpetuity of the world, and continuance of the race on it for ever, would with equal effect set aside the doctrine that Christ is to reign on the earth in any form, that the Spirit is to renew and sanctify men, or that there is to be any millennium whatever, any judgment, or even a future existence.

Such are the formidable difficulties he had to encounter; such is the task he should have performed, if he would have attained his end. He, however, has neither accomplished nor undertaken it. He manifestly did not even apprehend what it is that he had to achieve, in order to establish his views. The question, what the authentic laws of interpretation are, on which the whole issue depends, has entirely escaped his notice; and, accordingly, instead of demonstrating what he alleges, he only employs himself either in stating constructions that are gratuitous and mistaken, or in arguing on assumptions that are unauthorized and erroneous; as we shall now proceed to show by an analysis of his several arguments.

The first ground which he presents for the support of his views, is the representation that the present is peculiarly the dispensation of the Spirit, and that it is under this alone that the work of redemption is to be accomplished. To show what he came to accomplish, he says: "Let us ask what

Christ brought and left here? what the world had after he lived in it which it had not, or had not in the same manner before?" And among other effects and gifts he enumerates,

"The Holy Spirit, the living agent on whom the execution of the whole design of Jesus devolves. His agency here was now made permanent. Besides this, it was now to take a new direction, be put forth on a new class of subjects, and on a more extended scale, becoming the real and acknowledged source of the effects, which through the great redemption should from that time appear over the earth."—Pp. 7-9.

"Nor will it escape our notice, that, in order to establish this kingdom, Christ retired, as to his bodily presence, from our midst, and sent the Holy Spirit, an invisible agent, who has power to deal with the understanding and conscience, and mould men into the likeness of Christ. We hail his presence, and account it the glory of our age, that it is the dispensation of the Spirit we enjoy. He comes to complete the work of Christ—to apply the redemption he procured. If we honor Jesus for bringing in everlasting righteousness, we honor him more for the mission of the Spirit whose operations have kept pace with the purpose of divine love, and whose presence guarantees life and righteousness to the heirs of salvation. His ministration is shedding continual glory on the work of Christ, and reflecting it from earth to heaven."—Pp. 20, 21.

"Henceforward, till time closes, we live under the dispensation of the Spirit."—P. 29.

He thus holds that this is peculiarly the dispensation of the Spirit, as renewer and sanctifier; that Christ retired from the earth in order to devolve on him the completion of the work of redemption, and that he is to accomplish it solely by the word, the ministry, and other means that are now employed for the purpose.

To this, however, we answer, in the first place, that it is only a statement of his opinion. No proof, whatever, is presented of it. But he ought not to advance such an extraordinary doctrine, and make it the basis of a whole system of constructions, without alleging the clearest evidence of its truth. He should produce express testimony from the Scriptures, that this is peculiarly the dispensation of the Spirit, that the whole work of redemption is now intrusted to him, and that he is to complete it through the means that are now used,

if he would command the assent of his readers. The mere fact that the Holy Spirit is the renewer and sanctifier of all who are redeemed, and that his gifts were bestowed on the apostles, and his renewing influences on their hearers, immediately after Christ's ascension, does not demonstrate it.

In the next place, it is wholly mistaken, as well as unproved. This is not the dispensation of the Spirit in the relation Mr. B. represents. It is not peculiar to it that the Spirit renews and sanctifies those who are saved; nor that he uses the word, a ministry, and ordinances, as instruments in the work. He was the renewer and sanctifier of the saints under the patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations, as much as he is under the present, and employed truth and other instrumentalities then as much as he does now. The office he now fills, instead of being limited to this, is common to all dispensations. Its only peculiarity, compared with those that preceded it, is that he now exerts his influences on greater numbers. Their nature, and his relations to the Father, and Christ, are identically the same as they were before.

But the total error of his theory is apparent from the consideration that it implies that this is not the Christian dispensation, and that no such dispensation has ever been instituted. His aim is to show that the present dispensation is administered by the Spirit, in contradistinction from Christ, and that it is the Spirit's, therefore, in place of Christ's. But this is in direct contravention of the Scriptures, which everywhere exhibit Christ as the head of the church, and as exercising the government under which it subsists. If this is not the Christian dispensation, there certainly has been none, as this indisputably succeeded the Mosaic.

The notion that this is peculiarly the dispensation of the Spirit, is probably drawn from Christ's direction to his disciples not to commence their ministry, till they should be baptized by the Holy Ghost; his promise that they should then receive power to fill their office as his witnesses, Acts i. 4-8; and the fact, that they and many who were converted under their ministry, were endowed with extraordinary spiritual gifts. But those powers and influences were miraculous, and were conferred by the Spirit, not as renewer and sanctifier, but as the enlightener, the revealer, and the inspirer, in attesta-

tion of the truths spoken by the apostles ; and the design of them was to give birth to convictions and impressions that might be employed by the Holy Spirit as means in the work of conversion and sanctification. That the baptism of the Holy Ghost promised to the apostles, in order to qualify them for their ministry, and bestowed on them on the day of Pentecost, was not his renewing influences, is manifest from the fact that they were already renewed ; as is expressly shown by Christ's prayer, John xvii. 6-20. "I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world : thine they were, and thou gavest them me : *and they have kept thy word.* For I have given unto them the words which thou gavest me ; *and they have received them, and have known surely that I came out from thee, and they have believed that thou didst send me.* I pray for them : I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me, *for they are thine : Those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition. They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.*" Those extraordinary powers were thus conferred on them *as believers*, not to constitute them such, and were designed to qualify them for their ministry, and attest the truth of their doctrines. This is seen, also, from the fact that the gifts bestowed on them on the day of Pentecost were miraculous. The effect of their being filled with the Holy Ghost was, that they were raised to a supernatural understanding of the truths they were to teach ; that they spoke with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance ; and that they wrought miracles in the name of Jesus. It is indicated, likewise, by Peter's exhortation to the people, on that occasion, to repent, in order to their receiving the gift of the Spirit. "Repent and be baptized every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, for the promise is unto you, and to your children."—Acts ii. 38, 39. It was exclusively on believers, also, that miraculous gifts were subsequently bestowed. It was on their exercising faith that they received prophetic and other extraordinary powers ; not in order to their renovation. "Now, when the apostles who were at Jerusalem heard that Samaria *had received the word of God*, they sent unto them Peter and John ;

who when they were come down prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost; for as yet he was fallen upon none of them, *only they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus*. Then laid they hands on them, and they received the Holy Ghost," Acts viii. 14-17. In like manner, at the house of Cornelius, at Cæsarea; "While Peter yet spake, the Holy Ghost fell on all them which heard the word; and they of the circumcision which believed, were astonished, as many as came with Peter, because that on the Gentiles also was poured out the gift of the Holy Ghost; *for they heard them speak with tongues, and magnify God*," Acts x. 44-46. That they were believers on whom this gift was bestowed, and that the baptism by the Holy Ghost was simply the bestowment of miraculous powers, is shown by the representation which Peter, on his return to Jerusalem, gave of this event. "As I began to speak the Holy Ghost fell on them, *as on us at the beginning*. Then remembered I the word of the Lord, how that he said,—John, indeed, baptized with water; but *ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost*. Forasmuch, then, as God gave them *the like gifts as unto us, who believed on the Lord Jesus Christ*, what was I that I could withstand God? When they heard these things they held their peace and glorified God, saying—Then hath God, also, to the Gentiles, granted repentance unto life," Acts. xi. 15-18. The gift was thus miraculous, and was conferred on those who had already repented and believed. Inspiration, in like manner, prophecy, and the power of working miracles were confined throughout the apostolic age, to those who had already believed, and were members of the society of Christ's disciples; as at Antioch, Corinth, and Ephesus. It was after the Ephesians had believed, we are told, that they were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, which was baptism with miraculous powers. These gifts, moreover, are neither peculiar to this dispensation, nor characteristic of it. They were enjoyed by the prophets of all previous periods, and were confined in this to the age of the apostles. *They are, in fact, peculiar to periods of revelation*, and accomplish their end in attesting the divine commission of the teachers, in connexion with whose testimony they are wrought. They have never been conferred except at such epochs. They have, accordingly, been wholly unknown in the church for more than seventeen centuries; and are, there-

fore, no more characteristic of this than of the dispensation that preceded it. Mr. B. has thus fallen into a total mistake in representing this as peculiarly the dispensation of the Spirit. It is neither such in respect to his office as renewer and sanctifier, nor as the bestower of miraculous gifts.

He errs, in like manner, in the representation that Christ finished his part in the work of redemption at his departure from the earth, and then devolved its completion on the Holy Spirit. There not only is not anything in the Scriptures to authorize such a statement, but it is wholly inconsistent with their plain and indisputable teachings. Christ, so far from finishing, at that epoch, all that he had to accomplish, and resigning the work of saving men to the Holy Spirit, then received all power in heaven and earth, that he might execute the great designs for which he had come into the world. He was then made "the head over all things to the church, which is his body," "that in all things he might have the pre-eminence," and that he might "reconcile all things to himself, whether they be things on earth or things in heaven." It was he, not the Holy Spirit, that commissioned the apostles to preach the gospel, and promised to be always with them. It was he, not the Spirit, who promised to attest their ministry by the gift of miraculous powers. And he and the Father are, accordingly, everywhere represented as bestowing all the blessings, exerting all the agencies, and working all the effects even that are wrought by the Holy Spirit in the redemption of men; and the church is everywhere directed to look immediately to them for all the gifts which it needs, whether they are those of the Spirit or of providence. Thus it was Christ who, when he ascended up far above all heavens, that he might fill all things, gave apostles, and prophets, and evangelists, and pastors, and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ, till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ; and they, accordingly, are everywhere represented as Christ's ministers, not the ministers of the Holy Spirit, as they would have been, had Mr. B.'s theory been true. God and Christ are also represented as bestowing the Holy Spirit, John xvi.

7-13, on all those to whom he is given. And in harmony with this, the apostle offered prayers for the gifts of the Spirit to the Father, not to the Holy Spirit himself. "I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the whole family of heaven and earth is named, that he would grant you according to the riches of his glory to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye being rooted and grounded in love, may be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth and length, and depth and height, and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fulness of God," Eph. iii. 14-19. The office of the Spirit, as enlightener, renewer, and sanctifier, is thus that simply of co-operator with Christ, and executor of his will; not that of his successor and substitute in the work of redemption. No more extraordinary error was ever conceived. He is not, in any sense, the substitute of Christ. He is not, in any sense, intrusted with the independent and absolute conduct of the work of redemption. He acts, in every respect, as Christ's coadjutor, and the accomplisher of his will. If he renews, it is those who are given to Christ. If he enlightens, it is in the knowledge of Christ. If he sanctifies through the truth, it is the truth that respects Christ. If he writes the law on the heart, it is the law of Christ. If he confers miraculous gifts, it is in attestation of the doctrine taught by Christ's ministers. If he inspires and reveals, it is the revelation of Christ which he communicates. It is Christ, also, who is the providential ruler, and the benefactor, and judge of the church. It is he who walks amidst the golden candlesticks, appoints the trials of his followers, chastens them for their sins, bestows on them their blessings, defends them from their enemies, and crowns them with their victory and reward; and it is to him that they directly look for all the gifts which they need, whether external or spiritual. A vast share of the acts and measures of the present dispensation are thus absolutely those of Christ, and not in any sense those of the Spirit. Is it not singular that Mr. B. should have so totally misconceived Christ's relation to the church, and imagined that the Holy Spirit has absolutely taken his place in the work of redemption, and

assumed all these incommunicable functions of his office as the head of his body, and the king of the universe ?

And, finally, he is equally in error in the statement that all the obstructions to the redemption of the world are to be overcome, simply by the Spirit, and through the means which he now employs in the conversion and sanctification of men. Instead of such a representation, it is expressly revealed, that many of those obstacles are to be removed by a wholly different agency. Thus the devil is to be banished from the earth during the millennium, and intercepted from tempting the nations, and that is to be accomplished, not by the renewing and sanctifying influences of the Spirit, but by a wholly different agent and power. And what a stupendous change will his exclusion from the world involve ! It is fore-shown, also, that the anti-christian powers, denoted by the wild beast and false prophet, who have assumed authority over the gospel, substituted a false faith and worship in place of the true, and persecuted the saints, are to be destroyed before the millennium, and the race freed for ever from their deceptive and corrupting influence : and what a momentous deliverance will that prove ! It is expressly revealed, that Christ is, at that period, to assume the sway of the earth in a new relation, and exert a variety of acts that must work a vast revolution in the ideas of men, and be a thousand fold more efficacious than any other means that are now employed to enlighten, convert, and impress them. He is to descend visibly, and assume the dominion of the race. He is publicly to destroy his open and organized antagonists in the church. He is publicly to judge and punish the nations that resist his reign, and pay their homage to false gods. He is to deliver his ancient people, the Israelites, by stupendous miracles, from their enemies at Jerusalem, recall them universally from their dispersion, and re-adopt, and own them as his chosen people. He is to raise the holy dead from their graves, invest them with the offices of kings and priests, and cause them to reign with him on the earth. He is to judge and accept the living saints, change them from mortal to immortal, and give them to live in unspotted rectitude and blessedness under his reign. We are explicitly assured by the voice of the Redeemer himself that they are then to be freed from the

curse, want, toil, sorrow, death, brought on the race by Adam, and enter on a life, in that respect, wholly new. And they are to enjoy his visible presence and immediate communication with him ; for they are to serve him in his temple, and he is to lead them to the fountains of the waters of life, and God himself is to dwell with them and be their God. Can any change of which our world has ever been the scene, approach this in greatness and wonderfulness ? The whole race also are to enjoy the visible signals of Christ's presence, and receive from him new revelations of his will, and manifestations of his favor. They are to go to his temple at Jerusalem, to offer him worship and hear his commands ; for "the law is to go forth from Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem." They are to enjoy also the ministry of the risen saints as teachers and rulers ; for they are to walk in their light, and honor them in the offices they are to sustain as kings and priests. These great acts and measures, the certainty of which we shall show as we advance in the discussion, will thus form and involve the institution of a new and extraordinary system of means for the instruction, impression, and sway of the race, immeasurably more august and effective than those which are now used, and be the great instruments, undoubtedly, through which the Holy Spirit will renew men, and raise them to the perfection of knowledge and virtue to which they are to be exalted ; and they will constitute a far greater change in the administration of the world, than took place at the introduction of Christianity, and render it in a far higher sense a new and peculiar dispensation. Mr. B.'s representation on this subject is thus in every respect erroneous, and the argument, accordingly, which he founds on it, in support of his views of the future administration of the world, falls to the ground.

Mr. B., however, alleges it as an indication that no other measures are to be employed for the redemption of the race, that the manifestations Christ has already made and means he has instituted, are, if enforced by the Holy Spirit with the efficiency of which he is capable, fully adequate to that end. He says :

"So many distinct elements of power did Christ leave upon the

earth. Combined, what might is in them! We look on them and learn what their effect must be. A mission from God to the world, what might it do, if the evidence of it were spread out, as in the sun-beam, and made legible, as it may be, to our race! The example of moral perfection found in Christ, what effect may it produce, were ambition, and covetousness, and sensuality, put under restraint, and it held up before the eyes of an attentive world! Justifying righteousness, what a change would it work, were it to attract general notice, and draw all men up upon it to labor for its great end! The expression of his love which God has given in the cross of our Redeemer, what if it should be made to put forth all its attractive power upon the spirits of all flesh! Truth, laying open the spiritual world and our whole interest in it, what if it should supersede the illusion of the senses, which has occupied our lost race so generally and so long! The ministry of the word of God, what if it should succeed in drawing the attention of mankind from their fruitless speculations, and fasten it upon eternal realities! The Holy Spirit, what if he should put forth his power upon the rich and mighty, and noble and learned, and upon the masses of the children of this world, as he now does upon the one that he brings from the city, and the two that he brings from the family, unto Zion! What if all these elements were combined, and were to exert the power that we see to be lodged in them; what form of evil would not be hurried from the earth, and under the sun of righteousness, now midway in the heavens, what virtue would not bloom in perpetual beauty! —Pp. 9, 10.

But the question at issue, is not whether the Holy Spirit is able, without any higher means than he now employs, to convert all mankind, but simply what are God's purposes respecting the institution of other means? What has he revealed in regard to the administration under which the whole race are to be brought to the acceptance of his salvation? That he can, if he please, convert all mankind with the present instrumentalities, is no proof that he will, demonstrably from the fact that he has not already universally converted them. Nor does the adequacy of his power form any ground of probability that he will exert it to that end. It can no more be inferred from his omnipotence, that he is hereafter to bring all men to the obedience of the faith under the present dispensation; than it could at its institution, that he would bring them all to that obedience during the ages that have

already passed. Mr. B. exclaims: "Truth laying open the spiritual world, and our whole interest in it, what if it should supersede the illusion of the senses! The ministry of the word of God, what if it should succeed in winning the attention of mankind from their fruitless speculations, and fasten it upon eternal realities!" But how does it appear but that wisdom requires that new and more emphatic means should be employed to produce these effects? On what ground is it to be assumed that God is to work them by the least possible, or even by slight means? That certainly is not the law of his government. So far from it, the means he employs in his moral administration are as obviously, as in his providence over the material world, proportionate in greatness and visibility to the ends which he attains by them. He always acts on the senses with a conspicuity and resistlessness commensurate with the greatness and significance of the impressions he produces on the heart. When he comes, therefore, to give such an absolute efficacy to the truth as Mr. B. contemplates, it will be in harmony with the principle of his whole procedure towards the world, to employ an array of means as extraordinary and resistless, beyond those of the present dispensation, as the effects that are then to be wrought are to be vast and wonderful above those that are now achieved. But Mr. B. proceeds:

"Here is a special mode of reaching a specific result; all the ministry of Christ did but secure it, and when he retired we can say this of him, he left mankind in full possession of the means of renovating all their generations. The gospel, as he left it, is able to make the old man new, and to bring the new creation out of the old. Amazing adaptation! Grace, not glory; Christ crucified, not Christ glorified, is what the world needs, and shall need, while one generation of depraved beings cometh, and another generation of Christ's redeemed goeth, to meet that solemn appointment to all—death."—Pp. 10, 11.

There are several expressions here which we are surprised Mr. B. has employed. In saying that Christ, at his ascension, "left mankind in full possession of the means of renovating all their generations," does he mean, that had they been universally employed, they would have been absolutely effi-

cacious? Has God given a pledge that he will universally make the gospel, when preached, the savor of life unto life? Are all to whom it is now communicated converted under its influence? If not; if instead it is almost universally inefficacious; if men, with but here and there an exception, disregard and reject it, how does it appear that new and extraordinary means are not necessary to rouse them from unbelief and indifference, impress them with its truth and importance, and lead them to embrace its salvation? But the representations that follow are still more exceptionable. Did Christ, at his ascension to glory, cease to be Christ crucified? When he descends in visible majesty to judge and rule the earth, will he be any the less Christ crucified, than he now is on the throne of heaven? Will the salvation which is then to be bestowed on the race, be any less of grace than the renovation and sanctification are that are now wrought in his people? If not, how does it appear that grace will not be given, and Christ crucified be the object of faith then, as much as they are now?

Mr. B. proceeds to argue in support of his position from the nature of Christ's teachings, and the ministry of the apostles.

"It adds to the importance of this thought, that all our Saviour's instructions, whether given personally or through his apostles, as they respect the present world, terminate in this design. The general impression made by them is, that he came to show us the way of God perfectly. His business was with individual character, and his aim was to show us what man is in the sight of God, what he should be, what he may become, and in what way. His casual remarks, under every variety of circumstance, his more formal discourses, do they not all relate to spiritual things, and is it not their design to help men to ascertain and secure them? His sermon on the mount is a fair specimen. . . . Its intent cannot be mistaken: it was to turn men into the way of holiness, and so save them from present and endless ruin. Does any instruction that ever fell from his lips have any other design? Hear his intercessory prayer;—it is throughout the language of a spirit charged with the care of the spiritual welfare of men, and who pours out, in strong supplication, his ardent desires in behalf of those for whom his life is spent and sacrificed. . . .

"The aim of his instructions was not more direct than single,—the

salvation of the soul. This was the whole of it as respects man. . . . By exposing the vanity of the world, revealing the worth of the soul, making known the certainty of our condemnation, disclosing the grace of God, and in himself the way of life, he aimed solely at convincing men of their sin and misery, and enlightening their minds in the knowledge of the truth, and renewing their wills, and persuading and enabling them to embrace himself, who had come charged with effecting the redemption of the soul.

"In the acts and in the writings of the apostles, we have nothing additional to this single design."—Pp. 11–13.

An argument of more extraordinary irrelevance and error, it has never, we believe, been our lot to encounter. It proceeds on the mistaken and portentous assumption that Christ would not have given such instructions, unless they were the only teachings, and the means associated with them, the only means he was ever to employ for the illumination and renovation of men ; as otherwise, it contributes nothing to Mr. B.'s object. But what position could he have advanced more unauthorized and contradictory to Christ's administration on his ascending the throne of heaven ? If the nature of his teachings shows that he was never to employ any other means to convict and convert men, how is it, that instead of limiting himself to those which he had used during his ministry, he immediately armed his apostles with other miraculous powers, and instituted and employed a vast system of extraordinary instruments for the very purpose of giving impression to the truths which he had himself taught, and commissioned them to teach ? If the fact that he employed only such a species and measure of means at that time, proves that he is never to institute any other, why does not the fact that he employed a different species and measure at a different epoch, demonstrate with equal certainty that none but those were to be used ? And why is not the principle on which Mr. B. argues, as applicable to the influences of the Holy Spirit, as to the word, the ministry, ordinances, or any other means through which men are instructed and sanctified ? His argument, if legitimate, obviously confutes himself, as much as those whom he opposes. If the fact that Christ gave only such a measure of instruction to his disciples and hearers

shows that he is never to give any more, then, the fact that the Spirit gave efficacy to his teachings in only a limited degree, must prove, with equal strength, that he is never to exert his power in any greater measure to give efficacy to the gospel; and Mr. B.'s theory of the conversion of the world, by his agency, is overthrown. How is it that he did not see what the issue is to which his assumption carries him?

He proceeds, also, on the equally unauthorized and extraordinary ground, that Christ would not have given such instructions, had it been his design at a future period to return to the earth and institute a different dispensation, under which new revelations should be made of his will, and a higher system of means employed for the conversion of men; as, otherwise, his reasoning is wholly irrelevant. But what can be more groundless? Are not Christ's teachings exactly suited to the administration he has hitherto exercised? And did not his purpose, to exercise such a dispensation, require that his instructions should be adapted to it, although it was his design to institute a different one at a later period? Mr. B.'s argument implies that if Christ had contemplated the institution of a series of dispensations, he would never have given any instructions, nor appointed any means except such as were exclusively adapted to the last in the series. But what could be more unauthorized? The fact that Christ designed to establish another and far more efficient dispensation after this, is no reason that the instructions given, and appointments made, at the institution of this should not be suited to the peculiar administration that was to be exercised during its continuance; nor, on the other hand, is the fact that they are suited to this administration, under which he limits the gifts of knowledge and the Spirit's influences to small numbers and low degrees, any proof that he is not, at a future time, to employ new instrumentalities and bestow his Spirit in far higher measures. Mr. B., doubtless, does not regard the fact that the Mosaic dispensation was limited to the Israelites, as indicating that the gospel also is designed only for them; yet why, on the principle on which he argues, would not that follow as legitimately as the conclusion which he draws from the premises he here assumes?

The Scriptures, however, in place of authorizing the repre-

sentation that this is the last dispensation, and embodies all the means that are ever to be employed to accomplish the redemption of the race, expressly teach that God now aims only to save an election of Jews and Gentiles, not the whole body of the nations; that he limits the knowledge he imparts and the influences he employs to convict, renew, and sanctify men; that the gospel is proclaimed to the nations as a witness, not as a message that is to be made universally effective; that instead of carrying the sanctification of men to the utmost degree that is possible, he subjects them to trial, leaves them to struggle with temptation, and allows his enemies to pervert the truth and seduce the church to apostasy; and thus demonstrate, on a vast scale, the great facts of their character and condition, and his rights and purposes on which his government is founded, and thereby prepare the way at length for his direct and visible interposition, and institution of new and far more effective means for the salvation of the world. Is it not singular that all these great characteristics of his present dispensation, which indicate so clearly that it is but preliminary to another, should have escaped Mr. B.'s notice?

He next alleges Christ's ascension and reign in heaven, as yielding confirmation to his views:

"Following the historical chain, we next contemplate the present position of Christ, in which we find a very strong corroboration both of the unity of his design, and of the means of effecting it. During the last eighteen centuries, where has he been, how occupied, how known? . . . If he did one thing on earth, he made heaven a peculiar term here; if he left one impression on the minds of men which time has not effaced, it is that there is such a place apart from this world, and distinguished from all others, by the bright displays of God's perfections, and the rich manifestations of God's favor. With what frequency and familiarity he speaks of it, as the place to which himself was to remove in the human nature, and to which human nature, as redeemed and sanctified, is to be removed! Deeply did he imbue the minds of the apostles with this. The representation which does away with the idea of a locality, and resolves heaven into a state, never seems to have crossed the vision of any apostle. They appear, in their labors and in their letters, as men who are looking up steadfastly into heaven, and who see Jesus there already in possession of the inheritance, to which they are joint heirs. . . . Here, then, we stand: we have no gospel, or there is

a place denominated heaven, which is distinguished by the bodily presence of our Redeemer at this time."—Pp. 15, 16.

But what support do these considerations yield Mr. B.'s views? That heaven is a place, and that Christ literally reigns there in his human nature, is not at all in debate in this controversy. It is held as specifically by those whom Mr. B. opposes as it is by himself; and is not only perfectly consistent with their persuasion that he is hereafter to come literally and reign in this world, but is one of its essential elements. If he were not in a specific place, it would imply that his human nature was annihilated, and preclude the possibility of his reappearing and reigning, either here, or in heaven. But how does the fact that he now reigns in heaven prove that he is not hereafter to reign on the earth? Will Mr. B. be good enough to inform us? Does his now reigning in heaven any more prove that he is not hereafter to reign on earth, than the fact that he before had the glory with the Father which he now has, proves that he never came to the earth, and dwelt here in our nature? Does it prove that he is not to come here to reign, any more than it does that he is not to come to raise and judge the dead? Besides, whose method of interpretation is it, that "does away with the idea of a locality, and resolves heaven into a state?" Mr. B.'s, most indisputably; not theirs whom he opposes. The assumptions by which he converts Christ's reign on earth into a mere spiritual reign, and the first resurrection into a spiritual resurrection, and works a similar change in a large class of other events foretold by the prophets, will, with equal effect, convert heaven into a state, and divest Christ's reign there of its reality. Why does he not apply his principle to the whole of the passages that relate to Christ's agency in conducting the administration of his kingdom? Why does he assail those from whom he dissents, for construing the class which relates to Christ's reign on earth, by the same laws by which he interprets those which relate to his reign in heaven? He, however, regards the fact that Christ has "already been advanced to the highest honors of the universe," as indicating that he cannot design to quit his heavenly throne and descend to reign on earth.

"To the mind of Paul the Saviour had already been exalted even as he had arisen; and what conception of glory have we, beyond that which is conveyed in these words: 'God hath set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come, and hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all.' In the delineations of John, which introduce the agencies of a spiritual dispensation, and the succession of events in it, everywhere Jesus holds the pre-eminence; his sovereignty extends over earth and heaven; all creatures do his bidding, and exalt his name."—P. 18.

But how does it appear but that Christ's exercising precisely such an administration over the world as the present, is indispensable, in order to the ultimate redemption of the whole race? How does it appear but that his departure from the earth was indispensable, in order to the exercise of this administration? And how does it appear but that it was equally essential that he should, while exercising it, reign on the throne of heaven? Mr. B. plainly assumes, that he would never have been exalted to that universal dominion, had he designed, at a subsequent period, to descend and reign on the earth. He, however, alleges no proof of it, nor could he, had he attempted it. Instead, Christ's withdrawment from the earth, on the one hand, and exercise of the present dispensation, under which the great facts on which his whole work proceeds are verified; and, on the other, his exaltation to supreme power, are undoubtedly essential in order to the dispensation that is to follow, under which the race at large is to be saved. That there are adequate reasons for his present peculiar administration over our world, is seen from the fact that it is exercised. Were it not essential to his ultimate ends, it would be inexplicable that it is chosen. But the great characteristics of his present sway are, that men are put to a trial of their dispositions towards him. The means he employs to bring them to repentance and faith, are restricted within narrow limits. The unbelief, apostasy, and ruin of men, are immeasurably more common than their sanctification. The devil is allowed to exert on them his tempting powers. Most of them are left in great ignorance. To far the greatest

number the gospel is not made known. Multitudes who are made acquainted with it, are allowed to reject it. Vast crowds who profess to receive it, in fact never embrace its salvation. The church itself is left to apostatize. The civil rulers are permitted to usurp authority over his laws and his people, and substitute a false religion in place of his ; and his true worshippers and witnesses are persecuted and put to death. The effect of this dispensation thus is, that a vast exemplification is made of his rights, and man's alienation, and a demonstration that conversion and sanctification are the work of his Spirit, and salvation the gift of absolute grace. And this verification of these truths by such a dispensation, shows that it is essential to the great ends he is pursuing.

But in order to such a trial of the truths on which he is proceeding, it was doubtless indispensable that he should withdraw from the earth. Had he immediately established his throne here, it would have precluded such an experiment of the dispositions of men. It would then doubtless have been incompatible with his glory, to have allowed Satan such a sway ; to have suffered the church to apostatize, and in his very presence, offer to creatures and idols the homage due to him ; and to have left his faithful disciples to be trampled down and slaughtered for their allegiance. It would have led, perhaps, to a doubt of his power to maintain his cause : or been regarded as indicating a relinquishment of his rights, and acquiescence in the pretensions of his enemies.

His exaltation to the throne of the universe during this dispensation, is undoubtedly equally essential to his subsequent assumption of the dominion of the earth. A demonstration is made thereby of his deity, and the whole universe brought to an acknowledgment and homage of him as the incarnate Jehovah, which is doubtless indispensable both to his glory, and the wellbeing of his subjects. It were to forego his rights not to require them to worship him in the relations he actually sustains to them. It were to debar them from the knowledge of a most important measure of his government, to leave them unacquainted with his work as Redeemer. We are taught, accordingly, that the reason that " God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above

every name" is, "that at his name every knee should bow of those in heaven and on earth, and under the earth, and every tongue confess that he is Lord to the glory of God the Father." There is thereby a proof that he is adequate to the work he has undertaken, that he has the rights which he asserts; that his expiation is entitled to the influence which is assigned to it; and that the present triumph of his enemies is not owing to his want of power to repress them; and the fact that God secures these demonstrations on such a vast and impressive scale, indicates in the most emphatic manner, that they are essential conditions of a perfect administration.

As all the manifestations, then, that are thus made are of such moment to God and his kingdom, and as those of them of which this world is the scene, must most obviously be of the utmost necessity, if they are hereafter to be discontinued, it is apparent that they may be essential preliminaries to the institution of a new dispensation, under which all the race are to be saved. The demonstrations now made will secure the just understanding of the measures he is then to adopt. There will be no room left when he comes to execute vengeance on his enemies, to doubt that they are his foes; and that he has a right to punish them; nor when he redeems the whole race, that it is he that redeems them, and that he redeems them from alienation and ruin. His prerogatives, his power, his grace, will be understood and realized, and the glory given to him that is his due. His exaltation, thus, in place of yielding any support to the inference Mr. Beattie deduces from it, corroborates the views which he employs it to confute.

He alleges as a further proof, that Christ's reign here is to be merely spiritual; that the supposition that it is to be literal implies that he is to divest himself of his glory, and descend to a condition essentially like that of a mere human monarch. He says, in respect to Christ's reign in heaven:

"He is known as a priest discharging the last function of his office, and as a king exalted to the highest possible dignity and honor. Herein we have the complete expansion of that idea of royalty which has ever attached to the person of the Mediator. In the light of it we may estimate the worth of an opinion that prevailed generally before

the Spirit was poured out, and that has some currency to this day, to the effect, *that Christ is to number himself with our mortal monarchs, fix a material throne in our crazy and sickly world, outstrip the children of folly and pride in worldly show, and in his own regal state cause earthly grandeur to culminate.* Well enough this might be, were there nothing better; but the Scriptures use the splendor of our courts and potentates as an image to help our conceptions up to a higher, a celestial magnificence, which distinguishes an exalted Redeemer."—Pp. 16, 17.

"Whatever anticipations, then, some may indulge of earthly royalties, as yet to invest the Son of God, our confession with the church when apostles led its devotions rather is, 'We see Jesus crowned with glory and honor.' We see him on his throne, exercising his divine attributes, and managing the kingdoms of nature and of providence, and the dispensation of the gospel, so as to gather his redeemed to himself; and we feel that were he to leave his present position for the most splendid monarchy which earth's treasures and polish could furnish, it would be like descending from the throne to become the deputy of an obscure and distant province of some great empire."—Pp. 18, 19.

We regret that Mr. Beattie has thus ventured on statements that are not only injurious to those whose opinions he professes to express, but that are directly in contravention of the clear teachings of the Scriptures, and detract from the glory of Christ. Where does he find any authority for the representation that to hold that Christ is to reign in person on earth, is, "in effect," to hold, that he "is to number himself with our mortal monarchs," "*outstrip the children of folly and pride in worldly show, and in his regal state cause earthly grandeur to culminate?*" Are there any indications in the vision beheld by Daniel of his investiture with the dominion of the earth, by the Ancient of days, whose throne was like the fiery flame, and his wheels as burning fire; a fiery stream issuing from before him, thousands ministering unto him, and ten times ten thousand standing before him, that he "is to number himself among our mortal monarchs," "and outstrip the children of folly and pride in worldly show?" Are there any such indications in the visions of him beheld by Isaiah, seated on a throne high and lifted up, attended by seraphim celebrating his infinite sanctitude and glory? Or, in that beheld by Ezekiel, of his entrance into the temple, represent-

ative of that which is hereafter to be erected in Jerusalem, when his "glory" "filled the house," and he announced to the prophet with his own voice, his eternal residence there? "Son of man, the place of my throne, and the place of the soles of my feet, where I will dwell in the midst of the children of Israel for ever; and my holy name shall the house of Israel no more defile." Does he find anything to justify that assumption in Christ's own representation, that he is to come "in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory; and that all the tribes of the earth are to be filled with consternation at the sight;" and that when he judges the nations he is to sit upon the throne of his glory, attended by all the holy angels? Is there any ground for it in Paul's announcement that he is to be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not our Lord Jesus Christ; and glorified in his saints, and admired in all them that believe? Is there anything to justify it in John's vision of him as the King of kings, and Lord of lords, descending to destroy the usurpers of his power on earth; or as seated on the great white throne, and raising and judging the dead? Is there anything to sustain it in his vision of him as enthroned in the new Jerusalem, and lighting it with the effulgence of his glory? These are the representations he has himself given of the form in which he is to come, and the grandeur with which he is to be invested; and these are the conceptions which those entertain of his glory, who believe he is to reign on the earth. How is it, that with these impressive exhibitions before him, and forewarnings that Christ's presence is to penetrate his adorers with awe, and overwhelm his enemies with consternation, Mr. B. has ventured to represent that to appear visibly, and exercise his kingly power on earth, would be to divest himself of his glory, descend to the rank of a "mortal monarch," and "outstrip the children of folly and pride in worldly show?" We are surprised at the inconsideration it displays. We are astonished at its presumption and irreverence. Never was there a more causeless and unjustifiable detraction from the majesty of Christ. In all the revelations which he made of himself to the ancient prophets and the apostles after his ascension, and in all the delineations that

are given of his coming and reign on earth, he appears as the Deity, invested with dazzling grandeur, attended by the angelic hosts or the redeemed and glorified saints, impressing the spectators with the utmost awe or terror: and it is from these representations that we are to form our ideas of his appearance and reign.

And where, we ask also, does Mr. B. find authority for his representation, that to hold that he is literally to reign here is, "in effect," to hold that he is to fix his "throne in our crazy and sickly world?" Has he forgotten the announcement, that when he descends to dwell with men he shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying; neither shall there be any more pain, for the former things are to pass away, and all things be made new? The extraordinary errors into which Mr. B. has fallen in these representations indicate that he has taken but very inadequate care to make himself acquainted with what the Scriptures teach on the subject.

But whose views are they that in reality detract from the glory of Christ's reign? *Mr. B.'s*; not theirs whom he thus misrepresents. For if, first, as he asserts, "the Scriptures use the splendors of our courts and potentates as an image to help our conceptions up to a higher, a celestial magnificence, which distinguishes an exalted Redeemer;" if, next, as he represents, to ascribe to him a literal reign on earth is, "in effect," to exhibit him as fixing his "throne in a crazy, sickly world," "numbering himself with mortal monarchs," and "outstripping the children of folly and pride in worldly show;" and finally, if, as he asserts, the reign ascribed to him on earth is a spiritual one,—then its meaning is, that it is to be like that of a mortal monarch in a scene of distractions and miseries, and distinguished principally for a show, like that of the children of folly and pride! Such is the direct and inevitable issue of the several assumptions on which he here proceeds. He has told us not only that the language is used by a metaphor, and what the object of the figure is, but what its meaning must be if literally applied to Christ; and thence that its figurative import is, not that he is actually to reign, but only that he is indirectly to exert a sway that is like a reign; and that its resemblance is to be to that of mortal monarchs over dis-

tracted and sickly subjects, and marked by a show like theirs! Can a more unfortunate result be imagined for the cause he is attempting to maintain? Can any higher evidence be required, that he has written without due investigation, and is unaware of the real import of the principles on which he proceeds?

He next alleges, that it is expressly taught in Christ's parables that the present order of things is to continue to the end of the world. He says, in respect to his views of the dispensation of the Spirit:

"And this order is fixed. . . . The parable of the sower describes a process which is to be repeated *without ceasing* till the hairs of life are gathered unto Jesus. The parable of the net describes the gospel collecting the redeemed *out of all generations*. The representation made in the parable of the tares reaches on to the end of all things. . . . The marriage feast, he tells us, describes the kingdom of heaven; it covers the whole period of the dispensation of the Spirit, as the close of the parable puts beyond doubt. The parables of the ten virgins, and of the talents, and of the sheep and goats, disclose, in the most vivid colors, how mankind shall be found occupied until and when the Spirit shall have accomplished every object of his mission, and the august scene in which he labors ends."—Pp. 21, 22.

This is certainly a very confident expression of his convictions. The question, however, whether his views are just, is left wholly undecided. He offers no proof whatever of their truth. He takes it for granted that Christ's coming, of which several of these parables treat, is not to take place till what he regards as the end of the world, arrives. If the reader chooses without evidence to assent to that assumption, which involves the most important of the questions in debate, and to dismiss from consideration also the other numerous representations of the Scriptures that wholly confute it, he doubtless may acquiesce in Mr. B.'s asseverations, not otherwise. In the first place, they only exemplify the course which men are to pursue under the calls of the gospel, up to the period of Christ's advent. If his advent is to take place anterior to the millennium, and be followed by his reign on earth, and exercise of a different dispensation, there is

nothing in these parables inconsistent with it. In the next place, Mr. B.'s construction is shown to be erroneous by the consideration that it denies that there is to be a millennium, or period during which all nations are to obey Christ, and the earth be filled with righteousness. If "the parable of the sower describes a process which is to be repeated without ceasing, till the heirs of life be gathered unto Jesus," then there is to be no period during which the devil is not to tempt men as he now does, and a large part continue in unbelief and perish; for the wayside, from which the fowls devoured the seed, represents, we are told by the Redeemer, those hearers from whose heart "the devil taketh away the word, lest they should believe and be saved;" the rocky ground, those who believe but "for awhile, and in time of temptation fall away," and the thorny ground, those who are occupied by worldly care, and "bring no fruit to perfection." There is to be no thousand years then, according to Mr. B., during which the devil is to be imprisoned so that he shall not deceive the nations; nor any period during which Christ shall receive "dominion and glory, and a kingdom, that all people and nations and languages, should serve him." If "the parable of the net describes the gospel collecting the redeemed out of *all generations*," then, as there were bad fish caught with the good, so there are to be wicked men intermixed with the good of every generation; and, therefore, there not only is never to be a time when from one new moon to another, and from one sabbath to another, all flesh shall go to worship in the presence of Jehovah, Isaiah lxvi. 23; but none even in which all the Israelites are to know the Lord from the least to the greatest, and receive the forgiveness of their sins. Heb. viii. 10-12. Can any stronger proof be required of the error of Mr. B.'s views, than that they thus directly contradict these, and other passages which assure us that there is to be a period when all nations shall be converted, and the world filled with righteousness and peace? In the third place, as there is to be a time when "the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea," and "all peoples and nations and languages shall serve him;" it is apparent from these parables that Christ's advent is to precede that period, and that they do not, therefore, as Mr. B.

presumes, represent the course of events till the work of redemption is completed. As the parable of the tares and wheat indicates that the wicked are to continue to be intermingled with the righteous till the time denoted by the harvest, it shows that the period of their separation is to precede the millennium; inasmuch as then all nations are to be converted. And as the parable of the judgment exhibits those who are to stand at the tribunal as the nations, and men, therefore, in the natural body, and the sentence pronounced on them as founded on their conduct towards Christ's brethren in a season of want, suffering, and persecution; it shows that it is to precede the millennium, as there not only are no indications in the Scriptures that there is to be a persecution of his disciples during or after that period, but it is expressly foreshown that then nothing shall hurt or destroy in God's holy mountain, and that there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain, for the former things will have passed away and all things become new. These parables, therefore, do not cover the whole period during which the redemption of men is to be continued. They only extend to the time of Christ's coming; and show that that coming is to precede the conversion of the world.

Mr. B., however, holds that at the harvest and judgment, there is to be an absolute termination of the life of the race here, and an end of the world. He says:—

"The representation made in the parable of the tares, reaches on to the end of all things. . . . The parables of the ten virgins, and of the talents, and of the sheep and goats, disclose in most vivid colors, how mankind shall be found occupied until and when the Spirit shall have accomplished every object of his mission, and the august scene in which he labors, ends." . . . —Pp. 21, 22.

"Another matter here meets us. Is the form of this kingdom ever to be changed? This is equivalent to asking whether the redeemed form an infinite series, or a series that is running to an end. If it has, therefore, what is the method of grace to be exchanged? Happily we have no need of conjecture on this point. Christ has spoken, and in no ambiguous terms. That the present dispensation is to end, how it is to end, and where . . . and in what it is to end, he has determined for us. Often did he refer to his second coming. God, said Paul, now commandeth all men everywhere to repent, because he hath appointed

a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness, by that man whom he hath ordained. Did Jesus ever utter anything on this topic that does not coincide entirely with this simple view? . . . His coming is for judgment. It brings to a solemn and final pause the business of man. It takes place when the acts which form the ground of judgment have all been performed, that is, when the last generation has passed through its day. The *race* of men are gathered before the Saviour; the sheep and goats comprise *all mankind*; without exception all are there. The whole number of the saved, and the whole number of the lost, in two vast assemblies, meet our eyes. The only matter in hand after his appearing is judgment, and this ends in the retribution of eternity. . . . The fact that there must be a point when the generations of men shall end, when, consequently, the dispensation of the gospel shall cease, beyond which time reaches not, but eternity takes the *race* of men within its great cycle, leaves not the shadow of doubt to our minds upon the sense of this passage."—Pp. 23–25.

This, however, is not only without authority, but against the plain teachings of the Scriptures.

1. There is nothing in these passages to justify it. Thus, in the parable of the tares, Matth. xii. 24–30, 36–43, it is not at the end of the world, but of the age, that the gathering of the wicked out of the kingdom is to take place. There is a clear distinction made by Christ in his explanation, between the world and the age. He represents the field as standing for *ὁ κόσμος*, the world, the earth; but the harvest as denoting *συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος*, the end of the age. To make the world and the age synonymous, is to misrepresent the parable, and convert it into a solecism. Mr. B. might as well treat the sowing and harvest as the same, or confound the wheat with the tares. What then is the age, at the termination of which the separation of the children of the wicked from the children of the kingdom, is to take place? It is the period, we are shown in other passages, that is to intervene between Christ's commission of his apostles to preach the gospel, and his second advent, as it is when he is seen coming in the clouds of heaven, that the angels are to gather together his elect. Matth. xxv. 30, 31. There is no intimation, therefore, whatever, in the parable, that the world is then to be destroyed, time come to an end, or men cease to reside on the earth, any more than in any other passage of the gospels. Instead, indeed, there is

a clear intimation that the earth is still to be the scene of Christ's kingdom, and the residence of the glorified saints; and, therefore, the abode also of the saints and nations that are unglorified. The Saviour distinguishes this as a specific age; for he says, As therefore the tares are gathered and burned with fire, so shall it be, *ἐν τῇ συντάξει τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*; at the close of *this* age. This is not the language that would have been used were it the only age. It implies that it is to be followed by another; and that another age of the kingdom is to follow, is, accordingly, directly shown in the announcement that "*then* shall the righteous shine forth in the kingdom of their Father;" and that that kingdom is still to be in this world, is seen from the consideration that the gathering denoted by the harvest of the tares that is then to take place, is to be a gathering *ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ*, out of Christ's kingdom, of all things that offend, and them that do iniquity. The kingdom itself is to remain, and to be the scene in which the saints are to shine as the sun. There not only is no intimation that they are to be transferred to another world, but Christ's language precludes such a construction. In like manner, in the parable of the judgment, it is *the nations* only, not the dead as well as the living, that are to be separated into two classes, and the righteous are then to *inherit the kingdom* prepared for them from the foundation of the world. What kingdom then is that? That with which Christ is to be invested at his second coming when he is to receive "dominion and glory and a kingdom that *all nations, peoples, and languages should serve him*, whose dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed." Daniel vii. 13-28. That it is that, is indubitable from the fact that he has but one kingdom; that the dominion he is to exercise in that kingdom is to be a dominion over the nations; that it is that kingdom which the saints are then to receive and possess, for we are expressly told that "the kingdom, and the dominion and the greatness of the kingdom," that is then to be given to the saints of the Most High is to be "*under the whole heaven*," and, finally, that that kingdom is to endure for ever. His dominion is to be an everlasting dominion, and the saints are to possess the kingdom they are to receive for ever and ever.

It is on an everlasting life in that kingdom, accordingly, that the righteous of the nations are to enter at the judgment; and they are to enter it, doubtless, by the change from mortal to immortal, and from corruptible to incorruptible, which is to be wrought in the living saints at Christ's coming; which is to occasion the saying, "Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting! O grave, where is thy victory!" and the effect of which is described in the Apocalypse, as exemption from death, sorrow, want, toil, pain, and the curse in all its forms brought on the race by the fall. The parable, therefore, instead of showing that, at the epoch of the judgment which it exemplifies, "the generations of men shall end," "the dispensation of the gospel cease," "and time reach its close," indicates that the generations of men are to continue on the earth for ever, and time here be commensurate with eternity.

2. Mr. Beattie's assumption is seen to be erroneous, also, from the fact that it implies that the domination of the power denoted by the wild beast is to continue to the end of the world; and that there is never to be a period, during which the religion of Christ will generally prevail. The sway of the civil rulers and apostate ecclesiastics, denoted by the wild beast and false prophet, are most certainly to continue till Christ's second coming. It is expressly taught in several forms. Thus we are assured that the little horn of the fourth beast "*made war with the saints and prevailed against them,* UNTIL THE ANCIENT OF DAYS CAME, AND JUDGMENT WAS GIVEN TO THE SAINTS OF THE MOST HIGH, AND THE TIME CAME THAT THE SAINTS POSSESSED THE KINGDOM." The time, also, when the ancient of days is to come, is the time when Christ is to be invested with the dominion of the earth, that all people, and nations, and languages should serve him; and finally, that it is at the time when the dominion of the horn shall be taken away, and the horn itself destroyed, that the kingdom under the whole heaven shall be given to the saints of the Most High, Dan. vii. 13-27. The powers symbolized by the fourth beast, therefore, are to continue, and continue to persecute the saints until Christ's second advent, when he is in person to take possession of the earth as his empire. It is expressly foretold also by Paul, that the man of sin who represents the

same order of usurping ecclesiastics, as the eleventh horn of the fourth beast, is to be destroyed by Christ at his appearing, 2 Thess. ii. 8. And finally, it is clearly foreshown in the Apocalypse, that the wild beast, false prophet, and the kings and armies leagued with them in war on Christ, are to be taken and destroyed at the period of his descent from heaven with the risen saints to smite the nations, and "tread the wine press of the fierceness of the wrath of Almighty God," chap. xix. 11-21. As, then, the wild beast and false prophet are indubitably to continue, and maintain their war on the saints till Christ's second coming, if the generations of men are at that coming to end, the dispensation of the gospel cease, and time itself expire; then, plainly, there is not to be a millenium, nor any period of universal righteousness and peace; for the thousand years during which the saints are to reign, and the kingdom which the saints of the Most High are to possess, are to follow the destruction of the fourth beast and false prophet, not to be contemporaneous with them. A reign of a thousand years cannot possibly be comprised within a domination of but twelve hundred and sixty days. A domination of but twelve hundred and sixty days cannot possibly be conterminous with a dominion that is never to end. We are moreover directly shown, that it is Christ's kingdom, symbolized by the stone which smote the image, that is to break in pieces the dynasties denoted by the image and the four great beasts, and is to stand for ever; and that it is after the rulers, denoted by the fourth beast, have run their career and are destroyed, that the saints of the Most High are to take the kingdom under the whole heaven, and possess it for ever. Can Mr. Beattie ask a more ample demonstration of the error of his views? It is confuted, also, by the representation in the Apocalypse, that during the thousand years of the saints' reign with Christ satan is to be imprisoned, so that he shall not deceive the nations. The reign of the man of sin, therefore, cannot fall within that period, or terminate with it; as it is the great characteristic of his career, that it is "after the working of satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness," 2 Thess. ii. 9, 10. It must precede the binding of satan and reign of the saints, not coincide

with them. This might be confirmed by other considerations, but these sufficiently show that Mr. B. is under a total mistake, in the representation that the millennium is to precede Christ's advent, and that the generations of men are then to end, and the dispensation of the gospel cease.

He is in a like error, also, in assuming that there is to be but one judgment. That the judgment of the living, exemplified in the parable of the separation of the righteous and the wicked, is to take place at Christ's coming, and therefore to precede the millennium, we have already shown; and that there is to be another judgment after the thousand years, is revealed in the Apocalypse, in the vision of the judge on the white throne, and the resurrection and trial before him of the dead, Rev. xx.

He alleges, finally, in confirmation of his views, that there is to be but one resurrection, and that that is to take place at the end of the world, and is to be with the judgment of the dead, the last great act of Christ's mediatorial reign.

"At the coming of Christ the resurrection takes place. That is the end; every object of his mediatorial trust is accomplished. . . . It is the literal resurrection of mankind. It occurs at the coming of Christ, and at the end of the mediatorial reign."—P. 27.

Instead of this, it is clearly foreshown that there are to be two resurrections. "For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive; but every one in his own band, the first, Christ; then they that are Christ's at his coming; afterward, τὸ ἔσχατον, the last band;"—a common sense of the term, when applied to an army, and shown to be its meaning here, by the distribution of those who are to be raised, into their several bands: The resurrection of the last band is to take place, therefore, at a different epoch from theirs who are Christ's; and the period that is to separate them, we learn from the Apocalypse, is the thousand years of the reign of the saints; for the resurrection of those who are Christ's, we are here shown, is to take place at his coming; and that coming is, as we have already proved, to precede the thousand years. It is expressly foreshown, also, Rev. xx. 4–15, that the first resurrection is to be a resurrection of saints, and is to precede

the thousand years ; and that the rest of the dead are not to be raised until the thousand years have passed ; and the second resurrection is, accordingly, symbolized, and the judgment which is to follow it, as taking place after the thousand years have expired. There is no more specific and indisputable revelation, therefore, than that there are to be two resurrections, the one before, the other after the millennium. Any process that sets aside this revelation, will, with equal effect, erase from the sacred volume all predictions that there is to be any resurrection whatever.

Mr. B., however, endeavors to divest them of this meaning, by assuming that they are merely metaphorical.

“The passage in the book of Revelation, whence we derive the term millennium, resolves itself by its connexion. There is a parallelism between the two parts of the description, chap. xx. 1-6 ; that which relates to Satan, and that which relates to the saints. The second result grows out of the first : Satan is bound ; hence saints reign. As there is a parallelism in the facts, so there is, *as is presumable*, in the manner of describing them. The first is presented through one of the boldest metaphors to be found in human speech. May not the second, to preserve the correspondence, be presented by a metaphor equally bold ? We affirm that no such act shall ever be done, as that an angel shall come down from heaven, having a chain, and bind it around Satan, and hold him fast one thousand years. Why may we not say, no such thing shall ever occur, as that thrones shall ever be raised on the earth, to accommodate the souls of one order of martyrs for one thousand years ? If the first is the announcement of a spiritual fact, why shall we not so receive the second ? The necessity seems as strong for assigning this sense in the last instance as in the first.”—P. 42.

Such is the extraordinary process by which he attempts to controvert the unequivocal teachings of the passage ;—the denial of its clearest characteristics ; the assertion that it is metaphorical, instead of symbolic ; and the assumption, without any attempt at proof, of all the positions which he should demonstrate. All his affirmations, that, if admitted, could contribute to his end, are mistaken.

1. There is no such parallelism as he alleges, between “that which relates to satan, and that which relates to the saints.” Instead of parallels, they are opposites. Satan is precluded

from the exertion of his power; the saints are invested with authority. He is banished from the earth and imprisoned; they return to the earth and reign!

2. He is equally in error in representing that that which is foreshown of the saints, "grows out of that which is foreshown of satan." "Satan is bound; hence, saints reign." The only consequence that is indicated of satan's imprisonment, is that the nations are not deceived any more by him till the thousand years are passed; and it is expressly affirmed that it is in order to that, that he is to be bound and shut within the abyss. The reigning of the saints, moreover, is not the effect, or consequence of his incarceration. His imprisonment has no connexion with their reign, either as cause or condition. They are to reign, because they are raised from death, and invested with authority as kings and priests. "They sat on thrones, and judgment was given to them; and they shall be priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand years." That, resurrection, investiture, and reign, are not in any sense to result from satan's being divested of his power over men. They are not previously prevented by him. There can be no greater mistake, than to ascribe to him such an agency. It is not he who has the keys of the grave and of death, and opens and no man shuts, and shuts and no man opens, but Christ.

3. But he betrays his entire misconception of the passage by representing it as metaphorical, instead of symbolic. The binding of satan, he says, "is presented through one of the boldest metaphors to be found in human speech," and he asks, "May not the second," the resurrection, "to preserve the correspondence, be presented by a metaphor equally bold?" But the spectacle described in the passage was actually beheld by the prophet, and the agents, objects, acts, and events, which he saw, were symbols, and representative of agents, objects, acts, and events, that are future. They are described, accordingly, in literal language. He says he "saw an angel come down from heaven, having the key of the bottomless pit, and a great chain in his hand; and he laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the devil, and satan, and bound him a thousand years, and cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up and set a seal upon him, that he should

deceive the nations no more, till the thousand years should be fulfilled." It was, thus, a literal binding of satan with a chain, and imprisonment in an abyss, which the apostle beheld, not a spectacle of a different kind. If the passage had been metaphorical, the metaphor would have been in the verb *saw*, not in the words bind, cast into a pit, shut up, and set a seal. As the vision then is symbolic, what is it that it foreshows? The banishment of satan to the abyss, and preclusion from seducing the nations during the period denoted by the thousand years. This is specifically taught in the statement that the design of his binding is, that he should deceive the nations no more till that period shall have passed. The mode of his restraint and the place of his incarceration, are not to be the same as those which were beheld by the apostle; but of analogous species. His expulsion, however, from the earth, and confinement in the abyss, are to be real, and in such a form as to secure the end for which they are employed. Mr. Beattie's affirmation, accordingly, "that no such act shall ever be done, as that an angel shall come down from heaven, having a chain, and bind it around satan, and hold him fast one thousand years," is wholly irrelevant to the question at issue. Though an act of that identical species may not be exerted, the analogous act is to be which it is employed to foreshow; as otherwise, the vision will not be verified. Mr. B. may, with equal confidence and safety, affirm that no dragon of seven heads ever struck down one third of the stars to the earth, or stood on the moon before a woman clothed with the sun, and having on her head a crown of twelve stars; but that does not prove that the agents of a different kind, which that dragon symbolized, have not come into existence, and exerted the acts which his were employed to foreshow. He may aver that no wild beast of seven heads and ten horns has ever made war on the saints, or will hereafter be taken alive by the Word of God, and cast into a lake of fire and brimstone; but that is no evidence that the civil rulers whom that monster represents, have not persecuted the saints, and are not to be destroyed in an analogous manner, at Christ's second coming. Mr. B. has overlooked the fact that the spectacle was symbolic, and fallen into the error of supposing that the language, instead of describing the symbols, is directly descriptive of

that which they foreshow ; and thence, as that is not literally to come to pass, that it is metaphorical. Could he have given higher evidence that he has not taken care to acquaint himself with the subject he is attempting to discuss ?

In like manner, the thrones, they who sat on them, their living, their receiving judicial authority, and their reigning, were actually beheld by the apostle, and were symbolic, and the description of the vision is the description of them as symbols ; not of that which they represent. That which they foreshow is announced in the explanation that is given, and is expressly declared to be the first resurrection, and shown to be a literal resurrection by the statement that they lived, in distinction from being dead ; that the rest of the dead lived not till after the thousand years had passed ; and the fact, that the life on which the rest of the dead entered after the close of the thousand years, was a life by a resurrection from the grave. Mr. B.'s attempt to erase from this passage the revelation which it presents of a first and second resurrection, is thus founded on a total misconception of the media through which the prediction is made, and the laws by which it is to be explained. Had he recollected that it is symbolical, and been aware of the principles on which symbols are used, he would have seen that the method by which he attempts to determine its meaning is wholly unauthorized, and leads of necessity to the grossest error.

But, Mr. B.'s assumption that the passage is metaphorical, is not only unauthorized ; if it were even admitted, it would not yield the result he deduces from it. It is the law of the metaphor that the agent or object to which the word used by the figure is applied, is the agent or subject of that which the figurative word denotes. In the expression, for example, the ship *flies*, the ship is the subject of that which is affirmed by the metaphor, as exclusively as though the expression were literal—the ship sails. As, therefore, it is of satan that the binding and imprisonment are affirmed, it is he, also, if they are figurative, that is to be the subject of that which they denote ; and as it is of the souls of martyrs and others that the sitting on thrones, receiving judgment, living and reigning with Christ a thousand years are affirmed ; so those souls are to be the subjects also of that which their living,

sitting on thrones, and reigning with Christ signify ; not a different body of saints. On Mr. B.'s own assumption, therefore, that the prediction is metaphorical, his construction is wholly false ; as he employs it to show that the saints who are to reign, are not the saints of the vision who had passed from their life in the body, but saints in the natural body who are to live on the earth at the time which the vision respects. No more perfect confutation of his construction can be asked than is furnished by this consideration.

After thus presenting his views on these several subjects, he proceeds to consider the difficulties with which they are embarrassed, by their inconsistency with the representations of the reign of the Messiah by the ancient prophets ; and the expedient which he employs, is the assumption that the New Testament presents a complete exposition of all their predictions.

" Ere dropping the subject, let us glance at the difficulties, real or imaginary, which attend the view now presented. We have gone upon the supposition that the New Testament, as a second part of divine revelation—yet comprising the same subjects—is an advance upon the Old ; that it gives us the true development of the great idea of grace and glory, which the Old Testament prophets struggled to utter. If we are wrong in this, our interpretation is valueless ; if we are right, then where is the difficulty arising from the intimations made by the ancient prophets of the gospel day ? If they have been interpreted for us, translated into our familiar language, what have we to do but accept the interpretation ? As regards the substance of the gospel, it is not to be denied that the New Testament is properly the exposition of the shadows of the ceremonial law. Well, now, it is just as certain that Christ and his disciples—John with great minuteness—give us the history of the gospel age to its close, and, briefly, but plainly, of what follows. They meant to cover the whole ground which the elder prophets had gone over before them. How, then, shall we deny to their exposition of the prophetic visions of the elder economy, a similar authority to that which we attribute to the outspoken gospel as the interpretation of the ancient law ?"—Pp. 32, 33.

To determine questions thus, by assuming the ground on which the conclusion is founded, is certainly a summary method of clearing up difficulties. There is no inconsistency

that cannot be removed by it ; there is no error which it will not vindicate. Mr. B. here takes for granted the very point in debate,—that his interpretation of the New Testament, which we have shown to be wholly unauthorized, and in contravention of its clear and irrefutable teachings, is correct. His argument, translated into familiar language, is simply this : “ We know what it is which the New Testament teaches. The constructions we place on its parables, its predictions, made through language, and its revelations through symbols, are demonstrably just. But the New Testament is an exposition of the prophetic visions of the older economy. Therefore, there is nothing in the Old Testament that is inconsistent with our interpretation of the New.” But we have shown that his constructions of the New Testament are not only unproved, but are wholly unauthorized, and in direct contravention of its plainest and most irrefragable teachings. His attempted reconciliation of his views with the prophecies of the Old Testament, is, accordingly, no reconciliation whatever. This sweeping method of determining by “ a foregone conclusion,” what it is that God has revealed, is as unauthorized and as unsafe in all instances, as in this. The import of his several revelations is to be determined by the media through which they are made, as interpreted by their proper laws. What can surpass the error and presumption of setting the instruments, whether language or symbols, through which God has communicated them, wholly aside, and deciding their meaning on extraneous grounds—a mere fancy, a presumption or theory formed of the divine purposes from a superficial view of a few passages ? Yet that is the mode which Mr. B. pursues, not only in this instance, but throughout his whole discourse.

After thus attempting to reconcile the Old Testament with his views, he concludes his discourse by endeavoring to show that “ the New Testament furnishes no valid argument against them.” He alleges nothing, however, that requires notice, except in respect to the vision of the first resurrection, Rev. xx. 4, 6 ; his misconception of which, we have already pointed out.

It has now become amply apparent, we trust, that he has not accomplished the object at which he aims. He has neither

disproved the views which he rejects, nor verified those which he entertains; nor were they practicable by the method he has pursued. He has mistaken the nature of the task he has undertaken, and the mode in which, if successful, he must have accomplished it. The great views which he endeavors to set aside, are not mere inferences, assumptions, or conjectures from the sacred word, but its direct teachings. If, then, he would refute them, he must demonstrate that the real meaning of the passages in which they are taught, is not that which they naturally express, but such as he ascribes to them. He must state, therefore, the laws of language and symbols by which he deduces from them that meaning, prove that they are legitimate and authoritative, and show that they lead to the results which he derives from them. That is the only expedient by which he can invalidate the direct testimony of the Scriptures which he attempts to countervail. On achieving that, however, he will have but half accomplished the verification of his views. In addition to showing that there is nothing in the sacred volume against them, he must also prove by direct and specific testimony, that they make the revelations which he ascribes to them. Unless he achieves this, also, he fails of his object. He, however, has done nothing whatever in either of these directions. He has not offered any laws of language or symbols by which the passages presenting the revelations he rejects are divested of their natural meaning, and shown to have a significance that accords with his views. He has not entered into any inquiry respecting the principles by which they are to be interpreted. He has only stated his opinion of their import, without any explanation of the grounds on which he founds it. He has left the question, therefore, whether the passages which he alleges have the meaning he ascribes to them, as completely unsettled as it was before he wrote his discourse. Nor has he, on the other hand, produced any passages in which there is a direct and affirmative revelation of the antagonistic views which he advances. He has not produced any direct authority for his theory, that the present, instead of being the Christian dispensation, is the dispensation of the Spirit. He has not quoted any specific testimony that the present dispensation is to continue to the end of time. He has not

alleged any passage that specifically teaches that Christ's advent is not to take place till after the millennium. He has not pointed out any positive announcement that there is to be but one resurrection, and one judgment. He has not offered any direct proof that Christ is not to reign in person on the earth, nor that his reign is to be merely figurative, or spiritual. He has not presented any positive affirmation that the generations of men are to end at his coming, the dispensation of the gospel close, and his mediatorial reign itself terminate. Not one of these representations is sanctioned by any other authority than his mere judgment or asseveration. The question whether they are vindicable or not, is left by him as entirely undetermined as it was before his discourse was written.

We invoke the attention of our readers to the contrast which these two methods of procedure present to each other. Mr. Beattie's method is that of mere preconception, assumption, or theory. He makes no reference to the laws of language, or the principles on which symbols are employed. The other, rejecting preconceptions, conjecture, and theory, looks exclusively to the media through which God has made his revelations, and the principles on which those instruments are employed, and receives that as the truth communicated by him, which they express. The one, in fact, makes man the revealer; the other, God, and man but the learner and recipient of his purposes. The one is the method by which all the great errors that prevail in the church are taught, and if legitimate may be used to overturn every truth of the gospel. The other is the method by which all the truths presented in the Scriptures are derived from them, and the only method by which any of their doctrines can be maintained.

If the questions, then, which Mr. B. discusses, are to be satisfactorily determined, they must be treated in a manner wholly different from that which he has pursued. They turn wholly on the nature of the instruments which God has employed to make known his purposes: the principles on which they are used, and the laws by which their meaning is to be deduced. Until this is ascertained, no progress can be made towards a demonstration of the truth. We hope Mr. Beattie's

discourse may contribute to produce a deeper feeling, at least, of this fact. Should it directly, and by the discussions it occasions, awaken in the large body before whom it was delivered, and others who may read it, a just realization that, preliminary to all others, an inquiry is to be instituted into the legitimate laws of interpretation; that the issue depends wholly on them; that they are but imperfectly understood, and need a thorough investigation; its delivery and publication, defective as its views are, will not have been in vain.

ART. VII.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. MEMOIR OF THE REV. WALTER M. LOWRIE, Missionary to China, Edited by his Father. New York: R. Carter and Brothers. Philadelphia: William S. Martien. 1849.

THE Letters and Journals with which this volume, with the exception of a few pages, is occupied, present so full a delineation of Mr. Lowrie's life, and are stamped so strongly with his characteristics, as to render any other memoir unnecessary. The freedom and ingenuousness of thought with which they are written, the freshness and sincerity of feeling, the mature judgment and modesty with which they are marked, and the experimental knowledge they indicate of the great truths of redemption, sense of God's dominion, submission to his sovereignty, trust in his faithfulness, and joy in his service, leave the reader in no doubt what the genuine features were of his intellect and heart, and make a deeper impression of his character and qualifications for usefulness than could be produced by a labored and eloquent eulogy. Of the many excellent men who have gone on missions, there is no one, perhaps, whose talents, education, spirit, views of the nature of the work, and devotedness, more happily fitted him either for success abroad, or a salutary influence on the churches at home.

How forcibly are the obstructions with which he met, and the sudden and violent termination of his labors and life, adapted to bring home to those who consider the ways of God, the realization that his thoughts are not as ours? From the sanguine expectations that some have indulged, it seems to have been supposed that God is to make the gospel efficacious, when proclaimed to the heathen, in a far higher measure than when addressed to those already christianized; that it is to become the instrument of an immediate overthrow of idolatry, conquest of ignorance and prejudice, and elevation of the wretched and debased to the dignity of rectitude and wisdom. No mistake could be

greater or more unwarrantable. The proclamation of the gospel is to be attended there as well as here, by many other events and effects besides the conversion of those who hear it. Other ends are there contemplated and secured by the divine administration, as well as here. God there conducts his providence, as he does here, in such a manner as to put those whom it affects to trial, and give all the great facts and truths of his rights and work, and man's character and wants, a conspicuous exemplification. The heathen are left to show precisely what they are; God manifests his power, grace, and faithfulness, on the one hand, and his sovereignty and justice on the other; his servants are put to a test, and made to show their self-denial, subjection, humbleness, faith, and devotedness; and the churches at home excited to sympathy with them, taught the true nature of the work, and led to relinquish their self-reliance and trust in means, and put their hope alone in God. The great truths of man's character and condition, and God's rights and agency are thus verified, and the way prepared for the just understanding of his work when he comes to take possession of the earth, and bring the nations at once to submission to his sceptre. The influence on Mr. Lowrie of the hindrances and discouragements with which he met, was most obviously salutary, impressed him with a resistless sense of the total inadequacy of mere means to convert men, led him to see that it is God's work, and prepared him to welcome Christ's purpose to come, and by his presence annihilate the blindness and unbelief of the nations. He, and several of his associates, received it as the doctrine of the Scriptures, that the Redeemer's advent is to precede the conversion of the nations, and found it, instead of a check to their zeal, a source of most effective support and encouragement in their labors.

The volume presents very pleasing descriptions of the scenery around Macao, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai, and much information respecting the arts, manners, and religion of the Chinese. The letters of condolence with which it closes, addressed to the family on the news of his death, present a beautiful expression of Christian sympathy.

2. *AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE BIBLE.* By Rev. Lyman Coleman, Illustrated by Maps, from the latest and most authentic sources, of various countries mentioned in the Scriptures. New Edition, with additions. Philadelphia: E. H. Butler & Co. 1850.

THIS volume supplies a want that has been greatly felt by students and attentive readers of the Bible. The information given of the geography of Palestine and the adjacent regions, in most histories and commentaries, is extremely meagre. Within a few years, however, those countries have been visited by a great number of travellers, the principal

places minutely examined, accurate views obtained of cities, mountains, battle-fields, seas, lakes, and streams, and elegant delineations drawn of innumerable objects of beauty and interest. Of the materials thus accumulated for the determination of geographical questions, Dr. Coleman has skilfully availed himself, and produced a volume in which all the important information, hitherto gained, of the places mentioned in the Bible is embodied. The plan of the work fits it both for the general reader and the student of the Scriptures. In place of arranging the names alphabetically, they are treated in the order in which they occur on the sacred page; and with the description of each, a narrative or notice is given of the chief events of which it has been the scene. A connected view is thus presented of the principal occurrences from the creation to the close of the New Testament history, in connexion with the geography of the sites or regions in which they took place. The description and narrative are followed by a chronological table, embracing all the important dates and events: maps of the ancient world, the route of the Israelites from Egypt, Palestine, and Asia Minor, indexes of passages and subjects, and a key to the maps. The work is written in good taste, the sentiments are appropriate, the attention bestowed on the several topics proportioned to their importance, and the description of many places of interest, enlivened by brilliant passages from recent travellers. It is thus admirably suited to the author's design,—presenting, in a small compass, a vast body of useful information, and in so attractive a form as to make the study of it, especially to the young, for whom it is principally intended, a pleasure instead of a task. It will obtain, we trust, as it merits, a general circulation. It should not only be possessed by clergymen and theological students, and introduced into academies, schools, and Bible classes, but have a place in every family library.

3. *THE ENGLISH PULPIT.* Collection of Sermons by the most eminent living Divines of England. New York: R. Carter and Brothers. 1849.

THIS volume may be regarded as a favorable specimen of the style of preaching at the present period in the evangelical denominations in England. Of the thirty-two sermons which it contains, a large part are by persons who are extensively known. Dr. Bloomfield and H. Melvill, of the Episcopal Church; Jay, James, and Raffles, of the Congregational; Bunting and Newton, of the Methodist; Cumming, of the Presbyterian; and B. W. Noel, now of the Baptist. They treat of important topics, and are, as a body, plain, scriptural, and earnest; while several of them are of a superior order.

Other notices are postponed to the next number.

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